

# THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

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## THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

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## CONTENTS

Houses in the <i>Odyssey</i>	DOROTHEA GRAY	I
Aeschylus, <i>Agamemnon</i> 160-83	A. J. BEATTIE	13
Some Problems in Anaximander	G. S. KIRK	21
The Manuscripts of Aristophanes <i>Knights</i> (II)	D. MERVYN JONES	39
<i>Xórov</i> in the <i>Plutus</i> : A Reply to Mr. Handley	W. BEARE	49
Thucydides and the Pentekontaetia	H. D. WESTLAKE	53
Three Conjectures in Euripides, <i>Helena</i>	G. ZUNTZ	68
The Origin of the Use of <i>ἀν</i> and <i>κε</i> in Indefinite Clauses	R. H. HOWORTH	72
The Costume of the Actors in Aristophanic Comedy	T. B. L. WEBSTER	94
Plutarch and Alexander	A. E. WARDMAN	96
The Text of Aristotle's <i>Topics</i> and <i>Elenchi</i> : The Latin Tradition	L. MINIO-PALUELLO	108
A Note on the Metrical Scholia to the <i>Agamemnon</i>	RAPHAEL SEALEY	119
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# CONTENTS

## NUMBERS 1, 2

Houses in the <i>Odyssey</i> . i. Up and Down	DOROTHEA GRAY	I
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Tacitus and the Death of Augustus	R. H. MARTIN	123

## NUMBERS 3, 4

Husked and 'Naked' Grain	L. A. MORITZ	129
'Corn'	L. A. MORITZ	135
The Poet's Defence (1)	NIALL RUDD	142
The Poet's Defence (2)	NIALL RUDD	149
The Classification of Greek Lyric Poetry	A. E. HARVEY	157
A Note on the Berlin Papyrus of Corinna	A. E. HARVEY	176
The Relation of Stoic Intermediates to the <i>Summum Bonum</i> , with Reference to Change in the Stoa	I. G. KIDD	181
The So-Called Tzetzes Scholia on Philostratus and Andreas Darmarios	R. BROWNING	195
Notes on Plutarch's Life of Marius	T. F. CARNEY	201
The Prosody of Greek Proper Names in -A in Plautus and Terence	R. H. MARTIN	206
The <i>Asotodidaskalos</i> Attributed to Alexis	W. G. ARNOTT	210
Three Passages in Arrian	J. R. HAMILTON	217
Plato's Use of Extended <i>Oratio Obliqua</i>	D. TARRANT	222
Threshing-Floor or Vineyard	A. D. URE	225
<i>The Greater Alcibiades</i>	P. M. CLARK	231
M. Calidius and the Atticists	A. E. DOUGLAS	241
The <i>KAIMATA</i> in Greek Geography	D. R. DICKS	248

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<sup>3</sup> 'Notes  
lxxi (1951),



## HOUSES IN THE *ODYSSEY*

### i. UP AND DOWN

THREE contributions have been made recently to the understanding of the house of Odysseus. In 1949 Professor L. R. Palmer<sup>1</sup> revived the theory that a door at the back of the megaron led into the women's quarters, a two-storied building with storerooms on the ground floor and stairs leading up to Penelope's rooms. 'If only we resist the temptation to use Mycenaean palaces as the *mise-en-scène* for Homer's story' (p. 111), we recognize a house type which was widely diffused over the Indo-European world from Neolithic to medieval times. Since the argument is that the narrative and language of Homer are themselves evidence for the existence of this type of house at a relevant time and in a relevant area (presumably on the almost unexplored west coast of Asia Minor in the Early Iron Age), the author is justified in disregarding the dates of his parallels. Doubts arise, however, when the result is found to be that the simple plan of main room with porch in front and inner room behind, still retaining traces of its development from a pit dwelling, is chiefly illustrated from the Neolithic or Early Bronze Age, that all the detail is illustrated from Germanic and Scandinavian sagas and the archaeological evidence appropriate to them, and that there are practically no references either to the period when the events are supposed to take place or to the centuries within which the poems must have been composed. In 1950 Miss H. L. Lorimer,<sup>2</sup> after reviewing the evidence for these two periods (the extreme limits are *c.* 1400-600 B.C.), reached the conclusion that Homeric houses on the whole 'agree in their general structure with such a relatively simple Bronze Age type as that of the Little Megaron at Tiryns, but presuppose its survival into the succeeding age and its transplantation to Ionia' (p. 430). In 1951 Professor A. J. B. Wace<sup>3</sup> discussed some special features of the Homeric house in the light of the House of the Columns which he himself excavated at Mycenae.<sup>4</sup> This finely built private house resembles the palaces in general plan but differs in having a side entrance on to a passage which leads to rooms and a stairway. It is clear from the plans of ground floor and basement<sup>5</sup> that it would be easier to act the story of the *Odyssey* in it than in any other building known.

Since the House of the Columns is well provided with stairs and basements, Professor Wace can give ἀναβαίνω and καταβαίνω their literal meaning. Both Professor Palmer and Miss Lorimer refer with approval to Sir John Myres's suggestion that within a house ἀνά and κατά mean *out* and *in*,<sup>6</sup> the former,

<sup>1</sup> 'The Homeric and the Indo-European House', *Transactions of the Philological Society*, 1948 (1949), pp. 92 f. Plan on p. 95. Hereafter Palmer.

<sup>2</sup> *Homer and the Monuments* (1950), pp. 406 f. Plan on p. 408. Hereafter Lorimer. The book was in the press before Professor Palmer's article became available.

<sup>3</sup> 'Notes on the Homeric House', *J.H.S.* lxxi (1951), pp. 203 f. Hereafter Wace. Pro-

fessor Wace takes account of Professor Palmer's article.

<sup>4</sup> A. J. B. Wace, *Mycenae* (1949), pp. 91 f. and pls. 32-34.

<sup>5</sup> Also given in *J.H.S.* lxxi. 206 and 208.

<sup>6</sup> 'On the Plan of the Homeric House', *J.H.S.* xx (1900), pp. 128 f. Hereafter Myres. Sir John Myres and Miss Lorimer have died since this article was written. My debt to them both is immeasurable, though I have ventured to disagree on some details.

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however, uses it to make the megaron a semi-basement and the latter to eliminate stairs. Sir John did not in fact say 'that in Homer verbs of motion compounded with *ἀνά* indicate progress from the inside of a room or building towards the exit, and those compounded with *κατά* movement in the opposite direction',<sup>1</sup> still less that the 'use of *κατά* for entering a house is constant in the Homeric idiom'.<sup>2</sup> He was concerned almost wholly with the *prepositions* followed by the accusative case as indicating direction *within* the megaron, and he allowed Melanthius to go up to the orsothyre. There are thus three distinct assumptions on which conclusions about the house plan are based, and they all need re-examination.

*κατά δώματα, ἀνά μέγαρον*, etc. Sir John's original argument is convincing so long as only the examples he quotes are considered. Its difficulty becomes plain if one looks at the other contexts in which the prepositions occur. Omitting houses altogether, there are, in the *Odyssey* only, some 150 places where the prepositions are used in precisely similar phrases. It is only possible to give examples of the main types:

δ 638 οἱ δ' ἀνά θυμὸν ἐθάμβεον, α 323 θάμβησεν κατὰ θυμόν: τ 73 πτωχεύω δ' ἀνά δῆμον, ρ 227 πτώσσω κατὰ δῆμον: γ 215 ἐχθαίρουσ' ἀνά δῆμον, ζ 283 ἀτιμάζει κατὰ δῆμον: π 461 κλέος ἔστ' ἀνά ἄστυ, θ 551 οἱ κατὰ ἄστυ: ξ 473 περὶ ἄστυ κατὰ ῥωπήϊα πυκνά, ξ 474 ἂν δόνακας καὶ ἔλος: θ 7 ἡ δ' ἀνά ἄστυ μετώχετο, β 383 εἰκυῖα κατὰ πτόλιν οἴχετο πάντη: θ 173 ἐρχόμενον δ' ἀνά ἄστυ, η 40 ἐρχόμενον κατὰ ἄστυ: ο 80 τραφῆναι ἂν' Ἑλλάδα καὶ μέσον Ἄργος, α 344 κλέος εὐρὺ καθ' Ἑλλάδα καὶ μέσον Ἄργος: ξ 286 (ἄγειρα) χρήματ' ἂν' Αἰγυπτίους ἄνδρας, ο 276 αἶσα κατ' ἀνθρώπους ἀλάλησθαι: α 193 ἐρπύζοντ' ἀνά γουνὸν ἀλωῆς, ω 338 παιδνὸς ἑών, κατὰ κῆπον ἐπισπόμενος: η 129 ἡ μὲν τ' ἀνά κῆπον ἅπαντα (σκιδνάται), λ 193 πάντη οἱ κατὰ γουνὸν ἀλωῆς (βεβλήται): β 430 θοῇν ἀνά νῆα μέλαιναν, λ 9 ποιησάμενοι κατὰ νῆα: ψ 136 ἂν' ὁδὸν στείχων, ρ 204 στείχοντες ὁδὸν κάτω: ε 456 (θάλασσα δὲ κήκιε πολλή) ἂν στόμα τε ῥίνας θ', σ 97 ἦλθε κατὰ στόμα φοῖνιον αἶμα.

In isolated contexts it may be possible to see subtle indications of direction, but when the usages are considered together, it is clear that the prepositional phrases are interchangeable and that it was convenient for the composers that one group begins with a vowel and the other with a consonant.

Differences in use are few. *κατά* is much more frequent. In the type of phrase given above it occurs about 118 times and *ἀνά* about 37 times, and there is no alternative to phrases like *κατὰ μοῖραν, κόσμον, σκοπιάς, χρέος*, etc., or *κατὰ δεξιὸν ὤμον*, etc. (43 times). *κατὰ πόντον* seems to be invariable, but there is *ἄμ πέλαγος* in ε 330. Verbs which are (or might be) compounded with one preposition are also followed by it, e.g. ρ 86 κατέθεντο κατὰ κλισμούς, ο 134 ἐξέστην δ' ἄρ' ἔπειτα κατὰ κλισμούς. It is sometimes difficult to be sure if it is a preposition or a compound verb with tmesis. A very few passages are quoted for the meaning *up* and *down*.<sup>3</sup> They are all somewhat doubtful; in γ 492, etc., *ἀνά θ' ἄρματα ποικίλ' ἔβαινον* is better taken as tmesis; χ 239, 'Darting up, she perched on the roof-tree'. Π 349 τὸ δ' ἀνά στόμα καὶ κατὰ ῥίνας πῆρσε seems a clear case until one compares *ἀνά ῥίνας* and *ἂν στόμα τε ῥίνας θ'* in ε 456, χ 18, and ω 318 and *κατὰ στόμα* in σ 97; in fact with such a wound the blood would gush out

<sup>1</sup> Lorimer, p. 407.

<sup>2</sup> Palmer, p. 98.

<sup>3</sup> Chantraine, *Grammaire homérique*, ii, pars. 129, 161.

by both nose and mouth. *κατὰ ῥόον*, in spite of the English *down stream*, is certainly in the stream in  $\Phi$  147 and probably in  $\epsilon$  327, μέγα κῦμα κατὰ ῥόον ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, picked up by l. 330, ἄμ πέλαγος ἄνεμοι φέρον ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα. In  $\mu$  204, although the oars are not carried down stream, the movement of the water as the ship lost way would make the blades swing round and bang against the sides; but here and in  $\epsilon$  461,  $\xi$  254 with the stream (cf. *κατὰ μοῖραν*) is better than *down*; ἀνὰ ῥόον, as in Herodotus (1. 194. 5) ἀνὰ τὸν ποταμόν, is not found; instead we have πρὸς ῥόον in  $\Phi$  303. However, even if the meaning *up* and *down* were accepted in all these places, their number would still be notably few. ἀνὰ νῆσον may imply a contrast between inland and on the shore in  $\mu$  143 and 333, but the sailors also start from the shore in  $\iota$  153 ἐδινοέμεσθα κατ' αὐτὴν, and ἀνὰ is used without reference to the shore in  $\epsilon$  60 and  $\kappa$  308. Finally, there are two curious uses. In  $\delta$  510 τὸν δ' ἐφόρει κατὰ πόντον, normal Homeric Greek for *carried over the sea*, must mean *down into the sea*. In  $\theta$  377 ἀν' ἰδὺν seems from the context to mean neither *straight* nor *with an effort* but *straight up into the air*, and it might be suggested that in  $\Phi$  303 it means *up stream*.

Indoors the position is the same. *κατὰ* is used about 68 times, ἀνὰ 14 times to describe position or motion. In about 66 of these places the prepositions are not metrically interchangeable.<sup>1</sup> In some 14 places *κατὰ* (never apparently ἀνὰ) means in the house generally without further implication, e.g. δμῶν οἱ κατὰ δώματ' Ὀδυσσεύς θείου,  $\rho$  402 =  $\sigma$  417 =  $\nu$  298 =  $\nu$  325. Sometimes a contrast might be suspected between *farther in* and *farther out*, e.g.  $\gamma$  428, where Nestor tells the women to make ready a meal κατὰ δώματα and himself remains αὐτοῦ, outside, cf.  $\tau$  67,  $\nu$  159, 178, 369,  $\chi$  180, 377; but elsewhere this does not work. In  $\iota$  7 feasters ἀνὰ δώματα are compared with those outside, κατὰ δῆμον, in  $\kappa$  479 the men who sleep κατὰ μέγαρα are farther out than Odysseus in Circe's bed, in  $\tau$  18 the weapons are κατὰ οἶκον instead of being stored away within, and in  $\nu$  122 the women in the megaron, κατὰ δώματα, are contrasted with a woman still at the mill and certainly farther in. There is no justification for seeing subtleties in any of these passages. Telemachus and Peisistratus, looking in from the door of Menelaus' house, are impressed by what they see κατὰ δῶμα ( $\delta$  44, cf.  $\delta$  15, 46, 72). Odysseus by the door gazes at the magnificence of Alcinous δῶμα καθ' ὑπερέφες ( $\eta$  85). But *κατὰ* is used also of the torchholders along the wall, of the surprise felt when Odysseus miraculously appears by the hearth, of driving the feasters out of the house, and of the spell cast by his words, when no idea of emotion spreading inward from the door is possible ( $\eta$  102, 144,  $\beta$  247,  $\lambda$  334 =  $\nu$  2). On the other hand, the wine is poured πᾶσιν ἀνὰ μέγαρον ( $\eta$  180 =  $\nu$  51). It is true that among the disorderly suitors the wine is served from the far end of the room ( $\phi$  140 f.), but, if this kind of reasoning is permissible at all, in the hall of Alcinous the important people round the hearth would certainly be served first. Finally, Odysseus in his own hall often looks or moves κατὰ δῶμα. But μνηστήρας κατὰ δώματα ( $\nu$  331), δαίνυσθαι κατὰ δῶμα ( $\alpha$  228), μνηστήρσι δόμον κάτα δαυννένοισι ( $\rho$  332), like δμῶι κατὰ δώματα, are very nearly stock epithets;  $\chi$  199 means 'You bring goats, for the suitors to feast in the hall', not 'You bring goats to the house for the suitors to feast', and  $\chi$  484 'Summon all the women in the house to come', cf.  $\chi$  396. The repeated line μνηστήρας δ' ὀμάρησαν ἀνὰ μέγαρον (α σκίοντα) is used not only in  $\rho$  360 and  $\sigma$  399, where the noise might be thought of as coming out of the room,

<sup>1</sup> I apologize for these statistics, but it is no use simply asserting that my impression

on reading the *Odyssey* is that the prepositional phrases are interchangeable.

but in α 365 and δ 768, where the emotion is, if anything, spreading from the door. The case for a distinction rests on one sequence:

- φ 234 Eumaeus is told to come to Odysseus *φέρων ἀνὰ δώματα τόξον*. In φ 359 he begins to carry out the plan. The suitors clamour *ἐν μεγάροις* and he lays down the bow. Telemachus says *πρόσω φέρε τόξα*, and φ 372 wishes that he were stronger than the suitors *ὅσοι κατὰ δώματ' ἔασι*. φ 378 *τὰ δὲ τόξα φέρων ἀνὰ δῶμα* Eumaeus gives it to Odysseus, who is certainly by the door. Odysseus kills his first victim:

χ 21-23 *τοὶ δ' ὁμάδησαν  
μνηστήρες κατὰ δώμαθ', ὅπως ἴδον ἄνδρα πεσόντα,  
ἐκ δὲ θρόνων ἀνόρουσαν ὀρνθέντες κατὰ δῶμα.*  
(Anger spreads from the door.)

χ 299 *οἱ δ' ἐφέβοντο κατὰ μέγαρον.* (Flight from the door.)

χ 307 *... ἐπεσσύμενοι κατὰ δῶμα.* (Pursuit from the door.)

χ 381 *πάπτηνεν δ' Ὀδυσσεὺς καθ' εὖν δόμον.*

χ 474 *ἐκ δὲ Μελάνθιον ἦγον ἀνὰ πρόθυρόν τε καὶ αὐλήν.*

(So in ξ 34 Eumaeus, coming out, *ἔσσυτ' ἀνὰ πρόθυρον* and in T 212 the corpse *κείται ἀνὰ πρόθυρον τετραμμένος*.)

The only phrases at all notable are the repeated *φέρων ἀνὰ δῶμα(τα)*, and the invariable *ἀνὰ πρόθυρον*: and one must reluctantly admit that they are not enough to outweigh all the other places where the prepositions are used indifferently. When Athena enters a cave *μαιομένη κευθμῶνας ἀνὰ σπέος* (ν 367), we cannot suppose that she goes in by the entrance for gods and searches outwards to the entrance for men.

*ἀναβαίνω, καταβαίνω, κατ' οὐδοῦ*, etc. In all other syntactical relations, *ἀνὰ* and *κατὰ* are distinguished, and, if position or motion is indicated, usually distinguished as *up* and *down*: *κατὰ πετράων, κατ' οὐρανοῦ, κὰκ κεφαλῆς, ἀνὰ νηὸς ἔβην, κάτω ὁρώων, ἄνω ὤθεσκε, ἴν' οὐρανόσ' ἀμβατός εἴη, οὐρανόνθεν καταβάς, Αἰδόςδε κατελθέμεν, κατέβην δόμον Αἰδὸς εἴσω* (but *ἔβην δόμον Αἰδὸς εἴσω* in λ 150, where movement is on the level), *ἀνίστατο, καθέζετο*, etc. Compounds with *εἰς-, ἐπι-, ἐκ-* are used in the same senses, especially of ships and chariots. The coast is thought of as lower than the sea—*ξὺν νηϊ κατήλυθον* (α 182), *ἐνθα κατεπλόμεν* (ι 142), *ἐνθα κατέσχετ'* (γ 284), *τοὶ δ' ἀνάγοντο* (τ 202), *ὅτε Ἴλιον εἰσανέβαινον* (β 172), *ἐς Τροίην ἀναβήμεναι* (α 210). On land, city is higher than coast, and farmland higher than city: *στήσε δ' ἐν Ἀμινῶ . . . αὐτίκα δ' Ἰδομενεῖα μετὰλλα ἄστυδ' ἀνελθών* (τ 188-90), *μίμνει ἀγρῶ, οὐδὲ πόλινδε κατέρχεται* (λ 188), *κατιόντα . . . ἀγρόθεν* (ν 267), *ἐσπέριος δ' ἐς ἄστυ ἰδὼν ἐμὰ ἔργα κάτειμι* (ο 505), where Telemachus is down by the sea but is going first to visit his farms. The well-house is appropriately lower than the city, *ἐς κρήνην κατεβήσετο* (κ 107). The compounds, however, have other meanings, and only the context shows whether, for instance, *ἀνα-* means *up*, *out to sea*, or *back*: *ἔρνος ἀνερχόμενον* (ζ 163) *shooting up*, but *ἀνερχομένω* (α 317) *on my way back*; *ἐξ Ἐφύρης, ἐκ Τροίης ἀνιόντα, ἐκ πομπῆς ἀνιούσαν* (α 259, κ 332, ν 150) clearly *returning*. Sometimes the same preposition is used in different senses of opposite directions, even when the words are in close proximity: *Charybdis ἀναρροιβδεῖ, draws the water up and down, ἀνίησι, spouts it up, and ἀναρροιβδεῖ, gulps it down* (μ 104 f.), cf. *καταβρόζειεν* in δ 222. *Odysseus κατέδυ Τρώων πόλιν* (*entered*, see p. 5 *κατὰ δὲ φρόνιν ἦγαγε πολλήν* (δ 249, 258). So in ρ 461 *ἀναχωρήσειν, retreat*,

has no more to do with movement out through the door than ἀνεχώρησαν in χ 270 and ἀνέρουσαν in χ 23, both in the opposite direction.<sup>1</sup> The exact force of the preposition can be seen or conjectured in many contexts. δ 534 Aegisthus invited Agamemnon to come to his house from the place where he landed, ἀνήγαγε; in ν 163 Eumaeus came to the palace with pigs from his farm, κατὰ ἄγων; in σ 115 the stranger is to be taken out to sea to the mainland, ἀνάξομεν ἡπειρόνδε; in ξ 272 = ρ 441 the prisoners are taken inland, ἀναγον. Other passages, however, are less amenable: εἴρερον εἰσανάγουσι (θ 529): L. and S.<sup>9</sup> *lead up into slavery*. ἀνά cannot here be *back, out to sea, or inland*, and even if there were parallels for the meaning *out of her home*, it would be precluded by εἰς; but this sentence cannot be separated from ξ 272. ἀνήγαγεν ὅνδε δόμονδε (γ 272) is again Aegisthus, but this time it is Clytemnestra that he is taking to his home, which was certainly lower than Mycenae in every sense. στεινωπὸν ἀνελπόμεν (μ 234), *We sailed up the channel*, is misleadingly familiar in English, but it has no relevance here; and the ship has not *turned round or put out to sea*, nor is ἀνά used for *against the current* (p. 3 above). *We sailed on homewards*, as in ἐκ Τροίης ἀνιόντα, is at least factually correct, but in the crisis a more immediate point is needed. For the original audiences such prepositions may have given precision to the general sense of the passages. For us it is perhaps unsafe to read an exact meaning into any except the most obvious. Scholars of the future may deduce a race of giantesses from a novelist's casual 'He went up to her'.

No verb compounded with ἀνά or κατά is ever used of traversing house or room in either direction. The only question is whether verbs which mean *come up, go down* are used for leaving and entering. They are certainly not the normal Homeric idiom, which includes a variety of phrases: ἐς δ' ἦλθον, ἐς δώματ' ἴσαν, ὑπὲρ οὐδὸν ἐβήσετο δώματος εἴσω, ἐκ δ' ἐλθὼν, ἐκ θαλάμῳ ἐλθόντες, and so on, and often βῆ δ' ἵμεναι πρὸς δῶμα, and similar phrases, immediately followed by the action which took place within. Examples are far too numerous to list, but any page with comings and goings will supply them. A few passages are, however, quoted for the idea of *descent*.

ρ 336 ἐδύσετο δώματ' Ὀδυσσεύς.

η 81 δύνε δ' Ἐρεχθίδος πυκινὸν δόμον. (Athena.)

ν 366 δύνε σπέος ἡεροειδές. (Athena.)

Ε 140 κατὰ σταθμούς δύνεται. (A lion.)

The verb is unemphatic. Men do not, and did not in remote times from which the use might be a survival, plunge *down* into clothes or armour; yet we find even καταδύς κλυτὰ τεύχεα (μ 228). The reverse is ἀποδύω, not ἀναδύω. In Ο 345 δύνοντο δὲ τεῖχος, although the Achaeans are entangled in the moat and have to climb out, and in Χ 99 Hector ponders πύλας καὶ τεῖχεα δύνω, although he is certainly standing lower than the fortifications of Troy. The word is fairly commonly used of cities and groups of people, only once of a human being entering a house; but even if it were used frequently, the argument would not be strong. ρ 336, however, has a rather better right than κ 432 and δ 680 (below) to the *e.g.* or *etc.* with which they are all usually credited.

ω 115 ἥ οὐ μέμνη ὅτε κείσε κατήλυθον ὑμέτερον δῶ;  
*Put in at Ithaca (κείσε) cf. π 322 Ἰθάκηνδε κατήγετο νηὺς, α 183 ξὺν νηϊ κατήλυθον.*

κ 431-2 Ἄ δειλοί, πόσ' ἵμεν; τί κακῶν ἱμείρετε τούτων,  
Κίρκης ἐς μέγαρον καταβήμεναι . . . ;

<sup>1</sup> Myres, pp. 141, 143.



This is the only example of *καταβαίνειν* used of *going to a house*. It is a problem, less because it suggests steps down than because the speaker is on the shore and the house of Circe is in the middle of the island *διὰ δρυμὰ πικνὰ καὶ ὕλην* (κ 197), *ἐν βήσσησι . . . περισκέπτω ἐνὶ χώρῳ* (κ 210-11). If Odysseus had so spoken *σκοπιῇ ἐς παιπαλόεσσαν ἀνελθών* (κ 97), there would have been no difficulty. It is probably best to admit the mild abnormality *go down to the house in the woods* without argument. To me it seems to emphasize the depth of the peril, as though Circe and death were unconsciously identified (cf. *κατέβην δόμον Αἰδὸς εἴσω* ψ 252); but that is not an explanation for which parallels or arguments can be produced.

*καταβαταὶ ἀνθρώποιον*, ν 110, of the *θύραι* of a cave.

This may be taken literally, especially as the Cave of the Nymphs is not a dwelling. *κατὰ σπέιους κοῖλοιο* (μ 93) suggests that the cave of Scylla also descended from its entrance. In ι 330 *κατὰ σπέιους κέχυτο*, v.l. *σπέιους*, is nearer to *κάκ κεφαλῆς χεῦεν* (ψ 156). Since caves really are like holes, what is surprising is that in the *Odyssey* they are regularly entered and left on the level: *εἰς εὐρὺ σπέος ἤλυθεν* (ε 77), *ἐλθόντες δ' εἰς ἄντρον, ἄντρον ἐξήλασε, ἐξέσσοντο, διὰ* (not *ἀνὰ*) *σπέος ἔσσοντο* (ι 218, 312, 438, 447), etc. The vocabulary appropriate to houses is transferred to caves.

δ 680 *τὸν δὲ κατ' οὐδοῦ βάντα προσήνδα Πηνελόπεια*.

Like *Κίρκης ἐς μέγαρον καταβήμεναι*, this is unique. (*ὑπὲρ οὐδοῦ βαίνειν* or *ὑπερβαίνειν οὐδὸν*, 8 times in the *Odyssey*, *ἐπ' οὐδὸν ἰών* or *οὐδὸν ἰκέσθαι*, 11 times.) *κατὰ* governing the genitive elsewhere always means *down*, either *from* or *over*. This is Penelope's room, and in δ 718 she sits *ἐπ' οὐδοῦ*. Odysseus also once sits *ἐπὶ μελίνου οὐδοῦ ἔντοσθε θυράων* in his own *megaron* (ρ 339), and he and two of his followers sit *παρὰ σταθμοῖσιν ἐπ' οὐδοῦ* in the house of Aeolus (κ 62-63). Miss Lorimer<sup>1</sup> describes the Geometric house models from Perachora and the Argive Heraeum with their high thresholds, presumably of wood since none has been found in actual buildings, and tentatively suggests that δ 718 and ρ 339 were unconsciously modelled on contemporary doorways. If so, δ 680 and κ 62-63 will have the same origin. The rest of the language is consistent with the broad threshold level with the floor which the action requires and which is found in all Mycenaean *megara*. It is well seen in the Palace of Nestor at Pylos, where the painted pattern on the plaster floor has survived and the three large blocks which formed the threshold were covered by the last coat of plaster on the floor.<sup>2</sup> No *megaron* known from the Late Bronze or Early Iron Age has a floor sunk below the level of the entrance.<sup>3</sup>

This is all, except for the four disputed passages (β 337, ο 99, Ζ 288, and Ω 191) where Telemachus (δ δ' *ὑφόροφον θάλαμον κατεβήσεται*), Menelaus, Hecabe, or Priam (*ἐς θάλαμον κατεβήσεται κηώντα*) goes to a room which is always a storeroom where treasures are kept. Elsewhere *καταβαίνειν* and *ἀναβαίνειν* are always used with specific mention of an upper room or stairs: α 330, 362 = δ 751 = ρ 49 = τ 602 = φ 356 = ψ 364, β 358, δ 760, κ 558 = λ 63, π 449, ρ 101 = τ 594, σ 206 = ψ 85, σ 302, τ 600, χ 428, φ 1, 20. The only possible objection to the natural assumption that the storerooms are downstairs is that the characters are not specifically said to come upstairs again

<sup>1</sup> Lorimer, pp. 419 f., cf. B.S.A. xlviii (1953), p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> C. W. Blegen, 'The

Palace of Nestor', A.J.A. lvii (1953), p. 61.  
<sup>3</sup> For Mycenae see Wace, p. 211.

and that they sometimes talk to people who are not specifically said to have come downstairs with them. There is nothing to add to what Professor Wace has said on this.<sup>1</sup>

χ 132 οὐκ ἂν δὴ τις ἂν ὀρσοθύρην ἀναβαίη;

χ 142-3 ὥς εἰπὼν ἀνέβαινε Μελάνθιος, αἰπόλος αἰγῶν,  
ἐς θαλάμους Ὀδυσῆος ἀνὰ ῥώγας μεγάρου.

There was never any reason to suppose that ἀναβαίνειν meant to go out except that it was taken to be the opposite of καταβαίνειν meaning to enter. Only one passage might be taken as go out from the house, ζ 29, ἐκ γάρ τοι τούτων φάτις ἀνθρώπους ἀναβαίνει, and this is probably nearer to the ἀνα- in ἀναφαίνω and ἀναπετάννυμι, 'indicating extension or diffusion' (Cunliffe). In the Late Bronze and Early Iron Age only two known houses have side doors; the House of the Columns, in which the door is slightly raised and leads to a passage, and the principal house at Karphi, the hill city in which the Achaeans of Crete seem to have found refuge in the eleventh and tenth centuries. This house was originally a single room, but later it was enlarged by the addition of an ante-room and of small rooms at the back and side, communicating with the main room, the former by means of a raised hatch; the main room also had a good raised threshold.<sup>2</sup> In any room with a fixed central hearth, a side door was likely to be raised to avoid draughts. There is therefore no reason to doubt the plain statement that Melanthius went up through such a side door.<sup>3</sup> The order of the words in χ 142-3 separates ἀνὰ ῥώγας from ἀνέβαινε (i.e. ἂν ὀρσοθύρην) and connects closely together θαλάμους Ὀδυσῆος ἀνὰ ῥώγας μεγάρου (cf. δμῶαι κατὰ δώματα). Since I hope that it has been shown above that ἀνὰ does not in itself mean up, there is nothing to show that Melanthius, having once gone up by the door which led on to the main corridor (λαύρη), had to go up still higher to reach the storerooms. Speculation about the meaning of ῥώγας is unprofitable, but the storerooms, accessible alike from ὀρσοθύρην and πρόδομος, could conveniently be placed in a block behind the corridor which connected them.<sup>4</sup>

## ii. PAST AND PRESENT

All Homer's houses conform to the same general plan.<sup>5</sup> Even caves have at least grove, glade, and vine to make natural αὐλή and πρόδομος (ε 63 f.). This does not in itself prove that all dwellings are modelled on an ideal plan, since Mycenaean houses of any distinction show much the same general resemblance. It is worth considering whether there are any differences in the various houses described, and if so, whether they seem to come from the individualization of a particular house or from the poetic idiom of different periods. May we suppose that if the Mycenaean palace on Ithaca were found, the megaron would have a side door, or that if Telemachus had gone to Mycenae, he would have described the Lion Gate?<sup>6</sup>

αὐλή. Professor Palmer made a good deduction from the use of the line ἐκ δ' ἦλθεν (ἦλθον) μεγάρου παρὲκ μέγα τειχίον αὐλῆς (π 165, 343) both of the farm of Eumaeus and of the palace of Odysseus, that the entrance to the αὐλή was

<sup>1</sup> Wace, pp. 203 f.

<sup>2</sup> 'Karphi: A City of Refuge of the Early Iron Age in Crete', *B.S.A.* xxxviii (1937-8), p. 77: Nos. 8, 9, 11, and 14 on pl. ix.

<sup>3</sup> Wace, pp. 210 f.

<sup>4</sup> See plan facing p. 12. The only purpose of this plan is to make the text easier to follow. Many arrangements are possible.

<sup>5</sup> Palmer, p. 94.

<sup>6</sup> Wace, p. 204.

not directly opposite the megaron door but to one side.<sup>1</sup> This was in fact its position at Mycenaean Tiryns<sup>2</sup> as well as at fourth-century Priene, but it is inconceivable that a poet intended to stress so trivial a resemblance between particular farm and particular palace. It is a good example of a detail in an ideal house type preserved in idiom. The general plan of the ideal αὐλή is clear, and there is little disagreement about it; it had one αἶθουσα before the house door (πρῶται θύραι), another at least along the wall where the outer gates were (αὔλεια θύραι),<sup>3</sup> an altar of Zeus, and a number of buildings used as bedrooms or workrooms. This conforms with the actual Mycenaean plan, but it has often been pointed out that a midden is not what one would expect in a Mycenaean αὐλή. The point has perhaps been exaggerated. We cannot, as Professor Palmer does,<sup>4</sup> clean up the αὐλή by putting Argos outside; the order in ρ 260 f. is quite unambiguous; Odysseus has entered the αὐλή before he comes to the famous dung-heap. But it is not a midden, only a heap of mule and cattle dung swept up and waiting for slaves to take it away to manure the home farm. This is not below the dignity of a pious, horse-loving aristocrat with a good appetite. Ithaca itself was exceptional in having no horses, though there were mules; elsewhere chariots drove right into the αὐλή, stopping just within, ἐν προθύροις, to have the horses unharnessed and taken to stables and the chariots leant against the wall. The procedure is not always made wholly clear.<sup>5</sup> It is natural to suppose that Nausicaa's cart stands outside the house, not outside the αὐλή, when she loads it with the washing ἐκ θαλάμῳ and when it is unloaded (ζ 72-74, η 4 f.), and that the servants deal with the chariot of Telemachus and Peisistratus on the inner side of the gates (δ 39 f.). Ares is immediately outside the megaron when he arms himself and calls for his horses to be harnessed (O 119 f.), and the gates which the Horae keep and through which Hera and Athene drive (E 748-52 = Θ 392-6) are the Olympian equivalent of the αὔλεια θύραι: Olympus has no Lower Town. The one certain occasion, which confirms this interpretation of the other passages, is Priam's departure in Ω 265 ff. His sons pull out the cart and harness the chariot for Priam ἐν δώμασιν ὑψηλοῖσι, Priam then pours a libation στὰς μέσῳ ἔρκει, and only after this drives out προθύροιο καὶ αἰθούσης ἐριδούπου. Chariots then stopped ἐν προθύροις inside the αὐλή, just as Argos is lying inside the αὐλή, προπάροιθε θυράων. But horses or mules and the mess they make do not turn the αὐλή into a farmyard, and, except for Penelope's geese which are somewhere κατὰ οἶκον, the only other animals brought in 'on the hoof' are for the table or presumably for sacrifice, and they are temporarily turned loose or tied up in the αἶθουσα near the gate (τ 536, υ 164, 176). There is no reason to think that when Priam rolled in the dirt αὐλῆς ἐν χόρτοισι (Ω 640), he went into a part of the αὐλή specially fenced off for cattle,<sup>6</sup> since Peleus certainly did not go into the byres to sacrifice to Zeus αὐλῆς ἐν χόρτῳ (Λ 774), and no gentleman's residence is ever said to have a μέσσαυλος. Compared with the courts of kings,

<sup>1</sup> Palmer, pp. 94 f.

<sup>2</sup> Plan reproduced in Lorimer, p. 409, fig. 60. The αὐλή of both Great and Little Megaron leads on to a forecourt.

<sup>3</sup> Palmer, pp. 93 f. Add α 104 οὐδοῦ ἐπ' αὐλείου.

<sup>4</sup> Palmer, p. 93.

<sup>5</sup> Entrance to αὐλή and μέγαρον both have θύραι, αἶθουσα, and πρόθυρον (-α), and the vocabulary for passing through is

similar, except that διέκ is used only of leaving the megaron. Megaron door must be meant in θ 304, 325, κ 220, ξ 34, υ 355, σ 10, 101, 386, φ 299, χ 474, O 124, T 212, and X 71: gate of αὐλή in α 103, 119, γ 493, δ 20, η 4, ο 146, 191, π 12, Λ 777, Ω 323. In E 496 the house seems to open into the street.

<sup>6</sup> Palmer, pp. 96 f.



the αὐλή of Eumaeus, with its rows of pigsties, is a real farmyard (ξ 5 f.). But it is a difference of use, not of plan; architecturally the pigsties take the place of the family bedrooms.

There were farms and poorer houses at every period; but it is noticeable that, except for the detailed description of Eumaeus' farm, they appear in the poems chiefly in similes and passages of the same character. The word μέσσαυλος or μέσσαυλον is used for the steading where the goddesses appear to Paris (Ω 29), and in retrospect for the home of the Cyclops where the crew of Odysseus suffered (κ 435). Otherwise it is the enclosure from which the lions of similes are driven (Α 548, P 112, 657). It is not to be assumed in every αὐλή, but only on solitary farms and steadings, and in use it is hardly distinguished from the steading itself. The lion which is driven ἀπὸ σταθμοῦ goes away ἀπὸ μεσσαύλου, and 'an enclosure for cattle in the middle of an αὐλή', taken literally, is singularly inept as the scene of the beauty competition or the misdeeds of the Cyclops. The meaning of ἔρκεα is extended in the same way in φ 238 and of αὐλή in δ 74. The big house in its courtyard is usually thought of as isolated, but occasionally the poet seems to have in mind a row of houses opening directly into a street. In the City at Peace on the Shield the women watch a marriage procession pass, standing ἐπὶ προθύροις ἐκάστη (Σ 496). In a simile the women go out into the middle of the street to squabble (Υ 252 f.). And in Scherie, the harbour town which, with its dockyards and Temple of Poseidon, might well be Smyrna or Miletus, a stranger is told to ask for the house of Alcinoüs; there will be no difficulty, because it is the finest house there—as one can well believe from its description (ζ 298 f.). There is no actual inconsistency, but the impression is none the less strong that the great houses belong to a traditional past and the farms and rows of little houses along a street to the familiar present, and that the poet sometimes allowed the simplicity of the present to invade the past.

*Penelope's rooms.* It is generally agreed that Penelope and her women can hear what goes on in the main megaron, and that their rooms should therefore be put close to it. The arguments for putting them behind the megaron with a door between<sup>1</sup> are unconvincing. If Odysseus had said that to reach Penelope he would have to pass through the megaron among the suitors, it would be final proof; but in fact he only says (ρ 564 f.) that he fears the company of the suitors because they struck him when he walked harmlessly through the hall, i.e. that since they objected when he walked through the common hall where he had a right to be, they will object much more if they see him going to Penelope's private room.<sup>2</sup> This gives no indication where the room is. Again, it was not in full view of many men that Penelope collapsed on her doorstep. The usual translation is certainly correct here. 'She could not bear to sit on a chair, although there were many chairs in the room' (δ 716-17). πολλῶν κατὰ οἶκον ἑόντων is used again in τ 195 and ω 272 meaning 'there being many possessions in the house'. If the practical comment is thought unromantic, it is better than making Penelope so forget common sense and propriety that she discusses confidential business and flops down on the floor in public. She remains calm until even Medon has gone away. For a position near the main door<sup>3</sup> the evidence is that sounds are audible from the women's rooms to someone sleeping in the πρόδομος or standing in the αὐλή in front of it (υ 92, 111-20: Odysseus imagines

<sup>1</sup> Palmer, p. 111.    <sup>2</sup> So Myres, p. 136.

<sup>3</sup> Lorimer, p. 413. This position was suggested by S. E. Bassett, 'The Palace of Odysseus', *A.J.A.* xxiii (1919), pp. 288 f.

that Penelope is standing by his head but he does not imagine the sobbing); that Penelope can see what happens in the megaron near the door ( $\rho$  492, 501 f.); and that the suitors make no attempt to open or break down the door to the women's rooms. To this I should add the sequence of events given with great exactness in  $\phi$  378 f. Eumaeus comes from the hearth to give the bow to Odysseus, who is beside the megaron door, and then tells Eurycleia to fasten the door to the women's quarters, instructions which she immediately obeys. It would be physically possible for Eurycleia to push her way boldly through the crowd in the hall or to scuttle like a rabbit by devious ways all round the house to another door of which we are told nothing, but if she did, the epic manner of telling a story would require a few lines to fill the interval. The natural interpretation is that she was standing by the door which she immediately made fast; and the two megara at Tiryns and the megaron at Mycenae have doors in the *πρόδομος*, leading to private rooms and in one case to a stair, in exactly the position needed if Eumaeus at the door is to give the message secretly. This is the door which Telemachus shakes when the fighting is over ( $\chi$  394), and the fact that he 'led the way' ( $\chi$  400) and that she did not see the slaughter until  $\chi$  407 shows that it did not open directly into the *μέγαρον*.

There is little evidence for differences in the accommodation of women. It is only natural that Arete and Helen spend more time in the public megaron than Penelope who lacks the protection of a husband ( $\rho$  101 f.,  $\sigma$  184). The two meanings of *μυχός*<sup>1</sup> as *bedroom* and *back of the megaron* may suggest knowledge of a house type with a private room behind the main room, such as is found in some of the private houses at Korakou<sup>2</sup> and at Karphi.<sup>3</sup> If so, it has left no trace on the action of the poem.

*μέγαρον*. Again the plan is Mycenaean. The discovery of one Mycenaean house with a side door, which might still leave doubts if the *δρυσθύρη* were a universal feature of Homeric houses, is of particular importance because the poet describes it as something exceptional in the hall of Odysseus. He assumes immediate understanding of the arrangement of the *αἶλη*, of the *μέγαρον* with its pillars and hearth, and of the storerooms and bedrooms, but he gives an exact account of the raised side door and the rooms and passages with which it communicates. It is only our ignorance of the meaning of *ῥῶγες* that makes it at all obscure. Here, however, the resemblance to a Mycenaean palace stops; instead of a floor 'coated with hard lime plaster' and marked out in squares 'filled with painted designs, wavy lines, chevrons, rectangles, circles and other patterns, in a variety of colors'<sup>4</sup> or anything like it, there is a floor which, after being trenched, can be scraped smooth with spades, and so made fit for dancing ( $\phi$  120,  $\chi$  455-6,  $\psi$  143 f.); no use is made of the dramatic and artistic possibilities of frescoes on the wall; *ἐνώπια παμφανόωντα* sounds like the traditional phrases for them, but they are found in improbable places, in Achilles' hut ( $N$  261), in the *αἶλη* of Zeus and Menelaus, as the walls against which chariots are propped ( $\Theta$  435,  $\delta$  42), and only once inside a megaron as the face of the doorway ( $\chi$  121); instead of lamps there are braziers, torches, and fire-light; and a bath-tub<sup>5</sup> brought beside the hearth takes the place of a well-

<sup>1</sup> Wace, pp. 209 f.

<sup>2</sup> Blegen, *Korakou*, pp. 79 f. and figs. 112 and 121. Ground plans are uncertain.

<sup>3</sup> B.S.A. xxxviii. 71 and 73; Nos. 138-40 and No. 2 on pl. ix. The megaron type

house, Nos. 137 and 141, had no inner room.

<sup>4</sup> Blegen, *A.J.A.* lvii. 61.

<sup>5</sup>  $\rho$  85 f.,  $\tau$  384 f. The formula for a lady washing before going upstairs sounds more like a Mycenaean bathroom,  $\delta$  750-1 =  $\rho$  48-9.

drained bathroom. When great splendour is described, it is not of a kind known in Mycenaean houses; but since precious metals were naturally stolen and perishable materials have vanished, the absence from Homer of characteristic Mycenaean decoration is more significant than the absence from Mycenaean houses of things which Homer mentions. In furnishings and luxury the dwellings in the *Odyssey* are distinguished one from another. The houses of Alcinous and Circe and the cave of Calypso contain gold and silver treasures which are elsewhere allowed only to the gods. The house of Menelaus is the height of human luxury. Then follow, in a descending scale, the house of Odysseus, the farm of Eumaeus, and the cave of the Cyclops. But they are distinguished as being more and less luxurious dwellings of the same general type. If Telemachus had gone to Mycenae, his comment would probably have been something like: 'I thought Menelaus happy, but now I know that the king of golden Mycenae is twice as happy.'

The House of the Columns has provided a Mycenaean parallel for the one thing in the Homeric house plan which was thought to be un-Mycenaean. It will seem to most people to add, to an already formidable list of resemblances, the final proof that there was some connexion between the houses in which rulers did live in the generation of the destruction of Troy and the houses in which the *Odyssey* describes them as living. There are two possible explanations of these resemblances. The house plan may have been taken to Ionia and have persisted there with decreased luxury and possibly with the gradual abandonment of the normal isolation of the Mycenaean megaron. The positive evidence for this is slight; it did persist in a modified form at Karphi in the period immediately following the destruction of Mycenae, and there may be a survival of the megaron, fully incorporated in the house, in one of the fourth-century houses at Priene near Miletus.<sup>1</sup> The alternative is that knowledge of the proper sort of house for the heroes of legend to live in was preserved in the vocabulary of oral poetry and in the stories which were continuously retold by poets. The plot of the stories (not necessarily the plot of the *Odyssey*) demanded not only a trap-like megaron but a complicated arrangement of storerooms, bedrooms, and passages, ἐξ ἐτέρων ἑτερα. The vocabulary preserved convenient phrases such as ἐς θάλαμον κατεβήσεται κηῶντα and ἐκ δ' ἔλασαν προθύροιο καὶ αἰθούσης ἐριδούπου, neat doublets such as διὰ προθύροιο θύραζε and διὰ προθύρου δὲ θύραζε, curious details such as παρὰ μέγα τευχίον ἀλλῆς, and misunderstood phrases such as ἐνώπια παμφανόωντα and even possibly ἀνὰ ῥῶγας μεγάραιο. The preservation of a longer fragment describing the δροσθύρη is not impossible, as the description of the boars' tusk helmet in *K* 261-5 and the death of Periphetes in *O* 638-52 show. The conditions of the poet's own times would then have furnished the houses with a familiar simplicity or decorated them with a new kind of magnificence. That this is possible can hardly be doubted; a tradition which retained a complete political geography could certainly retain a complete house plan. It is more surprising that frescoes and painted floors were forgotten, but sealings and writing were forgotten too. The house has admitted fewer fundamental changes than armour or dress or burial customs, perhaps because the trap-like megaron continued to be familiar, and because the Early Iron Age had so little to contribute in architecture. A succession of house types is now known from Smyrna,<sup>2</sup> a small, oval house from the Proto-

<sup>1</sup> Plan reproduced in *Lorimer*, p. 410, fig. 61.

<sup>2</sup> *I.L.N.*, 28 Feb. 1953, pp. 328-9.


geometric period, rectangular houses of a slightly later date built against the city wall, an apsidal house of c. 700 B.C., and a much better house of the late seventh century, with megaron, anteroom, and porch facing on to a court and beside it a second room entered only from a separate court. They are sufficiently like the Homeric house to have made the tradition comprehensible, but hardly sufficiently like to have been the historical prototypes. Houses more like the palace of Odysseus may have been built in the open country and may still be found; but at present the evidence seems to favour the transmission of an ideal house type by a continuous tradition of heroic poetry.

*St. Hugh's College, Oxford*

DOROTHEA GRAY

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HEA GRAY



# ΔΩΜΑΤΑ ΚΑΛ' ὈΔΥΣΣΕΟΣ

(ρ 264)

## A. μέγαρον

- α πρόδομος (elsewhere αἶθουσα), cf. χ 258
- β πρῶται θύραι (α 255)
- γ ἐσχάρη (τ 389, etc.)
- δ κίονες οἱ σταθμοί (α 333, etc.)
- ε ὀρσοθύρη (χ 126 f., 333, 341)
- ι θύραι (τ 30, φ 382, χ 399)
- ζ στόμα λαύρης (χ 137)


## B. αὐλή

- η βωμός of Ζεὺς ἐρκείος (χ 334)
- θ αἶθουσα αὐλῆς (I 472, σ 102, υ 176, φ 390, χ 449 etc., cf. 1472)
- κ αὐλείαι θύραι (α 104)
- λ Stables (for mules, ρ 298, cf. ἵππειαι κάπαι δ 40)
- μ θάλαμος of Telemachos (α 425, τ 48)
- ν θάλαμος of Odysseus (ψ 190 f.)
- ξ θόλος (χ 466)
- ο κρήνη (τ 504, υ 154)
- π Trough and pens for geese (τ 536)

## C. δώματα, θάλαμοι

- (i) μέγαλα γυναικῶν
- ρ Mill (υ 105 f.)
- σ Kitchen
- τ Stairs to ὑπερώϊον (ψ 1 f.) and (φ 5), cf. β 337
- υ Rooms for spinning, etc. (α 356)
- (ii) Workrooms and storerooms
- φ λαύρη (χ 128)
- χ θάλαμος reached by ῥῶγες μεγάροι<sup>143</sup>
- χ' χ'' Other θάλαμοι
- ψ Stairs
- ω Workrooms for carpenters, smiths (σ 328)
- D. ἔρκος, τεῖχος, τειχίον, οἶκος with θριγκοί





ΣΗΟΣ

C. δώματα, θάλαμοι

γυναικῶν  
(105 f.)

to ὑπεράϊον (ψ 1 f.) and Treasury

cf. β 337  
for spinning, etc. (α 356)

rooms and storerooms

χ 128)  
reached by ῥῶγες μεγάροιο (χ 140,

αὐτῶν θάλαμοι

rooms for carpenters, smiths, etc.

28)  
ος, τείχος, τειχίον, or τοῖχος  
with θριγκοί

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AESCHYLUS, *AGAMEMNON* 160-83

Ζεὺς ὅστις πότ' ἔστιν, εἰ τόδ' αὖ- 160  
 τῷ φίλον κεκλημένῳ,  
 τοῦτό νιν προσενέπω—  
 οὐκ ἔχω προσεικάσαι,  
 πάντ' ἐπισταθμώμενος,  
 πλὴν Διός, εἰ τὸ μάταν ἀπὸ φροντίδος ἄχθος 165  
 χρὴ βαλεῖν ἐτητύμῳς.  
 οὐδ' ὅστις πάρειθεν ἦν μέγας,  
 παμμάχῳ θράσει βρύων,  
 οὐδὲν ἂν ρέξαι παρών 170  
 ὅς δ', ἐπεὶ τ' ἔφν, τρια-  
 κτῆρος οἴχεται τυχών.  
 Ζῆνα δέ τις προφρόνως ἐπινίκια κλάζων  
 τεύξεται φρενῶν τὸ πᾶν— 175  
 τὸν φρονεῖν βροτοὺς ὁδώ-  
 σαντα, τῷ πάθει μάθος  
 θέντα κυρίως ἔχειν  
 στάζει δ' ἐν θ' ὕπνῳ πρὸ καρδίας,  
 μνησιπήμων πόνος, καὶ παρ' ἄ- 180  
 κοντας ἦλθε σωφρονεῖν.  
 δαιμόνων δὲ ποῦ χάρις βιαίως  
 σέλμα σεμνὸν ἡμένων;

163 προσεικάσαι M<sup>3</sup>VFT<sup>r</sup>: προσηκάσαι M<sup>1</sup> 165 τὸ μάταν ἀπὸ Pauw: τότε μάταν ἀπὸ  
 MVF: τό γε μάταν ἀπὸ Tr 170 οὐδὲν ἂν ρέξαι scripsi: οὐδὲν λέξαι MVF: οὐδὲν τι λέξαι  
 Tr: οὐδὲν ἂν λέξαι Schütz: οὐδὲ λέξεσθαι H. L. Ahrens παρών scripsi: πρὶν ὧν codd.  
 171 ἐπεὶ τ' scripsi: ἔπειτ' codd. 177 μάθος (sed super os scr. η F) codd. 179 ἐν θ'  
 VFT<sup>r</sup>: ἐν θ' M: ἀνθ' (et ὕπνου pro ὕπνῳ) Emperius 182 δὲ ποῦ MV: δὲ πού FT<sup>r</sup>

Tr.: 'Zeus, whoe'er he be, if so to be called is pleasing to him, thus do I name him—I have naught, when I weigh all things in the balance, to count their equal, save Zeus, if it behoves me to strike truly this vain burden born of anxiety.

'He that at the outset was great, flourishing with all-conquering boldness, will not stay to accomplish anything; he, as soon as he was born, met his conqueror and is gone. But a man who willingly hails Zeus as victor will achieve wisdom in full measure—

'Zeus, who showed mortals the path to wisdom, who ordained that through the affliction a lesson should prevail. And it trickles in sleep across the heart, a pain that keeps suffering in mind, and comes home to men who refuse to be wise. But where is the grace of gods who wield the great helm with violence?'

Ζεὺς ὅστις πότ' ἔστιν κτλ. The opening relative clause is to be taken primarily with the two clauses that follow it, and 160-2 virtually form a complete sentence. From this point of view the relative clause anticipates both τόδ' αὐτῷ and τοῦτό νιν. But the break after προσενέπω is not complete; for the qualifying

'whoever he is' is to be understood with 163-5 also, the sense being 'I have nothing to compare . . . except Zeus, whoever he is.' Accordingly it seems best to put a dash after *προσεννέπω* rather than a full stop and to regard the whole stanza as one long, rambling sentence. A similar looseness of sentence-structure may be observed in the following stanzas, esp. 173-81. This style of composition is no doubt intended to represent the Chorus's reluctance to express an unpalatable truth about the situation of their princes and also the difficulty which they experience in unravelling the ways of Zeus.

The words *Ζεύς* and *πλήν Διός* in this stanza, as well as *Ζήνα* 173, carry very strong emphasis. The full significance of this emerges at 182-3 (see below).

The *Ζεύς* *ὅστις* clause is not vocative either in form or in meaning. It is best described as *nom. pendens*. Despite the following *κεκλημένωι* and *προσεννέπω*, there is no question of the Chorus addressing a prayer or invocation to Zeus at this moment. The first three stanzas of the poem merely affirm the might of Zeus; in the remainder of the poem the Chorus tell how Agamemnon decided to slay his daughter, this deed being a manifestation of Zeus' power; and finally we are told that on this score justice, which is the province of Zeus, still awaits the Atreidae. The pattern of the poem bears some resemblance to that of a hymn or invocation. But it should be observed that the story of Iphigeneia is not, as in a hymn, introduced to demonstrate the power of the god; on the contrary, this story is the main substance of the poem, and the three introductory stanzas about the god are brought in in order to explain the story. Besides, there is no appeal to the god either to be present or to help the Atreidae. Therefore the description 'Hymn to Zeus' should not be used of this poem or of its first three stanzas.

*Προσεννέπω* accordingly does not mean 'address (now)' but 'name', 'describe' quite generally. Another instance of this usage occurs at 323: *διχόστα-τοῦντ' ἂν οὐ φίλως προσεννέποις* 'you would describe them as standing at variance'. (In this second passage the notion of anyone *addressing* two liquid substances in a bowl is clearly unacceptable.)

163-5. *οὐκ ἔχω προσεικάσαι κτλ.* Fraenkel takes this sentence to be a variant form of the theme *Q. τινί μάλιστα τὸν Δία εἰκάζω*;—*A. οὐδενὶ πλήν Διός*. But so simple a thought would be more appropriate to rustic conversation than to tragic poetry. Besides, when it is expressed as a statement, it loses the little force that it has as a question.

The dative to accompany *προσεικάσαι* is to be supplied not from *Ζεύς* (160) but from *πάντα* (164). The Chorus have spoken of their anxiety and have ascribed it to the wrath of Artemis, which is also a wrath child-avenging (104-59). Iphigeneia's death, which they are about to relate, is the prime example of the working of that wrath. But at this point the Chorus review the past in a new light. Hitherto in speaking of the *wrath* they have used the words of Calchas. Now they give us their own interpretation; the fortunes of the Atreidae can be explained only in terms of the power and will of *Ζεύς*. They place all that has happened in one scale, and only by putting Zeus in the other can they obtain a balance. Thus they imply that Calchas' opinions are, if not erroneous, at least insufficient; and we shall find that this criticism is stated more clearly at 182-3.

165-7. *εἰ τὸ μάταν κτλ.* Pauw's emendation is widely accepted and is perhaps correct. The question, how MS. *τόδε* and *τό γε* arose, may be answered as follows. At an early stage in the tradition, a variant *τε* was inserted above

τό, and then the two readings were combined as τό τε. Next, in certain MSS. τό τε was emended to τόδε to restore the sense. Finally, the Triclinian τό γε is an emendation of either τό τε or τόδε.

Fraenkel translates Pauw's text thus: 'if there is need to cast the burden of vain thought from the careladen mind in real truth'. This does not make sense, however; for the power of Zeus is inseparable from the punishment of evildoers, and so in the present situation the Chorus can find no relief from anxiety in thinking of Zeus. They are convinced that the Atreidae will soon suffer at the hand of Zeus, and it is precisely this conviction that forms the substance of their anxiety.

The clause refers not to the discarding of a burden but to the correct assessment of a burden. In spite of the obscure prophecies made by Calchas, the Chorus understand the plight of their king because they understand the principle of divine justice.

The words τὸ μάταν ἀπὸ φροντίδος ἄχθος form a single phrase. Μάταν serves as an adjective qualifying ἄχθος, and ἀπὸ φροντίδος is in adverbial relationship to φροντίδος (sc. γινόμενον); tr. 'the uncertain burden that arises from anxiety'. This construction avoids the awkward word-order that results from making ἀπὸ φροντίδος depend on βαλεῖν or from linking ἀπὸ as a pre-verb with βαλεῖν.

Φροντίδος is a deliberate allusion to φροντίδ' (102) and so means 'anxiety' rather than 'thought', 'mind'. This kind of verbal connexion is too common in Aeschylean lyric to need illustration. In the present instance it is an important indication of the sequence of thought that runs through the three long poems of the Parodos.

Βαλεῖν signifies 'aim at and strike' the truth, as if a target. This figure recurs below at τεύχεται (175). The adverb ἐτητύμως 'truly', 'exactly' goes well with βαλεῖν. It is also contrasted with μάταν which refers to the obscurity of Calchas' interpretation. For ἐτητύμως of accurate perception or judgement cf. εἰ δ' ἐτητύμως τίς οἶδεν; (477-8), ὠνόμαζεν ἐτητύμως (681-2); also Cho. 948.

168-72. οὐδ' ὅστις πάροιθεν κτλ. This passage is generally thought to refer to two adversaries of Zeus or to his predecessors as ruler of the world. The scholiasts took the first three lines to be an allusion to Kronos and the next two to describe Typhoeus. Schütz suggested that the two adversaries were Ouranos and Kronos; and Fraenkel, who agrees with Schütz, compares *Prom.* 956-7 οὐκ ἐκ τῶνδ' ἐγὼ δισσοὺς τυράνους ἐκπεσόντας ἡμισθόμην; According to Ahrens's emendation of 170, Ouranos 'will not even be mentioned as existing', while Kronos 'met a thrower and is gone'.

The alleged descriptions of the adversaries of Zeus are very obscure. Neither contains a single word that can fix the identity of the deity concerned. Πάροιθεν ἦν μέγας and παρμάχῳ θράσει βρύων are applicable in equal degree to Ouranos and Kronos; they could also be used of any god, hero, or mortal who ever opposed the will of Zeus. Headlam and others thought that τριακτῆρος contained a reference to an Elean tale about a wrestling-match between Kronos and Zeus. Fraenkel wisely rejects this notion and regards τριακτῆρος as a reference to the overwhelming power of Zeus. It follows from this, however, that the second description too could be applied to anyone who was ever defeated by Zeus.

The foregoing consideration might be unimportant if the context led us to expect any mention of Ouranos and Kronos or other deities of the same kind

at this point. If, for example, the first stanza stated that the power of Zeus was *unchallenged* by any rival, we should be ready to hear now of individual challengers; and in that case we might be able to identify the deities meant despite the vagueness of the phrases used to describe them. As we have seen, however, the first stanza merely affirms the supremacy of Zeus in relation to mortals, and particularly in relation to the royal house of Argos. Hence a veiled allusion to Ouranos and Kronos in the following sentence is by no means inevitable or even plausible.

The sentence that follows 172 deals again with the relation between Zeus and men, and in the third stanza, as in the first, the Chorus have in mind the fortunes of their own kings. The omnipotent Zeus showed *men* the path to wisdom (see below). There is nothing here to suggest that 168 f. should be concerned with the rulers of heaven before Zeus.

Hence we must conclude that the context does not favour a reference to Ouranos and Kronos. The situation is quite different from that in the *Prometheus*, where the means by which Zeus came to power are of immediate interest to the characters on the stage and the terms used to describe his predecessors are plain.

We might ask in addition why, if Ouranos and Kronos are meant, the poet does not name them outright. If the dread name of Zeus can be uttered, there is no impiety or danger in using the names of ancient deities now powerless. Or why, according to Ahrens's version of the text, should the Chorus refuse to mention Ouranos, when in so doing they apparently all but name him? These minor difficulties reinforce the general objections already mentioned against the traditional interpretation of this passage, and it seems clear that this interpretation must be abandoned.

The explanation which I propose is as follows:

(a) The two sentences 168-70 and 171-2 refer to one person only; i.e. the pronoun *ὅς* (171) is anaphoric, and repeats *δοτὶς* (168); see Kühner-Gerth, *Gr. Gr.* ii. 2, pp. 226 f. § 516. 1-4 and L.-S.<sup>9</sup> s.v. *ὁ* VII. Moreover, the particles *οὐδέ* (168) and *δέ* (171) indicate a contrast between the two sentences and not merely between the subjects of these sentences; for the construction cf. Homer, *Il.* 9. 496-7, *Od.* 9. 45, Aeschylus *Suppl.* 1026, and see Denniston, *G.P.*, pp. 167 f. and Kühner-Gerth, ii. 2, p. 274, § 531. 2.

In the *first* of the two sentences, the construction *οὐδ' ὅστις . . . οὐδέν . . .* resembles Homer, *Il.* 6. 59 *μηδ' ὄντινα . . . φέροι, μηδ' ὅς γε φύγοι*; see Denniston, pp. 196 f., Kühner-Gerth, loc. cit.

In the *second* sentence, MS. *ἔπειτ'* is to be read as *ἐπεὶ τ'* 'as soon as', a conjunction taken from Ionian epic; see Denniston, pp. 521 f., Kühner-Gerth, ii. 2, p. 237, § 518. 2d. Although elsewhere in Attic literature the use of this word would be cause for surprise, it is not strange that Aeschylus should use it; the *Agamemnon*, in particular, bristles with epic words, including conjunctions and particles as well as nouns and verbs. See below on 170, 179.

Following aor. *ἔφθ*, pres. *οἴχεται* represents an immediate consequence; cf. Herodotus 1. 34. 3 *ὁ δὲ ἐπεὶ τε ἐξεγέρθη . . . ἄγεται μὲν κτλ.* Normally in a sentence such as this the subject would be an identifiable person and *οἴχεται* would be an historic present. And this is substantially the case here. For although *ὅς* (*δοτὶς*) is formally indefinite, we shall find in (b) below that it points to an individual who can be identified; cf. 1064-5 *ἥ μαινεταί γε καὶ κακῶν κλύει φρονῶν, ἥ τις λιποῦσα μὲν κτλ.*, and see L.-S.<sup>9</sup> s.v. *δοτὶς* II. 1. Thus

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the present-perfect *οἶχεται*, which does not lend itself to gnomic sentences, is in place here. Also, it makes a vivid contrast with *ἀν πέξει* and *τεύχεται*.

(b) In view of the foregoing assumptions the sense of the stanza will be: *a man who was great and bold at first . . . nothing, but from the very beginning of his life has lost the struggle; it is only a man who willingly acknowledges Zeus as victor in every fight that will achieve wisdom (and so live happily)*. This interpretation is in harmony with the principle announced in the first stanza, and also with the opinions expressed in the third.

The Chorus speak in general terms (*δοῖς, ὅς δέ*), but these terms must have some bearing on the dramatic context. In fact everyone in Argos is thinking now of Agamemnon (cf. 18 f., 32 f., 98 f., 121 f., 155 f.). Here is a king who was mighty of old and who is still mighty despite misfortune. His valour and warlike spirit are not in doubt. We have been told besides that the king and his house have been afflicted by the malevolence of Artemis, and the Chorus's mention at 154-5 of a *μῆνις τεκνόποινος* has shown this malevolence to stem from the curse pronounced by Thyestes. The Atreidae are destined to suffer through this wrath even in the hour of victory over Troy (131-4). Finally, we know that the fate of these princes is the special concern of the king of heaven (43, 60 f., 108 f.). Therefore when we hear of great and bold men who from the outset are engaged in an unequal struggle against the will of Zeus, we think naturally of Agamemnon and of no one else.

Now we have not been told previously that Agamemnon is foolish or wicked; but in this second stanza we find that the man who sets himself against Zeus is lacking in wisdom. This is precisely the point of the stanza: it reveals for the first time a flaw in the character of the king whose dignity, loyalty, and courage have been set before us as deserving admiration and respect. (In view of the fact that the audience already know about this flaw from epic poetry and can be expected to guess that the story of Iphigeneia which revealed the flaw is about to follow the story of the portent at Argos, Aeschylus is able to introduce the subject by an allusion expressed in general terms.)

The opening lines of the third stanza are syntactically dependent on the closing lines of the second. We shall find that they are concerned specifically with the death of Iphigeneia as a deed ordained by Zeus. Accordingly the third stanza supports the hypothesis that *οὐδ' ὁδοῖς . . . ὅς δέ* is aimed at Agamemnon.

(c) The sentence 168-70 should evidently be the negative converse of the sentence 171-2.

On the analogy of *Iliad* 6. 59 f. we might expect *οὐδ' ὁδοῖς* to be followed in 170 by another *οὐδέ* rather than by *οὐδέν*. But *οὐδέν* may be kept and treated as equivalent to *οὐδέ ἐν*; in sense it may be contrasted with *τριακτῆρος*, setting total defeat against overwhelming victory. (The classical rule in Attic that *οὐδέ* and *ἐν* are kept separate in the sense of 'not one' need not hold good for poetry in the archaic manner.)

Whether MS. *λέξει* be made into a 3 s. fut. indic. mid. or into some other verbal form it is hard to find a verb-stem that gives good sense in combination with *πρὶν ὦν*. Most emendations, including Ahrens's *λέξεται*, fail on this score alone. Hence it is reasonable to question the validity of *πρὶν ὦν* along with the rest of 170. Although this phrase is attested by all four manuscripts and is apparently unobjectionable in itself, it does look like a repetition of *παροιθεν* (168). Clearly, therefore, it might be a corruption inspired or influenced by



*πάροιθεν* and made tolerable by the fact that the rest of 170 was already in a confused state.

Following up these considerations I propose *οὐδὲν ἂν ρέξαι παρών*. This involves three changes in the MS. tradition, but each of them is simple enough; viz. loss of *ἂν* by haplography after *οὐδέν*, change of *ρ* to *λ*, rewriting of *παρών* either deliberately or accidentally to suit *πάροιθεν*.

The *-ais*, *-ai* endings of the 2, 3 s. aor. opt. act., though rare in Attic literature, are attested for Aeschylus and for other authors: see Kühner-Gerth i. 2, p. 74, § 214. Here it may be regarded either as an archaism native to the Attic dialect or as a further borrowing from epic. *Παρών* is often used in poetry at the end of a line or phrase, and it often accompanies a verb that denotes vigorous activity.

In sense both *ρέξαι* and *παρών* suit the figure of wrestling or duelling that runs through the passage; cf. the use of *ρέζω* in connexion with warlike deeds (see L.-S.<sup>9</sup>, s.v.) and the Homeric *παρεῖναι μάχη*, etc.

176-8. *τὸν φρονεῖν βροτοὺς ὁδῶσαντα*. In the first two stanzas the allusion to the royal house is veiled, but in these lines a reference to the portent given at Argos and another to the sacrifice of Iphigeneia, which followed the portent, make the Chorus's meaning clear.

It was Zeus who sent the eagles to warn the Atreidae both of victory and of impending disaster. The wrath that avenges children may be the wrath of Artemis, but it was not Artemis who sent the portent. And so in the events that fulfilled the promise of disaster it is wise to see the hand of Zeus also.

*Ὀδῶσαντα*, lit. 'providing with a way', 'guiding', 'directing'. Cf. *ὀδῖος* 'escorting' (104, 157); and Pindar, *N.* 9. 18 *οἰωνῶν ὁδὸν αἰσιον* (*αἰσιῶν* B: *αἰσιῶν* Tr) 'favourable direction shown by the birds', Soph. *O.C.* 34 *οἰωνῶν ὁδοῖς*.

This aorist participle hardly refers to the original institution of portents by Zeus as a gift to mankind. Like *θέντα* in the next phrase it indicates a particular instance of divine benevolence, i.e. the portent at Argos. Thus, although *βροτοὺς* is vague, the tense of these two participles limits the field of reference to one person (or one group of persons).

177. *τῷ πάθει*, the sacrifice of Iphigeneia. The occurrence of adverse winds at Aulis, together with Calchas' announcement of the price which must be paid to still them, constituted a second warning. Agamemnon hesitated but decided to slay his daughter. The suffering which he thus brought upon himself was a lesson confirming the power of Zeus.

The Chorus thus reject as inadequate Calchas' assertion that Artemis caused the winds and demanded the sacrifice. Calchas was not indeed wrong: the wrath of the goddess would call for the blood of the descendants of Atreus as long as any of them survived, and having been given some of that blood would be temporarily satisfied so as to allow Agamemnon to go on his way to Troy. But the prophet had failed to see underlying the cruel whim of Artemis the supreme will of Zeus, who warns before he condemns.

The article with *πάθει* indicates a particular experience, as do the aorist participles *ὁδῶσαντα*, *θέντα*. The audience, who already know the history of the Atreidae, would readily grasp the significance of a detail such as this.

179-80. *στάζει δ' ἐν θ' ὕπνωι*. The Chorus here revert from the particular to the universal; i.e. they speak in general terms as in 168-175. Nevertheless

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the structure of the sentence depends on the participial phrases which precede it. The subject of *στάζει* is to be inferred from *μάθος* or from *τῶι πάθει*. *Μνησιπήμων πόνος* is in apposition to the subject.

MS. *ἐν θ'* may stand. The combination *δέ . . . τε* is used here as in epic poetry (see L.-S.<sup>9</sup> s.v. *τε* B 1, C 4) to add a further circumstance, in this case one of general validity. The position of *θ'* does not throw stress on *ἐν ὕπνῳ* but is comparable with the separation of *τε* from *δέ* at Hom. *Il.* 10. 466 etc.

Emperius's emendation *ἀνθ' ὕπνου* is unnecessary. Apart from the fact that it requires two changes in the manuscript text, it offers no improvement in the sense. Men may be prevented from sleeping by the memory of their crimes; but they may also suffer *during* sleep by dreaming of them. (Similarly, in this play, Menelaus' grief is increased not by lying awake and thinking of Helen but by seeing visions of her in sleep.)

180-1. *καὶ παρ' ἄκοντας ἦλθε σωφρονεῖν*. The aorist signifies, in contrast with *στάζει*, the idea of completion or attainment.

*Καί* coordinates the two sentences; the emphasis on *παρ' ἄκοντας* depends on its position in the phrase and not on the particle.

It is sometimes thought that *ἦλθε* is impersonal and that *σωφρονεῖν* follows it closely in a consecutive sense. Housman rightly rejected this on the ground that *ἐλθεῖν* cannot be so used. It may be rejected also because the Chorus are suggesting not that Zeus makes fools wise but that he checks their folly by the memory of wrong doing. The subject of *ἦλθε* is in fact that of *στάζει*, and *σωφρονεῖν* depends directly on *ἄκοντας*. For *ἐλθεῖν* of the perception of pain cf. Homer, *Il.* 11. 363, 398, etc.

182-3. *βιαίως σέλμα σεμνὸν ἡμένων*. These words form a single phrase. *Σέλμα ἦσθαι* is equivalent to *κυβερνᾶν*, and so to *ἄρχειν*, *βασιλεύειν* etc. (cf. *οἶακα νέμων* 799, of Agamemnon; also *Sept.* 3 *οἶακα νωμῶν*, Sophocles *Aj.* 249 *εἰρεσίας ζυγὸν ἐξόμενον*). Thus, whereas *ἦσθαι* alone would be neutral in sense, indicating the simple fact of sitting and precluding vigorous activity on the part of the sitter, *σέλμα ἦσθαι* can well admit such activity as is appropriate to a steersman or ruler. Therefore this phrase may be qualified by adverbs describing the steersman's actions. Even if it be impossible to 'sit violently', a king may 'sit the bench violently', i.e. 'rule violently'.

We may agree with Fraenkel that they who rule violently are gods. But his contention that the god to whom this phrase chiefly refers is Zeus must be rejected. The Aeschylean Zeus is not, at least in this play, a violent god. His ways are the ways of inexorable justice and, if the punishments that he occasionally brings on mankind involve murder and wholesale slaughter, he is not therefore the wielder of what Fraenkel calls 'detestable brute force'. Elsewhere in the *Agamemnon* neither *βιά* nor any of its cognates is used with reference to Zeus. Such epithets belong properly to Ares and his like.

Indeed, the violent gods indicated by the phrase under discussion must stand in contrast to Zeus. If we look away from the justice of Zeus to the other Olympians, it is obvious that their relations with mankind are based not on moral principles but on a system of hard bargaining, where good is repaid with good and evil with evil. Now we know that the Chorus have already directed their attention towards Artemis, whom Calchas declared the enemy of the royal

house. Her persecution of the children of Atreus is simply a reflection of the curse pronounced by Thyestes. She neither warns her victims nor spares them, but simply exacts from them what is due to her. That is to say, her use of her divine power is violent in the extreme: she bestows no gift of grace on mankind.

Consequently we may suppose that, in speaking of gods who rule violently, the Chorus have in mind the malevolent attitude of Artemis which differs so sharply from the benevolent, though stern, decrees of Zeus. In this light it appears that the punctuation of M is right. The sentence is a question implying a negative answer. The all-powerful Zeus may in the end bring a man to ruin, but not before warning him once or, if necessary, twice by means of portents and punishments. No other god, least of all the relentless deity to whom Calchas ascribed the death of Iphigeneia, shows such leniency to mankind.<sup>1</sup>

*Edinburgh University*

A. J. BEATTIE

<sup>1</sup> The first drafts of this article were read by Professor Page and Mr. Rattenbury, to whom I am grateful for many criticisms. If errors still abound, I alone am to blame.

I am now inclined to consider ἔρρεξεν, gnomic aorist, as an alternative to ἄν λέξαι at 170, and also πονῶν for παρών in the same line.

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## SOME PROBLEMS IN ANAXIMANDER

THIS article deals with four almost classic problems in Anaximander. Of these the first is of comparatively minor importance, and the second is important not for what Anaximander thought but for what Aristotle thought he thought. Problem 1 is: Did Anaximander describe his *τὸ ἄπειρον* as *ἀρχή*? Problem 2: Did Aristotle mean Anaximander when he referred to people who postulated an intermediate substance? Problem 3: Did Anaximander think that there were innumerable successive worlds? Problem 4: What is the extent and implication of the extant fragment of Anaximander? Appended is a brief consideration of the nature of Theophrastus' source-material for Anaximander; on one's opinion of this question the assessment of the last two problems will clearly depend.

The present article was read as a paper to the Oxford Philological Society in November 1953, and has been slightly emended as a result of the helpful discussion on that occasion. Recently there has appeared a study of considerable interest and importance, J. B. McDiarmid's 'Theophrastus on the Presocratic Causes', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* lxi (1953), 85-156. In his brief discussion of Anaximander (pp. 96-102, with notes) McDiarmid has a good deal to say which bears on my problems 1, 2, and 4. In the first two cases, and up to a sharply defined point in problem 4 (after which there is a radical difference of interpretation), his views complement my own. It seemed more useful, therefore, to leave my main text unaltered (except for the addition of the present paragraph), and to refer to McDiarmid's views, where necessary, in additional footnotes—one or two of them of some length. It might be added that the suggestions at the end of this paper about Theophrastus' access to original Presocratic sources may now be judged in the light of McDiarmid's general thesis (which he seems to me to have proved<sup>1</sup>), that Theophrastus is heavily dependent on Aristotle's Presocratic interpretations, and should not be unthinkingly accepted as an independent source.

In the table on the following page will be found the main evidence, set out in corresponding columns, for the reconstruction of Theophrastus' abridged account of Anaximander's *arche*. Simplicius appears to give a more or less exact quotation from the two-volume abridgement of *Φυσικῶν δόξαι*. Hippolytus and the pseudo-Plutarchean *Stromateis* give looser paraphrases. In the right-hand column I have placed some extracts from Aristotle which illustrate Theophrastus' dependence on him at some points. If one compares the language of λέγει δ' αὐτὴν . . . φύσιν ἄπειρον in column 1 with Aristotle's οἱ δὲ περὶ φύσεως πάντες κτλ. in column 4 (where the sense is notably different), one sees that Theophrastus was so soaked in Aristotle that he tended on occasion to express (and to distort) his meaning by means of the mere rearrangement of complex Aristotelian terms.

### 1. DID ANAXIMANDER DESCRIBE HIS *τὸ ἄπειρον* AS *ἀρχή*?

It is now generally agreed<sup>2</sup> that the words *πρῶτος τοῦτο τοῦνομα κομίσας τῆς*

<sup>1</sup> See also my *Heraclitus, the Cosmic Fragments*, 20-25, 30.

<sup>2</sup> Not, however, by McDiarmid, who in a note to the article already mentioned (*Harvard Studies* lxi (1953), n. 46 on pp. 138-40) argues in favour of the conclusion put for-

ward here. However, he rejects Burnet's interpretation of *πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἀρχὴν ὀνομάσας τὸ ὑποκείμενον* (see p. 23), and tentatively suggests reading (see p. 23 below) *οὕτως* for *αὐτός*. His objections to that interpretation are: (1) it 'does not render the Greek, as

SIMPPLICIUS in Phys. p. 24. 13 Diels (DK 12 A 9)	HIPPOLYTUS Ref. 1. 6. 1-2 (DK 12 A 11)	[PLUTARCH] Stromateis 2 (DK 12 A 10)	ARISTOTLE parallels
... Αναξίμανδρος ... ἀρχὴν τε καὶ στοιχείον εἶρηκε τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἄπειρον,  πρῶτος τοῦτο τοῦνομα κομίσας τῆς ἀρχῆς.  λέγει δ' αὐτὴν μήτε ὕδωρ μήτε ἄλλο τι τῶν καλουμένων εἶναι στοιχείων, ἀλλ' ἐτέραν τινὰ φύσιν ἄπειρον,  ἐξ ἧς ἅπαντας γίνεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμους.  ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσις ἐστὶ τοῖς οἷσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρεῶν.  διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσαν ἀλλήλοισ τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν,  ποιητι- κωτέροις οὕτως ὀνό- μασιν αὐτὰ λέγων.	(2) οὗτος μὲν ἀρχὴν τε καὶ στοιχείον εἶρηκε τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἄπειρον,  πρῶτος τοῦνομα καλέ- σας τῆς ἀρχῆς.  (1) οὗτος ἀρχὴν ἔφη τῶν ὄντων.  φύσιν τινὰ τοῦ ἁπείρου,  ἐξ ἧς γί- νεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς κό- σμον.  ταύτην δ' αἰδίων εἶναι καὶ ἀγήρω, ἣν καὶ πάντας περιέχειν τοὺς κόσμους.  λέγει δὲ χρό- νον ὥς ὠρισμένης τῆς γένεσεως καὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς.  (λέγει δὲ χρόνον)	... Αναξίμανδρον ... τὸ ἄπειρον φάναι τὴν πάσαν αἰτίαν ἔχειν τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως τε καὶ φθορᾶς,  ἐξ οὗ δὴ φησι τοὺς τε οὐρανοὺς ἀποκεκρίσθαι καὶ καθ- όλου τοὺς ἅπαντας ἀπεί- ρους ὄντας κόσμους.  ἀπ- εφῆματο δὲ τὴν φθορὰν γίνεσθαι καὶ πολὺ πρό- τερον τὴν γένεσιν ἐξ ἁπείρου αἰῶνος ἀνακυ- κλουμένων πάντων αὐ- τῶν.	Phys. Γ 4. 203 <sup>a</sup> 16 οἱ δὲ περὶ φύσεως πάντες ὑπο- τιθέασιν ἐτέραν τινὰ φύσιν τῷ ἀπείρῳ τῶν λεγομένων στοιχείων, οἷον ὕδωρ ἢ ἀέρα ἢ τὸ μεταξὺ τούτων.  de Caelo Γ 5. 303 <sup>b</sup> 10 ἐνιοὶ γὰρ ἐν μόνον ὑπο- τίθενται, ... ὁ περιέχειν φασὶ πάντας τοὺς οὐρα- νοὺς ἄπειρον ὂν.  Phys. Γ 4. 203 <sup>b</sup> 11 (τὸ ἄπειρον) περιέχειν ἅπαν- τα καὶ πάντα κυβερνᾷ ... καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ θεῖον ἀθάνατον γὰρ καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξίμανδρος καὶ οἱ πλείστοι ...  Phys. Γ 5. 204 <sup>b</sup> 33 ἅπαν- τα γὰρ ἐξ οὗ ἐστὶ, καὶ διαλύεται εἰς τοῦτο.

Jaeger claims': with this I disagree (see n. 1 on p. 23). (2) 'It makes no sense, since Simplicius has already treated the water of Thales as a material substratum of the opposites (Phys., p. 149, 5-7 and p. 150, 11-12).' This objection seems to me to be met by my submission below that 'Anaximander would be singled out here as the first explicit holder of the idea in question because oppo-

sites were actually named by him (and not of course by Thales) as emerging from the *arche*.' But McDiarmid would not accept this: see n. 2 on p. 26. He usefully calls attention to another passage in Simplicius, *de Caelo* p. 615. 15 Heiberg, which possibly supports the minority view: ἄπειρον δὲ πρῶτος (Anaximander) ὑπέθετο.

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*ἀρχῆς*, in the Simplicius column of the table opposite, mean that Anaximander first used the word *ἀρχή* of the originative substance, in his case τὸ *ἄπειρον*. I merely wish to revive and reinforce Burnet's view (*E.G.P.*<sup>4</sup> 54, n. 2) that, on the contrary, what is meant is that Anaximander was the first to call his material principle (for which *ἀρχή* was the normal Peripatetic term) by the name τὸ *ἄπειρον*. The Simplicius version seems to me to mean *that and nothing else*. The Hippolytus version, printed in column 2, is odd as it stands: I know of no good parallel for the genitive of the name given, after the phrase *ὄνομα καλεῖν*. Burnet suggested that *τοῦτο* was omitted by haplography before *τοῖνομα*, which seems probable enough in itself; compare another corruption in the Hippolytus passage, τὸν . . . κόσμον for τοὺς . . . κόσμους. As for *καλέσας*, it is possible as it stands, or it may have replaced an original *κομίσας* (which indeed is more likely in view of the greater accuracy elsewhere of Simplicius' version): note that Hippolytus omits τῶν καλουμένων στοιχείων, which he nevertheless probably read in his source. If this interpretation is correct, Theophrastus was simply developing Aristotle's judgement at *Phys. Γ* 4. 203<sup>a</sup>16 (the first passage in the right-hand column above), that all the *φυσικοί* assumed an *ἄπειρον*: Anaximander was the first actually to use the expression, and as a complete description of the *arche*.

The real objection to the Burnet interpretation, however, is based on another passage of Simplicius, in *Phys.* p. 150. 20 Diels: ἕτερος δὲ τρόπος καθ' ὃν οὐκ ἐπὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν τῆς ὕλης αἰτιῶνται οὐδὲ κατὰ ἀλλοίωσιν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου τὰς γενέσεις ἀποδιδοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐκκρίσιν· ἐνούσας γὰρ τὰς ἐναντιότητας ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, ἀπείρῳ ὄντι σώματι, ἐκκρίνεσθαι φησιν Ἀναξίμανδρος, πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἀρχὴν ὀνομάσας τὸ ὑποκείμενον. I accept that the obvious meaning of the last clause is 'having been the first to call the substratum of opposites *ἀρχή*'. Yet leaving aside the possibility that Simplicius might merely have misunderstood Theophrastus, this piece of information is quite gratuitous and irrelevant in the place where it stands. Burnet's interpretation of the clause was: 'being the first to name the substratum of the opposites as the material cause'. I accept this as a possible, though not the obvious, meaning of these words.<sup>1</sup> What seems important is that such a meaning would be absolutely relevant, instead of absolutely irrelevant, to Simplicius' commentary here, the sense of which is that the *φυσικοί* made their originative substance a substratum of Aristotelian change. Admittedly this is assumed to be true, also, of Thales *qua* *φυσικός*: but Anaximander would be singled out here as the first explicit holder of the idea in question because opposites were actually named by him (and not of course by Thales) as emerging from the *arche*.

Three final points. First, Theophrastus, like Aristotle, was content to use the word *ἀρχή*, without special comment, in his remarks on *Thales*, and Simplicius had actually quoted those remarks only about 250 words before the passage on Anaximander. Secondly, if Simplicius had really understood from Theophrastus that Anaximander pioneered this sense of *ἀρχή*, he might be expected to have introduced this information somewhat earlier, in his long expansion of Aristotle's discussion of *ἀρχαί* at the very beginning of his commentary (in *Phys.*, pp. 3-7 Diels, esp. p. 6, lines 31 ff.). Thirdly, it is admitted that Anaximander

<sup>1</sup> At any rate Jaeger's objection, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* 201, n. 28, that ὀνομάζειν must mean literally 'to give the name of', is not cogent. This verb

is sometimes used loosely to mean 'specify as', 'identify as'; e.g. Plato, *Rep.* 4. 428 e . . . ὅσοι ἐπιστήμας ἔχοντες ὀνομάζονται τιwes εἶναι . . .

could perfectly well have used ἀρχή, meaning 'source', compare, for example, *velikos ἀρχή* in the *Iliad*. In any case I should have expected him, like most cosmogonists, to have used phrases like ἀπ' ἀρχῆς or κατ' ἀρχήν. But ἀρχή used by itself, and not in prepositional phrases, does not occur in the surviving fragments of any other Presocratic thinker, as a description of the primary and originative substance. I find this *silentium* odd, though of course by no means conclusive. In sum, I do not think that Burnet's view can be proved to be correct; but I suggest that it is at least as likely to be right as the accepted view, and should certainly not be regarded as liquidated.<sup>1</sup>

## 2. DID ARISTOTLE MEAN ANAXIMANDER WHEN HE REFERRED TO PEOPLE WHO POSTULATED AN INTERMEDIATE SUBSTANCE?

It is well known that in nine places Aristotle, when listing the material principles of monistic physicists, mentions a substance intermediate between the so-called elements: either denser than fire and finer than air, or denser than air and finer than water, or once, oddly and no doubt by error, intermediate between water and fire. Of the ancient commentators, Alexander referred all and Simplicius most of these passages to Anaximander. Zeller, however, followed Simplicius in noting that one of them clearly places Anaximander in a quite separate group from whoever postulated an intermediate substance: *Physics* A 4. 187<sup>a</sup>12 'ὡς δ' οἱ φυσικοὶ λέγουσι, δύο τρόποι εἰσίν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ποιήσαντες τὸ σῶμα τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἢ τῶν τριῶν τι ἢ ἄλλο ὃ ἐστὶ πυρὸς μὲν πυκνότερον ἀέρος δὲ λεπτότερον, τὰλλα γεννώσι πυκνότητι καὶ μαλόνῃτι πολλά ποιούντες . . . οἱ δ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐνούσας τὰς ἐναντιότητας ἐκκρίνεσθαι, ὥσπερ Ἀναξίμανδρος φησι, καὶ ὅσοι δ' ἐν καὶ πολλά φασιν εἶναι, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας' ἐκ τοῦ μίγματος γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι ἐκκρίνουσι τὰλλα. This crucial passage states that 'the physicists may be divided into two groups. Those (οἱ μὲν) who make the corporeal substratum *one*, either one of the three (*sc.* fire, air, water) or something else denser than fire and finer than air, generate the rest by thickening and thinning . . . while the others (οἱ δέ) say that the opposites are separated out from the one, in which they inhere, as Anaximander says . . .'. On the strength of this passage Zeller (*Z-N* I. i. 283 ff.) held that Anaximander can *never* be meant when an intermediate is mentioned. A few, for example Burnet (*E.G.P.*<sup>4</sup> 55 f.) and Joachim (*Aristotle on Coming-to-be and Passing-away*, 193 and 225), clung to Alexander's view, but Zeller has carried the day and it is now widely taken for granted (for example by Ross, *Aristotle, Physics*, 482 f.) that the intermediate substance has nothing to do with Anaximander.<sup>2</sup> One of the characteristics of this highly academic dispute is the freedom with which each side has simply ignored hostile evidence. Thus Burnet ignored the crucial passage already quoted; while those, on the other hand, who maintain that the references must be to some unknown thinkers *intermediate between Anaximenes and Heraclitus*, for example (!) (cf. Ross, *loc. cit.*), neglect the damaging fact that the description of the nature of the intermediate body varies from passage to passage, apparently at random. Burnet remarked: 'This variation

<sup>1</sup> With McDiarmid's support I now feel inclined to claim rather more than this.

<sup>2</sup> McDiarmid has a good discussion (*op. cit.*, pp. 100 ff.) of the way in which Aristotle and then Theophrastus were able to

treat Anaximander as both a monist and a pluralist. He does not go into the particular difficulties of the intermediate-substance terminology, but obviously assumes that Anaximander is sometimes meant.

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shows at once that he [*sc.* Aristotle] is not speaking historically'. If this were modified so as to mean that Aristotle did not always have in mind a specific intermediate actually postulated by a specific thinker, I should agree unreservedly.<sup>1</sup>

Once again, the commonly discarded view seems the more correct. The idea of intermediate substances surely arose in the first instance out of Aristotle's obvious bewilderment at Anaximander's concept of an originaive material qualified only as *ἄπειρον* (which Aristotle took to mean, primarily, spatially infinite), and as divine and all-encompassing. Himself committed to the four simple bodies and to the theory of change as between opposites, and accepting 'the elements' as the key-note of primitive physics, Aristotle normally assumed that Anaximander must have meant his *ἄπειρον* to have some relation to one or more of the *στοιχεῖα*—especially since it evidently gave rise to the opposites. Thus at *Phys.* Γ 4. 203<sup>a</sup>16 (quoted in the right-hand column on p. 22), in the course of his discussion of infinity, Aristotle asserted that *all* the *φυσικοί*, obviously including Anaximander, attach to the infinite some other substance from the so-called elements, for example water or air or something intermediate between the two. Here we may pertinently ask what substance Anaximander attached to the *ἄπειρον*, in Aristotle's present judgement, if not an intermediate.

The conviction that there should be some relationship, even if not one of simple identity, between τὸ *ἄπειρον* and the Presocratic elements underlies the use of Aristotle's phrase τὸ παρὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα, 'that which is other than the elements, is not identifiable with any of them'. Some at least of the passages in which this phrase occurs, although no formal mention is made of Anaximander (whom Aristotle names only four times in all), almost certainly refer to him.

(i) *de Generatione* B 5. 332<sup>a</sup>18 ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος περὶ πάντων, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τούτων ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα. οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἄλλο τί γε παρὰ ταῦτα, οἷον μέσον τι ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος ἢ ἀέρος καὶ πυρός, ἀέρος μὲν παχύτερον καὶ πυρός, τῶν δὲ λεπτότερον. ἔσται γὰρ αἷρ καὶ πῦρ ἐκεῖνο μετ' ἐναντιότητος, ἀλλὰ στέρησις τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων, ὥστ' οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μονοῦσθαι ἐκεῖνο οὐδέποτε, ὥσπερ φασὶ τινες τὸ *ἄπειρον* καὶ τὸ περιέχον. . . . Here τὸ *ἄπειρον* καὶ τὸ περιέχον, which is implied to be 'something other than the elements', τί γε παρὰ ταῦτα (and a μέσον or intermediate), seems almost certainly intended as a reference to Anaximander. He at any rate is the only one who can have held that the indefinite surrounding stuff (*cf.* *Phys.* Γ 4. 203<sup>b</sup>11) may be considered as existing by itself (*μονοῦσθαι*), without reference to specific forms of matter ('the elements'). (ii) *de Generatione* B 1. 329<sup>a</sup>8 ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ποιοῦντες μίαν ὕλην παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα, ταύτην δὲ σωματικὴν καὶ χωριστήν, ἀμαρτάνουσιν. ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀνὲν ἐναντιώσεως εἶναι τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο αἰσθητὸν ὄν· ἢ γὰρ κοῦφον ἢ βαρὺ ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ *ἄπειρον* τοῦτο, ὃ λέγουσί τινες εἶναι τὴν ἀρχήν. 'But those who assume a single corporeal and separate material beyond those specified, παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα, are in error. For it is impossible for this body, being perceptible, to be without contrariety; for this infinite thing, which some say is the ἀρχή, is necessarily light or heavy or hot or cold.' The argument is that this substance is corporeal, and therefore perceptible, by definition: hence it must have the properties of perceptible bodies, lightness or weight, etc., and so be bound up with the opposites and

<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, Nicolaus and Porphyrius suggested Diogenes of Apollonia, whose *arche* was indubitably air and not an intermediate; while Zeller and Diels hit infelicitously upon

one Idaeus of Himera, about whom we are told one thing and no more by antiquity, that he, too, believed the *arche* to be air.



positively related to the elements. The description τὸ ἀπειρον τοῦτο, ὃ λέγουσι πυνες εἶναι τὴν ἀρχήν must, I think, be intended to refer to Anaximander. (iii) *Phys.* Γ 5. 204<sup>b</sup>22 declares that some people say that there is an infinite body beside the elements, τὸ παρὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα, to avoid the consequence that derivative bodies would be destroyed by the infinite stuff if both it and they were characterized by opposites. This reason for the avoidance of an actual constituent of our differentiated world as origination substance, although expressed in typically Aristotelian terms, may well have been substantially Anaximander's,<sup>1</sup> *contra* Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy*, 376. It accords with the implication of the extant fragment, to be discussed later, which cannot be said of the other motive suggested by Aristotle for the hypothesis of an infinite *arche*—'that becoming might not fail', ἵνα ἡ γένεσις μὴ ἐπιλείπη. Admittedly a motive resembling this latter one was assigned to Anaximander by Aëtius and presumably, therefore, by Theophrastus: but Theophrastus may simply have picked the wrong one of the two motives suggested by his master, or he may have thought that both were relevant.

In view of the above instances we may accept the opinion of many scholars that in some at any rate of the passages concerning a substance *other than the elements* Aristotle appears to have Anaximander in mind. If this is so, then we may take it that on occasions at least Aristotle thought of Anaximander's τὸ ἀπειρον as τὸ παρὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα.

Now the formulation τὸ παρὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα is presumably a deliberate one. One notices that it is wide enough to embrace not only intermediate substances, if such were really to exist, but also other postulable forms of matter not identical with fire or air or water or earth. Normally, it is true, the phrase appears to refer to an intermediate. It may be significant, however, that in one passage, *Phys.* Γ 5. 204<sup>b</sup>29 (continuing the passage cited at (iii) above), the idea expressed by the phrase in question is refuted by an argument appreciably wider than (though not precluding) that regularly brought to bear against any intermediate substance: not that it is an element, merely, with excess or deficiency of one contrary (as, for example, at *de Generatione B* 1. 332<sup>a</sup>22, quoted under (i) above), but that if it were originally perceptible body we should still be able to perceive it, since things are destroyed into that from which they came.

Theoretically, then, a *mixture* or *fusion* of the so-called elements, in addition to an intermediate between them, might come under the broad heading of τὸ παρὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα. Now that Aristotle was inclined on occasion to class Anaximander with Empedocles and Anaxagoras, as *separating out* the opposites from an original One, we know both from *Phys.* A 4. 187<sup>a</sup>20 (quoted on p. 24) and from *Met.* A 2. 1069<sup>b</sup>21: τὸ Ἀναξαγόρου ἐν . . . καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους τὸ μίγμα καὶ Ἀναξίμανδρου. It is not difficult to guess why Aristotle considers Anaximander in this light: it is because he knew that Anaximander used a term like ἀποκρίνεσθαι or ἐκκρισις, or because he knew that Anaximander somehow produced opposed substances in a secondary stage of the world-forming process.<sup>2</sup> In

<sup>1</sup> So also McDiarmid, *Harvard Studies* lxi (1953), 99.

<sup>2</sup> U. Hölscher, *Hermes* lxxxi (1953), 261 f. (cf. 265-7), thinks that it was Aristotle who supplied the opposites in Anaximander, because he took Anaximander's use of ἀποκρίνεσθαι (which need not imply opposites) to imply the ἐκκρισις of Aristotle's own oppo-

sites and the four simple bodies. One should certainly be cautious here, but I think that Hölscher's attempt to deny the concept of opposites to Anaximander has no indisputable foundation, and that it is contrary to the probable implications of the fragment and to Heraclitus' implicit correction of Anaximander. McDiarmid now adds his warning

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either case, Aristotle would have assumed, τὸ ἄπειρον must, for Anaximander, have potentially or actually contained the opposites. According to the present suggestion, then, Aristotle, by thinking of Anaximander as postulating a first principle which was not identifiable with any of the traditional elements, which was παρὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα, was enabled by the ambiguity of this formulation and the concept which it expresses to concentrate on either of two alternative interpretations of τὸ ἄπειρον—as an *intermediate*, or as a *mixture*. Passages have been adduced in which each interpretation is used; though it must be admitted that the two mixture-interpretation passages do not use the παρὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα formulation. Thus it may be that in the crucial passage *Phys.* A 4. 187<sup>a</sup>12 (on p. 24), where Aristotle divides the φυσικοί into two classes, those who generate out of the one by condensation and rarefaction, and those who generate by separation from a mixture, Anaximander appears explicitly in the second class; but Aristotle is led to associate with the first class, also, a type of substance, for the sake of exhaustivity, which he elsewhere normally connects with Anaximander.

That an intermediate substance should be named on occasion simply for the sake of exhaustivity, and be devoid for the time being of any specific historical association for Aristotle, may seem improbable on first consideration. Yet the casual way in which the intermediate may be introduced is exemplified by *Met.* A 8. 989<sup>a</sup>12: κατὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐτ' εἰ τις τούτων τι λέγει πλὴν πυρός, οὐτ' εἰ τις ἀέρος μὲν πυκνότερον τοῦτο τίθησιν ὕδατος δὲ λεπτότερον, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοι. Here Aristotle's argument is that he who explains γένεσις by accretion should postulate as *arche* the finest form of matter, that is, fire; 'otherwise, if he specifies anything but fire, even if he made it denser than air and finer than water, he would be at fault'. Clearly the second-best to fire here is the intermediate between fire and air, and Aristotle should have said 'denser than fire and finer than air'.<sup>1</sup> He also varies in his treatment of intermediates as a class. At *Phys.* A 6. 189<sup>b</sup>5 he asserts that τὸ μεταξύ is less bound up with the opposites than the elements are, but elsewhere there is held to be no distinction between them in this respect. At *de Generatione* B 5. 332<sup>a</sup>20 (quoted on

(op. cit., pp. 101 f.) to Hölscher's, and in particular calls attention to Simplicius in *Phys.* p. 27. 11 Diels (*Dox.* 479. 2), where Simplicius may assert that, according to Theophrastus, Anaximander separated gold and earth out of his ἄπειρον. The question is whether ἐκεῖνος here refers to Anaximander or to Anaxagoras (the two are being compared). Both views have been taken, and I am not convinced that McDiarmid is right in saying that ἐκεῖνος must be Anaximander. We have to take into account that the choice of the strong demonstrative may have been determined by the lost context in Theophrastus himself, or even in Alexander, and not by the extant context in Simplicius' version. In this extant context, it is true, ἐκεῖνος should refer to Anaximander: and this is important evidence so far as it goes. In any event, I do not maintain that what is separated off from Anaximander's ἄπειρον must only be the two important pairs of opposites mentioned by Heraclitus, canonized by Empedocles, and taken over by Aristotle—

though these were the most obvious cosmological (and meteorological) oppositions at any date. Nor would I insist that only objects defined by their names as opposites (e.g. τὸ θερμόν and τὸ ψυχρόν, or τὸ σκληρόν and τὸ μαλακόν) are separated off. We can see from Anaxagoras fr. 4 that no one kind of classification would necessarily be used. If Anaximander (and not only Anaxagoras) mentioned gold and earth among the things separated from the Indefinite, this does not mean that he did not feel all those things to possess contrary δυνάμεις in one way or another; though some would have a more obvious polarity (and would perhaps be more important cosmologically) than others. See also p. 33 below.

<sup>1</sup> A slip by Aristotle, or a displacement in the text-tradition, is a possibility, of course, but hardly more probable than not. We have allowed him one such slip already—the intermediate between water and fire (omitting air) at *Phys.* A 6. 189<sup>b</sup>1.

p. 25 above), and in other passages, it is plain enough that it is the intermediate as such and not any particular intermediate that is under consideration. These factors lead to the conclusion that Aristotle did not on any occasion have any objective historical use of an intermediate substance in mind, and that he usually specified one or other intermediate almost at random, merely for the sake of example.<sup>1</sup> At the same time the variation in his treatment and the fact that the intermediate is mentioned not once but several times, when the *archai* of the Presocratics are in question, indicate that he thought the possibility of the existence of such substances to deserve attention, if only by refutation. The conception of the intermediate is really his own, but it arose out of a feeling that Anaximander must have meant his *ἄπειρον* to be somehow qualified in terms of opposites. Aristotle assumed (to recapitulate) that Anaximander must have met this problem in one of the two ways which Aristotle himself suggested, both of which are covered by the description of the *ἄπειρον* as 'not identical with any of the elements'. When it was Aristotle's purpose to enumerate the single *archai* of the monists he tended to include τὸ μεταξὺ, which arose out of his consideration of Anaximander and which he sometimes but not always associated with him. When, on the other hand, he turned to consider cosmogonies which made explicit use of the opposites, he was able to treat Anaximander's *ἄπειρον* as being παρὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα to the extent of containing the opposites, like Empedocles' σφαῖρος and Anaxagoras' ἦν ὁμοῦ πάντα. On one occasion this latter interpretation of Anaximander is formally opposed to the postulation of an intermediate. This should persuade us not that the intermediate never had any association with Anaximander, but that it is simply a rather vague formulation by Aristotle which, though in the first place applied to Anaximander, is often repeated with no thought of him in mind and merely to satisfy Aristotle's own requirements of exhaustivity.<sup>2</sup>

### 3. INNUMERABLE WORLDS

Cornford demonstrated in *C.Q.* xxviii (1934), 1 ff. that Burnet's assignment (*E.G.P.*<sup>4</sup> 58 ff.) of coexistent innumerable worlds to Anaximander rested on a

<sup>1</sup> The intermediate between water and earth is not mentioned, since it would be liable to the same obvious objections as earth, though to a lesser degree.

<sup>2</sup> Before leaving this problem mention should be made of an hypothesis propounded by O. Gigon in his *Der Ursprung der griechischen Philosophie*, pp. 68 ff. In our nine Aristotelian passages which refer to an intermediate he distinguishes between those that describe it as denser than one element and finer than another, and those (four in number) which simply call it μεταξὺ and do not mention density. These latter passages, Gigon asserts, are accurate references by Aristotle to Anaximander; while the others are classed as 'a later interpretation' on the dubious ground that the idea of rarefaction and condensation does not antedate Anaximenes. On this criterion the crucial passage *Phys.* A 4. 187<sup>a</sup>12 is 'a later interpretation'. But this does not explain the opposition in

that passage between Anaximander and the intermediate; for the so-called later interpretation, of a substance intermediate in density, was at any rate an interpretation of Anaximander, and must have been to some extent associated by Aristotle with him. The suggestion that, in those passages where *as it happens* (as I would contend) Aristotle does not mention density in connexion with the intermediate, we are face to face with a genuine undistorted account of Anaximander is surely rather extravagant. This suggestion is made in order to support a theory that many will find implausible, that Anaximander's *ἄπειρον* was intermediate between light and night, in a manner not so much physical as metaphysical or ideal! As so often an apparently promising initial examination of the evidence is followed by highly speculative conclusions which lie far beyond the range of that evidence.

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false assessment of the doxographical evidence on this point, as well as on the misinterpretation of several later Presocratics. References in the doxographers to coexistent *kosmoi* were due, Cornford thought, partly to a confusion with Anaximander's *κύκλοι* of sun, moon, and stars, partly to a post-Theophrastean application of Atomistic arguments to *all* who postulated unlimited matter.

Cornford accepted Zeller's contention (Z-N I. i. 305 ff.) that the plural worlds which all scholars accept in Anaximander were successive and not coexistent. His chief objection to coexistent worlds was that there is 'nothing in the appearance of nature' to suggest them (except perhaps the stars, obviously excluded by the character of Anaximander's account of them). But the same objection, I submit, applies to the *successive* separate worlds accepted by Zeller and Cornford—'separate', that is, as opposed to local *κόσμοι* or periodical rearrangements of our earth's surface. The total destruction of the world and its reabsorption into the originative material, followed by the birth of a new world, and so on, were for long accepted in Heraclitus on the strength of the Stoic *ecpyrosis*-interpretation (see my *Heraclitus, the Cosmic Fragments*, 335 ff.), and its acceptance has perhaps unconsciously conditioned many modern scholars to countenance successive separate worlds in Anaximander. But the idea of different worlds in time would be, surely, an absolutely extraordinary one for an early Ionian thinker, whose object, judging from the other evidence, was to explain *our* world and account for its coherence. This necessitated, as it seemed to the Milesians, the description of a cosmic evolution from a single kind of matter. It did *not* necessitate the irrelevant and bizarre hypothesis of the world disappearing again into that same kind of matter. The material of the world was divine; it possessed its own life and movement, perhaps, but the life was the unending life of the immortal gods and not the terminable life of R. G. Collingwood's cosmic cow (*The Idea of Nature*, 32).<sup>1</sup> As for the argument that what was born must die, one has only to think of the widely scattered myths of the birth of Zeus, for example, to dispose of *that*. This world is assumed to have had a birth because only so, it seemed, could its intuited unity be rationally explained.

At the same time there was undoubtedly a widespread tendency among the Greeks to believe that our world has undergone in the past, and will undergo again in the future, periods or cycles of drastic physical alteration. I refer not to the analogous idea of culture-periods like Hesiod's five ages, but to the belief in catastrophes by extensive fire and flood, a belief well illustrated in the course of the *μῦθος* at *Timaeus* 22 c-e: 'Many are the destructions of men and of many kinds that have been and shall be, the greatest of them by fire and water, the rest shorter and from countless other causes.' The Egyptian priest who speaks these words goes on to say that the story of Phaethon conceals a truth, that periodically the earth is scorched when the heavenly bodies incline too near in their orbits. The Deucalion myth, too, may be placed in a comparable context. These mythical traditions arose in part, no doubt, from a residual folk-memory of floods and droughts in, for example, Egypt and Mesopotamia. But in the sixth century B.C. supporting evidence of a more tangible kind was at hand. In Ionia there seemed to be incontrovertible signs that the sea was slowly drying up: the great river-mouths were silting at surprising speed, and the harbours

<sup>1</sup> Collingwood's interpretation here is influenced by his tendency to view archaic Greek speculation through the medium of

later thought. In this case he is projecting the ideas of the *Timaeus* on to the Ionians (cf. *op. cit.* 72).

of Ephesus and Miletus were in danger. Further, Xenophanes, who was not much junior to Anaximander, had access to reports of fossils from many parts of the Aegean world, from which he concluded that the land must once have been sea and is gradually drying out. In time, he thought, the process would be reversed and everything would turn into mud, and so on. Anaximander, too, might have heard of these marine fossils, which would naturally be a source of general curiosity. At all events Alexander of Aphrodisias, in his commentary on Aristotle's *Meteorologica*, asserted that according to Theophrastus a reference there (*Meteor. B* 1. 353<sup>b6</sup>) to 'those who think that the sea is diminishing and drying up, and that eventually it will all be dry' was to Anaximander and Diogenes of Apollonia.<sup>1</sup> It is possible, therefore, that Anaximander did, like Xenophanes, postulate long-term changes in the constitution of the earth's surface—changes in heat and cold, dryness and wetness, which might alternate like summer and winter though at much longer intervals.<sup>2</sup>

If Anaximander held this kind of view—and we have Alexander's word for it, and no more, that Theophrastus thought he did—then it is easy to see how his theory of successive states of the earth's surface, perhaps involving the near-destruction of animal life, could have been later expanded into one of successive separate worlds. This type of distortion might be particularly easy because of the ambiguity of the word *κόσμος*, which could signify either the world as a whole or more localized arrangements within it.

Our direct evidence for successive separate worlds in Anaximander is entirely based upon Aristotle and Theophrastus. According to Simplicius' version of Theophrastus (in the left-hand column of the table on p. 22) he wrote of 'all the heavens and the worlds in them'; these, we are told, came from the Boundless. It is clear that this contention is meant to be supported by the fragment of Anaximander, which Theophrastus evidently went on to quote. I shall argue below that this fragment cannot in fact be concerned with the relation between successive worlds and the Boundless. If that is so, then the reliability of Theophrastus' testimony<sup>3</sup> on the question of innumerable worlds falls very much under suspicion. In fact, the phrase *τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμους* looks like a reminiscence of a remark by Aristotle at *de Caelo* Γ 5. 303<sup>b10</sup>: *ἐνιοὶ γὰρ ἐν μόνον ὑποτίθενται, καὶ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν ὕδωρ, οἱ δ' αἶρα, οἱ δὲ πῦρ, οἱ δ' ὕδατος μὲν λεπτότερον αἶρος δὲ πυκνότερον, ὃ περιέχειν φασὶ πάντας τοὺς οὐρανοὺς ἀπειρον ὄν.* Here the reference to 'all the heavens' is puzzling on any interpretation.<sup>4</sup> Conceivably it is intended to cover those *φυσικοί* who might in Aristotle's view have posited plural worlds—possibly Heraclitus, and also Empedocles and the Atomists, although formally the reference is limited to monists. If, as some think, Aristotle's phrase points particularly to Anaximander (for the intermediate substance has just been mentioned), we have to consider whether *πάντας τοὺς οὐρανοὺς* might be intended to describe Anaxi-

<sup>1</sup> Of course, Theophrastus might simply have referred this opinion to Anaximander because he thought that he at any rate postulated successive worlds; but on such grounds he might have referred it also to, for example, Empedocles. It would fit in, too, with Anaximander's known anthropogonical theories, to which the suggestion of Alexander is not opposed.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle called such periods 'great sum-

mer' and 'great winter' (*Meteor. A* 14. 352<sup>a30</sup>), though he himself argued that changes in climate and in the conformation of land and sea were localized, and were balanced by reverse changes elsewhere.

<sup>3</sup> Or the coherence of Simplicius' account of Theophrastus, I might now add in view of McDiarmid's interpretation discussed in n. 1 on p. 34.

<sup>4</sup> Less so, if one stomachs coexistent worlds in c. 6.

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mander's plural rings of the heavenly bodies: this at least is what Cornford thought. I must confess I find this difficult, and I do not think that Cornford adequately demonstrated that *οὐρανός* might be used in precisely such a sense (*C.Q.* xxviii (1934), 10-12). At any rate Theophrastus seems to have decided to clarify Aristotle's phrase by adding the words 'and the worlds in them'. Cornford held that he meant successive worlds, but this was certainly not implied by the Aristotle text, where *περιέχειν* if anything (though not by any means inevitably) suggests coexistent worlds. A further possibility is that Aristotle was thinking of his own development of the Callippean system of concentric spheres (which might properly be termed *οὐρανοί*), and by a slip applied the language proper to these to the early monists. At *Phys.* Γ 4. 203<sup>b</sup>11 he wrote simply *τὸ ἀπειρον . . . περιέχειν ἅπαντα καὶ πάντα κυβερνᾶν*.<sup>1</sup>

When we turn to the post-Theophrastean doxographical tradition we find confusion: sometimes Anaximander's worlds are coexistent, sometimes they are successive, sometimes they are both. Simplicius consistently treats them as both coexistent and successive, as though they were the worlds of the Atomists. Consider in *Phys.*, p. 1121. 5 Diels: *οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπείρους τῷ πλήθει τοὺς κόσμους ὑποθέμενοι, ὡς οἱ περὶ Ἀναξίμανδρον καὶ Λεύκιππον καὶ Δημόκριτον καὶ ὕστερον οἱ περὶ Ἐπικούρου, γινομένους αὐτοὺς καὶ φθειρομένους ὑπέθεντο ἐπ' ἀπειρον ἄλλων μὲν αἰεὶ γινομένων ἄλλων δὲ φθειρομένων, καὶ τὴν κίνησιν αἰδιον ἔλεγον . . .* Here Simplicius applies to Anaximander, as well as to the Atomists, Aristotle's assertion at *Physics* Θ 1. 250<sup>b</sup>18 that 'All who say that there are innumerable worlds, and that some worlds are coming into existence and others perishing, say that motion is eternal'. Further, in Aristotle's enumeration of the causes of the concept of infinity comes the following passage: *Phys.* Γ 4. 203<sup>b</sup>23 *διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἐν τῇ νοήσει μὴ ὑπολείπειν καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς δοκεῖ ἀπείρους εἶναι καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μεγέθη καὶ τὸ ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. ἀπείρου δ' ὄντος τοῦ ἔξω, καὶ σῶμα ἀπείρον εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ κόσμον· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον τοῦ κενοῦ ἐνταῦθα ἢ ἐνταῦθα;* 'If that which is outside the heaven is infinite, then there seems to be infinite body, too, and infinite worlds: for why should there be more of the void in one place than another?' The actual reference is to the Atomists, but the same argument might seem to apply to Anaximander with his *ἀπειρον* primary substance. Cornford thought that only Simplicius drew this false conclusion; but can we be sure that Theophrastus himself was not swayed by Aristotle's formulation, or the familiar Atomist arguments which determined it? In this case Simplicius' judgement would not be independent, but would depend, as often, upon the doxographical tradition stemming from Theophrastus.<sup>2</sup> Certainly the division in the two versions of Aetius (see Cornford, *C.Q.* xxviii (1934), 4 f.) about the nature of Anaximander's worlds could be easily accounted for on the hypothesis that Theophrastus, himself lacking special information (except, he thought, for the fragment, which he misinterpreted), assigned Leucippean worlds passing away and coming to be throughout space to Anaximander. It is infuriating of Cicero not to have made himself clearer at *de nat. deorum* 1.10. 25: 'Anaximandri autem opinio est nativos esse deos longis intervallis orientis occidentisque, eosque innumerabiles esse mundos. sed nos deum nisi sempiternum intellegere qui possumus?' In this comparatively early offshoot of the Theophrastean tradition the point at issue is concealed in the ambiguous words

<sup>1</sup> I owe this suggestion to Professor R. Hackforth.

<sup>2</sup> It is important that St. Augustine, whose

source for Theophrastus is separate from Simplicius', attributed Atomistic-type worlds to Anaximander: *C.D.* 8. 2 (DK 12 A 17).

*longis intervallis*. Are these intervals spatial or temporal? If spatial, they show that the assignment of Atomistic-type worlds to Anaximander probably derives from Theophrastus himself. Unfortunately there is no way of settling the question on the basis, at least, of Cicero's language.<sup>1</sup>

My suggestions on the question of innumerable worlds in Anaximander may be summarized as follows. (1) The concept of successive separate worlds is a very difficult one, and is unlikely to have occurred before Parmenides forced scientific dogmatism to become more extreme, and to exceed by far the range of common sense, in the effort to overcome his criticisms. Empedocles, with his theory of successive states of the cosmic *σφαῖρος*, may have mediated the idea of entirely separate successive worlds. (2) Cycles of alteration of the earth's surface, however, were accepted in ancient legend and were further suggested by the changing relation of land and sea. In one source it is implied that, according to Theophrastus, Anaximander believed in such cycles. (3) We do not know for certain what Aristotle thought; but Theophrastus may have been persuaded (a) by an illegitimate extension of the application of natural cycles in Anaximander, (b) by a misinterpretation of the extant fragment, and (c) by an application of Atomistic arguments to *all* who explicitly postulated (as it seemed) infinite matter, to credit Anaximander with innumerable worlds of the Atomistic type. This would account for peculiarities in the later tradition.

#### 4. THE EXTENT AND IMPLICATION OF THE EXTANT FRAGMENT

Simplicius in *Phys.*, p. 24, 17 Diels (for what precedes see column 1 of the table on p. 22) . . . ἑτέραν τινα φύσιν ἀπειρον, ἐξ ἧς ἀπαντας γίνεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανούς καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμους. ἐξ ᾧ δὲ ἡ γένεσις ἐστὶ τοῖς οὐσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρεών· διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δικήν καὶ τίσειν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν, ποιητικωτέροις οὕτως ὀνόμασιν αὐτὰ λέγων. Where the quotation begins has been much disputed; but the words ἐξ ᾧ δὲ . . . εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι are probably not by Anaximander, *contra* Cornford, Jaeger, Kranz in DK, etc. Cornford (*C.Q.* xxviii (1934), 11, n. 2) held that Theophrastus would have written γίνεσθαι and not ἡ γένεσις ἐστὶ, and φθεῖρεσθαι and not τὴν φθορὰν . . . γίνεσθαι. But the nouns γένεσις and φθορά had become Aristotelian technical terms and this is precisely why they are used. They do not occur at all (for what this is worth) in extant Presocratic contexts. (In Anaximander, too, we might perhaps have expected πᾶσι or πᾶσι χρήμασι and not τοῖς οὐσι—the dative case of which appeared to Deichgräber, in *Hermes*, lxxv (1940), 13, to be 'alt'). The statement seems to be a Peripatetic variant on a common formula applied by Aristotle to the φυσικοί, simply expressed, for example, at *Phys.* Γ 5. 204<sup>b</sup>33: ἀπαντα γὰρ ἐξ οὗ ἐστὶ, καὶ διαλύεται εἰς τοῦτο.<sup>2</sup> The words κατὰ τὸ χρεών, on the other hand, look like part of the *verbatim* quotation. χρεών is the most plausible conjecture for MS. χρεώμενα in Hera-

<sup>1</sup> Burnet though it 'much more natural' to understand intervals of space rather than of time. Cornford wrote as follows: 'That Cicero himself took "intervals" to refer to time seems probable from Velleius' next words, "sed nos deum nisi sempiternum intellegere non possumus".' Here is an example

of special pleading almost as notable as anything Burnet ever perpetrated: for the contrast implied in 'deum . . . sempiternum' is adequately provided by *nativos* and *orientis occidentisque*.

<sup>2</sup> Similarly McDiarmid, *Harvard Studies*, lxi (1953), 97-98.

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clitus fr. 80, to give κατ' ἔριν καὶ χρεών, and χρεών is used by itself, meaning 'necessity', in Euripides and Plato. It is a rather poetic word except in the common phrase χρεών ἐστί, and it is this special usage alone which is found in Aristotle, six times. We should readily accept χρεών ἐστί in Theophrastus, but not κατὰ τὸ χρεών. What may have happened, therefore, is that Theophrastus paraphrased the preceding sentence in Anaximander, by substituting for it a familiar Peripatetic formulation which seemed equivalent; yet he retained the original closing phrase κατὰ τὸ χρεών to connect his paraphrase with the direct quotation which follows, διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην κτλ., which contained a narrower restatement, and a justification, of the preceding assertion.<sup>1</sup>

Now it has been argued by Heidel, Cherniss, and Vlastos that αὐτὰ and ἀλλήλοις must refer to more or less equal partners, because of the nature of the legal situation depicted: as Heidel put it (*C.P.* vii (1912), 234), 'dike obtains between peers'. This is, of course, an over-simplification. Dike as a personification regulates the behaviour of man to man, but also, on occasion, of man to gods. Yet *mutual dike*, that is, an established reciprocal relation, was assumed to operate only between members of a single social group: there was no point, for example, in a man exemplifying his concept of *dike* by offering not to attack a lion. It is absurd to think, therefore, as used to be thought, that it is the world on the one hand and the Boundless on the other that stand in this relation (which is specified as a reciprocal one) to each other. How could the divine ἀπειρον be said to commit injustice? Rather the subject of αὐτὰ is the opposed world-masses of (primarily) the predominantly hot stuffs and the predominantly cold stuffs, the wet and the dry, the first pair of which Theophrastus, according to the pseudo-Plutarchean *Stromateis* quoted on p. 38, said were somehow *produced*<sup>2</sup> from the Boundless at the beginning of the world. That this analysis into opposed substances, or into groups of objects possessing contrary *δυνάμεις*, was applied not only to a stage in cosmogony but also to the continual natural processes of the developed world is not unlikely in itself.<sup>3</sup> Whether Anaximander actually called these opposed conglomerates 'the hot' and 'the cold' and so on, or whether he was content normally to use more specific terms like winter and summer (which are, however, opposed to each other and mutually exclusive), is immaterial. According to this interpretation, then, our fragment means that cosmological events are maintained by a fluctuating balance of power between opposed masses. The legalistic metaphor of excess and deprivation, κόρος and χρησιμοσύνη (these words occur as fr. 65 of Heraclitus), accounts not only for the *balance* of natural cycles like day-night, winter-summer, heat-

<sup>1</sup> See Theophrastus' *de sensibus* for his tendency to quote isolated words and short phrases.

<sup>2</sup> I deliberately do not emphasize any possible biological meaning in γόνιμον. It may have such a meaning here, it may imply that Anaximander used here, like the *Theogony*, the metaphor of sexual generation. Yet there are at least two instances in Plutarch where γόνιμος means simply 'productive of', in a purely metaphorical and weakened sense and without any noticeable implication of sexual generation: *Qu. conv.* 7. 715 f; *Maxime cum princ.* 3. 978 c. We simply cannot

be sure, therefore, of its exact connotation in the pseudo-Plutarch passage.

<sup>3</sup> The analysis into 'opposites', in the developed world, was certainly made shortly after Anaximander, most notably by Heraclitus; we are told that Anaximander used opposites at some stage in cosmogony (though see n. 2 on p. 26); it is reasonable to assume, therefore, quite apart from the evidence of the fragment, that he did not simply ignore their future history but retained them as constituents of our developed world of experience. It is from this world, after all, that the analysis into opposites must originally have been derived.



cold, perhaps great winter—great summer, it also explains the continuity of these cycles by providing a metaphorical, anthropomorphic motive for action and reaction.

The essentials of the interpretation outlined above were stated both by Burnet and by Heidel, who failed, however, to establish any satisfactory relation between this continuing cosmological balance and the odd hypothesis of innumerable coexistent worlds. If the worlds are successive, however, the difficulties become intolerable. How does the world pass away, if it forms a self-perpetuating system? And how are we to reconcile the fragment, as Theophrastus tries to do, with the idea of innumerable worlds? Vlastos (*C.P.* xlii (1947), 172) followed Cherniss in developing an ingenious but laborious answer to this problem: 'the damages are paid (*sc.* by the opposites) not to the Boundless but to each other', but they are only paid in full when the world is reabsorbed into the Boundless. The Boundless itself is a fusion of opposites, as is shown by the plural form of ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσις (Vlastos 170, after Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy*, 377 ff.).<sup>1</sup> It is clear that the whole argument here depends upon the assumption that the Boundless itself somehow contains the opposites. That this is incidentally implied is undeniable; but that it should have been explicitly argued by Anaximander is contrary to the whole conception of τὸ ἀπείρον, which is presumably so called just because its nature cannot

<sup>1</sup> McDiarmid, *op. cit.*, p. 97, agrees that the payment cannot be between the world and the ἀπείρον; and also shows that the Cherniss-Vlastos suggestion is untenable. But he goes on to argue that the subject of διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ is not pairs of opposed substances, but is τὰ ὄντα, the existing things of the separated world—as is shown by τοῖς οὖσι in the preceding sentence in Simplicius (n. 48 on p. 140). I would reply that these very existing things are in fact opposites, in the sense suggested in n. on p. 27; but that it is illegitimate to use sentence-sequence here in order to determine the precise reference of αὐτὰ, since on any interpretation, and particularly on McDiarmid's, there is confusion in the sequence of Theophrastean generalization and direct quotation. Indeed, McDiarmid himself states on p. 98 that 'The generation-destruction clause is not to be connected with the metaphor'. His own interpretation of the whole passage is ingenious. He argues that in διδόναι . . . ἀδικίας Theophrastus 'is quoting what appears to be Anaximander's justification of his own doctrine against Thales and anyone else who made one of the opposed elements the primordial matter'. The world-constituents, I take this to mean, pay the penalty to each other, i.e. each to all the others, and not all to one constituent material, the ἀρχή in the Thales-type theory. The gist of the Theophrastean extract according to McDiarmid is, then, as follows (p. 98): 'Anaximander declared the Infinite to be the principle of

all things (i.e. that out of which all things are generated and into which they are destroyed); and he said that the Infinite is some body which is not water or any other of the so-called elements, for, as he said, "they make reparation and satisfaction to each other for their injustice". This interpretation deserves a fuller examination than can be given here, and is in many ways an attractive one which cannot be lightly dismissed. I will only say that its plausibility is severely diminished by the necessity of assuming that, in McDiarmid's words, "The thread of the argument has been obscured, probably by Simplicius". If the meaning were as proposed, we should expect ἐξ ὧν γὰρ (not δέ), and διδόναι δ' ἐκεῖνα (or another strong demonstrative), not διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ. In addition, the sentence-order would be different. But why should Simplicius or any intermediary have ruined the emphasis by tampering with pronouns and connecting particles—a far profounder change than the mechanical shift of a sentence or two? Further, the addition of κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν, whether by Theophrastus or by Anaximander himself, removes the heavy emphasis on ἀλλήλοις (which is not, in any case, in a particularly emphatic position), which is demanded if the argument is to be that which McDiarmid suggests. In any case, it seems difficult to exclude from the injustice-metaphor the implication that the things of the world are opposed to each other.

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be properly defined. The minor argument from ἐξ ὧν is too improbable to merit discussion.<sup>1</sup>

I fall back, therefore, on the view that the fragment has nothing to do with worlds perishing into the Boundless, but that it describes cosmological changes in the one continuing world. The assertion that originally preceded κατὰ τὸ χρεῶν, and which Theophrastus was able to paraphrase by an Aristotelian formula which suited his own cosmogonical interpretation of the fragment, might have been to the effect that each opposite changes into its own opposite and into no other, for example the hot is replaced by the cold and not by the wet or the soft. This is a necessary hypothesis for Anaximander's theory of cosmic stability, obvious to us but not so obvious then, since Heraclitus also emphasized it for his own special purposes. The axiom may easily have been stated in terms so general that Theophrastus was able to mistake its proper application.

The final words, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν, are treated by Theophrastus as belonging to Anaximander, since the stylistic judgement ποιητικωτέροις οὕτως ὀνόμασιν αὐτὰ λέγων would naturally follow directly upon the quotation and not upon an insertion or paraphrase by Theophrastus. Admittedly, we find superficially similar phraseology in Theophrastus himself; for example, of Heraclitus, τάξιν τινα καὶ χρόνον ὀρισμένον.<sup>2</sup> There may be an unconscious echo here, but what marks the phrase in Anaximander as original is the personification of χρόνος. There is a very close parallel for this, as Jaeger has pointed out, in Solon fr. 24 Diehl, lines 1-7:

ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν οὐνεκα ξυνήγαγον  
 δῆμον, τί τούτων πρὶν τυχεῖν ἐπανασάμην;  
 συμμαρτυροίη ταῦτ' ἂν ἐν δίκῃ Χρόνου  
 μήτηρ μεγίστη δαιμόνων Ὀλυμπίων  
 ἄριστα, Γῇ μέλαινα, τῆς ἐγὼ ποτε  
 ὄρους ἀνείλον πολλὰ χεῖρ πεπηγότας  
 πρόσθεν δὲ δουλεύουσα, νῦν ἐλευθέρα.<sup>3</sup>

The idea of the 'trial conducted by time' is similar to that of the 'retribution according to the assessment of time' in Anaximander. With κατὰ τὴν τοῦ

<sup>1</sup> It might be argued that Aristotle *Phys.* Γ 4. 203<sup>b</sup>11, τὸ ἀπειρον . . . περιέχειν ἅπαντα καὶ πάντα κυβερνᾶν, καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ θεῖον, needs some explaining. How does the Boundless 'govern' or 'steer' all things? By virtue, obviously, of surrounding or containing them; but what actual control can it exercise within the cosmos, if the idea of innumerable destructions and re-creations is rejected? The question is difficult to answer on any hypothesis; we cannot be absolutely sure, of course, that περιέχειν . . . καὶ κυβερνᾶν, though perhaps an archaic phrase, is taken from or refers specifically to Anaximander. Heraclitus' fire steers all things (fr. 64), but that of course exists *within* the cosmos, to some extent. We cannot suppose that the Boundless as such interpenetrates the differentiated world. But presumably it may have been thought of by Anaximander as the ultimate source of the δίκη between oppo-

sites on which the stability of the world depends. By enclosing the world, the Boundless prevents the expansion of differentiated matter; if there is thought to be any loss (which is doubtful), the Boundless would make it good. Possibly, if Anaximander thought of the Boundless as divine, he automatically gave it control, without determining precisely how this control was to take effect.

<sup>2</sup> McDiarmid, op. cit. 141 f., is won over by such similarities, and accepts the view of Dirlmeier, *Rh. M.* lxxxvii (1938), 380 f., that κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν is Theophrastus' paraphrase of κατὰ τὸ χρεῶν.

<sup>3</sup> Bergk's conjecture ἐν Δίκῃ θρόνῳ in line 3 is unnecessary, improbable in itself, and entirely lacking in textual warrant. It is approved by Dirlmeier, *Rh. M.* lxxxviii (1938), 378.

χρόνου τάξιν one might compare, for example, κατὰ τὴν Ἀριστείδου τάξιν in the Athenian tribute-lists.<sup>1</sup> What is assessed in the present case, however, is not so much the *amount* of retribution, for this is fixed on a pre-established proportional quantitative basis of restitution in full plus an indemnity. In any case Time does not control the *amount*, but rather the *period* in which the fixed proportion must be paid. Again, this does not imply, what would be improbable in itself, that the time-limit for payment must be fixed once and for all, the period the same and unchanging in every case.<sup>2</sup> Rather it implies one or both of two things: (a) that Time on each occasion will make an assessment of the period for repayment, for example a short period for an encroachment of night on day, a longer one for an encroachment of winter on summer; and (b) that Time has made a general assessment once and for all, to the effect that *sooner or later* in time the compensation must be paid. These ideas have partial analogies in Aeschylus; *Choephores* 648 ff., τέκνον δ' ἐπεισφέρει δόμοις | αἰμάτων παλαιτέρων | τίνεω μύσος χρόνῳ κλυτὰ | βυσσόφρων Ἑρινύς: here χρόνῳ means 'in the fullness of time, sooner or later'; *Supplikes* 732 f., χρόνῳ τοι κυρίῳ τ' ἐν ἡμέρᾳ | θεοὺς ἀπίζων τις βροτῶν δώσει δίκην: here χρόνῳ, 'in time', is limited by the addition of κυρίῳ τ' ἐν ἡμέρᾳ, 'the day fixed for payment'. In neither case, however, is Time itself in control. Earlier, in Solon, it is the *inevitability* of retribution that is stressed again and again—payment sooner or later, πάντως: so at line 8 of fr. 1 Diehl, πάντως ὕστερον ἦλθε δίκη, or again at line 28, of the retribution of Zeus, πάντως δ' ἐς τέλος ἐξεφάνη. So too in fr. 24, quoted above, the indubitable meaning is that Earth justifies Solon's actions, because *with the lapse of time* she has become free. This, and not any predetermined time-limit, is what the δίκη χρόνου implies there: *formerly* Earth was enslaved, *now* she is free. No more specific chronology is either implied or required. The analogy of Solon persuades me that this idea of *inevitability* lies also behind Anaximander's κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν, though not, perhaps, to the exclusion of separate individual assessments. According to such an interpretation δίκη, retribution, comes sooner or later, inevitably, among men according to Solon and among natural events according to Anaximander. No single mechanical time-cycle is in question; there are variations in the length of day and night, of summer and winter, of which Anaximander would be well aware. What mattered was that a particular encroachment should earn, eventually, an equivalent retribution: a drought, for example, be made good either by a series of wet winters or by a single flood. So too Heraclitus allowed for

<sup>1</sup> Whether τάξις in the fragment means 'act of assessing' or 'objective assessment' (i.e. the result of an act of assessment) makes no material difference, as it happens, to the meaning. Jaeger approved the translation 'ordinance' (e.g. *Paideia*<sup>3</sup>, Eng. tr.<sup>3</sup>, Oxford, 1946, 159 f. and n. 50 on p. 455). A consideration of the meaning of nouns in -σις in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* suggests that the active meaning is more likely here. Professor D. L. Page drew the following conclusion from a review of the Homeric evidence which he kindly sent me: 'It is strongly suggested that a new -σις formation, such as τάξις, will have been intended to denote the action of the verb, not its result, at least in archaic

Greek.' But Jaeger's assumption that active uses were necessarily *legal* is discredited by the use of the verb, and the necessary supplement of the noun, in the tribute-lists; though even there (as indeed in Jaeger's examples from Plato, *Politicus* 305 c and *Laus* 925 b) it cannot be proved that the sense of the noun is active.

<sup>2</sup> As, for example, in Empedocles fr. 30.2: ἐς τιμὰς τ' ἀνόρουσε τελειομένοιο χρόνοιο. Vlastos, *C.P.* xlii (1947), 161, n. 48, has no grounds for his assumption that Anaximander's phrase must have had an equivalent application to that of Empedocles here.

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flexibility in the balance of his natural changes, provided only that the total equilibrium of fire, water, and earth was not disturbed.

So much, for the time being, for the problems; but clearly the assumption that Theophrastus was sometimes mistaken in his interpretation of Anaximander requires justification. Theophrastus is regarded as infallible because, it has always been maintained, he had Anaximander's book in front of him. This is, in fact, nowhere asserted by Theophrastus or any other ancient source, and I shall outline some reasons for doubting whether Theophrastus had access to the complete works of a sixth-century Milesian like Anaximander. None of these reasons is compelling in itself, and the case must be regarded as a cumulative one.

1. We know from the catalogue of his works preserved in Diogenes Laertius (5. 42-50) that Theophrastus wrote special monographs on Anaximenes, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Diogenes, and Democritus, but not on Thales, Anaximander, or Heraclitus. It is at least a possibility that one motive for neglecting the last three was a dearth of original evidence. Of the thinkers to whom Theophrastus did devote monographs, only Anaximenes and Empedocles might not be obviously familiar in the Athens of the Sophists, and interest in Anaximenes was no doubt revived by Diogenes of Apollonia; while Empedocles had the advantage of using an easily propagated and less perishable verse medium. With the decline of Miletus in the fifth century Anaximander's book might very well have gone out of direct circulation, especially if it had never gained popularity on the mainland.

2. We do not know how much *Thales* committed to writing, but, whatever it was, neither Aristotle nor Theophrastus had direct knowledge of it.

3. The surviving fragment of *Anaximenes*, on whose Ionic dialect and style Theophrastus commented, is not only not in Ionic but also partly reworded. This may be due to Aëtius, but it might well mean that Theophrastus did not always use the most original version of Anaximenes.

4. Theophrastus did not write a special study on *Heraclitus*: indeed, he appears to have been comparatively ill-informed about him, and to cling closely to the Aristotelian interpretation. He ventured a stylistic or logical judgement, however: some of the things Heraclitus wrote were half-finished, ἡμιτελής, others were inconsistent. To us Heraclitus' surviving fragments do not give an impression of shoddiness: perhaps Theophrastus was handicapped by the nature of his source, which may well have been a mechanically-arranged selection of the odder sayings. Heraclitus is said to have deposited his book in the temple of Artemis at Ephesus; possibly this was an aetiological story to explain its absence from the Alexandrian library, since it would have been destroyed when the temple was burnt down in 356 B.C.<sup>1</sup>

5. In his *de sensibus* we possess a long extract from Theophrastus' doxographical work. It is surprising that he could not find more to say about Heraclitus' views on sensation than he actually did, if he had a book by Heraclitus, or a complete collection of his pronouncements, in front of him. It is also plain that Alcmaeon, at all events, must have had more to say on the subject than he is credited with in the few lines on him in Theophrastus.

6. Diogenes Laertius mentions a summary exposition by Anaximander which

<sup>1</sup> See the index of *Heraclitus, the Cosmic*. Whether Heraclitus himself ever 'wrote a book' in the usual sense seems doubtful.

he supposes Apollodorus to have come across, since the latter knew that Anaximander was sixty-four in 546 B.C. This does not prove, of course, that the whole of Anaximander was extant. On the contrary, Diogenes' statement that Anaximander *πεποιήται κεφαλαιώδη τὴν ἐκθεσιν* (2. 2) suggests that Apollodorus somehow mentioned that his source for him was not, in Apollodorus' opinion, the original work.

7. It is clear that Theophrastus was relatively well informed on the astronomy, meteorology, and anthropogony of Anaximander. Yet on his *arche* Theophrastus was evidently vague. This is suggested (a) by the inadequacy of his account of the nature of τὸ ἄπειρον; (b) by what I have proposed to be a misinterpretation of the fragment; and (c), perhaps, by the apparently puzzled phraseology in pseudo-Plutarch's version of Theophrastus, on the subject of Anaximander's cosmogony: [Plut.] *Stromateis* 2 φησὶ δὲ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γόνιμον θερμοῦ τε καὶ ψυχροῦ κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου ἀποκριθῆναι καὶ τινα ἐκ τούτου φλογὸς σφαῖραν περιφυῆναι . . .

These considerations indicate that we are not entitled automatically to assume that prose works written in Ionia in the sixth or early fifth century were still available in their entirety to Theophrastus. In the case of Anaximander I would suggest that what Theophrastus might have had in front of him was not a complete book but a collection of extracts, in which emphasis was laid upon astronomy, meteorology, and anthropogony rather than upon the nature and significance of τὸ ἄπειρον, which might always have seemed confusing. In respect of his *arche*, indeed, Anaximander must assuredly have been considered obsolete and unimportant by the end of the fifth century. The extant fragment could be quoted by Theophrastus, of course, because it really came among the cosmological-meteorological extracts.

Trinity Hall, Cambridge

G. S. KIRK

## THE MANUSCRIPTS OF ARISTOPHANES *KNIGHTS* (II)

IN the first part of this paper<sup>1</sup> we discussed R and the  $\gamma$  family, which divides into the two groups  $\nu$  (VE) and  $\Phi$  (AΓΘ). Before leaving the  $\gamma$  family, however, we may consider some of the *recentiores*, nearly all of which belong within it. They seem to contain no genuine tradition unknown to their elders and betters; so it is not proposed to inflict on the reader a detailed account of them all, but rather to study a representative selection.

These manuscripts consist of an uninterpolated and an interpolated group: the latter group includes also the Aldine edition.

### (a) *Uninterpolated*

Vp3. Codex Vaticanus Palatinus 128 (15th cent.) in the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, containing *Eq. Ach. Vesp.* and arguments to *Ach. Vesp. Av.*

C. Codex Parisinus graecus 2717 (16th cent.) in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris, containing *Eq. Ach. Vesp. Pl. Nub. Ran. Av. Pax* (1-947, 1012-1354, 1357) *Lys.* (1-61, 132-99, 268-819, 890-1097, 1237-fin.), prolegomena, arguments, and occasional scholia and glosses.

The host of blunders peculiar to these two manuscripts, and, on the other hand, their minor divergences, make it clear that as in *Ach.*<sup>2</sup> and *Vesp.*<sup>3</sup> they are independent copies of the same hyparchetype. This hyparchetype will be known as  $\epsilon$ , the symbol used by Cary in his discussion of the manuscripts of *Ach.* There are two good readings in *Eq.* peculiar to  $\epsilon$ , 68 ἀναπέσσει (also lemm. schol. VEG<sup>3</sup>) and 725 Ἀλλ. νῆ Δί' ὦ πάτερ.<sup>4</sup>

### (b) *Interpolated*

Vv5. Codex Vaticanus 1294 (A.D. 1370<sup>5</sup>) in the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, containing *Pl. Nub. Ran. Eq.* (1-270), with prolegomena, arguments, scholia, and glosses.

This manuscript has suffered not only the loss of the major part of *Eq.*, but also considerable damage from damp, and the scholia on the last two pages of *Eq.*, containing 231-70, are in places illegible. This minor damage can be made good from a copy of Vv5, *II* (Laur. plut. 31. 4, 15th cent.), but the major mutilation of *Eq.* in Vv5 had already taken place before *II* was copied. The text (without scholia or glosses) of *Eq.* 271-fin. in *II* has been copied by a second hand from the Aldine.

<sup>1</sup> D. Mervyn Jones, 'The Manuscripts of Aristophanes, *Knights* (I)', *C.Q.* n.s. ii (1952), 168 ff., referred to hereafter as 'codd. *Eq.* I'. I should like to thank again Professor Robertson, Mr. Deas, and the librarians and photographers of the libraries containing Aristophanes manuscripts for their advice and help: and also to express my gratitude to Professor R. Pfeiffer for some most valuable discussions.

<sup>2</sup> See E. Cary in *Harv. Stud. in Class. Phil.* xviii (1907), 171 f.

<sup>3</sup> See the collations of J. W. White and E. Cary, *Harv. Stud. in Class. Phil.* xxx (1919), 1 ff.

<sup>4</sup> The statement, found in Zacher's edition and in the Oxford text, that Vp3 reads 1273 μῆ and 1331 τετραγοφώρας, is erroneous.

<sup>5</sup> See C. R. von Holzinger in *Mélanges Chatelain* (Paris, 1910), p. 15.

Fulvio Orsini, who owned Vv5, has written on the fly-leaf of the manuscript 'Aristofane, le prime quattro Comedie, con scholii in margine sotto nome parte di Aristofane Grammatico, parte di Demetrio Triclinio, di mano del quale è scritto il libro'. This last statement is erroneous; the date of Vv5 seems too late for Triclinius, and the hand is clearly not the same as that of the known autographs of Triclinius, the Marcianus (464) of Hesiod, the New College, Oxford, manuscript (258) of Aphthonius and Hermogenes, and (an almost certain autograph) the Neapolitanus (II.F.31) of Aeschylus. But the scholia of Vv5, as we shall see, are certainly Triclinian; and the text has Triclinian *σημεία*, both colometrical and quantitative.<sup>1</sup>

Vp2. Codex Vaticanus Palatinus 67 (15th cent.), in the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, containing *Pl. Nub. Ran. Eq. Ach. Vesp. Av. Pax* (1-947, 1012-1354, 1357) *Lys.* (1-61, 132-99, 268-819, 890-1097, 1237-fin.) arguments, and a few scholia and glosses on *Eq.* and *Ach.* 1-102.

There exists a gemellus of Vp2 which I have not collated, H (Havniensis 1980) in the Royal Library at Copenhagen. It is contemporary with Vp2 and contains the same material, except that it has prolegomena, which Vp2 lacks, but no scholia or glosses, which are the work of a second hand in Vp2. The few scholia and glosses in Vp2 are based on old scholia, independently of the scholia in Vv5.

Ald. The Aldine edition, edited by the Cretan Marcus Musurus (A.D. 1498) containing *Pl. Nub. Ran. Eq. Ach. Vesp. Av. Pax* (1-947, 1012-1354, 1357) *Eccl.* with prolegomena, arguments, and scholia.

The Aldine was originally designed to contain only the first seven of the above-mentioned plays, as is shown by the following subscriptio at the end of *Av.*: *Αριστοφάνους κωμωδιῶν ἐπὶ τὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς αὐτὰς σχολίων ἀρχαίους συντεθέντων γραμματικοῖς, ἃ δὴ σποράδην ἐν ἀντιγράφοις κείμενα διαφόροις καὶ πεφυρμένως συνειλεχταί τε καὶ ὡς οἶόν τ' ἦν ἐπιμελέστατα διώρθωται παρὰ Μάρκου Μουσούρου τοῦ Κρητός. ΤΕΛΟΣ.* Evidently *Eccl.* came to hand after the book was complete, and possibly *Pax* also, though Musurus may have kept it back in the hope of obtaining a complete text (he was clearly aware of the lacunae). The first quire (a quaternio), which contains the title-page, mentioning all nine plays, and the prolegomena, was the last part of the book to be prepared: it is unnumbered, and the numbering of the quires begins with the first quire of *Pl.*

Musurus had a manuscript containing *Lys.* but, as Aldus tells us in his preface, 'decimam Lysistraten ideo praetermisimus, quia uix dimidiata haberi a nobis potuit'.

We know that Musurus possessed E: on the fly-leaf of E stands the inscription 'de miser Marco Musuro' followed by the names of later owners of the manuscript.

B. Codex Parisinus graecus 2715 (16th cent.) in the Bibliothèque Nationale

<sup>1</sup> The text of *Eq.* in Vv5 contains the Triclinian sign for a *κοινή συλλαβή* scanned short (⌊), but not that for one scanned long (⌋), although the reading 162 *δεῦρο βλέπε* seems to require it. (On the Triclinian *σημεία* for the *κοινή συλλαβή* see Triclinius'

own prolegomena (No. XVII in Dübner, section *περὶ σημείων τῆς κοινῆς συλλαβῆς* κτλ.) and Eduard Fraenkel, *Aeschylus Agamemnon*, i, pp. 18 f.) Vv5 also marks long *a*, *i*, *u* and contains some elementary glosses on points of quantity.



at Paris, containing *Eq. Ach. Av. Vesp. Lys.* (1-61, 132-99, 268-819, 890-1097, 1237-fin.) *Eccl.* (1-1135) *Pax* (1-947, 1012-1300).

The lacunae in *Pax* and *Lys.* common to all the manuscripts of this group which contain those plays suggest that they may be descended from a common hyparchetype; and in fact there is evidence for a common hyparchetype for the whole group, including Vv5. There are comparatively few readings common to the whole group, because of the mass of individual blunders in *c* and Vp2, the loss of most of the play in Vv5, the presence of conjectures peculiar to B, and the influence of E on Ald. But the following may be noted: 218 *κακῶς* *κακὸς* cVv5Vp2Ald. et fort. B<sup>ac</sup>: 241 *ἀλλαντοπῶλα*] *ἀλλαντοπῶλης* cVv5Vp2B<sup>ac</sup>: 571 *πῶ*] *ποτε* cVp2B: 1164 *πρότερος*] *πρώτος* cVp2B. More cogent evidence is found in the fact that the conjectures in the interpolated group are based on readings of *c*: some examples of conjectures based on readings peculiar to *c* are: 186 *εἰ μὴ 'κ*] *εἴμ' ἐκ c*, *εἴμ' ἐκ* Vv5Vp2Ald., *ἀλλ' ἐκ B*: 337 *εἰ δὲ δέ*] *εἰ δὲ c*, *ἀλλ' εἴ γε* Vp2B: 475 *μὲν οὖν αὐτίκα*] *οὖν om. c*, *μὲν αὐτίκ' ἂν* Vp2B: 971 *νῦν om. c*, *δὴ suppl.* Vp2Ald.B: 1149 *ἄττ' ὅτ' c*, *ὅσο' Vp2Ald.B*: 1247 *πύλαισιν, οὐ]* *πύλαις, οὐ c*, *πύλαις, οὐ καὶ* Vp2B: 1377 *σοφός γ' ὁ Φ. δεξιῶς τ']* *δεξιός γ' ὁ Φ. σοφῶς τ' c*, *γ' om. B*, *καὶ ante σοφῶς (τ' omisso)* Vp2B. It is clear, however, that the conjectures in the interpolated group are not based on *c* itself, as they are unaffected by innumerable blunders found in *c*, such as the telescoping of 739-40 into *σαντὸν δὲ λυχοπώλησι δίδως*. We shall therefore postulate a common hyparchetype for our *recentiores*; it will be known as *c'* (Cary's symbol).

The lacunae in *Pax*, *Lys.*, and *Eccl.* in *c'* coincide to some extent with those in *Γ*, which contains *Pax* 378-490, 548-837, 893-947, 1012-1126, 1190-1300, *Lys.* 1-61, 132-99, 268-819, 890-1034, *Eccl.* 1-1135, though *c'* contained much that is missing in *Γ* today. But *Γ* can never have been the source of *c'*, because some of the lacunae in *Γ* not shared by *c'* are not due to the dismemberment of *Γ*, but were also in its original *Φ*: e.g. *Γ* writes *Pax* 893 immediately after 837, and 1190 immediately after 1126, clearly copying the text as it was in *Φ*: also the insertion of *Vesp.* 1494-fin. after 705 was clearly copied by *Γ* from *Φ*, and it is plain from the way *Vesp.* in *Γ* breaks off at 1396 in the middle of a page that *Φ* broke off there too.<sup>1</sup> As *c'* contained *Vesp.* un mutilated, and fewer lacunae in *Pax*, it cannot be descended from *Φ* as copied by *Γ*; but it seems nearer to *Φ* than to *v*, which lacked *Ach.*<sup>2</sup> *Lys. Eccl.* but contained *Vesp.* and *Pax* complete. But as the readings of *c'* are very often independent of *Φ* (e.g. *c'* has *Eq.* 201, which *Φ* omits),<sup>3</sup> the facts are perhaps best explained by postulating a common ancestor of *Φ* and *c'*, which we may call *Φ'*, descended from *γ* independently of *v*. The damage to *Φ* which *c'* has escaped may then be explained by supposing that *c'* was copied before *Φ*, and that *Φ'* suffered further mutilation in the interval between the copying of its two descendants, including the displacement of the last leaf of *Vesp.*

<sup>1</sup> The damage in *Vesp.* has been noted by *Γ*<sup>4</sup>, who has also filled up many smaller lacunae where the scribe of *Γ* could not read his original. *Γ*<sup>4</sup> in *Vesp.* seems to have used B, and to be identical with the corrector in B, as is the case in *Ach.* (see E. Cary in *Harv. Stud.* xviii. 187 ff.).

<sup>2</sup> E in *Ach.* is a member of the *Φ* group (Cary, loc. cit., pp. 168 ff.).

<sup>3</sup> Two further illustrations of the alignment of *c'* may be given, from the Arguments to *Eq.*: in Arg. I 1. 32-33 Coulon, the words *καὶ ἡ ἐπιτροπή . . . παραδίδεται* are omitted by *Φ* (and not inserted by any of the correctors in *Γ*) but found in *vc'*. Cf., on the other hand, the same Argument, line 27: *εἰκει θατέρω* Vv5Vp2, from *εἰκει θατέρω Φ c*: *ἐκβάλλεται v*.

We may now set forth the conjectures found in the interpolated members of the *recentiores*, omitting those derived from readings peculiar to *c* which have already been quoted.

(a) *Good conjectures found nowhere else*

8 νυν Vv5Ald.: 34 recte interpunct B: 295 λακήσεις B (in -ει corr. Blaydes): 379 σκεψόμεσθ' Ald.B: 382 πυρός γ' Vp2Ald.B: 407 οἶμαι Ald.B: 423 ἐλάνθανόν γ' Vp2Ald.: 434 ἐάν Vp2Ald.B: 616 ἄξιόν γε Vp2<sup>ac</sup>Ald.B: 668 ἴν' ἄθ' Vp2<sup>ac</sup>Ald.B: 687 αἰμύλοις Vp2Ald.B: 764, 832 τὸν Ἀθηναίων Ald.: 878 δῆτα ταῦτα Vp2Ald.B (ταῦτα δῆτα M): 989 ἂν Vp2Ald.B: 1100 ἐγὼ Vp2Ald.B: 1346 ἡσθόμην Vp2Ald.B: 1373 ἀγένης οὐδείς ἐν ἀγορᾷ Ald.B (οὐδείς ἀγένης ἐν ἀγορᾷ Vp2). Arg. I. 1. 9 ἀναγωγότερος Vv5Vp2: 26 ὡς περιφανῶς Vv5Vp2: 27 εἵκει θατέρω Vv5Vp2: 30 Κλέων Vv5Vp2.

(b) *Good conjectures confirmed by other sources*

14 σοι del. Vv5Ald.B (om. R): 26 ἦν Vv5B (cf. Σ'): 438 δ' Ald. (RAM): 517 ὀλίγοις χαρίσασθαι Vp2Ald.B (MS(vid.)): 535 χρῆν Ald. (MS): 542 πρῶτα Vp2Ald.B (MS): 600 καὶ σκόροδα Vp2Ald.B (ΣΜ): 662 τριχίδες εἰ Vp2Ald.B (R): 717 τῷ μὲν Vp2Ald.B (Γ<sup>2</sup>MS): 789 εἴλες Vp2Ald.B (A): 846 ἦ τῶν Vp2Ald.B (RS): 849 αὐτοῖσι τοῖς Vp2Ald.B (RMS, lemm. VEM): 908 γε Vp2Ald.B (RM, om. γ): 970 ἰὼν Vp2Ald.B (RM): 1087 βασιλεύεις Vp2 (RM): 1088 γε Ald.B (RΓ<sup>2</sup>).

(c) *Other conjectures*

29 τὸ δέρι' δτιή τῶν B: 32 βρέτας; ποῖον βρέτας; Vv5Vp2B, ποῖον βρετέττας Ald.: 162 δεῦρο βλέπε Vv5Vp2Ald.B: 163 ὄρας γε τῶνδε Vv5Vp2Ald.B: 182 ἰσχύσαι cB: 274 ὅσπερ Ald.B: 344 οὐν τι πρᾶγμα Vp2Ald.B (οὐν πρᾶγμα γ', οὐν σοι πρᾶγμα R): 377 εἰτά γ' Vp2Ald.B: 400 γενομένην ἂν Κρατίνου Vp2: 408 ἡσθέντα καὶ παιῶνα δὴ καὶ Vp2Ald.B: 418 ἐπιλέγων Vp2Ald.B: 453 καὶ post ἀνδρικώτατα om. Vp2Ald.B (et M): 463 γομφούμενα τε (Vp2, γε Ald.B) τὰ: 508 ἡνάγκαζεν ἐπη λέξοντάς γ' Vp2Ald.B: 569 κοῦδεις οὐδεπόποτ' Vp2Ald.B: 629 πιθανώτατα δ' (δ' Rc') ἡ βουλή γ' Vp2Ald.B: 635 Βερέσχεθαι τε καὶ μόθωνες γε (Vp2, τε B) κόβαλοι Vp2B: 727 οἰάπερ γ' Vp2Ald.B: 742 τὸν στρατηγὸν ὑποδραμῶν (ὑπεκδραμῶν Vp2Ald.) τὸν ἐκ Πύλου Vp2Ald.B (τὸν . . . ὑπεκδρ. τὸν et Γ<sup>2</sup>): 760 ἔξει] ἔσει Ald.: 869 τουτῷ γε Vp2Ald., τῷδε γε B: 873 ὅσον γ' Vp2Ald.B: 893 περιήμπισχέν γ' ἵνα σ' Vp2B: 899 τουτί γ' εἴπ' Vp2Ald.B: 901 ἦν καὶ (om. γε) Vp2Ald.B: 904 οὐ με Vp2Ald.B: 921 δὲ τῶν ξύλων Vp2Ald.B: 1069 ὃ + τοῦτο τί ἐστι Vp2Ald.B: 1098 καὶ μὴν Vp2Ald.B: 1196 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐκείνι γ' Ald.B: 1214 τί οὐν ἐστ'; Ἀλλ. ἀλλὰ γ' οὐχ Ald.B: 1218 ὄρας νυν; Δημ. οἶμοι Vp2Ald.B: 1259 τοῖνυν γ' Vp2Ald.B: 1268 τὸν om. Ald.B: 1273 διὰ τὸ κακῶς Vp2Ald.B: 1296 τῆς om. Vp2Ald.B: 1339 κάτειπέ μοι πρὸ τοῦ ποῖος Vp2Ald.B: 1346 τί φῆς; τοιαῦτα μ' ἔδρων, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ἡσθόμην Vp2Ald.B: 1401 αὐτὸ τοῦτρον πίνεται Vp2Ald.B. Arg. I. 1. 6 ὡς ἐπιτροπέση Ald.

The interest in metre which these conjectures show (an interest extending to the lyrics, cf. the clumsy attempt to restore strophic correspondence at 1296 by omitting τῆς) suggests that Triclinius may well have been their author: and this suggestion is strengthened by the fact that some of the conjectures are

<sup>1</sup> The statement (*codd. Eq. I*, pp. 178, 180) that Γ has the correct reading οὐν σὺ πρᾶγμα

is erroneous: VEAΓΘ all read οὐν πρᾶγμα. σὺ was added by Hermann.

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found in an undoubtedly Triclinian manuscript, Vv5, and many occur in Ald., which has Triclinian scholia and colometrical *σμεῖα* and is partly derived from a Triclinian manuscript.<sup>1</sup>

We may conclude our discussion of the *recentiores* by examining briefly the scholia in Vv5 and Ald., the only two members of the group to contain a full corpus of scholia, and the text of Ald.

(a) Vv5. The scholia on *Eq.* in Vv5 are headed *σχόλια παλαιὰ Ἀριστοφάνους γραμματικοῦ*, except for the Triclinian metrical scholia on 1 and 247, which are written separately from the main body of scholia in the margin of the manuscript. Whatever reservations one may hold about the attribution to Aristophanes, it is true that the scholia on *Eq.* in Vv5 are closer to the old scholia than the scholia on the other plays it contains (*Pl. Nub. Ran.*), doubtless because these three plays were the triad selected by Thomas Magister. But even the ostensibly old scholia in Vv5 have been freely edited. There are some scholia (e.g. the second scholion on 29, 38 *ἐκ γὰρ κτλ.*, 40, 105 *οἱ δὲ . . . μετὰ φόβου ἔρχεον*) found only in Vv5 and Ald., and insertions in old scholia (e.g. the quotation of *Pl.* 75 and Theocr. 1. 149 at *Eq.* 26, of *Nub.* 186 at *Eq.* 55, and of *Il.* i. 132 at *Eq.* 137 found only in Vv5): but even where no additional matter has been inserted, the scholia in Vv5, though not those in Ald., have been drastically rearranged and reworded. This edition is in all probability the work of Triclinius, in spite of its claim to antiquity.

The rearrangement of scholia in Vv5 often corrects that given in our manuscripts' old scholia, generally by isolating as glosses notes which had wrongly become embedded in the marginal scholia, e.g. 32 *φησὶν ὅτι . . . θεοῖς ἐχθρὸς* is clearly a separate note on 34, as Vv5 has it: the *οὐ μόνον . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ* of VETΘAld. makes nonsense. Vv5 also restores scholia that have been wrongly split up, e.g. 107 (on *Πραμνίου*) *τοῦ προσηγοῦς, ἀπὸ τοῦ πρᾶνεν τὸ μένος*. These corrections in the arrangement of the scholia are Vv5's most important contribution to our text: corrections in single words are comparatively few and unimportant: we may mention 1 ad fin. (*πρὸς*) *τὸν ἕτερον* and 161 (p. 39, col. 1, line 6 Düb.) (*μόνον*) *διαβάλλειν* (cf. schol. 334).

The rewriting of the scholia in Vv5 makes it impossible to be certain about their exact source, but they seem to go back to a manuscript between *y* and *Φ* (our *Φ'*), like the *recentiores* in the text. (For example, Vv5 follows *Φ* closely in the text of schol. 140, but contains a considerable number of scholia found elsewhere only in *v*, and a very few peculiar to E (e.g. 160 "*Ὁμηρος διὰ παντὸς . . . οὐ κουλίας*").

(b) Ald. We have already noted that Musurus owned E, and have observed that his text contains many conjectures of the interpolated *recentiores*. He cannot be shown to have used any of our *recentiores*, and certainly had a Triclinian manuscript now lost: for he has Triclinian metrical scholia for the whole of *Eq.* Our only manuscript containing Triclinian scholia on *Eq.* is Vv5, which breaks off at 270: and Musurus can hardly have known Vv5 unmutated, because the damage had already been done when *Π* was copied from it, earlier in the fifteenth century.

The subscriptio after *Av.* in Ald. speaks of *σχόλια ἐν ἀντιγράφῳ κείμενα διαφόροις*, which might lead one to expect Musurus's text to show traces of a

<sup>1</sup> On Triclinius's work on Aristophanes see Karl Holzinger, *Vorstudien zur Beurteilung der Erklärertätigkeit des Demetrios Triklinios zu den*

*Komödien des Aristophanes* (Sitz. d. Ak. d. Wiss. in Wien, ccxvii. 4 (1939)).

wide variety of sources; but his text of *Eq.* is almost entirely accounted for by E and the interpolated *recentiores*. It is not quite the best text that those two sources yield: e.g. Ald. follows E's error *ἀπαντα τὰ πρὸς* at 219 and the error of the *recentiores* (and Φ) *ἕως ἂν ἕτερος* at 134. There are, however, as we have seen, some good conjectures found only in Ald. We cannot be certain of their authorship: some may be Triclinian; a few are found in Suidas, which may have been used by Musurus for the scholia: but there is evidence that Musurus was an original emender. The reading of Ald. at 32 *ποῖον βρετέτας* is clearly based on *ποῖον βρεττέτας* (VE) not on *ποῖον βρέτας* (Φ) from which Triclinius conjectured *βρέτας*; *ποῖον βρέτας* (Vv5Vp2B).

The scholia in Ald., like its text, are a mixture of old and new: and it will be convenient to begin our examination of them by stating, where possible, what material Musurus has added to his old scholia.

In the first place, he has drawn extensively on recent Byzantine scholia, especially on Triclinius, whose metrical scholia and colometry he has adopted in preference to those of Heliodorus. There are many additions to the scholia peculiar to Vv5Ald., and many more after *Eq.* 270 peculiar to Ald., which are probably due to Triclinius or to other late Byzantines. The most interesting of these is on *Eq.* 589 (see Eduard Fraenkel on Aesch. *Ag.* 1344 ff.). The words enclosed by Dübner in square brackets are found only in Ald. and are most probably an interpolation by Triclinius (Holzinger, *Sitz. d. Ak. d. Wiss. in Wien*, ccxvii. 4, pp. 19 ff.). In this case, exceptionally, we can see a clear textual motive for the interpolation: for the words *καὶ τραγικοί* (p. 55, col. 1, l. 54 Dübner) make nonsense of the scholion, which is discussing the comic chorus only, and must have been inserted by some simpleton who reflected that tragic as well as comic poets *χοροὺς ἴστασαν*. Triclinius saw that something was wrong, but instead of deleting *καὶ τραγικοί*, he tried to patch the scholion up by interpolating more matter about tragedy.

Secondly, there are many scholia found only in Ald. and external sources, and not in any manuscript of Aristophanes. Dindorf (Dübner, p. viii) regarded these as interpolations by Musurus from the lexica, etc., in which we find the scholia in question: but Zacher was right to point out (*Handschr. u. Class.*, p. 564) that he may have got them from manuscripts of Aristophanes now lost, for it is clear that he used such manuscripts. This possibility is strengthened when we find Musurus and the source in question giving different versions of a scholion, e.g. 628 ad fin. *καὶ τὴν ὄχθην . . . κρημνοὶ* is peculiar to Ald.Suid. but Suid. (s.v. *κρημνός*) reads *Ὀμηρος καὶ τὴν ὄχθην . . . λέγει*. On the other hand, there are several examples that look more like interpolations by Musurus: and interpolations from external sources are found even in the scholia in our manuscripts of Aristophanes, e.g. the interpolation from Herodian found in Σ *Eq.* 1185, in VΓΘAld., which betrays itself by the words *οὕτω γὰρ τὴν ἐντεριώνην Ἀρ. ἐν τοῖς Ἰππεύων εἶπεν*.

We may now go on to attempt to determine which, if any, of our surviving manuscripts were used by Musurus as his source for the old scholia. We naturally turn first to E, and do in fact find immediately that almost throughout Ald. is in general agreement with the *v* group, to which E belongs, and there are several interesting cases of agreement between E and Ald. against the other manuscripts. There are notes found in EAld. alone at *Eq.* 573, 626, 1386, and 1391: of individual readings we may mention 1130 ad fin. *δημεύω* M, *δημεύσω* Suid., *δουλεύω* VΦ (δολ- V, -ων Γ), *ὑστερον πένητα ἐποίησα* EAld.

It seems clear that Musurus used E as his main source for the old scholia, but it is equally clear that E was not his only source. In the first place, nearly all the scholia omitted by *v* but found in  $\Phi$  are included in Ald. (There are scholia peculiar to  $\Phi$  Ald. at 11, 50, 560, 855, 882, 1053, 1093, 1128, 1140.) There are also some 50 places where Ald. follows  $\Phi$  against *v* in single readings, and between 1060 and 1187, where many scholia are omitted by E, Ald. definitely sides with  $\Phi$  against V, though Ald. is less close to  $\Phi$  here than it is to E when it follows E. This suggests that Musurus did not use a  $\Phi$  manuscript himself, but got his  $\Phi$  scholia from Triclinius.

In addition, Ald. has some scholia, indistinguishable to us from old scholia, which are found in neither E nor  $\Phi$ , e.g. 1140 ἡ παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς κτλ. (p. 71, col. 2, l. 3 Dübner.) is peculiar to  $\Gamma^2$  Ald.; and the scholion on κημὸς at 1150 (down to στόματος p. 71, col. 2, l. 34 Dübner.) survives only in V $\Theta$  Ald., but Ald. gives a version independent of V $\Theta$ , e.g. it assigns the quotation from Sophocles (*fr.* 504 P.) to the Πηλεΐς, whereas V $\Theta$  assign it to the Ποίμενες. Very occasionally Ald. has a different version of an old scholion found in E, as at 355, where Ald., besides a few small individual variants not found in any manuscript, gives the scholia in the same order as  $\Gamma$  corrected by  $\Gamma^3$ .<sup>1</sup> This, combined with the presence in Ald. of  $\Phi$  scholia and a scholion peculiar to  $\Gamma^3$ , might seem to suggest that Musurus used  $\Gamma$ : but these scholia may also have come to him from Triclinius or another descendant of  $\Phi'$  independently of  $\Phi$ , and our ignorance of his Triclinian manuscript and of the ἀντίγραφα διάφορα of which he speaks in the subscription after *Av.* (quoted above, p. 40) makes certainty on this point unattainable. There is no evidence that Musurus used any other of our surviving manuscripts.

As far as we can tell, the alterations, as distinct from the additions, made by Musurus to the scholia are comparatively slight. Like the redactor of  $\Phi$ , he has eliminated glosses, and has incorporated nearly 200 glosses in the marginal scholia, occasionally with alterations on a scale rare in his treatment of the marginal scholia themselves.

We owe some twenty good readings in the scholia to Ald. alone. They are all minor corrections, whether by Musurus himself or not it is impossible to say. We may mention 51 (on ἐνθου) ὅλως (ὅλου codd.), 264 εἰ τις καὶ τοιοῦτό τι (various errors in codd.), 428 ad fin. ὡς δὲ (μὴ codd.) παρὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν τὰ τῶν γυναικῶν (τὰ om. codd.), 511 (p. 52, col. 1, l. 41 Dübner.) ἠύξησεν <ἂν>, 546 (p. 53, col. 2, l. 50 Dübner.) ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἐρετῶν (ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἀρίθμων codd.), 634 (p. 57, col. 1, l. 41 Dübner.), οἱ <ἀνόητα κοῦντες> καὶ, 651 ad init. ἡσθησαν<sup>2</sup> (ἡσθοντο codd.), 1056 (p. 69, col. 2, l. 15 Dübner.) ὠτακουστήσαντας (-αντας codd.), 1151 (p. 71, col. 2, l. 52 Dübner.) ἔρρ' (αἰρε V: schol. om. cett.).

Our examination of the *y* family, the largest and most important family, is now complete: and we pass to a third family, which contains scarcely any truth in the text unknown to R and *y*, but is of great importance in the scholia.

### 3. $\Gamma^2$ MS(vid.)

When examining R and the *y* family, we mentioned in passing<sup>3</sup> some

<sup>1</sup> This is the order given by Dübner:  $\Gamma$  ends at Ἀθηναίων (p. 45, col. 2, l. 12 Dübner.):  $\Gamma^3$  has put in from ἄλλως to the end. V $\Theta$  have these two sections in reverse order. (The sentence νῦν δὲ . . . λουδορρηθεῖν (ll. 9-10

Dübner.) makes nonsense here and may be an attempt to explain 771-2: the following sentence is a scholion on 358.)

<sup>2</sup> ἡσθησαι Ald., by a misprint: corr. Gelenius. <sup>3</sup> Codd. *Eq.* I, pp. 170 f, 183.



significant cases of agreement between R and three other sources, Γ<sup>2</sup>, M (Ambrosianus L. 39 sup.), and the lexicon known as Suidas. We may begin by describing briefly the last two of these.

- (a) M. Codex Ambrosianus L. 39 sup. (14th cent.) in the Biblioteca Ambrosiana at Milan, containing *Pl. Nub. Ran. Eq. Av.* (1-1641) with prolegomena, arguments, scholia, and glosses, also Euripides *Hec. Or. Phoen.*, Hesiod *Op. D.*, and Soph. *Ai. El. O.T.* (it is designated Mb in A. C. Pearson's text of Sophocles).

The text, scholia, and glosses on *Eq.* in M were all written by the same scribe. There are comparatively few glosses in the play (about 120 in all) of which nearly half are on 1-150. Red ink is used for the glosses, and to mark the beginning of each marginal scholion, whether there is a lemma or not. The scribe was careless: there are many blunders, of which the omission of 1155-7 is the most serious, and names of speakers are habitually omitted. Nor was he very intelligent: in the scholia his use of red ink exposes his frequent ignorance of where a new scholion begins, and his inability to recognize lemmata, as in his conflation of the scholia on 1389 and 1388 into *σπονδὰς ἐσπέισαντο . . . πρὸ τοῦ Πελοποννησιακοῦ πολέμου, τριακοντούτιδας πόρνας εἰσφέροντες*. Yet he seems to have known Greek; but he was totally ignorant of metre, e.g. he has arranged his lines to coincide with the end of a sentence at 64 and 92. He clearly found his original difficult to read, especially as regards compendia.

There is only one good reading in the text peculiar to M (277 *παρέλθῃ σ'*), but in the scholia it is indispensable. Although it omits over 200 scholia found in *v* it contains several important scholia found nowhere else. For example, nearly all the Heliodorean metrical scholia found in VETΘ are omitted by M; yet at 333 a genuine Heliodorean scholion survives in M alone: <διπλῇ> . . . *δίστιχον ἐπάγοναι* (fort. *ἐπάγει*: cf. *Σ Nub.* 476) *τοῦ χοροῦ ἱαμβικὸν τετράμετρον καταληκτικόν· ἐξῆς ἔπονται [στίχοι δύο ὅμοιοι]<sup>1</sup> ἱαμβοὶ τετράμετροι καταληκτικοὶ λβ'.* Among other scholia found in M alone may be mentioned a note at 1055 on the contest between Athena and Poseidon (cf. *Σ Nub.* 587, Suid. s.v. *Ἀθηναίων δυσβουλία*).

But M also contains many true readings, or remnants of true readings, in the scholia, of passages corrupted elsewhere, e.g. 336 ad fin. *βουλόμενον λέγειν* (reading *ἐπιστοιμίζει* with Γ<sup>3</sup>), 355 (p. 45, col. 2, l. 18 Düb.) *ὁ Κλέων ἐπεπήδησεν ἄλλοτρία νίκη*, 382 (p. 47, col. 1, ll. 4 ff. Düb.) *ὑπερηκόντισεν ἢν' ὁ νικῶν μὴ . . . δοκῇ*, 693 (p. 58, col. 2, l. 37 Düb.) *φόβητρα (φοβερά cett.)*, 708 ad init. *ἐκξύσω (ἐξοίσω cett.)*, 984 (p. 68, col. 1, l. 22 Düb.) *post πάντα add. συνταράττοντα*, 1130 ad fin. *ἑάσας πλουτῆσαι δημεύω (δημεύσω S.)*. In addition, M sometimes gives in their correct position scholia that have strayed in the other manuscripts, e.g. 291 from p. 43, col. 1, l. 23 Düb. *τοῦτο ὡς πρὸς βυρσοδέψην* to the end of the scholion are notes on 316, as Rogers (at 316) saw: and M gives a version of the scholion at 316, though it also gives at 291 the version we know from our other manuscripts. At 350 the last sentence (on *μετοίκους*) belongs to 347, where M gives it. At 1106 the words *ἐκάλουν οὕτως τὸ ἰχθύδιον* are a fragment of a scholion on *Γλάνδος* (1097): M gives the correct lemma *Γλάνδος σοφώτερος* from 1097, though it also includes under this lemma a scholion which really belongs to 1106 (*μόνῃ τῇ ἐσθλίῃ σχόλαζε*)<sup>2</sup> and places it between the scholia on 1103 and 1109.

<sup>1</sup> Apparently a gloss on *δίστιχον*.

<sup>2</sup> M omits *καὶ τὸ ὄφρον* and *τοιαύτην . . . παρέξω*.



All this suggests that M's scholia contain traces of a genuine tradition not found elsewhere; but they also bear unmistakable marks of the hand of an editor. Many scholia have been abridged or paraphrased, and polemical notes are occasionally found, e.g. after *Σ Eq.* 1001 *φλυαρία δὲ τοῦτο ξυνουκία γάρ καὶ τὰ κατώγεα λέγονται*. The text, on the other hand, shows virtually no readings plainly due to conjecture which are not found elsewhere; there are only three such in *Eq.*, 38 *προσώποις δὴ*, 878 *ταῦτα <δῆτα>*, 1086 *ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ χρησμός ἐμοί*. These metrical corrections are plainly not due to the scribe of M himself: but we have no positive clue to their authorship.

(b) *S(uidas)* This lexicon has been recognized since Kuster as an important source for the text and scholia of Aristophanes, and no description of it is necessary here. *Eq.* is one of its favourite plays: it quotes over 500 lines of the text, and scholia on over 400 lines. It clearly used a manuscript of Aristophanes descended from the same archetype as our manuscripts: among errors it shares with our manuscripts may be mentioned 418 *μαγείρους, λέγων*, 635 *Μόθωνες*, 798 *πεντώβολον*, and 1401 *λοῦτρον*.

In the text the only good reading we owe to S is 254 *ἔφευγε*: but in the scholia there are several, e.g. 9 (p. 33, col. 2, l. 18 Düb.) *συναλεῖν*, 84 (p. 36, col. 2, l. 19 Düb.) *ἄμα τῷ στρατεύματι*, 91 (p. 37, col. 1, l. 39 Düb.) *βουλευέσθαι*, 414 (p. 48, col. 1, l. 41 Düb.) *εἰς τὸ σταῖς*, and 42 *ῥ' ἀπομάττονται*, 526 (Cratin. fr. 186 K., l. 1) *τοῦ ρεύματος*, 532 (p. 53, col. 1, l. 23 Düb.) *ὠφθαλμιμένους*, and 534 (Cratin. fr. 317 K., l. 2) *πολυστέφανός σε φιλήσῃ*. All the above occur in passages omitted by R: 414 *εἰς τὸ σταῖς* and the readings in 526 and 534 occur in passages omitted by M.

We may now set forth the main cases of agreement in the text between R and one or more of *Γ<sup>2</sup>MS* against *γ*.

(i) *Good readings*. 61 *ὁ δὲ γέρων* RMS: 182 *ισχύειν* RΓ<sup>2</sup>γPMS: 196 *σοφῶς* RMS: 212 *ἐπιτροπεύειν εἰμ'* RM: 320 *καὶ φίλοις* RΓ<sup>2</sup>M: 339 *αὐτὸ περὶ* RM: 357 *ἐπιτιῶν* RS: 385 *ἦν ἄρ' οὐ* RΓ<sup>2</sup>γPMS: 408 *ἡπαιωνίσαι* RS: 412 *παίδιον* RM: 440 *τερθρίους* RM: 463 *γομφούμεν'* αὐτὰ RM: 508 *λέξοντας ἔπη πρὸς* RM: 569 *οὐ γὰρ οὐδεὶς πάποτ'* RM: 604 *δ' οἱ νεώτατοι* RM: 646 *οἱ δ'...* (Γ<sup>2</sup>γP) *διεγαλήνισαν (-ησαν M)* RM: 727 *suo loco habent* RM: 748 *ἵνα τοῦτον* RM: 768 *κατατμηθῇν* RM: 904 *οὐχὶ* RΓ<sup>2</sup>M: 955 *τοῦτ' ἔνεστιν* RM: 1018 *χάσκων* RΓ<sup>2</sup>M: 1039 *τὸν* RΓ<sup>2</sup>γPMS: 1058 *φράσαι (leg. φράσσαι)* RΓ<sup>2</sup>M: 1110 *εἴσω* RΓ<sup>2</sup>γPMS: 1256 *ὅπως ἔσομαι σοι* RΓ<sup>2</sup>γPMS: 1326 *δέ· καὶ* RM: also readings at 908, 970, 1087, and 1088 confirming conjectures in the *recentiores* (see above, p. 42).

(ii) *Errors*. 532 *οὐκ ἔντος R, οὐκέτ' ὄντος MS*: 679 *ἀπαίρουσιν* RM: 680 *ὑπερεμπιπάζοντό με* RS: 728 *ἀπὸ] ἐκ* RΓ<sup>2</sup>M: 741 *εἰπέ μοι νῦν* RM: 761 *πρότερον (om. σύ)* RS: 790 *ἀμείνων* RM: 801 *ἵνα μόνον* RΓ<sup>2</sup>γPMS: 1009 *καλῶς* RM.

All the readings in the above list for which S is not cited occur in passages it does not quote.

In the scholia, too, we can observe the kinship of RMS, and of MS after 214, where R's scholia end: e.g. 59 RMS explain *βυραῖν* as *παραγραμματοςμός*, *γ* as *ἐναλλαγή στοιχείου*: 152 RMS quote *Od.* 14. 432, whereas *γ* quotes (or rather misquotes) *Il.* 9. 215. There are also interesting cases of agreement in individual readings, e.g. 41 (p. 34, col. 2, l. 52 f. Düb.) *πρὸ γὰρ τῆς εὐρέσεως τῶν ψήφων* RMS (*ἐπεὶ ἀντὶ ψήφων γ*): 166 RS take *πατήσεις* to be a gloss on *κλαστάσεις*.

MS agree against  $\gamma$  in several readings in the scholia on 259 (S s.v. ἀποσυνά-  
ζεις), 277 (s.v. τήνελλα ad fin., ὁ δὲ νοῦς κτλ.) and 877 (s.v. Γρύττος) and often  
in single readings, e.g. 508 (p. 52, col. 1, l. 22 Düb.) ἀπὴρτῆται MS, ἀπῆκται  
 $\gamma$ : 641 (p. 57, col. 2, l. 13 Düb.) ἡ κλεῖς (κυγκλῖς  $\gamma$ ) πέμπεται.  $\Gamma^2$ 's affinity with  
this group in the scholia is slight: there are a few cases of agreement with M,  
but none of any significance except 794 (p. 62, col. 2, l. 44 Düb.) Ταῦρος  
Ἐχέτιμίδης δὲ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἑτεροί, with what follows omitted.

It seems clear, however, that MS are independent of R in the text, as they  
obviously are in the scholia, e.g. M has 414, which R omits, and S quotes it.  
MS several times agree with  $\gamma$  against R, e.g. 8 νυν] νῦν  $\gamma$  MS, δὴ R: 31 του R,  
ποι  $\gamma$  MS: 272 πρὸς  $\gamma$  MS, τὸ R.  $\gamma$  M agree against R some 150 times, e.g. 14 μὴ  
R, σοι μὴ  $\gamma$  M: 319 νῆ R, καὶ νῆ  $\gamma$  M: 433 μακρὰ  $\gamma$  M, πολλὰ R: 482 γνώμην R,  
ψυχὴν  $\gamma$  M: 544 οὖν R, om.  $\gamma$  M: 901 γε τοῦτο R, γε καὶ τοῦτο  $\gamma$  M: 1339 πρὸ  
τοῦ, κάτειπε, καὶ R, κάτειπέ μοι πρὸ τοῦ καὶ  $\gamma$  M. Also at 1086 M's conjecture  
ἔστιν ὁ χρησμός ἐμοὶ shows ignorance of the correct reading ἔστιν ἐμοὶ χρησμός  
found in RE. Nor does M side consistently with any single descendant of  $\gamma$ :  
cf. 24 πρῶτον om.  $\Phi$  M: 163 τὰς τῶνδε  $\nu$  M: 379 σκεψώμεθ'  $\nu$  M: 603 σαπφόρα  
 $\Phi$  M: 1106 ante 1105 transp. EM: and in the scholia, *passim*.

$\Gamma^2$ , as we saw (codd. *Eq.* I. 182 f.), appears to us as too much of an individual-  
ist to be placed firmly in any family, but there are a few striking cases of agree-  
ment between him and M(S): e.g. 335-9 ordine 335, 8, 9, 7, 6  $\Gamma^2$  M: 1108  
ὁπότερος ἂν σφῶν εὐ με μᾶλλον ἂν εὐ ποιῇ  $\Gamma^2$  M, from which S's reading (s.v.  
ἡνία and πυνκός) ὁπότερος σφῶν εὐ με μᾶλλον ἂν ποιῇ seems to be derived.  
 $\Gamma^2$  MS also read 717 τῷ, confirming Vp2Ald.B (see above, p. 42).

The connexion between MS is unexpectedly close, when we consider the  
inaccuracy of both.<sup>1</sup> But M is independent<sup>2</sup> of S: and its text keeps its character  
in passages which S does not quote. This evidence, and especially the character  
of M's scholia, suggests that MS, and some readings of  $\Gamma^2$ , are descended from  
a third hyparchetype, independent of both R and  $\gamma$ <sup>3</sup>; and thus M, as often the  
sole representative of this group, has a strong claim on the attention of editors.

This third hyparchetype will be known as  $\sigma$ . Its text seems to have contained  
variants, if we may judge from M, e.g. 79 ὁ δὲ νοῦς δ' M, ὁ νοῦς δ' R, ὁ δὲ νοῦς  
 $\gamma$ : 673 ἐρρέτω MSE<sup>γ</sup>  $\Gamma^2$   $\gamma$ , ἐρπέτω M<sup>1</sup> cett.: 856 κατασπῶσαντες MS  $\Gamma^2$ , θαρ  
MS<sup>1</sup>, καθαρπῶσαντες  $\gamma$ : 873 ἄνδρα MR, ὄντα M<sup>1</sup>  $\gamma$ :  $\Sigma$  *Eq.* 362 ad init. ἡ ἀπλῶς  
τὰ πλευριμαῖα τῶν κρεῶν MS, ἡ ἀπλῶς τὰ πλευρικά τῶν βοῶν M<sup>1</sup>  $\nu$  (schol. om.  $\Phi$ ).

Our examination of the manuscripts is now complete; some notes on the  
scholia will be given in a later paper.

Exeter College, Oxford

D. MERVYN JONES

<sup>1</sup> Cf., besides the examples just quoted, readings at 517, 535, 542 quoted on p. 42 above. Very occasionally, on the other hand, S sides with R against  $\gamma$  M, cf. 357, 680, 761 quoted above, p. 47.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. S s.v. τήνελλα ad fin. (=  $\Sigma$  M): *τερ-  
μάτιον* S, *ἐρμάδιον* M (fallitur Adler): *ἐρμαῖον*  
Schnee.

<sup>3</sup> This conclusion was reached by G. Büniger (*de Ar. Eq. Lys. Thesm. apud Suid. reliquis, Diss. Argent.* 1878, pp. 20 ff.) and supported by K. Zacher in his review of Büniger, *Bursian*, 1892, p. 34. The independent value of M had also been maintained by A. von Velsen, *ed. Eq.* (1869), praef. p. 8.

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## XOPOY IN THE *PLUTUS*: A REPLY TO MR. HANDLEY

IN an interesting article entitled '*XOPOY* in the *Plutus*' Mr. E. W. Handley questions the accuracy of some observations of mine on this subject,<sup>2</sup> and complains of my 'failure to state facts'. He quotes my remark that 'the editors freely insert (*χοροῦ*) in the *Plutus*; but, according to Weissinger (p. 51),<sup>3</sup> the only example afforded by the MSS. is after 770; and here there is no lapse of time'. I added in a footnote that R<sup>2</sup> inserts *XOPOY* after line 801, according to the Oxford text. Handley's own researches have shown him that R has *KOMMATION XOPOY* between 770 and 771, and that R<sup>2</sup> has inserted *XOPOY* between 801 and 802. A, U, and M have no indications of a choral performance. But the facsimile of V shows *XOPOY* at 321, 627, and 802 'in the left-hand margin, and in confusion with the scholia', and *KOMMATION XOPOY* inset between 769 and 770. This evidence had been neglected by the editors, and 'the first to appreciate the significance of these readings of V was K. R. von Holzinger', part of whose work appeared posthumously in 1940. On the ground that 'the contents of margins are peculiarly liable to accident', Handley holds that 'in the *Plutus* the positive evidence of V, which has four indications of a choral performance, is likely to outweigh the negative evidence of R, which denies two of them, or of A, U, and M, which have none'. He further argues that 'if the transmission of *XOPOY* to the surviving manuscripts was so uncertain, it may have appeared before the author of the "Life" more often than V leads us to believe, and the argument from the silence of that manuscript cannot be used with great effect'.

The relevant passage in the 'Life' states that Aristophanes inserted *XOPOY* to allow actors to rest and to change their masks. Consequently Handley feels justified in inserting *XOPOY* (attested by the Byzantine scholia) at 958 and 1096, and also in inserting it at 1170 to allow for mask-changing, although there is here no manuscript support at all.

I do not see that the further evidence accumulated by Handley invalidates my main point, which was that in deciding to print *XOPOY* editors have been guided not so much by the manuscript evidence as by their own sense of what is fitting; thus Bergk, Meineke, and Handley himself accept *XOPOY* at 1170. But I believe the real charge is against my handling of the schol. ad 619, which Handley quotes as follows: . . . ἐπὶ τῷ τέλει παράγραφος (i.e. ad 626), καὶ ἐξῆς τὸ χοροῦ. κἀνταῦθα γὰρ χορὸν ὤφειλε θεῖναι, καὶ διατρίψαι μικρόν, ἄχρῃ ἂν τις ἐξ Ἀσκληπιοῦ ἀναστρέψειε τὴν τοῦ Πλούτου ἀπαγγέλλων ἀνάβλειψιν, and adds: 'Professor Beare, it will be remembered, quoted the words κἀνταῦθα . . . ἀναστρέψειε as evidence that the scholiast had not *XOPOY* in his text. They are indeed evidence that he thought that the chorus did not perform at 626-7: Aristophanes "should have put there" a choral ode. But καὶ ἐξῆς τὸ χοροῦ is

<sup>1</sup> C.Q., N.S. iii (1953), 55-61.

<sup>2</sup> In '*XOPOY* in the *Heautontimorumenos* and the *Plutus*', *Hermathena*, lxxiv (1949), 26-38.

<sup>3</sup> In 'A Study of Act Divisions in Classical Drama', *Iowa Studies in Class. Phil.* ix (1940).

Weissinger's words are 'In the *Plutus* *KOMMATION XOPOY* occurs once in the MSS. . . . after vs. 770 . . . But editors have added five *XOPOY*'s . . . Bergk (1900) has a seventh *XOPOY* after vs. 1170.'

categorical: it follows that the scholiast had *XOPOY* in his text, and that from *XOPOY* he understood not "here the chorus performs", but "here the chorus should perform".

I had assumed that the meaning of *XOPOY* is 'a performance by the chorus'. As the scholiast himself implies that the chorus did not perform at this point, I had taken *καὶ ἐξῆς τὸ χοροῦ* to mean 'at that point he should have written the direction *XOPOY*'. This would give sense to the *γάρ* in the following words. Moreover, at line 627 the scholiast says<sup>1</sup> *ἐπὶ τῷ τέλει παράγραφος. σημειώσειν ἐνταῦθα ὅτι δέον χορὸν διὰ μέσου θεῖναι, μέχρις ἂν ἐκείνῳ ἐξ Ἀσκληπιοῦ ἐλθόντες ἀναβλέψαιεν τὸν Πλούτον, ὃ δὲ παραχρῆμα τὸν Καρίωνα εἰσφέρει εὐαγγελίζοντα τοῖς γέρονσι περὶ τῆς τοῦ Πλούτου ἀναβλεψέως. ἐποίησε δὲ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀλόγως, ἀλλὰ τῇ τε τῆς νέας κωμωδίας συνηθείᾳ, ἐν ἣ αἱ παραβάσεις ἐπαύσαντο, ὡς προείρηται, καὶ ἅμα δεῖξαι βουλόμενος ὡς ἄρα τάχιστα πάντῃ ὁ Πλούτος ἀνέβλεψεν*. That is, the scholiast is again saying that there ought to have been a choral performance here to allow time for the cure, but that Aristophanes has deliberately avoided this, 'not unreasonably', but after the fashion of New Comedy, in which there were no parabases; moreover, Aristophanes wished to indicate the *quickness* of the cure. There is nothing said here to show that *XOPOY* occurred in the manuscript. Handley comments (p. 56, note 5): 'cf. scholl. ad 627, 802 (Aldine), which remark on, and excuse, the absence of a choral ode at 626-7 and 822-3 respectively, but tell us nothing about *XOPOY*'.

Handley's view is apparently that *XOPOY* sometimes has no necessary reference to anything supposed to have been done or said when the play was performed, but may merely be an indication to the reader of an imaginary pause. Indeed he quotes (p. 57) a scholion to this effect: *νοεῖται ἔξωθεν τόπος, ἢ τὸς χοροῦ. ἐν γὰρ τῇ νέᾳ κωμωδίᾳ οἱ χοροὶ ἤγουν αἱ παραβάσεις ἐπαύσαντο· ἔνθα οὐδὲν βούλεται ὁ ποιητὴς διατρίψαι μικρόν, τίθησι τὸ χοροῦ ἔννοια διδοῦς ἡμῖν ἀναμένειν βραχὺ, ὡς καὶ ἐν Βατράχοις τὸ αὐλεῖ τις ἔνδον καὶ τὸ διαύλιον προσανλεῖ*, translating 'τόπος' is understood, to make *τόπος χοροῦ*. For in New Comedy the choruses, or rather the parabases, ceased. So where the poet wishes to pass away a short time, he puts *XOPOY*, meaning that we should wait a little, just as, in the *Frogs*, he puts *αὐλεῖ τις ἔνδον* and *διαύλιον προσανλεῖ*. It is in this sense that Handley is willing (p. 59) to accept *XOPOY* at 252-3, though 'there can be no question of a choral performance at this point: the absurdity would be involved that the chorus must perform in order to give Carion time to meet it off stage, and then enter with him from the country. On the assumption that *XOPOY* stands in the text "where the poet wishes to pass away a short time", *XOPOY* here is possibly reasonable. . . . But on the assumption that *XOPOY* signifies a performance by the chorus it is certainly not reasonable, and must be due to interpolation on the very principle used to explain its existence.' (Apparently, then, interpolation of *XOPOY* was possible.)

Thus Handley is committed to the paradoxical view that *XOPOY* can sometimes be regarded as authentic only on the view that it does *not* denote a performance by the chorus. I think that the passage in the 'Life' already mentioned is relevant here: *πάλιν δὲ ἐκλελοιπότες καὶ τοῦ χορηγεῖν τὸν Πλούτον γράψας, εἰς τὸ διαναπαύεσθαι τὰ σκηνικὰ πρόσωπα καὶ μετεσκευάσθαι ἐπιγράφει *XOPOY*, φθεγγόμενος ἐν ἐκείνοις ᾧ καὶ ὀρώμεν τοὺς νέους οὕτως ἐπιγράφοντας ζήλω Ἀριστοφάνους*. Here we are told that it was when the chorus was no longer available that Aristophanes took to entering *XOPOY* in his text, in order to

<sup>1</sup> I quote from Dindorf's 1822 edition, vol. i, p. 94.

give the actors a rest and allow them to change their masks. On this view, when Aristophanes wrote what we translate as '(a performance) of the chorus' he did not mean that there should be a choral performance of any kind, whether song or dance, but merely that there should be a pause in the performance of the actors.

It would take very strong evidence to convince me that Aristophanes, a practising dramatist, introduced blank pauses in the performance merely to give his actors a rest, or that he described either a blank pause, or a pause occupied by instrumental music, as 'a . . . of the chorus', when he knew full well that there was no chorus. Therefore if I find XOPOY in the manuscripts at a point where we have reason to believe that there never was a choral performance, I cannot regard it as the authentic direction given by Aristophanes, but must suppose that it has been interpolated by someone after Aristophanes' day. At lines 252-3 a choral performance is ruled out by the context; therefore XOPOY must be an interpolation whatever its meaning may have been for the man who inserted it. The scholion at 619 shows that, in the opinion of the writer, Aristophanes had not given the chorus anything to do at 627. Handley holds nevertheless that the scholiast did find XOPOY in his text, but that he took it in the sense that the chorus 'should have' (but did not) perform. If this is his view, how does he explain what the scholiast tells us at line 627? We are there told that, though Aristophanes ought to have had a choral performance, he preferred to bring Carion on at once in order to indicate the speed of the cure. One would have thought this just the wrong place to insert XOPOY in the sense that we should 'wait a little'. If the scholiast really found XOPOY here, I cannot understand why he should have been so certain that there had been no choral performance, and that Aristophanes had omitted a choral performance in order to give the effect of speed.

It seems to me that XOPOY can have originated only as a sign that the chorus were to give a 'turn' of some sort, perhaps a dance without words. Naturally such a performance would take up some time, during which incidentally actors *could* change their masks and action off stage *could* be imagined; but its primary purpose must have been entertainment. A time came when plays were no longer performed, and were known by reading alone. The reader, unhampered by any need to think out problems of staging, might come to regard XOPOY as a mere indication that a pause was to be imagined. Hence might arise the temptation to write XOPOY in the margin when, for any reason, a pause seemed appropriate; and in fact, as Handley has shown, it was inserted at places where we can clearly see that a choral performance can never have been practicable. But if this is so, then the mere occurrence of XOPOY in manuscripts liable to interpolation cannot be regarded as very strong evidence for what happened on the Athenian stage.

Handley's declared object is 'to clear up confusion'; but he can scarcely do this if he is not clear in his own use of terms. When he defends XOPOY, does he or does he not mean that it was the intention of the dramatist that the chorus should perform at that point? He is prepared to insert XOPOY merely to give the actors a rest, or to enable them to change their masks. But can we suppose that they needed to rest at 958, 1096, and 1170, or that the three-actor rule (doubted even by Pickard-Cambridge for comedy—see *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens*, p. 148) and the need to change masks (a matter of less than a minute, if we may judge by Latin comedy) make it necessary to postulate a choral

performance where there is no manuscript evidence? Still less is there any justification for postulating a choral performance merely to indicate lapse of dramatic time when the manuscript evidence is against it. The most striking instance of lapse of dramatic time in Aristophanes is *Plutus* 626-7. Yet we are assured by the scholiast that Aristophanes, so far from arranging a choral performance here, brought his actor on at once 'in order to indicate the quickness of the cure'.

*University of Bristol*

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## THUCYDIDES AND THE PENTEKONTAETIA

It was at one time almost universally believed, and is still believed by some scholars,<sup>1</sup> that Thucydides cannot have written his account of the Pentekontaetia (1. 89–118. 2) before his return from exile because he refers in it (97. 2)<sup>2</sup> to the *Ἀττικὴ ξυγγραφὴ* of Hellanicus, in which an event belonging to the year 407/6 was mentioned. This argument in favour of a late date for the composition of the excursus has been disputed and is now much less widely supported. It has been suggested that the reference to Hellanicus in 97. 2,<sup>3</sup> or the whole of that section,<sup>4</sup> was added by Thucydides to a part of his work written much earlier, or that an edition of the *Ἀττικὴ ξυγγραφὴ* including an account of the Pentekontaetia may have been published long before 406 and the work have been subsequently continued.<sup>5</sup> Of these three suggestions the first is perhaps the most convincing: the brief sentence in which Thucydides refers to the work of Hellanicus disturbs the balance of the passage, which would be clearer and more logical without it.<sup>6</sup> If this sentence is a later insertion, it supplies, as F. E. Adcock has pointed out,<sup>7</sup> a *terminus ante quem* instead of a *terminus post quem* for the composition of the excursus. At all events the reference to the work of Hellanicus can no longer be accepted as incontrovertible proof that Thucydides wrote his account of the Pentekontaetia after his return from exile.

This conflict of opinion on the conclusions to be drawn from 97. 2 well illustrates the weakness of relying upon short passages, or even single clauses, believed to be 'early' or 'late' as evidence of the date at which Thucydides wrote substantial sections of his work. Datable passages, provided that they really are datable, throw a certain amount of light on the problem, but their contribution is very limited and has been much exaggerated.<sup>8</sup> A list of 'early' and 'late' passages compiled by H. Patzer is not a long one,<sup>9</sup> and some of them are disputable; it provides a very slight and insecure basis for general conclusions on the composition problem. The 'early' passages show only that Thucydides began to compile notes while the war was in progress, a fact much more securely authenticated by the opening sentence of his work (1. 1), the 'late' passages only that, if he composed the bulk of his earlier books long before the end of the war, he subsequently made a few additions. Other methods of approach may appear to be based on less secure foundations because they are necessarily more subjective. There has, however, been a tendency in recent

<sup>1</sup> H. Patzer, *Das Problem der Geschichtsschreibung des Thukydides* (1937), 104; J. de Romilly, *Thucydide et l'impérialisme athénien* (1947), 23–24; Schmid-Stählin, *Gesch. der griech. Literatur*, i. 5 (1948), 131.

<sup>2</sup> Throughout this paper the references to Thucydides by chapter and section only are to Book 1.

<sup>3</sup> K. Ziegler, *Rhein. Mus.* lxxviii (1929), 66, n. 2.

<sup>4</sup> N. G. L. Hammond, *C.Q.* xxxiv (1940), 149–50.

<sup>5</sup> A. W. Gomme, *Historical Commentary on*

*Thucydides*, i (1945), 6, n. 3, 280, 362, n. 2. Gomme also (op. cit. 264–6) disposes of the arguments that references to the walls of Athens (93. 2) and of the Peiraeus (93. 5) were written after 404.

<sup>6</sup> Ziegler, loc. cit.

<sup>7</sup> *J.H.S.* lxxi (1951), 11.

<sup>8</sup> de Romilly, op. cit. 12, points out that a single phrase referring to Aegina in 7. 57. 2 is believed by Schadewaldt to date two entire books, by Schwartz to date two chapters, and by Rehm to date only the reference to Aegina.

<sup>9</sup> Op. cit. 103–9.

discussions of the Thucydidean problem, or of parts of it, to rely less on datable passages and more on broader considerations, and though disagreement on every aspect of the problem remains as wide as ever, this change of emphasis has yielded very interesting results.<sup>1</sup>

The excursus on the Pentekontaetia is remarkable in several ways. It falls into two parts, of which the first (89-96) is strikingly different from the second (97-118. 2) in scale and general tone, including the treatment of leading characters; neither part can be deemed to fulfil altogether satisfactorily the purpose for which the excursus was evidently written; the first part has affinities with the excursus on Pausanias and Themistocles which occurs towards the end of the same book (128-38); the second part has an introduction of its own (97), which is longer than that of the first (89. 1). Of these characteristics the last has played some part in discussions on the date of composition of the excursus,<sup>2</sup> but though attention has been drawn to the others, they do not appear to have been generally considered to be relevant to this problem. Gomme, however, in an interesting note,<sup>3</sup> writes: 'it is a not unnatural inference that 89-96 is in fact the beginning of a rewriting of the whole excursus'. This view will presumably be developed in the appendix to the third volume of his *Commentary* in which the composition problem is to be discussed.<sup>4</sup> As briefly stated in this note, it does not seem to be wholly convincing. He maintains that the two prefaces, namely 89. 1, οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι τρώῃ τοιῷδε ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐν οἷς ἡδύθησαν, and 97. 1, τοσάδε ἐπῆλθον πολέμῳ τε καὶ διαχειρίσει πραγμάτων μεταξύ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ κ.τ.λ., 'both cover all the ground'. Most editors, however, consider the first of these passages to be an introduction to 89-96 alone,<sup>5</sup> and it can be made to introduce 97-118. 2 as well only by interpreting ἡδύθησαν as equivalent to a pluperfect,<sup>6</sup> which seems unnatural. It is also questionable whether 97. 1 could stand as a preface to the whole excursus. The opening words ἡγούμενοι δὲ αὐτονόμων τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ ἀπὸ κοινῶν ξυνόδων βουλευόντων, which precede the part of the sentence quoted by Gomme, show that Thucydides is introducing an account of Athenian achievements after the foundation of the Delian Confederacy. The phrase ἀπὸ κοινῶν ξυνόδων clearly refers to the meetings of League representatives at Delos mentioned in 96. 2; hence 97. 1 is closely linked to the preceding narrative, as Gomme himself points out,<sup>7</sup> and is in no sense an alternative preface to the whole excursus.<sup>8</sup> An even stronger objection is that, if Thucydides had rewritten 98-117 on a scale approximately equal to that of 89-96, his excursus would have become of unmanageable length and

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the admirable study by J. H. Finley, *Harv. Stud., Suppl. Vol. i* (1940), 255-97, though I do not agree with his conclusion that Thucydides wrote his history wholly after 404.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. G. B. Grundy, *Thucydides*, i<sup>2</sup> (1948), 441-4.

<sup>3</sup> Op. cit. 363, n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Op. cit. 113.

<sup>5</sup> So Stahl, Classen, Forbes, and Maddalena.

<sup>6</sup> So Gomme, op. cit. 256 (n. ad loc.), but it is surely preferable to regard the aorist as virtually ingressive, cf. 6. 33. 6 where ἡδύθησαν is similarly used.

<sup>7</sup> Op. cit. 363, n. 1. He also draws attention

to another difficulty, namely that 'we should expect the longer preface, with the reason given for the whole excursus (97. 2), to be the later one, or, if it had already been written for the earlier and shorter form of the excursus, that it would have been transferred to the beginning of the later form at 89. 1'.

<sup>8</sup> μεταξὺ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ in 97. 1 is a convenient phrase, which is only slightly inaccurate. The first event recorded in 98. 1 occurred about two and a half years after the end of the Persian War. In 118. 2, which certainly refers to the whole excursus, the limits of time are much more accurately defined.

thrown out of balance his carefully constructed explanation of the causes of the Peloponnesian War.<sup>1</sup>

My own conviction is that the two parts of the excursus were not composed separately at different dates but that, except for the reference to Hellanicus (97. 2), the whole excursus as it now stands was put together at the same time, the marked difference between the two parts being due to the limitations of the sources then available to Thucydides. Gomme argues from the chronological deficiencies of the excursus that 'Thucydides had not any list of archons readily accessible' and therefore 'wrote it when absent from Athens either when in command in Thrace or after his exile'.<sup>2</sup> The arguments upon which this conclusion is founded do not seem to me to be entirely cogent. If the criticism of Hellanicus for inaccurate chronology is a later addition, as Ziegler suggests,<sup>3</sup> Thucydides must have written his excursus before he read the narrative of Hellanicus on the Pentekontaetia, and a desire 'to correct chronological errors'<sup>4</sup> was not necessarily among his objects in writing it. Apart from the reference to Hellanicus, there is nothing in the excursus to indicate that the chronology of the Pentekontaetia, which is barely relevant to the growth of Athenian power and Spartan fears, was a subject of special interest to him.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, there do appear to me to be good reasons for believing the excursus to have been written when Thucydides was absent from Athens. Because my reasons are unconnected with its chronological deficiencies and based upon its distinctive features mentioned above, it will be necessary to attempt to substantiate my view by an examination of these features. Thucydides appears to have been severely handicapped. For the first part of the excursus his information, though relatively abundant,<sup>6</sup> seems to have been of a largely personal character and adapted *faute de mieux* for use in a context to which it was not ideally suited. The second part of the excursus contains many indications that, as in his narrative on the last three years of the Archidamian War,<sup>7</sup> he was very inadequately informed on Athenian activities and plans about which he could surely have obtained more evidence if he had been at Athens. The entire process of composition,<sup>8</sup> including the

<sup>1</sup> 89-96, which cover a period of two years or a little more, amount to little less than half the length of 98-117, which cover a period of nearly forty years.

<sup>2</sup> Op. cit. 362. He evidently refers to 97-118. 2 and not to 89-96, which, as stated above, he believes to be 'the beginning of a rewriting of the whole excursus'.

<sup>3</sup> See above, p. 53 with n. 3.

<sup>4</sup> Gomme, loc. cit.

<sup>5</sup> 'He gives a few figures for the duration of events and a few others for intervals between events' (Gomme, op. cit. 361). Some of these figures illustrate characteristics of the Athenians which might be deemed to have contributed to the rapid expansion of their power: for example, that they invaded Boeotia on the sixty-second day after the battle of Tanagra (108. 2) and that they continued their campaign in Egypt for six years (110. 1). On the other hand, to have established the precise date of any given event in the Pentekontaetia could scarcely

have helped Thucydides to substantiate his main thesis. He undoubtedly knew some dates which he has not chosen to mention in his excursus (Gomme, op. cit. 362 and 389-91), and it is arguable that he omits them because in this context they did not seem to him to be important.

<sup>6</sup> It is significant that his complaint that his predecessors had neglected the Pentekontaetia (97. 2) occurs in the preface to the second part of the excursus.

<sup>7</sup> Grundy, op. cit. i.<sup>2</sup> 479-83.

<sup>8</sup> His statement that he began his work on the war as soon as it broke out (1. 1), which must refer to the compilation of notes, applies only to the events of the war itself and its immediate antecedents. A point to be remembered is that during the years of uneasy peace between 421 and 413 he could, and doubtless did, consult Athenians travelling abroad, but they did not necessarily include any whose knowledge of the Pentekontaetia was greater than his.

preliminary assemblage of material, seems to belong wholly to the period of his exile.<sup>1</sup>

In examining the excursus it will be convenient to begin with the second part (97-118. 2). This part, in contrast to the first, gives remarkably little prominence to individuals, especially to Athenian leaders who contributed to the rise of Athenian power. Decisions are made and action taken by 'the Athenians' or 'the Lacedaemonians'. References to individuals are few except in formal genitive absolutes as the commanders of fleets or armies.<sup>2</sup> Individuals appear in the nominative only in the accounts of the Athenian expeditions to Egypt and Thessaly and of the Samian revolt, and only one of them is an Athenian. The list is: Inaros (104. 1; 110. 3), Artaxerxes (109. 2-3), Megabazus (109. 3), Megabyzus (109. 4), Orestes the Pharsalian (111. 1), Pericles (114. 1; 116. 3), and Stesagoras the Samian (116. 3).<sup>3</sup> If Thucydides is believed to have deliberately chosen to limit his narrative at this point to a bare summary, it was naturally impossible for him to dwell upon the part played by the leading personalities of the period. It is, however, remarkable that he is entirely silent on the vitally important foreign policies of Cimon, to whom he was probably related, and of Pericles, whose personality was to dominate a large section of his work, and that the military leadership of both, except that of Pericles in the Samian revolt, is given so little prominence. More information might also have been expected about Myronides and Tolmides; the former was long afterwards remembered as a hero by Aristophanes,<sup>4</sup> while both seem to have been somewhat extravagantly praised by Ephorus.<sup>5</sup> Although it may be arguable that the achievements of the period were largely the outcome of collective effort by the whole citizen body, Thucydides nowhere expresses this view, and it is not his practice to belittle the influence of individuals upon the course of history. He cannot have assumed that his readers would already be well informed about these Athenian leaders; for one of his reasons for writing on this period is that historians had neglected it (97. 2). It is not unnatural to infer that he lacked adequate information about Athenian leaders, or at least information believed by him to be trustworthy.

Another unexpected feature of these chapters points in the same direction. Only a single sentence is devoted to each of four major Athenian victories, at the Eurymedon (100. 1), off Aegina (105. 2), at Oenophyta (108. 3), and off Salamis in Cyprus (112. 4), and except that in the first two instances the losses of the enemy are mentioned, no details are provided. Nor does Thucydides explain why the Athenians embarked upon the campaigns in which these victories were won. It is also noteworthy that, where his accounts of military operations or diplomatic exchanges become more than a bare catalogue of

<sup>1</sup> The possibility that he wrote the excursus during the period of his command in Thrace is perhaps sufficiently remote to be discounted. This period was probably not a long one, and he can scarcely have imposed upon himself the handicap involved by absence from Athens when there was every reason to expect that he would soon return.

<sup>2</sup> With *στρατηγόντων* where they are Athenians (98. 1; 100. 1; 102. 1; 105. 2 and 4; 108. 2 and 5; 111. 2; 112. 2; 113. 1; 114. 3; 116. 1) and *ηγουμένων* where they are Spartans (107. 2; 114. 2). In 117. 2 a differ-

ent formula is adopted in listing Athenian commanders of fleets sent to Samos. In 112. 3 and 4 and 114. 1 individuals are mentioned in genitive absolutes but not as commanders.

<sup>3</sup> Some of the same persons appear in other cases (cf. 104. 1; 109. 2 and 3; 110. 2; 111. 1), also Amyrtæus (110. 2) and Pisuthnes (115. 4 and 5).

<sup>4</sup> *Lys.* 801-4; *Eccles.* 303-5.

<sup>5</sup> Diod. 11. 81-84. It is possible that Diodorus may himself be partly responsible for these eulogies and their extravagance.

events, as they do in a number of cases, the Athenians, though invariably involved in the events described, do not, except in the chapters on the Samian revolt (115-17), dominate the narrative to the extent that might have been expected if the bulk of the narrative had been derived from Athenian sources. Nor can the episodes recorded rather more fully be considered to be conspicuously relevant to the growth of Athenian power or especially significant for any other reason.<sup>1</sup> It appears that here, as in the far more detailed narrative on the Archidamian War, Thucydides is selecting for somewhat fuller treatment episodes on which the amount of trustworthy information available to him was relatively large.

There are three passages in this part of the excursus in which he includes detailed information very probably derived from Spartan sources.<sup>2</sup> In his account of the revolt of Thasos he states that the Spartans, when urged by the Thasians to assist them by invading Attica, *ὑπέσχοντο μὲν κρύφα τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἔμελλον, διεκωλύθησαν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ γενομένου σεισμοῦ* (101. 2). It is significant that he expresses himself so confidently about an unfulfilled intention of the Spartans which was not disclosed at the time and cannot have been known at Athens at least two years later when Cimon was sent to Ithome.<sup>3</sup> Some scholars have rejected this statement,<sup>4</sup> though without adequate reason. The second passage is his account of the Helot revolt (101. 2-103. 3). Here he explains in some detail the undisclosed reasons why the Spartans dismissed their Athenian allies (102. 3), whereas he is silent on the question whether the Spartans were justified in suspecting the Athenians and does not seem to have been in possession of sufficient information from Athenian sources to enable him to assess the validity of these suspicions. While the revolt was both important and relevant to the main theme of the excursus because it led to the first open breach between Athens and Sparta, some details included by Thucydides in his account are of local and even antiquarian interest (101. 2; 103. 2). Somewhat less striking is a passage on the events leading to the battle of Tanagra (107. 2-7). He dwells upon the apprehensions of the Spartans, after they had concluded their campaign against Phocis, about the difficulties in which they would be involved if they attempted to return home by sea or by way of the Isthmus. These apprehensions are not wholly deducible from their decision to remain temporarily in Boeotia. The abortive plot of some Athenian traitors (107. 4) must have been better known to the Spartans, to whom they communicated their subversive intentions, than to the Athenian authorities, who only suspected a conspiracy. On the other hand, the chapter presents a somewhat puzzling account of Spartan actions,<sup>5</sup> and it contains at least some material probably derived from Athenian sources, namely, the figures of the Athenian and allied army (107. 5) and perhaps the reasons why the Athenians marched into Boeotia (107. 6), though these reasons could have been inferred from information already given. It is, however, noteworthy that, after Thucydides has recorded the Spartan return to the Peloponnese, his narrative reverts

<sup>1</sup> Gomme, *op. cit.* 363.

<sup>2</sup> That he used Peloponnesian sources during his exile is attested by his own statement in 5. 26. 5, though it refers only to evidence on the events of the Peloponnesian War.

<sup>3</sup> In 58. 1 he asserts almost as positively that the Spartan magistrates promised an

invasion of Attica if Potidaea were attacked; but this information was probably communicated to him by the Corinthian Aristeus (cf. my paper in *C.Q.* xli (1947), 25-30), who may well have been among the Corinthians sent with the Potidaean envoys to Sparta.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Maddalena, *n. ad loc.*

<sup>5</sup> D. W. Reece, *J.H.S.* lxx (1950), 75-76.



to a bare summary, and, as already mentioned, he does not explain how the battle of Oenophyta came to be fought.

The account of the Athenian expedition to Egypt (104 and 109-10) is noteworthy both for what it includes and for what it omits. The campaign impeded and did not advance the growth of Athenian power, but it illustrated the restless and adventurous spirit of the Athenians, which was an important factor in evoking Spartan fears. These chapters, though richer in detail than most in this part of the excursus, are not altogether satisfactory if judged solely as a record of an Athenian enterprise. Thucydides does not state the purpose of the Athenians in supporting the revolt or in persevering in their support, nor does he give the name of any Athenian or allied commander in a campaign lasting six years. There are also reasons for believing him to be mistaken in implying, as he certainly does, that the losses of the Athenians and their allies amounted to considerably more than 200 ships with most of their crews.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, he gives more information than would seem to be strictly necessary about Egyptian geography (cf. 104. 1; 109. 4; 110. 2), about measures taken by the Persians to suppress the revolt, and about the fortunes of the rebel leaders. As already pointed out, individuals are more prominent in the chapters on the Egyptian revolt than elsewhere in this part of the excursus, and they are all barbarians. Whatever the sources of the narrative may have been, they cannot have been wholly Athenian. It is tempting to conjecture that much of it was obtained from some Greek, or Greeks, who, like Herodotus, had travelled in Egypt and had been in contact with Egyptians and Persians alike.

Apart from the chapters on the Samian revolt, the only other passage in the second half of the excursus in which the narrative becomes more than a bare summary is the account of the campaign against the Corinthians in the Megarid (105. 3-106. 2). While this expedition illustrates the temperament of the Athenians in that they decided to use their reserve force of 'the oldest and youngest' outside Attica rather than raise the siege of Aegina, neither the indecisive battle nor its sequel, which is described in detail, seems to have been of great importance.<sup>2</sup> This sequel involved the Corinthians in what is described as *πάθος μέγα* because a detachment of troops was annihilated, but the main body escaped. There is no reason why Thucydides could not have obtained his relatively detailed information about these operations from Athenians who took part in them, but his statement that the Corinthians returned to the battlefield *κακιζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρεσβυτέρων* (105. 6) perhaps points rather to a Corinthian source. At all events, these chapters exemplify the fact that the scale of his narrative in this part of his excursus is by no means determined by the importance, or the relevance, of its content.

The Samian revolt was the outstanding episode of the decade between the conclusion of the Thirty Years Peace and the battle of Leukimne. It was, however, of no greater importance than the revolts of Naxos, to which Thucydides devotes only one sentence (98. 4), and of Thasos, which is also described very briefly (100. 2; 101. 1 and 3). These two earlier revolts may in fact be

<sup>1</sup> I have discussed this point, and others in which I believe his narrative to be defective, in *C.P.* xlv (1950), 209-16.

<sup>2</sup> Gomme, *op. cit.* 309-10, argues that 'the activities of this year, culminating in the victory of the Athenian reserves over the Corinthians, were memorable—hence the

much greater detail with which Thucydides narrates the campaign in the Megarid'. This view is not wholly convincing: it is surely more natural to expect Thucydides to enlarge upon the most important event of a memorable year than upon the last.



deemed more relevant than that of Samos to the growth of Athenian power and the development of Spartan fears because they occurred before the transformation of the Delian Confederacy into an Athenian *ἀρχή* and were the first major examples of 'enslavement'. The fuller treatment of the Samian revolt cannot legitimately be explained on the assumption that it was especially interesting to Thucydides because Pericles played a leading part in its suppression. Other operations where Pericles was in command are recorded briefly (111. 2-3; 114), while his expedition to the Euxine and other enterprises for which he was certainly or probably responsible are not even mentioned in the excursus.<sup>1</sup> The only reason why Thucydides describes the Samian revolt so fully seems to be that, probably alone among the major episodes of the Pentekontaetia, it lay within the limits of his own adult recollection.<sup>2</sup> If this explanation be accepted, it suggests that his brevity in dealing with earlier events was dictated by lack of trustworthy evidence.

The first part of the excursus (89-96) is on a very different scale and of a very different character. After an introduction consisting of a single sentence (89. 1), which has already been discussed, Thucydides briefly refers to the return of Leontychidas and the Peloponnesians after the battle of Mycale and to the siege and capture of Sestos by the Athenians with the aid of their allies from Ionia and the Hellespont (89. 2).<sup>3</sup> He then embarks upon a lengthy account of two episodes, the rebuilding of the wall round Athens (89. 3-93. 2) and the completion of the Peiraeus wall (93. 3-6). The former was carried out in great haste and occupied only a few months; the duration of the latter is not precisely determinable but probably did not much exceed a year.<sup>4</sup> Both these building operations were historically important because they were essential prerequisites to the development of Athenian sea-power, but it may be doubted whether it is for this reason alone that the scale of the narrative is here so much more generous than in other parts of the excursus. Themistocles dominates these chapters, which have a personal colouring so marked that they might almost have been written by Herodotus or Plutarch.<sup>5</sup> The story of the stratagems whereby he frustrated the attempt of the Spartans to prevent the rebuilding of the Athenian wall, though it recalls the trick played by Alcibiades upon a Spartan embassy in 420 (5. 44. 3-46. 1), has an almost romantic flavour encountered in very few passages of Thucydides, and its authenticity has been doubted. While these doubts are probably unfounded,<sup>6</sup> there is reason to suspect that on points of detail the trustworthiness of his evidence is here not above suspicion and that popular tradition, of which he is elsewhere contemptuous,<sup>7</sup> has to a large extent provided the basis of his account, though he has probably rationalized this tradition. The episode occurred long before his own time, and the number of persons to whom all its complex details were accurately known can never have been large. He can scarcely have possessed altogether trustworthy evidence on the final speech of Themistocles at Sparta,

<sup>1</sup> Gomme, *op. cit.* 366-9.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Adcock, *op. cit.* 12.

<sup>3</sup> His brevity is doubtless influenced by the fact that Herodotus (9. 114-18) had given a full account of these events.

<sup>4</sup> According to the confused narrative of Diodorus the work was speedily done (11. 43. 2). He records the building operations at Athens under 478/7, those at the Piraeus

under 477/6, and his chronology may be correct (Gomme, *op. cit.* 262).

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch (*Them.* 19) in fact follows a different tradition.

<sup>6</sup> E. Meyer, *Hermes*, xl (1905), 561-9.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. 20. 2. Characteristically, however, he confirms that the wall was hastily built by reference to its appearance in his own day (93. 2).

of which he gives a circumstantial report in *oratio obliqua* (91. 4-7). The passage on the completion of the Peiraeus wall is briefer but similar in character: it attributes to Themistocles the unfulfilled intention of having the wall raised to double the height that it actually reached (93. 5), a detail that may be authentic but is unlikely to have been known for certain after an interval of so many years. At the beginning (93. 3-4) and attached to the end (93. 7) of this passage on the Peiraeus wall stand a few observations on the aims of Themistocles, which together amount to a summary of his naval policy combined with a personal estimate by Thucydides (*ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ*) of the motives that caused him to adopt it. This summary supplies the key to the opening chapters of the excursus: Themistocles is here presented as the initiator of the naval policy responsible for the rise of Athens to the greatness of the Periclean age.<sup>1</sup> The claims of Themistocles to this distinction were by no means unchallenged,<sup>2</sup> and Thucydides here seeks to substantiate these claims, although the controversy is not strictly relevant to the main purpose of his excursus. The even more personal chapters on the last years of Themistocles contained in another excursus (135-8) have a similar aim, and their relation to chapters 89-93 will be discussed below.

The first part of the excursus concludes with three chapters (94-96) which do not differ from the second part to the same degree as the chapters on Themistocles, though they cover a period of little more than a year. The expeditions of the allied Greeks under Pausanias to Cyprus and Byzantium (94) are recorded as briefly as the first successes of Cimon (98), though somewhat more prominence is given to their leader. The concluding chapter (96) explains very summarily the organization of the Delian Confederacy: it is parallel to a later chapter (99) dealing with the causes of revolts in the Confederacy and, despite its position, may be deemed to belong rather to the second part of the excursus than to the first, being probably derived from sources of a similar character. On the other hand, the second of these three chapters (95), which considerably exceeds the combined length of the other two, is much more personal and resembles in general tone, though not in scale, the chapters on Themistocles. The decision of the Ionians and the other Greeks to invite the Athenians to assume the leadership of the allied forces is attributed wholly to the behaviour of Pausanias (95. 1), and one of the reasons given for the subsequent acquiescence of the Spartans in this transference of command is their apprehension that other Spartan generals might be similarly corrupted (95. 7). The recall and first trial of Pausanias (95. 3-5) influenced the relationship between Athens and Sparta only to a very limited degree; they did not affect the transference of command because the invitation to the Athenians was issued while he was still at Byzantium, and Thucydides evidently dwells upon them here because of his interest in the controversy raised by the various accusations made against Pausanias, which he later discusses in much greater detail (128. 3-135. 1). Pausanias dominates the excursus at this point in much the same way as Themistocles dominates its opening chapters and for similar reasons. The few passages dealing with matters in which neither was directly involved have the same conciseness as is general in the second part of the excursus. Accordingly it may be inferred with some confidence that, whereas the volume of evidence available to Thucydides on the Pentekontaetia generally was limited, he did possess plenty of information about Themistocles and, to a

<sup>1</sup> Cf. 14. 3.

<sup>2</sup> See below, p. 65.

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lesser degree, about Pausanias.<sup>1</sup> Not all this information was altogether suitable for inclusion in an excursus on the growth of Athenian power, for much was personal in character and apparently collected in the first instance for use in the long-continued debates on the merits of these two controversial figures.

This conclusion is to some extent confirmed by the substantial excursus on the last years of Pausanias and Themistocles inserted towards the end of Book 1 (128-38) on the somewhat flimsy pretext of the Athenian demand that the Spartans should drive out τὸ τῆς Χαλκιοίκου ἄγος (128. 2). This excursus is thus relevant to the problems under discussion and must accordingly be examined. Its two sections are not precisely continuations of the chapters dealing with Pausanias and Themistocles in the opening chapters of the excursus on the Pentekontaetia: in the one case there is an overlap,<sup>2</sup> in the other a hiatus of some years. Nevertheless the presentation of Pausanias and Themistocles, though divided between two excursuses, is essentially a unity, as E. Schwartz has shown.<sup>3</sup> The second excursus (128-38) is remarkable in that Thucydides here allows himself to describe the personal experiences of two individuals whose careers as leaders in their own states had already ended. It would, however, be a mistake to imagine that his interest in them was exclusively biographical. He evidently felt that Herodotus, and perhaps other writers, had erred in their estimates of Pausanias and Themistocles, especially the latter, and one of his aims in this excursus was to correct the errors of which he believed his predecessors to have been guilty.<sup>4</sup> While Herodotus draws a largely favourable picture of Pausanias as commander of the Greek forces at Plataea and is inclined to be sceptical about the stories of his subsequent intrigues (5. 32), Thucydides seeks to convict him on all the charges brought against him. The cleavage of opinion is even sharper in the case of Themistocles. To Herodotus he was a cunning, self-seeking, and untrustworthy intriguer, whereas Thucydides insists that he was a man of outstanding natural ability who did not meddle until he had become the victim of false charges and had been relentlessly hounded from one place of refuge to another through the spite of his ungrateful fellow countrymen. The famous passage in which Thucydides analyses the genius of Themistocles (138. 3) is remarkable both for its elaborateness and for its warmth of feeling. Hence this excursus develops and corroborates the views implicit in the passages dealing with Pausanias and Themistocles contained in the account of the Pentekontaetia.

The distinctive features of this excursus are approximately the same as those of the chapters at the beginning of the excursus on the Pentekontaetia. The

<sup>1</sup> It is clear from 128. 3-135. 1 that he was in fact equally well informed about Pausanias.

<sup>2</sup> It is true that 128. 3 takes up the story of Pausanias at the point where 95. 5 left it, but 128. 5-130. 2 deals with his behaviour in the course of his first visit to the Hellespont and therefore covers the same period as 95. 1-5, though in greater detail and from a more exclusively personal angle.

<sup>3</sup> *Das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides* (1919), 155-6. His whole chapter (154-67) is instructive, though his late dating of these excursuses is based on the view, no longer widely accepted, that Thucydides embarked upon

a fundamental revision of his work after the fall of Athens. H. Münch, *Studien zu den Exkursen des Thukydides* (1935), 16-17, points out that the first excursus deals with political, the second with personal, activities of the two leaders, but this fact does not destroy the unity to which Schwartz draws attention.

<sup>4</sup> Grundy, op. cit. i. 451; Münch, op. cit. 17-18; de Romilly, *Thucydide I* (Budé, which has been published since this article was written), *Notice*, xlv, n. 3. Among his objects in inserting the excursus here was doubtless to contrast the two leaders as representatives of Sparta and Athens (Schwartz, op. cit. 158-61).

difference is one of degree, the personal element and the romantic colouring being considerably more marked. Here also, to an even greater extent than in the narrative on Themistocles and the wall-building, there is reason to suspect that Thucydides has accepted popular tradition somewhat uncritically.<sup>1</sup> Though the excursus is packed with details about secret negotiations and private conversations which took place long ago, he gives scarcely a hint that the authenticity of any of them might be suspect.<sup>2</sup> Nor is it at all likely that after a lapse of so many years he can have possessed wholly trustworthy evidence on undisclosed and unattained aims of Pausanias (128. 3; 131. 2), which seem to be merely inferred from the sequence of events, a practice from which he normally refrains when writing contemporary history.<sup>3</sup> Other points are notably un-Thucydidean: the versions of two rival traditions on the death of Themistocles are mentioned, and the source of the story that his bones were secretly buried in Attica is cited.<sup>4</sup> A further remarkable and indeed unique feature of this excursus is the inclusion of three personal letters: from Pausanias to Xerxes (128. 7), from Xerxes to Pausanias (129. 3), and from Themistocles to Artaxerxes (137. 4). Thucydides gives what evidently purports to be the full text of each, except that a portion of the last is omitted and the content of this portion summarized in a parenthesis. The disputed question whether these letters are genuine lies outside the scope of this paper and cannot be fully discussed.<sup>5</sup> It is, however, evident that only by a singular stroke of good fortune, or rather by three singular strokes of good fortune, can Thucydides have had access to the texts of personal and secret letters written many years before he began to devote himself to historical research.<sup>6</sup> That he may have been so fortunate is not impossible, but it seems far more probable that he composed them himself. Some phrases in the letter from Xerxes to Pausanias which have an oriental ring and are paralleled in Persian documents<sup>7</sup> do not prove its genuineness. Thucydides may well have based them on similar phrases used by Herodotus,<sup>8</sup> and he had almost certainly seen at least one official letter from a Persian king.<sup>9</sup> It was surely not beyond his powers to compose a letter suffi-

<sup>1</sup> G. Méautis, *Ant. Class.* xx (1951), 297-304, has recently discussed the general character of the narrative describing the flight of Themistocles, cf. R. Flacelière, *R.E.A.* lv (1953), 14. F. M. Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (1907), 137 with n. 2, goes too far in asserting that 'what he has left is dramatized legend, not the historical facts out of which it was worked up' (on Pausanias) and that the chapters on Themistocles are 'rationalized Saga-history influenced by drama'.

<sup>2</sup> Only *ὡς λέγεται* in 132. 5 and 138. 1 and *λέγεται* in 134. 1 suggest uncertainty.

<sup>3</sup> *C.Q.* xli (1947), 28, where I did not refer to these two passages because they do not belong to the period of the Peloponnesian War or its immediate antecedents.

<sup>4</sup> 138. 4, *νοσήσας δὲ τελευτᾷ τὸν βίον λέγουσι δὲ τινες καὶ ἐκούσιον φαρμάκῳ ἀποθανεῖν αὐτόν*, and 138. 6, *τὰ δὲ ὁστὰ φασὶ κομισθῆναι αὐτοῦ οἱ προσήκοντες οἴκαδε*.

<sup>5</sup> Schwartz, *op. cit.* 30, n. 1; Münch, *op. cit.* 23-24; and Méautis, *op. cit.* 298, n. 2, believe that Thucydides wrote them himself. M. van den Hout, *Mnemos*, ii (4th series, 1949), 34-36 and 144, maintains that they are authentic, though somewhat altered by Thucydides.

<sup>6</sup> H. Schaefer, *R.E.* xviii. 4 (1949), 2577, seeks to defend the authenticity of the letters by referring to the treaties between Sparta and Persia of which the texts are reproduced in Book 8. The analogy is, however, misleading: copies of contemporary official documents are far more likely to have been accessible to Thucydides than copies of personal letters written many years ago.

<sup>7</sup> A. T. Olmstead, *Amer. Journ. of Semitic Languages*, xlix (1932-3), 156-61.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. the parallels cited by Gomme, *op. cit.* 432 (note on 129. 3).

<sup>9</sup> 4. 50. 1-2, where he records the substance of a letter from Artaxerxes to the Spartans intercepted by the Athenians.

ciently oriental in phrasing and tone to satisfy Greek readers that it could have been written by Xerxes. Very few readers can have been fully or accurately informed about Persian manners.

In the chapters on Pausanias and Themistocles the personal tone, the romantic treatment, the rapid flow of the narrative, and the ready acceptance of evidence that can scarcely have been authenticated beyond any reasonable doubt are all characteristics of Herodotus rather than of Thucydides. Nowhere else is the influence of Herodotus nearly so marked. It is therefore natural to believe that, whatever the date may have been at which Thucydides inserted this excursus in his account of the events leading to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, he wrote the substance of it before he developed the unique style and technique of historical writing which are so alien to the Ionian tradition. It is true that some scholars, including Schwartz,<sup>1</sup> believe that Thucydides wrote the excursus towards the end of his life. This late dating, however, is based upon general views about the development of his work to which not many scholars now subscribe:<sup>2</sup> if the account of the Pentekontaetia were held to be late, this excursus, which is clearly related to it, would naturally be held to be late also.<sup>3</sup> No cogent reason suggests itself to explain why if he wrote the excursus in his last years he should have chosen to abandon his own manner and principles of composition and to revert to those of his predecessors.

K. Ziegler has attempted to show that all the excursuses of Thucydides dealing with past history, including those on the Pentekontaetia and on Pausanias and Themistocles, are the fruits of research conducted by him before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War and were designed for inclusion in a general history of Greece, this projected work being abandoned because the greatness of the war caused him to devote himself to contemporary events.<sup>4</sup> While it is true that Thucydides is much more likely to have felt himself impelled to write a history of the Peloponnesian War if he had previously carried out historical research than if he had not,<sup>5</sup> this hypothesis is unconvincing as a general explanation of the excursus. It is altogether too simple; the excursuses, and the problems raised by them, are too diverse to be explained by a single comprehensive hypothesis of this kind. So far as the excursus on the Pentekontaetia is concerned, Adcock raises the objection that 'it seems too selectively relevant not to be written, or at least re-written, for purposes concerned with the causes of the war'.<sup>6</sup> This objection is certainly valid for the greater part of the excursus,

<sup>1</sup> Op. cit. 162, 'sie (sc. the accounts of Pausanias and Themistocles) sind ein Experiment des greisen Schriftstellers', cf. Münch, op. cit. 28. Grundy, op. cit. i. 2 450-1 (cf. 489), does not consider that the date at which the chapters on Pausanias were written is determinable, but he is inclined to assign the chapters on Themistocles to what he believes to have been the first draft.

<sup>2</sup> See above, p. 61, n. 3.

<sup>3</sup> The further contention of Schwartz, op. cit. 161-2, that Thucydides, when writing about the treatment of Pausanias and Themistocles by Sparta and Athens respectively, must have had in mind the treatment of Lysander and Alcibiades is over-subtle. It is not the practice of Thucydides to draw

parallels, directly or by implication, between the events of different periods. There were instances of injustice and ingratitude on the part of the Athenian democracy during the Archidamian War, cf. 2. 65. 3 and 4. 65. 3-4.

<sup>4</sup> Op. cit. 58-67.

<sup>5</sup> Ziegler, op. cit. 63. The view of W. Jaeger, *Paideia* (Eng. trans., 1939), i. 382, that 'it was the war that made Thucydides a historian' seems to me to overestimate the dependence of Thucydides the historian upon Thucydides the statesman and admiral, though it was probably the war that caused him to create a new kind of historical writing.

<sup>6</sup> Op. cit. 11 (cf. Grundy, op. cit. i. 2 442, 'it does not deal with a single incident which is unconnected with Attic history').



which, despite its inadequacies as an exposition of its main theme, can scarcely be even a drastically revised version of a narrative originally composed to form part of a general history of Greece. The chapters on the activities of Themistocles (90-93) and, to a lesser degree, the chapter on the recall of Pausanias (95) are very different: their distinctive features do suggest that they were written in the first instance for accounts of these two leaders composed for a purpose other than that of explaining the causes of the Peloponnesian War, and that they were adapted for use in this context because Thucydides lacked information of a less personal and more suitable character on the first stages in the development of Athenian power immediately after the Persian wars.<sup>1</sup> The excursus on the last years of Pausanias and Themistocles (128-38) seems to have the same origin. Because the chapters on Pausanias are somewhat tenuously linked with the narrative of events leading to the Peloponnesian War and the chapters on Themistocles are even less relevant, Thucydides was perhaps content to leave them largely unaltered. Hence they preserve, to a greater extent than the corresponding chapters in the excursus on the Pentekontaetia, the frankly biographical tone and partisan attitude which may be believed to have pervaded the original work, as well as traces of early composition, especially the clear and rapid style.

One of the sources used by Thucydides thus seems to have been a work, published or unpublished, dealing specifically with the careers of Pausanias and Themistocles, or with the later stages of their careers, and seeking to establish the guilt of the former and to vindicate the latter.<sup>2</sup> Such a work might have been written by someone other than Thucydides and merely used by him because it contained information of value to him. This possibility is, however, a very remote one: he disparages the historical research of others,<sup>3</sup> and in the *Archaeology* he clearly is not attempting to improve upon accounts of early Greece written by his predecessors but to create an entirely new one by employing his own methods of investigation. It is scarcely credible that he here accepted unquestioningly the polemical views of another and reproduced them in his own work. Accordingly there is some reason to believe that this source was an early piece of research conducted by himself, which was probably never published and may not even have been completed but was preserved with his notes on the Peloponnesian War and thus available to him while in exile, whereas an abundance of evidence on other aspects of the Pentekontaetia evidently was not.<sup>4</sup>

That Thucydides may have written a minor work of this kind at some time before his exile is by no means improbable. Stesimbrotus published, probably soon after the death of Pericles, a work entitled *περὶ Θεμιστοκλέους καὶ Θουκυδίδου καὶ Περικλέους*, of which some fragments survive.<sup>5</sup> It seems to have been written with the object of attacking Athenian democracy or Athenian imperial-

<sup>1</sup> See above, pp. 59-61.

<sup>2</sup> It is immaterial whether this source consisted of a single work or of two separate works, the one devoted to Pausanias and the other to Themistocles. <sup>3</sup> Cf. 20. 3-21. 1.

<sup>4</sup> It cannot be legitimately argued that if Thucydides had studied the career of Themistocles he would have been better informed about Athenian activities between 477 and 470 (which seems to be the most

probable date for the ostracism of Themistocles). It does not appear that Themistocles played any part in the foreign relations of Athens in these years, and Thucydides is not concerned with the internal history of the period (cf. 97. 1, and Gomme, op. cit. 385-7).

<sup>5</sup> F. Jacoby, *F. Gr. Hist.* 107 F 1-11 (ii. B. 516-19).

ism or biographical. Thucydides drew a narrative probably that of Pausanias accounts time, being a cal opinion to the un present T question ally respo contribut out above Stesimbrotus similar vi distinction dating fr from the in the p

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<sup>1</sup> R. L. Jacoby, *Stählin*, *op. cit.*

<sup>2</sup> Ion unsympa Jacoby, *op. cit.* his *Epidem* toles in of the wo (*F. Gr. H* tions of his flight

<sup>3</sup> In *προμαθών* Thucydides that the teach C.R. liv referred and, beca



ism or both; at all events, though its outward form was apparently that of biographical memoirs, it was essentially a political pamphlet.<sup>1</sup> Stesimbrotus drew an unsympathetic picture of Themistocles, denying him originality and probably damning his character on moral grounds as he certainly damned that of Pericles.<sup>2</sup> The surviving traces of this work show that highly polemical accounts of leading statesmen, including those of the past, were written at this time, being in some cases doubtless designed to influence contemporary political opinion. It may indeed have been the strictures of Stesimbrotus, in addition to the unflattering account of Herodotus, that prompted Thucydides to present Themistocles in what he believed to be a true light.<sup>3</sup> A much disputed question affecting the reputation of Themistocles was whether he was personally responsible for framing and putting into execution the naval policy that contributed so much to the expansion of Athenian power. As has been pointed out above, Thucydides strongly supports the claims of Themistocles,<sup>4</sup> while Stesimbrotus, though apparently disapproving of this naval policy, held a similar view (F 2). There are, however, traces of a tradition which assigned this distinction not to Themistocles but to Aristides,<sup>5</sup> and though no evidence dating from the fifth century survives, this controversy must have originated from their rivalry in their own lifetime and was very probably a political issue in the period of the Peloponnesian War.

The family connexions of Thucydides with leading politicians together with the political and military experience that are likely to have preceded his election to the *strategia* provided him with excellent qualifications for writing a work in defence of Themistocles. The date at which he may have composed such a work must remain uncertain. If it were the outcome of a desire to correct the pictures drawn by Herodotus and Stesimbrotus, it is not likely to have been written before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, though Thucydides may have had knowledge of their works before they were published. It can scarcely have been written after his period of exile had begun because he must surely have had access to Athenian sources while writing it. There is, however, no justification for assuming that between 431 and 424 he was so fully occupied by military duties and by the compilation of notes on the events of the Peloponnesian War that he was precluded from undertaking any other literary

<sup>1</sup> R. Laqueur, *R.E.* iii A (1929), 2466-7; Jacoby, op. cit. ii D 343-4; Schmid-Stählin, op. cit. i. 2 (1934), 676-7.

<sup>2</sup> Ion of Chios also seems to have been unsympathetic towards Themistocles, but Jacoby, *C.Q.* xli (1947), 12, concludes that his *Epidemiai* cannot have dealt with Themistocles in any great detail. Nothing is known of the work in which Charon of Lampsacus (*F. Gr. Hist.* 262 F 11) referred to the relations of Themistocles with Artaxerxes after his flight to Asia.

<sup>3</sup> In 138. 3, οἰκεία γὰρ ἐνέσσει καὶ οὐρε προμαθῶν ἐς αὐτὴν οὐδὲν οὐτ' ἐπιμαθῶν, Thucydides seems to be contesting the view that Themistocles was deeply indebted to the teaching of others, as G. B. Kerferd, *C.R.* lxiv (1950), 9, maintains. Stesimbrotus referred to the teachers of Themistocles (F 2) and, because he depreciated him, is likely to

have been among the advocates of this view and perhaps was its originator. Gomme, op. cit. 442 (n. ad loc.), denies that these words refer to what Themistocles was said to have learned from others, and H. T. Wade-Gery, *J.H.S.* lxix (1949), 84, seems inclined to agree. There is, however, evidence that the question whether Themistocles owed his success to his teachers or to natural ability was much debated (Xen. *Mem.* 4. 2. 2, cited by Kerferd, loc. cit.), and contemporary readers of Thucydides, being familiar with this controversy, would probably have no hesitation in interpreting these somewhat obscure words as a contribution to it.

<sup>4</sup> See above, p. 60; cf. Aristoph. *Eq.* 813-19, 884-5.

<sup>5</sup> Arist. *Ἀθ. πολ.* 24. 1-2, cited by Gomme, op. cit. 262, cf. C. Hignett, *History of the Athenian Constitution* (1952), 184.

composition. It is even more difficult to reach any conclusion about the date of his research on the fall of Pausanias. He perhaps became interested in this controversial subject while he was working on Themistocles, who was accused of treasonable collaboration with Pausanias (135. 2). It seems likely, however, that he did not complete his research on Pausanias until the early years of his exile when he was probably able to obtain information from Spartan sources.

If the results of the foregoing investigation have any validity, they throw a little light upon the wider problem of the date at which Book 1 assumed its present shape. It is beyond doubt that the purpose of the excursus on the Pentekontaetia is very largely, if not wholly, to substantiate the view of Thucydides on the ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις of the Peloponnesian War.<sup>1</sup> The chain of argument, though strengthened by the inclusion of this excursus, would not be broken if it were absent. While it is credible that Book 1 could have existed with the ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις included but without the excursus, it is incredible that Book 1 could have existed with the excursus included but without the ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις.<sup>2</sup> If Thucydides wrote the excursus while he was in exile, he must have completed Book 1, substantially as it now exists, before his return to Athens at the end of the war.<sup>3</sup> If this conclusion be accepted, it is impossible to maintain that in the period between his return and his death he either fundamentally revised an earlier draft of Book 1, as was once very widely believed, or composed *ab initio* his entire work, having hitherto written nothing except notes, as is believed by some scholars including Finley.

Hammond has recently argued that the bulk of Book 1, with the exception of 21. 2-23. 3, was probably composed before the exile of Thucydides.<sup>4</sup> His arguments in favour of a very early date of composition cannot be discussed here, but if the excursus on the Pentekontaetia was written when Thucydides was in exile, this view cannot be accepted. Nor does it appear likely that the bulk of Book 1 without the excursus on the Pentekontaetia was written before 424.<sup>5</sup> If, as I have suggested above, he composed at some time during the Archidamian War a minor work, or works, on Pausanias and Themistocles in which the style and historical method were not much different from those of his predecessors, it is improbable that he developed until later the highly individual style and historical method which are as prominent in Book 1 as they are in the rest of his history.

I have refrained from expressing any opinion on the question at what stage of his exile, which lasted twenty years, Thucydides wrote his excursus on the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. 23. 6 with 118. 2 (and the last sentence of 97. 2).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. de Romilly, *Thucydide et l'impérialisme athénien* 23-28, who dates the excursus late but maintains (23) that 'rien ne permet de supposer que l'idée de l'ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις en ait jamais été absente'.

<sup>3</sup> The brief account of the Pentekontaetia in 18. 2-19 perhaps suggests that when he wrote it Thucydides did not contemplate his excursus (Grundy, *op. cit.* i. 2 422-3); but the two accounts were written to support different theses. They have no real point of contact unless the disputed αὐτοῖς in the last sentence of 19 refers to the Athenians alone,

and A. Delachaux, *Notes critiques sur Thucydide* (1925), 29-30, seems to me to have shown conclusively that it refers to both the Athenians and the Spartans.

<sup>4</sup> *C.Q.* ii (new series, 1952), 140 with n. 1.

<sup>5</sup> It seems improbable that for some of the speeches in Book 1, notably that of Archidamus (80-85) which was delivered at a meeting attended only by Spartans (79. 1, cf. 87. 4), Thucydides can have obtained knowledge even τῆς ξυμπόσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων (22. 1) before his exile. It is much easier to believe that he obtained reports of them when he was in exile from Peloponnesian informants.

Pentekontaetia. My arguments, if valid, show only that he was absent from Athens; they do not serve to define the date of composition more precisely. It is, however, unlikely that he wrote the excursus in the last years of his exile. Book 1 contains nothing that must have been written after the beginning of the Decelean War, with the probable exception of the reference to Hellanicus (97. 2); it seems to have been designed to introduce the Archidamian War only, a conclusion to which the existence of the 'second preface' (5. 26) lends support. It is natural to believe, though obviously not provable, that in the earlier years of his exile, perhaps not long after the Peace of Nicias, Thucydides embarked upon the task of writing a history of the Archidamian War and its causes which he based mainly on notes compiled at Athens between 431 and 424. He then perhaps found that his principal thesis on the causes of the war could be strengthened by the inclusion of an excursus on the Pentekontaetia. When he came to assemble material for this excursus, a further reason for writing it occurred to him, namely, that the period had been neglected by historians (97. 2) and that his readers could not be assumed to possess any knowledge of it as they could of the period of the Persian wars. Thus the inclusion of the excursus may be considered to be an afterthought but only in the sense that he did not envisage that he would wish to write on the Pentekontaetia when he began to collect notes on the Peloponnesian War at its outbreak (1. 1) and did not decide to do so until he was in exile, when his explanation of the causes of the war began to assume its present shape. After he returned home and again had access to Athenian sources, he doubtless intended to revise the excursus, but though he probably added his reference to Hellanicus, he evidently did not live to undertake this task.

*University of Manchester*

H. D. WESTLAKE

### THREE CONJECTURES IN EURIPIDES, *HELENA*<sup>1</sup>

vv. 234 ff.

(Paris) ἔπλευσε βαρβάρῳ πλάτῃ  
τὴν ἐμὴν ἐφ' ἑστίαν  
ἐπὶ τὸ δυστυχέστατον<sup>a</sup>  
κάλλος ὡς ἔλοι γάμων ἐμῶν.<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> δυστυχές 1

<sup>b</sup> γάμον ἐμόν 1

Thus the manuscript.

A lyrical variation on vv. 27–30, the present passage is, at the same time, a new version of *Hec.* 631–7. A comparison is instructive in various respects, but *Hel.* 27 f. γαμεῖν τὸ ἐμὸν κάλλος will not be quoted in justification of what L gives in vv. 236 f. This wording raises the following objections: (a) the last word, ἐμῶν, is outside the metre and not easily attached to the following colon, the beginning of which naturally coincides with the new sentence and new idea α̃ τε δόλιος κτλ. If, then, ἐμῶν is obelized—and this seems unavoidable—the words τὸ δυστυχ. κάλλος are in need of specification: *which* beauty? (b) The juxtaposition of the two ἐπὶ-clauses, without a connecting particle, is stylistically unsatisfactory, for they are not strictly parallel as is δι' ἀσπίδων, δι' αἱμάτων (*Phoen.* 1292) and ἐπὶ πόλιν—ἐπὶ γῆν (*Rhes.* 261),<sup>2</sup> while, on the other hand, their undeniable formal parallelism forbids the description of the second clause as an 'exegetic' elaboration of the first. One expects some connexion; as in *Phoen.* 1324 ποῖ καπὶ ποῖαν συμφορὰν. (c) Euripides could have written αἰρεῖν τὸ κάλλος as well as αἰρεῖν γάμους; but the combination αἰρεῖν τὸ κάλλος γάμων (ἐμῶν) is impossible, and this all the more so, since τὸ κάλλος is already dependent upon ἐπὶ. *Alc.* 74 στείχω δ' ἐπ' αὐτὴν ὡς κατάρξωμαι ξίφει shows how the pieces in this jumble could be organized into a reasonable structure.

<sup>1</sup> My information about the readings of the manuscript and the suggestions of critics comes from the editions of Wecklein (1898), Murray (1913), Grégoire (1950), and Campbell (1950). I regret that, with the exception of Paley, not one of the older and recent commentaries has been accessible to me. I apologize beforehand if any of my suggestions should prove to have been anticipated by others. I have, however, greatly profited from the observations of W. B. Sedgwick, who read a draft of these notes. Finally I must record the privilege and pleasure of a correspondence with Mr. D. W. Lucas. His patient and profitable criticism has induced me to reconsider and rewrite my last section.

The delay thus caused has enabled me at last to see the valuable commentaries of A. C. Pearson (1903) and G. Italie (1949)—if without gain for my present, limited subject.

<sup>2</sup> In *Hec.* 635 ἐπ' οἶδμα—ἐπὶ λέκτρα, on the other hand, the connotation of ἐπὶ is, in the first and second place, so different that the iteration does not produce the effect of an anaphora at all. Since the anaphora of prepositions is very rare in Euripides, the point at issue may be further illustrated by reference to, for example, *Suppl.* 631 τὸ σὸν ἀγαλμα, τὸ σὸν ἱδρυμα or *Phoen.* 320 ἡ ποθεινὸς φίλοις, ἡ ποθεινὸς Θήβαις.

Hel

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δυστυ  
cf. I.A

vv. 28

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slip. A

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<sup>1</sup> I  
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ii.<sup>2</sup> 80j  
of met  
differ  
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two p  
Helen  
The t  
Parod  
<sup>2</sup> G  
differ  
τε κάλ

Helped by the corrector I, I suggest reading<sup>1</sup>

ἔπλευσε . . . ἐφ' ἐστίαν  
ἐπὶ τὸ δυστυχές τ' ἐμόν  
κάλλος,<sup>2</sup> ὡς ἔλοι γάμον.

I assume that ἐμόν was a marginal correction of the faulty last letters of δυστυχέστατον and was wrongly attached to the next line.<sup>3</sup> For ἐπὶ—ἐπί τε cf. *I.A.* 413.

vv. 287 ff. (L)

. . . εἰ μόλοιμεν ἐς πάτραν,  
κλήθροισι ἂν εἰργοίμεσθα, τὴν ὑπ' Ἰλίῳ  
δοκοῦντες Ἑλένην Μενέλεω μ' ἐλθεῖν μέτα.

leg. . . μ' ἐλθεῖν δίχα.

It may seem bold to turn the transmitted wording into its very opposite. And yet, how often have, for example, καλός and κακός been interchanged!<sup>4</sup> After ME(NEAEΩ) and ME(ΛΘΕΙΝ), a third ME(TA) is quite an understandable slip. Anyhow, an attentive reading of the text leaves, I feel, no choice.

The sequel εἰργοίμεσθα—δοκοῦντες probably makes the harshest anacolouthon in Euripides. I find no exact parallel for this *constructio ad sensum*, yet would agree with those who hold that the text is probably sound.<sup>5</sup> Instances comparable, though not identical, occur both in *Hel.* (58, 433) and in other plays,<sup>6</sup> and the meaning is, in the context, unambiguous and pregnant (which cannot be claimed for any one of the various conjectures which aim at normalizing the syntax).

Helen surveys the happenings and sufferings which make her life a *τέρας*.<sup>7</sup> The death of Menelaus has dashed her last hope<sup>8</sup> of ever asserting her real self against the disastrous effects of the *eidolon*. If now she were, perchance, to achieve her greatest desire and return home, the gates of her city would be closed to her, because the citizens would think—according to L—‘that the Helen of Troy was coming with Menelaus’. This is evidently impossible, for the

<sup>1</sup> I am aiming at a suitable metre but not at responson with a later part of what I consider, with most students, to be an epode. Attempts at bisecting it into a pair of responding strophes involve some rather violent rewriting; they are, moreover, prejudiced by the fact that comparable songs consisting of three pairs of strophes can be quoted from Sophocles (the Parodos of *O.T.* and, in a way, of *Phil.*), but not from Euripides (one would not, I suppose, hold up *I.A.* 164 ff. against this assertion; in *H.F.* 348 ff. the rhythmical refrain [cf. Wilamowitz, *Herakles*, ii. 280] and in the Parodos of *Suppl.* the change of metre [v. 71; cf. A. *Pers.* 115] make all the difference). If none the less this form were introduced here, it would be odd that the two preceding pairs are divided between Helen and the Chorus, but not so the third. The transmitted form corresponds to the Parodos of *Ba.* (v. 135–67).

<sup>2</sup> G. Hermann, in the course of a very different reconstruction, read ἐπὶ τὸ δυστυχές τε κάλλος.

<sup>3</sup> I have been much tempted by Wilamowitz's reading γάμῳ for γάμον ἐμὸν. However, if this conjecture is combined with the transmitted wording of v. 236, many of the objections formulated above remain; if the reading suggested is there adopted, the expansion of the latter only of the two ἐπί-clauses would seem illogical.

<sup>4</sup> e.g. *Hel.* 264 f.; cf. also, for example, v. 974, where ἦσσω (Hermann) or χεῖρω (Nauck) for κρείσσω is, I suppose, unavoidable. As Paley notes, the same holds good of *Andr.* 707.

<sup>5</sup> Thus, for example, R. Koch, *De anacol. ap. Eurip.* (Dissert. Hal. 1881), 41.

<sup>6</sup> Esp. *Andr.* 668 εἰ σὺ παῖδα σὴν δούς . . . εἴτ' ἔπασχε τοιάδε, and *Hipp.* 23, *Med.* 595, *I.T.* 695, 947, *Ph.* 283, *Ba.* 843; cf. Wilamowitz, *ad Her.* 186.

<sup>7</sup> Those who would retain the interpolated vv. 257–9 show that they have not understood this speech. The same applies to vv. 298–302.

<sup>8</sup> v. 279 (ἐπεὶ τέθνηκεν οὗτος Cobet).

assumption that Menelaus is dead is basic to the whole speech (and not only to the speech). F. W. Schmidt crudely put *θαεῖν*, and Grégoire *ἔρρειν*, in the place of *μ' ἐλθεῖν*. On a superficial reading this might seem to be suggested by Teucer's words v. 126. But if Helen arrived at Sparta—then she was alive, and not dead. She could not assume that her citizens would fail to recognize her; the whole play, and in particular the behaviour of Teucer, Menelaus, and the old retainer (v. 616), emphasizes that everyone seeing Helen recognizes her. But the Spartans would be bound to mistake her for *τὴν ὑπ' Ἰλίῳ Ἑλένην*—the stress is very markedly upon these words—and would behave in accordance with the sentiments which the presumed causer of the war inspired. How could it be otherwise? They did not know of the phantom and could not be expected to believe Helen's story if there was no Menelaus to confirm it. He, and he alone, could recognize the true Helen (vv. 290 f.). But he is dead. The present passage then indicates the finality of Helen's despair. Even if the unbelievable were to come to pass and she returned to her fatherland, there is no hope for her—*Μενέλεω δίχα*.<sup>1</sup>

v. 1545

\* *Ἀρ' . . . συνθάπτετε;**leg. Ἄλλ' . . . συνθάπτετε.*

Context and situation are against the transmitted *ἄρ'*. If it were genuine, the question which it introduces (by asyndeton!) could not but be a continuation and specification of the preceding one (v. 1543 *πῶς ἐκ τίνος κτλ.*); as in vv. 255 f. *τίνι πότμῳ . . . ἄρ' ἡ τεκοῦσα κτλ.* and in many similar passages.<sup>2</sup> The meaning then would be: 'Why, you unfortunate ones, and from what wrecked Greek ship have you come here? Is it because you are (in the act of) burying Menelaus together (with us)?' One need not elaborate the absurdity of this; nor is the sense improved by ascribing to *συνθάπτετε* a *de conatu* meaning. The 'linear' quality of the Greek present might be held to allow translating 'do you wish to bury?' I much doubt whether this translation would be grammatically admissible; if it were, the context would still exclude it. For how could Menelaus, who poses as the sole survivor of his wrecked ship, presume in front of the Egyptians to ascribe this intention to the alleged strangers? He must not imply that they knew beforehand of Menelaus' pretended death; he must then present them, not with a question, but with an unambiguous order or invitation. The following verses show that that indeed is what he has done: v. 1548 *ἐς ναῦν ἐχώρουν*. Now *ἄρα* c. ind. praes. cannot stand for an imperative;<sup>3</sup> nor is the fault put right by Badham's conjecture *συνθάψετε*, for *ἄρα* c. ind. fut. is not the equivalent of an imperative either.<sup>4</sup> The imperative in fact is there, all right: *συνθάπτετε*; the fault is not in the verb but in *ἄρα*.

<sup>1</sup> This conjecture had practically been anticipated by Brunck, who suggested *ἀνευ* or *ἀνερ* (ad Aesch. *Prom.* 1021; summarized in the Glasgow edition of Euripides ad loc.). I do not know that anyone has believed him; hence it has seemed worth while to argue the point again.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Hel.* 541; *Hec.* 488, 876; *Suppl.* 1143; *H.F.* 1094–1101; *Io* 429; *Or.* 153; *A. Prom.* 593; *Ag.* 681, 1141, 1194; *Hom. Od.* 9. 447, etc.

<sup>3</sup> The passages which A. C. Pearson ad loc. quotes in defence of the present are not

truly parallel.

<sup>4</sup> Preceded by *οὐ*, an interrogative ind. fut. does indeed stand for an imperative. It would, however, be vain to introduce this form here (by the questionable device of two alterations!); for this is how an acknowledged master addresses his subordinates ('won't you hurry up and bury?'). If Menelaus had used this strong form here, he would thereby have demonstrated that the alleged strangers actually were his men. He does use it, characteristically, after he has taken over command (v. 1561; cf. *I.T.* 1423).



Menelaus had to speak in such a way as to quickly draw his men into the plot without rousing the suspicion of the Egyptians beyond what was unavoidable. The old retainer (usually, but wrongly, styled 'messenger') had warned his fellows to be on the alert; they know that Helen has been found and that Menelaus plans to secure their escape by some ruse; they do not know what this ruse is going to be.<sup>1</sup> 'By asking his men about their ship Menelaus warns them that they are to be strangers; the next sentence . . . tells them they are to accompany him.'<sup>2</sup> At the same time, Menelaus has by his first question supplied the Egyptians with a plausible reason for their presence; he could not have prepared them more suitably for his next decisive move in asking his men—strangers ostensibly, but fellow Greeks—to join in the burial.

At this tense and crucial moment, then, Menelaus had got to give his men a definite lead; he had to tell them unambiguously what he wanted them to do—without, however, revealing his relation to them to the Egyptians. Hence, while leaving the imperative *συνθάπτετε* to stand, we may change the unsuitable interrogative particle *ἄρα* into the hortatory *ἀλλά*.<sup>3</sup> Menelaus then wisely does not wait for an answer to his first question but breaks it off, intimating: 'enough; whosoever you may be, Greeks you are. So then, help with burying Menelaus'. The omission of one *Λ* could easily occur in a sequel of four or, with *scriptio plena*, even five almost identical letters (*ΑΛΛ(Α)ΑΤΡΕΩC*); the surviving *Λ* was later changed into *P*, yielding a superficially suitable word.

Manchester

G. ZUNTZ

<sup>1</sup> See vv. 737 ff.

<sup>2</sup> I have here ventured to quote Mr. Lucas, with whose analysis I fully agree.

<sup>3</sup> I had previously thought of *δεῦρ* and *ἄγ*. Mr. Lucas has criticized the former with arguments which I cannot refute. *ἄγ* of

course would be the easiest possible alteration from the palaeographical point of view, but it effects too abrupt a transition (I do not feel that even *H.F.* 240 would be a sufficient parallel). For *ἀλλά* cf. *Hel.* 477, *Or.* 1337, *Andr.* 989.

## THE ORIGIN OF THE USE OF *AN* AND *KE* IN INDEFINITE CLAUSES

SEVERAL explanations have already been put forward to account for the origin of the use of *án* and *κε*<sup>1</sup> with the subjunctive (and occasionally the optative) in indefinite relative, temporal, and conditional clauses in Greek. Therefore, before I add one more to them, it is necessary for me to give the reasons which there are for thinking that the views already put forward are unsatisfactory, and that a new explanation is required.

Monro<sup>2</sup> says: 'The Particles *κεν* and *án*, as we have seen, are used to mark a predication as *conditional*, or made with reference to a particular or *limited* state of things.' Of these two uses, that of marking a predication as conditional is the function of these particles in principal clauses,<sup>3</sup> and that of making reference to a particular situation is their function in 'conditional' relative, temporal, and *ει* clauses.<sup>4</sup> Now the sentence which I have just quoted from Monro seems to imply that these two uses closely resemble one another; and this is the first fallacy in his argument. I can perhaps best make my meaning clear by constructing a few examples in English parallel to those which Monro quotes from Homer.<sup>5</sup>

- (a) 'He will call on you tomorrow.' (Principal clause, not conditional; parallel to *I* 121, which Monro quotes, § 275(a).)
- (b) 'He will call on you tomorrow if it doesn't rain.' (Principal clause, conditional; parallel to *A* 137, which Monro quotes, § 275(a).)
- (c) 'You always welcome whoever calls on you.' (Relative clause with no reference to a particular case; parallel to *A* 554, which Monro quotes, § 283(a).)
- (d) 'Welcome the first man who calls on you tomorrow.' (Relative clause limited to a particular case; parallel to *A* 139, which Monro quotes, § 283(b).)

In these examples, (b) differs from (a) in being subject to a condition; and the relative clause in (d) differs from that in (c) by being limited to a particular case; and Monro seems, in the passage quoted above, to imply that the difference between (a) and (b) is similar to that between (c) and (d). But the similarity is not at all apparent; it exists in Monro's wording rather than in the facts

<sup>1</sup> I do not propose to distinguish between the meanings of the two particles. The distinction between them seems to be one of dialect, as is recognized even by writers who point out differences between the ways in which they are used in Homer, e.g. by Chantraine, *Gram. Hom.*, tome ii, § 503. Such differences certainly exist, but they must be merely a convention of the artificial Epic dialect, since they cannot have existed in spoken dialects which only possessed one of the particles. Therefore, when we use the

Homeric poems as evidence for the usages of the living speech of the Greeks at an early period, we can safely ignore the slight difference in meaning between *án* and *κε*.

<sup>2</sup> *Homeric Grammar*, 2nd ed., § 362.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, §§ 275(a), 300, 324, 326(1).

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, §§ 283(b), 287(2), 289(2), 292, 305 note.

<sup>5</sup> I use the name Homer for convenience, without intending to imply any particular views on the Homeric question.

of the case; and therefore we ought to question Monro's attempt to derive the use of *án* and *κε* in such relative clauses directly from the function which he assigns to these particles in principal clauses.<sup>1</sup>

Secondly, his argument that their function in indefinite relative, temporal, and conditional clauses in Homer is to indicate limitation to particular circumstances, is not very sound. Such clauses may be indefinite either because they refer to an indefinitely large number of cases (indefinite frequency, as in example (c) above), or because they refer to the future (indefinite futurity, as in example (d) above); and where the indefiniteness is that of futurity, the clause will more often than not refer to one particular case (as in example (d)). Monro<sup>2</sup> rightly points out that in Homer clauses of this kind usually take *án* or *κε* when they refer to the future, but not when they refer to the present or past; but I hope to show that he is wrong in connecting this fact with his thesis that *án* and *κε* indicate limitation to particular circumstances. We can best decide the question by considering the cases where clauses of this kind indicate indefinite frequency in the future; if they tend to be without *án* or *κε*, Monro is right in saying that it is the question of limitation to particular circumstances that determines the use of these particles; but if they tend to have *án* or *κε*, then it is the fact of futurity that causes these particles to be used.

Before we consider the statistics on this point it must be said that we should look for the general tendency of the Homeric language rather than try to find a rule to which there are no exceptions. Greek epic poets probably deliberately archaized their language, and so would be liable inadvertently to slip in words and forms from their everyday speech among the usages which they had inherited from previous poets, and perhaps also to introduce false archaisms which had never existed in the living speech; and no doubt the rhapsodists, and the copying scribes of all ages until printing was invented, all did their little bit to alter the language.<sup>3</sup> We may, however, assume that such changes took place at random; and that where we have two usages which are equally susceptible to alteration, it has taken place in about the same proportion of the total number of cases of each of them. For our present purposes this means that if the subjunctive denoting indefinite frequency in the future is without *án* or *κε* in about as great a proportion of the total number of instances as the subjunctive of indefinite frequency in the present, Monro is right; but if it occurs with *án* or *κε* in as large a proportion of cases as the subjunctive referring to a single future case, Monro is wrong. If we take the text of Homer as it is, and merely observe its general trends, we shall be far more likely to discover the real tendencies of the living speech of the Greeks at an early period than if we propose wholesale emendation, as Monro does in § 283(b).

Of Homer's clauses with the subjunctive introduced by relative pronouns or adverbs, a large number do not concern us because they are indirect questions, or denote purpose, or add something more about a person who has already been

<sup>1</sup> Chantraine (*Gram. Hom.*, tome ii, § 311) follows Monro in this mistake when he says of *án* and *κε*, 'Elles soulignent un cas particulier, marquent une emphase. . . La particule *κε*, par exemple, exprime l'idée de "alors, dans ces conditions".' He differs from Monro in a few details, but their views are in general so similar that Chantraine's must fall with Monro's.

<sup>2</sup> *Hom. Gram.*, §§ 283(b), 287(2), 289(2)(b), 292(b).

<sup>3</sup> These views on the Homeric language are so generally accepted that they hardly require references to justify them. At any rate it is sufficient to refer to Bowra's summary of the case for them in *Tradition and Design in the Iliad*, ch. vii.

mentioned or is already known. There are forty-eight such clauses<sup>1</sup> in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (excluding the clauses introduced by relative adverbs of manner<sup>2</sup>). We are concerned rather with clauses which define a person or thing, or class of persons or things, whose individual identity is unknown either because the class is indefinitely large or because the factor which will decide who are the person or persons concerned is still in the future.

Among relative clauses of this kind, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* contain 132 referring to an indefinite number of cases in the past or over the present. Ninety-two of these<sup>3</sup> are without *ἄν* or *κε*, and 40<sup>4</sup> contain one of these particles. Denoting an indefinite number of cases in the future there are 57 examples altogether; of these 3<sup>5</sup> are without and 54<sup>6</sup> are with *ἄν* or *κε*. Referring to a single case in the future, there are 48 instances, of which 4<sup>7</sup> have no *ἄν* or *κε* and 44<sup>8</sup> have one of these particles.

From these figures it is clear that clauses referring to an indefinite number of cases in the future behave in the same way as those denoting a single future instance; both kinds of clause show a very strong tendency to have *ἄν* or *κε*, while clauses denoting indefinite frequency in the past or over the present show a moderate tendency to be without these particles. We may conclude, then, that reference to the future is an important factor in causing *ἄν* or *κε* to be used, and that reference to a particular case has nothing to do with the matter.

<sup>1</sup> Refs.: B233, B365-6, Γ287, Γ460, Δ191, Ε33, Η171, Θ34, Θ354, Θ465, Ι165-6, Ι424 (unless the verb is optative), Κ282, Ζ192, Φ103, Φ127, Χ130, Ψ345, Ω119, Ω147, Ω176, Ω196, Ω382, α396, β43, β192-3, β213, δ29, δ756-7, ζ37-38, ζ202, ι356, κ288, κ432-3, κ539, λ135, μ81-82, ν364, ν400, ο311, π349-50, ρ385, σ86-87, σ335-6, τ403-4, ψ140, ψ282, ω29. The verb is probably future indicative at Δ466-7 and Υ23; and δ389 is probably a main clause.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 79, n. 3 below.

<sup>3</sup> Refs.: Α230, Α543, Α554, Β293-4, Γ61-62, Γ109, Ε5-6, Ε137-8, Ε407, Ε747, Θ391, Ι117, Ι508, Ι592, Κ184-5, Α559, Μ48, Μ299-300, Μ423, Ν63-64, Ν138, Ν179-80, Ν229, Σ81, Ο80-82, Ο411-12, Ο491, Ο492, Ο579-80, Ο680-1, Π54, Π260, Π387-8, Π590-1, Ρ110-11, Ρ134-5, Ρ434-5, Ρ631-2, Ρ725-6, Ζ208, Ζ319, Τ265, Φ283, Φ347, Χ23, Χ73, Ψ517-18, Ψ761-2, α101, α352, α415-16, γ320, δ165, δ207-8, δ357, ε249-50, ε448, ζ287-8, η74, θ148, θ161-3, θ210-11, θ524, θ547, κ39, λ428, μ40, μ41, μ66, μ191, ν31-32, ν214, ξ65, ξ85-86, ξ106, ο324, ο345, ο401, π19, π228, ρ518-19, σ137, σ276-7, τ109-14, τ266, τ329, τ566, υ188, χ469, ψ119, ψ234-5, ω286. At ε395 the verb is as likely to be indicative as subjunctive.

<sup>4</sup> Refs.: Α218, Α527, Γ66, Γ279, Θ408, Θ422, Ι131, Ι510, Ι615, Α409, Σ416, Π621-2, Ρ99, Τ167-8, Τ228, Τ230, Τ260, Υ250, Φ24, Ψ322, Ω335, Ω529, Ω531, δ196, η33, θ32, θ586, κ74, κ328, ξ126, ο21, ο55, ο70-71, ο422, τ332, τ564, ν295, φ294,

φ313, φ345. At Σ376 the Oxford text reads the indicative in the second part of the clause, and the verb of the first part is unexpressed. No doubt it is to be understood in the subjunctive, but since it is not expressed I have not included this clause in the list. There is another clause with verb unexpressed at Ε481.

<sup>5</sup> Refs.: Ν234, Υ363, ξ139.  
<sup>6</sup> Refs.: Α294, Α549, Β231, Β346-7, Β391, Γ354, Δ306, Ζ228, Ζ229, Θ10, Θ405, Θ419, Θ430, Ι102, Ι167, Κ67, Λ367, Μ226-7, Σ127, Ο109, Ο348, Ο494-5, Ρ93, Ρ100-1, Σ271, Σ467, Τ72-73, Τ235, Υ308, Υ454, Φ103-4, Φ296, Φ484 (rel.-fut.), Ψ247-8, Ψ554, γ355, ζ28, κ22 (rel.-fut.), λ147, λ434, λ442, ε445, ο281, ο448, ρ11, ρ19, ρ559, σ63, σ286, τ27-28, τ322-3, χ66, ω29, ω202. There is a clause with verb unexpressed at Α547.

<sup>7</sup> Refs.: ο453, π76-77, τ528-9, ν335. Monro (*Hom. Gram.*, §283(a)) specifically remarks that in this last case the intention behind the omission of *κεν* or *ἄν* 'is to make the reference quite general and sweeping'. This cannot be so. The reference is to the man whom Penelope will marry, despairing of the return of Odysseus; and it seems quite obvious that she will only marry one man.

<sup>8</sup> Refs.: Α139, Β361, Γ71, Γ92, Ε421, Ι74-75, Ι140, Ι146, Ι282, Ι288, Ι397, Κ235, Κ306, Σ190, Ο46, Ο148, Ρ229-30, Τ110, Ψ660-1, Ψ805-6, Ψ855, Ψ857, Ω92, α158, α316, α389, β25, β128, β161, β229, δ421, ζ159, θ549, ο46, ο47, ο270, τ378, τ406, τ577-8, υ115, υ342, φ75-76, φ280, ω454. There is a clause with verb unexpressed at Η286.

We may, in fact, conjecture that originally  $\alpha\nu$  or  $\kappa\epsilon$  was normally used in a clause of this kind when it referred to the future, but not when it referred to the past or present; and that by the time of Homer the use of these particles had begun to be extended to clauses referring to the present, occurring in about one-third of them. By the time of classical Attic it had been extended to all such clauses in the present as well as the future. Clauses with the subjunctive referring to the past are, of course, very rare, but the few doubtful instances which do occur in Homer have been included with those referring to the present in the figures given above. Our general conclusion so far, then, is that we need an explanation of the origin of the use of  $\alpha\nu$  and  $\kappa\epsilon$  in indefinite clauses which will account for their appearing first in clauses referring to the future, but which does not involve the assumption that they make reference to particular cases.

I should perhaps point out in passing that in classifying the clauses in the categories mentioned above I have found a number of cases in which the precise meaning is not clear, and some others in which it is clear, but falls on the border-line between one category and another. In classifying such examples I expect that others will differ from me in their judgements in some cases; but not in enough to affect materially the very decisive results which my figures give. If a clause occurs twice in Homer with identical wording, I have listed it twice. This is the only thing to do, because it may occur with different shades of meaning in its different contexts, and the two occurrences may have to be placed in two different categories. If they have to be put in the same category, there is no harm in that, because together they provide stronger evidence for their genuineness as a true Homeric usage than one of them by itself would have done. Where there is doubt about the text, I have followed the reading of the Oxford text except in a very few places where it disagrees with the best manuscript evidence; and there I have only departed from it in order to conform to the principle laid down above, that we should base our conclusions on the text as it has come down to us.

It now remains to give the statistics of Homer's temporal and conditional clauses with the subjunctive. They tell the same story as the relative clauses, as will readily be seen when they are presented in the same categories. Of the temporal clauses, four<sup>1</sup> are not 'indefinite' and so do not concern us. There is also a very large class of purpose clauses introduced by  $\delta\phi\phi\alpha$ ; this usage is so common and distinctive that there is no need to give a list of the places where it occurs, but the cases in which there is doubt whether  $\delta\phi\phi\alpha$  means 'until' or 'in order that' will be mentioned in their proper place. The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* contain 160 temporal clauses with the subjunctive denoting indefinite repetition in the past or over the present. Of these 103<sup>2</sup> are without  $\alpha\nu$  or  $\kappa\epsilon$ , and 57<sup>3</sup> contain one of these particles. Denoting indefinite frequency

<sup>1</sup> Refs.:  $\Delta$  164-7,  $Z$  448,  $\Theta$  373,  $\Phi$  112.

<sup>2</sup> Refs.:  $A$  80,  $A$  82,  $A$  163-4,  $B$  147,  $B$  395,  $B$  782,  $\Delta$  130-1,  $\Delta$  131,  $\Delta$  141,  $\Delta$  259-60,  $\Delta$  344,  $\Delta$  346,  $\Delta$  351-2,  $E$  91,  $E$  500-1,  $E$  524,  $E$  597-8,  $Z$  506-7,  $Z$  524,  $\Theta$  338-9,  $I$  646-7,  $K$  360-2,  $\Lambda$  155,  $\Lambda$  292-3,  $\Lambda$  305-6,  $\Lambda$  324-5,  $\Lambda$  414-15,  $\Lambda$  477,  $\Lambda$  478,  $M$  281,  $M$  286,  $N$  141,  $N$  271,  $N$  334,  $N$  588-9,  $\Sigma$  16,  $\Sigma$  414,  $\Sigma$  522,  $O$  207,  $O$  263-4,  $O$  359,  $O$  363,  $O$  382-3,  $O$  605-6,  $O$  624,  $O$  680,  $\Pi$  10,  $\Pi$  53,  $\Pi$  212,  $\Pi$  245,  $\Pi$  297-8,  $\Pi$  365,  $\Pi$  386,  $\Pi$  641-2,  $\Pi$  690,  $\Pi$  61-62,  $P$  98,  $P$  389-90,  $P$  728,

$P$  756-7,  $\Sigma$  207,  $\Sigma$  600-1,  $T$  183,  $Y$  495,  $\Phi$  199,  $\Phi$  257-8,  $\Phi$  346-7,  $\Phi$  522,  $X$  74-75,  $X$  162-3,  $X$  189,  $\Omega$  369,  $\Omega$  417,  $\delta$  335-7,  $\delta$  400,  $\delta$  650-1,  $\delta$  792,  $\epsilon$  328,  $\zeta$  183,  $\zeta$  232,  $\eta$  72,  $\eta$  202,  $\iota$  6-10,  $\iota$  391-2,  $\kappa$  486,  $\xi$  60,  $\xi$  170,  $\xi$  374,  $\omicron$  409,  $\pi$  72,  $\rho$  126-8,  $\rho$  471-2,  $\rho$  520,  $\sigma$  133,  $\sigma$  134,  $\tau$  168-9,  $\tau$  515,  $\tau$  518-19,  $\upsilon$  25-27,  $\upsilon$  86,  $\upsilon$  196,  $\phi$  133,  $\psi$  159.

<sup>3</sup> Refs.:  $A$  168,  $B$  228,  $B$  397,  $B$  475,  $Z$  225,  $Z$  489,  $H$  5,  $H$  410,  $\Theta$  406,  $\Theta$  420,  $I$  101-2,  $I$  324,  $I$  409,  $I$  501,  $K$  5,  $\Lambda$  269,  $M$  150,  $N$  285,  $O$  23,  $O$  80,  $O$  170,  $O$  209-10,  $P$  520-2,  $P$  658,



in the future there are 10 clauses, of which 1<sup>1</sup> is without, and 9<sup>2</sup> are with *ἄν* or *κε*. Referring to a single future case there are 187 examples, or 209 if we include some doubtful ones with *ῥῥα* which are probably final clauses. There are 14<sup>3</sup> certain instances without either of our particles, and 17<sup>4</sup> more which could be interpreted as temporal but are more probably final. The clauses with *ἄν* or *κε* referring to a single case in the future number 173,<sup>5</sup> or 178 if we include 5<sup>6</sup> which are more probably final.

Of Homer's clauses introduced by *εἰ* or *αἷ* and containing the subjunctive, 76<sup>7</sup> do not concern us because they denote purpose or some similar idea or are indirect questions. Among those which do concern us, there are 21 denoting indefinite repetition in the past or over the present. Fifteen<sup>8</sup> of them have no *ἄν* or *κε*, and 6<sup>9</sup> contain one of these particles. Denoting indefinite frequency in the future there are altogether 10 clauses. One<sup>10</sup> of them is without, and 9<sup>11</sup> are with *ἄν* or *κε*. Referring to a single case in the future there are 169 clauses, of which 8<sup>12</sup> have neither *ἄν* nor *κε*, and 161<sup>13</sup> have one of these particles.

Thus in Homer's temporal and conditional, as in his relative, clauses with

T 223, T 375, Y 167-8, Φ 575, X 192, Ω 480, α 192, γ 237-8, ε 394, θ 147, θ 553, θ 554, ι 138-9, κ 216-17, κ 411, λ 17, λ 18, λ 192, λ 218, λ 221, ν 101, ξ 130, ρ 320, ρ 323, σ 194, τ 206, τ 567, ν 83-85, ν 202, χ 468-9, ψ 233, ω 7, ω 88-89. <sup>1</sup> Ref.: E 87.

<sup>2</sup> Refs.: Δ 40-41, K 130, Y 130, Y 335 (unless the verb is future indicative), θ 242-3, ν 180-1, π 287, τ 6, φ 159.

<sup>3</sup> Refs.: Σ 135, Σ 190, T 201-2, T 337, Φ 323, Ψ 47, Ω 551, Ω 781, β 135, κ 175, ν 336, π 268-9, ρ 9, ψ 257-8.

<sup>4</sup> Refs.: A 523, B 299, H 68, H 349, H 369, Θ 6, T 102, ζ 218-20, ζ 239, η 187, θ 27, μ 272, ρ 469, σ 43, σ 352, ν 292, φ 276.

<sup>5</sup> Refs.: A 242-3, A 509-10, A 519, A 567, B 34, B 332, Γ 291, Γ 409, Δ 53, Δ 229-30 (rel.-fut.), Δ 239, E 466, Z 83, Z 113-14, Z 412, Z 454-5, H 30-31, H 71-72, H 193, H 291-2, H 335, H 376-7, H 377-8, H 395-6, H 396-7, H 459-60, Θ 180, Θ 375-6, Θ 475, I 46, I 48-49, I 138, I 280, I 358, I 609-10, I 702-3, I 707, K 62, K 63, K 89-90, K 325, Λ 187, Λ 191-2, Λ 193-4, Λ 202, Λ 206-7, Λ 208-9, Λ 666-8, Λ 764, M 369, N 753, Σ 6-7, Σ 77-78, Σ 237, Σ 504-5, O 147, O 232-3, Π 62-63 (rel.-fut.), Π 95-96, Π 246, Π 453, Π 455, P 186, P 454-5, P 622, Σ 115-16, Σ 121, Σ 280-1, Σ 409, T 158-9, T 190-1, T 402, Y 316-17, Y 337, Φ 128, Φ 133-4, Φ 231-2, Φ 340-1, Φ 375-6, Φ 531-2, Φ 534, Φ 558-9, X 67-68, X 125, X 258, X 359-60, X 365-6, X 387-8, X 509, Ψ 10, Ψ 76, Ψ 244, Ω 154, Ω 155, Ω 183, Ω 184, Ω 431, Ω 553-4, Ω 717, α 41, α 293, β 97-98, β 99-100, β 124, β 204, β 357-8, β 374, γ 45, γ 353-4, δ 412, δ 414, δ 420, δ 477-8, δ 494, δ 588, ε 348, ε 361, ε 363, ε 378, ζ 259, ζ 262, ζ 295-6, ζ 297, ζ 303, ζ 304-5, η 319-20, θ 318, θ 444-5, θ 511-12 (rel.-fut.), κ 293, κ 461, κ 508, κ 526,

λ 106-8, λ 119-20, λ 122, λ 127-8, λ 351-2, μ 55, ν 59-60, ν 155, ν 394, ν 412, ξ 153, ξ 155, ο 26, ο 36, ο 51-53, ο 75-77, ο 337, ο 446, ο 543, π 282, ρ 23, ρ 56 (rel.-fut.), σ 150, σ 269, τ 142-3, τ 144-5, τ 410-11, τ 489-90, χ 58-59, χ 72-73, χ 216, χ 219, χ 254, χ 440, χ 443-4, ψ 269, ψ 274-5, ψ 358, ω 132-3, ω 134-5.

<sup>6</sup> Refs.: Z 258, K 444, Y 24, τ 17, χ 377.

<sup>7</sup> Refs.: A 207, A 408, A 420, B 72, B 83, Δ 249, E 279, Z 281, H 39, H 243, H 375-6, H 394-5, Θ 282, Θ 532-3, Θ 535-6, I 172, K 55-56, Λ 791, Λ 797, Λ 799-800, M 275, N 236, N 743, Σ 78, Σ 164-5, O 16-17, O 32, O 297, O 403, Π 39, Π 41-42, Π 725, Π 860-1, P 121, P 245, P 652-3, P 692, Σ 143-4, Σ 199-200, Σ 213, Σ 457-9, Σ 601, T 71, Y 172-3, Y 436, Φ 293, X 244-5, X 419, Ψ 82, Ω 116, Ω 301, Ω 357, α 94, α 279, α 282, α 379, β 144, β 186, β 216, β 332-3, β 360, γ 83, γ 92-93, γ 216, δ 34-35, δ 322-3, δ 739-40, ε 417-18, μ 215-16, ν 182-3, ξ 118, ο 312, χ 7, χ 76-77, χ 252-3, ω 217. The optative is the best attested reading at ε 471.

<sup>8</sup> Refs.: A 81, Δ 261-2, I 481, K 225, Λ 116, M 239-40, Π 263-4, Φ 576, X 191, α 167-8, η 204, μ 96, ξ 373-4, π 98, π 116.

<sup>9</sup> Refs.: A 166, Γ 25-26, Λ 391, M 302, ε 120, λ 159.

<sup>10</sup> Ref.: A 340-1. The verbs are probably future indicative at A 294, B 261-3, and E 350.

<sup>11</sup> Refs.: A 580, B 258, E 129, E 232, E 351, Θ 142, I 255, ι 502-3, π 276-7.

<sup>12</sup> Refs.: E 258, M 223-4, M 245, X 86, α 188, α 204, ε 221, μ 348-9. The verbs are probably future indicative at B 379, E 717, I 231, K 115, P 154, Σ 268, Φ 463, α 389, and ω 434-5.

<sup>13</sup> Refs.: A 90, A 128-9, A 137, A 324, B 364, Γ 281, Γ 284, Γ 288-9, Δ 98, Δ 170,



the subjunctive, there is a strong tendency to put *äv* or *κε* if the reference is to the future, regardless of whether they are concerned with a particular case or not; and if they refer to the present or past, there is a weaker tendency for them to be without these particles. The situation is rather different with his indefinite clauses containing the optative. A greater number of factors enter into them, and so we shall have to divide them into more categories. The statistics are as follows.

Of the clauses introduced by relative pronouns or adverbs (other than relative adverbs of manner), 84<sup>1</sup> do not concern us because they are not 'indefinite'. Among the indefinite relative clauses, 24<sup>2</sup> refer to an indefinite number of cases in the past or over the present; they are all without *äv* or *κε*. The optative without *äv* or *κε* also occurs in 23<sup>3</sup> relative clauses in statements referring to purely imaginary situations; the main verb is usually a potential optative, or occasionally an optative of wish, and often cannot be tied down specifically to past, present, or future. In classifying clauses with the optative which refer to the future, we must distinguish between the absolute future and the future relative to the time of the main verb. This distinction was unnecessary in the classification of the clauses with the subjunctive, because among them references to the relative future are too few to affect the results materially, and in any case behave in a very similar way to references to the absolute future; so they are merely indicated in the notes. But with the optative the distinction is important. There are, then, 3<sup>4</sup> relative clauses with the optative referring to an indefinite number of cases in the relative future, and 2<sup>5</sup> referring to a single case, none of them with *äv* or *κε*. Denoting an indefinite number of instances in the absolute future, we find 4<sup>6</sup> clauses without *äv* or *κε*, and 1<sup>7</sup> with *κε*;

Δ 353, Δ 415-16, E 131-2, E 212, E 224-5, E 260, E 762-3, E 820-1 (rel.-fut.), Z 94-95, Z 260, Z 275-6, Z 277, Z 309-10, Z 443, Z 526-7, H 77, H 81, H 118-19, H 173-4, Θ 287, Θ 471, Θ 478, Θ 482, I 135-6, I 277-8, I 359 (twice), I 362, I 393, I 412, I 414, I 429, I 604, I 692, K 106-7, K 449, K 452, Λ 315, Λ 404, Λ 405, Λ 455, M 71-72, N 260, N 379-80, N 829-30, Σ 110-11, Σ 310-11, Σ 368-9, O 498-9, O 504, Π 32, Π 87-88, Π 445, Π 499-500, P 29-30, P 39-40, P 91, P 94, Σ 91-93, Σ 180, Σ 273, Σ 278-9, Σ 306, T 32, T 147, Y 138-9, Y 181, Y 186, Y 301-2, Φ 437-8, Φ 553-4, Φ 556-8, Φ 567, X 55, X 99, X 111-19, X 256-7, X 349-50, X 487, Ψ 344, Ψ 413, Ψ 543, Ω 592, Ω 687-8, α 287, α 289, β 102, β 133, β 188-9, β 218, β 220, δ 391, ε 169, ε 417, ε 466, ε 470-2, ζ 313, η 75, θ 355-6, θ 496, ι 520, λ 105, λ 110, λ 112, λ 113, λ 348-9, μ 49, μ 53, μ 121, μ 137, μ 139, μ 140, μ 163, μ 288, μ 299-300, ν 359-60, ξ 140-1, ξ 395, ξ 398, π 254, π 403, π 405, ρ 51, ρ 60, ρ 79-80, ρ 82, ρ 230, ρ 549, ρ 556, σ 83, σ 318, τ 147, τ 327-8, τ 488, τ 496, υ 233, φ 114, φ 213, φ 237, φ 260, φ 305-6, φ 314-15, φ 338, φ 348-9, φ 364-5, φ 383, χ 167, χ 345-6, ψ 79, ω 137, ω 511.

<sup>1</sup> Refs.: Δ 64, B 687, Γ 235, Γ 317, E 192, E 303, E 362, E 457, E 484, Z 49, Z 452-3,

H 231, H 342, Θ 291, K 20, K 166, K 171, K 380, K 503, Λ 134, M 334, N 127, Σ 91, Σ 107, Σ 241, Σ 299, O 40, O 736, O 738, Π 16, P 640, Y 286, Φ 336, Φ 609, X 321, X 348, Ω 37-38, Ω 149-51, Ω 178-80, Ω 212, Ω 733, Ω 744-5, α 254, β 31, γ 319, δ 167, δ 204-5, δ 560, δ 699, ε 17, ε 142, ε 166, ε 188-9, ε 240, ζ 114, η 17, η 148-9, θ 280, ι 89, ι 126-7, ι 127, ι 332, κ 402, κ 101, κ 110, κ 434, λ 366, μ 282-3, ν 41-42, ξ 404-5, ο 458, ο 518, π 257, ρ 146, ρ 421, ρ 580, ρ 597, σ 27, σ 166, τ 77, τ 464, υ 368, υ 383, ω 189-90. The optative at α 404 is due to a conjecture. Perhaps I should also mention the indirect questions at E 85, ο 423, and ρ 368, although the pronouns which introduce them cannot be called 'relative'.

<sup>2</sup> Refs.: B 188, B 198, B 215, Δ 232, Δ 240, Δ 516, Z 177, K 489, M 268, M 428, O 22, O 731, O 743, Φ 611, Ψ 494, γ 106, ζ 286, ι 94, μ 331, ξ 221, ρ 317, χ 315, χ 415, φ 66.

<sup>3</sup> Refs.: Δ 540-2, Z 330, Z 521, I 125, I 267, M 228-9, N 118-19, N 322, N 344, Σ 92-93, α 47, α 229, δ 205, δ 222, θ 240, κ 383, λ 490, ν 291, ο 359-60, σ 142, χ 138, φ 101-2, ψ 169-70.

<sup>4</sup> Refs.: Σ 508, Ψ 749.

<sup>5</sup> Refs.: Z 58-59, λ 361, ο 317, τ 511.

<sup>7</sup> Ref.: λ 149.

referring to a single absolute future instance there are 4<sup>1</sup> clauses without *ἄν* or *κε*, and 5<sup>2</sup> with one of these particles.

Of Homer's clauses with the optative introduced by temporal particles, 6<sup>3</sup> are not 'indefinite', and so do not concern us. These are in addition to the many final clauses introduced by *ὅφρα*, and the 4<sup>4</sup> pure final and object clauses introduced by *ἥος*. Among the indefinite temporal clauses, 50 denote indefinite frequency in the past or over the present, 49<sup>5</sup> of them without *ἄν* or *κε*, and 1<sup>6</sup> with *κε*. The optative occurs without *ἄν* or *κε* in 7<sup>7</sup> temporal clauses in statements referring to purely imaginary situations, and with one of these particles in 2<sup>8</sup> such clauses. Referring to an indefinite number of cases in the relative future there are 4<sup>9</sup> examples, none of them with *ἄν* or *κε*; and denoting a single case in the relative future there are 14 instances, 13<sup>10</sup> without and 1<sup>11</sup> with one of these particles. Referring to an indefinite number of cases in the absolute future there is 1<sup>12</sup> example, without *ἄν* or *κε*; and denoting a single instance in the absolute future there are 12 clauses, 8<sup>13</sup> without and 4<sup>14</sup> with *ἄν* or *κε*.

In clauses introduced by *εἰ* or *αἰ* Homer uses the optative in 48<sup>15</sup> instances which do not concern us because they denote purpose or some similar idea, or are indirect questions. There are also 24<sup>16</sup> true conditional clauses which use the optative because they are known to be unfulfilled; these too hardly concern us, because they are not 'indefinite'. Among indefinite conditional clauses with the optative there are 4<sup>17</sup> referring to an indefinite number of cases in the past or present, none of them with *ἄν* or *κε*. In statements referring to purely imaginary situations there are 14<sup>18</sup> clauses without *ἄν* or *κε*, and 3<sup>19</sup> with one of these particles. There are no examples denoting indefinite frequency in the relative future; denoting a single case in the relative future, there are 3 clauses, 1<sup>20</sup> of them without and 2<sup>21</sup> with *ἄν* or *κε*. There is 1<sup>22</sup> example, without *ἄν* or *κε*,

<sup>1</sup> Refs.: Γ 299, Ω 139, β 336, π 386.

<sup>2</sup> Refs.: K 307, β 54, δ 600, π 392, φ 162.

<sup>3</sup> Refs.: I 304, P 489-90, α 236, β 31, β 43, δ 64. If the punctuation of the Oxford text is correct, σ 218 is a main clause.

<sup>4</sup> Refs.: δ 800-1, ε 386, ζ 80, τ 367-8.

<sup>5</sup> Refs.: Α 610, Γ 216, Γ 221, Γ 233, Θ 269-70, I 488-9, K 11, K 14, K 78, K 189, N 711, O 284, P 463, P 732-3, Σ 544, Σ 566, T 132, T 317, Y 226, Y 228, Φ 265, X 194, X 502, Ω 14, β 105, γ 283, δ 191-2, η 138, θ 87, θ 90, θ 220, ι 208, ι 384, λ 510, λ 513, λ 585, λ 591, λ 596-7, μ 237, μ 240, μ 381, ξ 217, π 141, σ 7, τ 49, τ 150, τ 371, ω 140, ω 344.

<sup>6</sup> Ref.: I 525.

<sup>7</sup> Refs.: Θ 23, Σ 248, Φ 429, ε 189, π 197-8, φ 185-6, ω 254. At δ 222 the manuscript reading is *ἐνῆν*, not *ἐνεί*.

<sup>8</sup> Refs.: β 78, δ 222 (here Oxford text reads *ἐνεί* for manuscript reading *ἐνῆν*).

<sup>9</sup> Refs.: Δ 263, Θ 189, θ 70, ξ 522.

<sup>10</sup> Refs.: B 794, Δ 334-5, H 415-16, I 191, Σ 524, Y 148, Φ 580, α 333, α 376, μ 437, ν 22, ν 138, φ 151. The *ὅφρα* clause at γ 285 is probably final.

<sup>11</sup> Ref.: π 298-9.

<sup>12</sup> Ref.: μ 106.

<sup>13</sup> Refs.: Γ 55, N 319-20, Σ 465, λ 375-6,

μ 114, ν 391, σ 148, φ 116.

<sup>14</sup> Refs.: O 70-71, T 208, Ω 227, X 444. (Here Oxford text reads subjunctive, contrary to MSS.) γ 117 is probably a main clause.

<sup>15</sup> Refs.: B 97-98, Γ 450, Δ 88, E 168, K 19, K 206-7, Λ 792, M 122-3, M 333, N 760, N 807, Σ 163, P 104, P 681, Σ 322, T 385, Y 464-5, X 196, Ψ 40-41, α 115-17, β 342-3, β 351, δ 317, ε 439-40, ε 471-2, ζ 144, ι 229, ι 267-8, ι 317, ι 349-50, ι 418, ι 421-2, κ 147, λ 479-80, λ 628, μ 113-14, μ 334, ν 415, ξ 120, ξ 460-1, ξ 498, ο 316, σ 375, υ 224-5, υ 327, χ 91, χ 381-2, φ 91. (But Oxford text reads subjunctive at ε 471-2.)

<sup>16</sup> Refs.: B 489-90, B 780, Γ 453, I 389-90, I 515-16, Λ 389, Λ 467, M 322-3, N 276, N 85, Π 72-73, P 156, P 399, X 20, X 410-11, Ψ 274, β 62, ε 206, ι 314, κ 416, κ 420, π 148, ρ 313, ρ 366. The clause at π 99-101 is probably a wish.

<sup>17</sup> Refs.: I 318, Ω 768, α 414, η 52.

<sup>18</sup> Refs.: Π 746, Π 748, δ 224, δ 225-6, ε 485, θ 139, θ 217-18, μ 78, μ 88, ν 292, ξ 56, ξ 132, υ 49-50, χ 13.

<sup>19</sup> Refs.: B 123-7, N 288, β 76.

<sup>20</sup> Ref.: ω 174.

<sup>21</sup> Refs.: B 597-8, H 387.

<sup>22</sup> Ref.: Ω 366.

referring to indefinite repetition in the absolute future; but there are 77 denoting a single case in the absolute future, 55<sup>1</sup> without and 22<sup>2</sup> with *án* or *κε*.

The statistics of Homer's indefinite clauses with the optative may be tabulated as follows:

	Without <i>án</i> or <i>κε</i>				With <i>án</i> or <i>κε</i>			
	Rel.	Temp.	Cond.	Total	Rel.	Temp.	Cond.	Total
Ind. freq. past and pres.	24	49	4	77	..	1	..	1
Imaginary	23	7	14	44	..	2	3	5
Ind. freq. rel.-fut.	3	4	..	7	..	..	..	..
Single rel.-fut.	2	13	1	16	..	1	2	3
Ind. freq. abs.-fut.	4	1	1	6	1	..	..	1
Single abs.-fut.	4	8	55	67	5	4	22	31

These statistics are not as decisive as those of the subjunctive. At least two factors seem to be at work in them; both reference to the future and reference to a particular case seem to produce some tendency to have *án* or *κε*. These particles are commonest in references to a single case in the absolute future (31 cases out of 98). But in references to an indefinite number of instances in the absolute future they still occur more frequently (1 case out of 7) than in references to an indefinite number of instances in the present or past (1 case out of 78). They occur much more frequently when the reference is to the absolute future (32 cases out of 105) than when it is to the relative future (3 cases out of 26). And references to imaginary situations whose time may be left vague fall between those to the future and those to the past with 5 cases out of 49. These conclusions should be accepted with reserve, however, since the total number of cases in some categories (e.g. references to indefinite frequency in the relative future) is small, and therefore may not give a very accurate picture of the tendencies of the Homeric language. Also there is in all categories a majority of cases without *án* or *κε*, and we are merely distinguishing between the large and the small minorities of examples which have one of these particles. Our general conclusion, then, must be that the statistics of the use of the optative do not debar us from accepting Monro's view that reference to a particular case tends to cause the insertion of *án* or *κε*; but equally they leave it open to us to accept the conclusion which we reached by examining the subjunctives, namely, that reference to the future tends to cause these particles to be used; and if we can find an explanation of this which applies more to the absolute than to the relative future, so much the better.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Refs.: A257, B491-2, Δ17, Δ34-35, Δ347-8, E215, Z284, H28, H129, Θ22, I379, I380, I385, K222, K346, Λ135, Λ386, Σ208-9, Σ333-5, O49-50, Π623, P102, P160-1, Υ100-1, Ψ894, Ω653, α163, β251, γ115-16, γ223, γ228, δ388, ε178, ι278, ι456, κ343, λ356-7, λ501, ο435-6, π103, π105, ρ407, ρ539, σ223-4, σ246, σ254, σ357, σ376-7, σ384, τ127, υ42, υ381, φ195-6, χ61, χ62. The clauses are probably wishes at α255-65, γ218, ρ132-6, ρ496, σ366-74, and υ236.

<sup>2</sup> Refs.: Δ60, E273, Z50, Θ196, Θ205,

I141, I283, I445, K381, T322, X220, X351, Ψ346, Ψ592-3, β246-8, η315, θ353, μ345, υ389, ο545, ρ223, τ589.

<sup>3</sup> It is perhaps best not to try to strengthen my argument by referring to Homer's adverbial clauses of manner. I do not accept the view of Majnarić (*Bulletin international de l'Académie yougoslave des Sciences et des Beaux-Arts*, ii (1931), p. 113) that in such clauses with the subjunctive, *ὥς* stands for *ὥς δέ*, because too much emendation is necessary to support it. But so many of these clauses are of a special nature, that it would not be

My third criticism of Monro's view is directed against the supposition which he has to make to explain how the Attic use of *ἄν*, in all indefinite clauses with the subjunctive, arose out of the Homeric usages. In discussing clauses which take *ἄν* or *κε* and refer to an indefinitely large number of cases, he says: 'In these places we see the tendency of the language to extend the use of *κεν* or *ἄν* beyond its original limits, in other words, to state indefinite cases as if they were definite—a tendency which in later Greek made the use of *ἄν* universal in such clauses, whether the event intended was definite or not.'<sup>1</sup> Now it is quite true that the use of a construction can be extended as Monro suggests; but it is almost inconceivable that a *single word*, whose sole function is to mark a clause as definite, and whose omission when the clause is indefinite does not spoil the grammar, should in the course of a few centuries come to have an apparently *exactly opposite* meaning. The similar developments which Monro mentions contain nothing parallel to this. For example, he refers to the way in which a conditional protasis with the indicative is sometimes used in a general sense instead of with reference to a particular case; but this is not parallel to the complete reversal of meaning which he assigns to *ἄν*, since the protasis still retains its essential characteristic as a protasis. And when *ὅ, ἡ, τό* came to be used as an indefinite relative in New Ionic, it retained the character of a relative which it possessed in Homer. Gildersleeve<sup>2</sup> compares the use of *τὸν καὶ τὸν* and *τὰ καὶ τὰ* in an indefinite sense; but here the change in meaning is made quite clear and natural by the repetition of the word and the insertion of *καί*; these phrases could only provide a parallel to what Monro believes has happened to *ἄν* if the Greeks of classical times had said *ἄν καὶ ἄν* when they spoke with reference to an indefinite number of cases. Moreover in this case, and in that of *τέως* which Gildersleeve also mentions, the change of meaning is from a definiteness like that of Latin *ille* to an indefiniteness like that of Latin *aliquis* or *quidam*; whereas in Attic *ἄν* appears to have the much greater indefiniteness of Latin *quivis* or *quilibet*. A closer parallel than any of these is required to prove that it is possible that *ἄν*, a single independent word, changed its meaning to the exact opposite during the course of a few centuries.

The other prevalent explanations<sup>3</sup> of *ἄν* with the subjunctive in indefinite relative, temporal, and conditional clauses assume that this is a use in a subordinate clause of the *ἄν* with the subjunctive which we sometimes find in principal clauses in Homer. Now it is quite certain that subordinate clauses do occur in Homer in which *ἄν* and *κε* are used with the subjunctive in the same way as in main clauses; e.g.

Θάνατος δέ τοι ἐξ ἁλὸς αὐτῷ  
ἀβληχρὸς μάλα τοῖος ἐλεύσεται, ὅς κέ σε πέφνη  
γῆρα ὑπο λιπαρῷ ἀρημένον. (λ 134-6)

safe to base general inferences on them; though if such inferences were to be made, they would not tell against my views. The references to these clauses are as follows: Subjunctive without *ἄν* or *κε*: B 474-5, E 161, I 323, K 183, K 485-6, A 67-68, M 167-8, M 278, M 421, N 198-9, O 323-4, O 381-2, O 690-1, Π 83, Π 428-9, P 547, P 742-3, X 93, Ψ 222, α 349, ε 368, ζ 189, θ 45, θ 523, π 17, χ 302-3. Subjunctive with *ἄν* or *κε*: B 139, I 26, I 704, M 75, Σ 74, Σ 370, O 294, Σ 297, Y 243, μ 213, ν 179.

Optative without *ἄν* or *κε*: Σ 473. Optative with *ἄν* or *κε*: η 293, ρ 586.

<sup>1</sup> Monro, *Hom. Gram.*, § 363, 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Greek Syntax*, § 425.

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, Schwyzler and Debrunner, *Griech. Gramm.*, Part II, pp. 310 ff.; Kühner and Gerth, *Griech. Gramm.*, Part II, pp. 217 and 250; Meillet and Vendryes, *Grammaire comparée des langues classiques*, 2nd ed., § 933. Stahl (*Synt. d. griech. Verbuns*, p. 258. 1) accepts this view for clauses referring to the future only (see p. 262. 2).

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<sup>2</sup> G

Similarly the corresponding use of the subjunctive without *an* or *ke* is found in subordinate clauses; e.g.

τιμὴν δ' Ἀργείοις ἀποτινέμεν ἢν τιν' εἴκειν,  
ἣ τε καὶ ἐσσομένοισι μετ' ἀνθρώποισι πέληται. (Γ 286-7)

In these clauses, as in the corresponding usages in main clauses, the subjunctive, whether with or without *an* or *ke*, almost always refers to the future,<sup>1</sup> though occasionally it is used with *an* or *ke* in a general potential sense (e.g. at δ 692). It is therefore unlikely that the subjunctive of indefinite clauses, which with or without *an* or *ke* commonly refers to the present as well as to the future, is directly derived from that of the above examples. And it is still less likely that the practice of almost always using *an* or *ke* when the reference is to the future, but omitting it in the majority of cases which refer to the present (which we have seen is Homer's practice in indefinite clauses with the subjunctive), should arise out of a usage in which the rare examples which do not specifically refer to the future all have *an* or *ke*.

It is, then, improbable that the use of *an* with the subjunctive in indefinite clauses is directly derived from Homer's *an* or *ke* with the subjunctive in main clauses; and when we take any particular theory of the significance of these particles, the improbability is only increased. Schwyzer and Debrunner<sup>2</sup> say that *an* and *ke* mean 'under circumstances', 'perhaps', marking a statement as not certain but dependent on the fulfilment of conditions. Meillet and Vendryes<sup>3</sup> appear to mean very much the same when they say that these particles underline the subjunctive's meaning of *éventualité* and the optative's meaning of possibility. This agrees very well with their use in principal clauses with the optative and historic tenses of the indicative (and with the subjunctive and future indicative in Homer); and at first sight it seems to agree with their use in indefinite clauses. For example, when Agamemnon says,

ὁ δέ κεν κεχολώσεται ὅν κεν ἴκωμαι (Α 139)

it is not yet certain to whom he will come. When Achilles says,

ὅς κε θεοῖς ἐπιπείθεται, μάλα τ' ἔκλυον αὐτοῦ (Α 218)

it is not certain what individuals are included in the class of those who obey the gods. When Achilles says to Agamemnon,

εἰ δὴ σοὶ πᾶν ἔργον ὑπείξομαι ὅττι κεν εἴπῃς (Α 294)

it is not certain what things Agamemnon will say in the future. So we seem to have *ke* with the subjunctive denoting something uncertain. But there is a fallacy here, because the uncertainty lies not in the action of the verb but in the identity of the person referred to by the relative pronoun. For example in the first instance cited (Α 139), the man who will be angry is not every one to whom it is possible Agamemnon may come, but the one unknown individual to whom he will in fact come. Contrast the remark of Sarpedon at Ε 483-4:

ἀτὰρ οὐ τί μοι ἐνθάδε τοῖον  
οἶόν κ' ἡὲ φέροιεν Ἀχαιοὶ ἣ κεν ἄγοιεν.

<sup>1</sup> Monro, *Hom. Gram.*, § 275.

<sup>3</sup> *Gramm. comp. d. lang. class.*, § 379.

<sup>2</sup> *Griech. Gramm.*, Part II, p. 305.



Here Sarpedon is referring to the kind of thing which the Achaeans *might* plunder; i.e. the uncertainty lies in the verb, and therefore  $\kappa\epsilon$  with the optative is used exactly as in a main clause. The contrast between this example and *A* 139, etc., is sufficient to show that in the latter we have not got a simple case of  $\kappa\epsilon$  with the subjunctive denoting future possibility as in a main clause. The weakness of the view of Schwyzler and Debrunner lies in a failure to distinguish between these two types of clause; for example, they classify together *I* 287 and *E* 407, and also *A* 218 and *Ψ* 345.<sup>1</sup>

The objection to my line of argument here is that language is not always very logical, and that in English we have a parallel to the illogical development which the view of Schwyzler and Debrunner ascribes to Greek. In English we can say,

'To whomsoever I may come, he will be angry.'

'Whoever may obey the gods, they listen to him.'

'If I yield to you in whatever demands you may make', etc.,

using the verb-form with 'may'. Now the English verb-form with 'may' is ambiguous. In a main clause it marks the action of the verb as uncertain, but in indefinite clauses it apparently serves to emphasize the uncertainty concerning the persons referred to by the relative pronouns (as in these three examples). It thus seems to provide a parallel to the double meaning which Schwyzler and Debrunner, and Meillet and Vendryes, ascribe to  $\acute{\alpha}\nu$  and  $\kappa\epsilon$  with the subjunctive. The parallel is not complete, however, because English also has to have the indefinite form of the relative pronoun ('whoever', 'whatever', etc.), and it is really by this form of the pronoun that it gets the required degree of vagueness in the identity of the person referred to. We are therefore not justified in assuming that Greek, often using the ordinary forms of the relative pronoun ( $\delta\varsigma$ , etc.), has come to express the same degree of vagueness in the person referred to simply by using a construction which basically expresses uncertainty concerning the action of a verb. To say that in indefinite clauses the  $\acute{\alpha}\nu$  is more important than the subjunctive<sup>2</sup> does not really explain the matter.

The old view of Delbrück<sup>3</sup> is that the function of  $\acute{\alpha}\nu$  and  $\kappa\epsilon$  is to point to the occurrence of the event. Kühner and Gerth<sup>4</sup> seem to try to combine Delbrück's view with that which we have already discussed, by saying that  $\acute{\alpha}\nu$  and  $\kappa\epsilon$  indicate that an action actually takes place under definite circumstances. With regard to indefinite relative clauses, Delbrück defends his view by pointing out that in Homer's similes they are always without  $\acute{\alpha}\nu$  or  $\kappa\epsilon$  (he does not mention the exceptions at *Ξ* 416 and *Φ* 24); and he claims that this is because in such cases they involve a demand on the imagination, and to think of their occurrence would be absurd. ('Er enthält stets Phantasieforderungen, an deren Eintreten zu denken eine Absurdität wäre.') This is a rather surprising statement, since Homer's similes are in fact concerned with situations which must have arisen time and time again in the life of the people for whom he wrote. As Delbrück proceeds, however, his theory seems to resolve itself into Monro's. He points out that in clauses with  $\delta\tau\epsilon$  or  $\acute{\omicron}\nu\acute{\omicron}\tau\epsilon$  and the subjunctive  $\acute{\alpha}\nu$  and  $\kappa\epsilon$  are much commoner in the expression of a single future expectation ('eine einzelne futurische Erwartung') than in that of a completely general supposi-

<sup>1</sup> *Griech. Gramm.*, Part II, p. 312.

<sup>2</sup> Schwyzler and Debrunner, *Griech. Gramm.*, Part II, p. 319.

<sup>3</sup> *Synt. Forsch.* i, ch. 9.

<sup>4</sup> *Griech. Gramm.*, § 392 Vorbemerk.



tion ('eine ganz allgemeine Voraussetzung'). Apparently to him they can point to the occurrence of the event in the former case better than in the latter. This argument would have been sounder if he had said that *án* and *κε* point to *one particular* occurrence of the event; but even so, his view would fall with Monro's because, as I have already shown, it is reference to the future, not to a particular case, that tends to cause *án* and *κε* to be inserted in indefinite clauses with the subjunctive.

Stahl,<sup>1</sup> in his account of the meaning of *án* and *κε*, seems to be saying that these particles indicate that the speaker affirms his statement as true; he says of them, 'Ihr Wesen ist subjektive Affirmation'. He points out that they thus merely draw attention to something which is already implied in a subjunctive or optative verb with which they are used. He says, however, that in *synthetisch* subordinate clauses (a category in which he includes all indefinite clauses and others besides) this idea of affirmation changes to one of supposition (*Voraussetzung*).<sup>2</sup> He tries to explain how so striking a change was able to take place, by saying<sup>3</sup> that the ideas of affirmation and supposition are very close together, and that a man who affirms that something will take place must also suppose its happening. The second of these two statements is true, but its converse, that a man who supposes something must also affirm it, is false; and there is in fact no great resemblance between supposition and affirmation. For example, there is nothing at all similar to affirmation in a clause with *εἰ κε* and the subjunctive expressing an open condition in future time, such as

εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώσωσιν, ἐγὼ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἔλωμαι. (A 137)

It is therefore a great weakness in Stahl's argument to have to assume that such a change of meaning occurred.

Musić, who holds<sup>4</sup> that *án* or *κε* is an *asseverative Partikel*, a view very similar to Stahl's, evidently saw this difficulty. He deals with it by drawing a distinction between protases in which the condition is the expectation that an action will take place, and those in which the condition is the actual occurrence of the action.<sup>5</sup> In the former, in which he calls the subjunctive *futurisch*, the *án* or *κε* can, he says, be translated into German as *gewiss* or *wohl*. In the latter, in which he calls the subjunctive *eventual*, the particle has no meaning, and is merely a survival from the *futurisch* subjunctive out of which the *eventual* developed. He points out that, in Attic, protases of the former type take the future indicative, while the latter type take *ἐάν* with the subjunctive. But his attempt to draw a similar distinction between two groups of Homer's protases with the subjunctive fails. He quotes *E* 257-8, *Z* 441-3, *Θ* 477-9, *M* 245-6, and *Σ* 90-93, as examples of the *futurisch* subjunctive, but they all make equally good, or even better, sense taken as *eventual*. For example *Θ* 477-9 reads,

σέθεν δ' ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀλεγίζω  
χωομένης, οὐδ' εἴ κε τὰ νείατα πείραθ' ἔκηαι  
γαίης καὶ πόντοιο.

Presumably Musić thinks it means, 'I care nothing for your anger, not even if you are going to go to the ends of the earth and sea'. But it makes equally good or even better sense as, 'I care nothing for your anger; I shall not care about it

<sup>1</sup> *Synt. d. griech. Verbums*, p. 255. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, p. 258. 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, p. 258. 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Beiträge zur griechischen Satzlehre*, p. 22.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 19-22.

even if you go to the ends of the earth and sea'.<sup>1</sup> In clauses which are definitely *futuristic*, Homer, like the Attic writers, uses the future indicative, as at α 389-90:

Ἀντίνο', εἴ πέρ μοι καὶ ἀγασσέαι ὅττι κεν εἴπω,  
καὶ κεν τοῦτ' ἐθέλωμι Διὸς γε διδόντος ἀρέσθαι.

There is therefore no reason for believing that they ever took the subjunctive; and so, since such clauses with the subjunctive are a necessary stage in the process by which Musié explains the use of *άν* or *κε* in other conditional clauses, his explanation breaks down.

The view which I wish to put forward is that the *άν* or *κε* which we find in indefinite relative, temporal, and conditional clauses which take the subjunctive, was originally felt as going, not with the verb of the indefinite clause, but with the verb of the principal clause. Thus, accepting the view which is held in a slightly different form by both Monro<sup>2</sup> and Schwyzer and Debrunner,<sup>3</sup> that these particles, when used in principal clauses, mark them as conditional, we may translate as follows:

ὕστερον αὐτε καὶ ἡμῖν, αἶ κ' ἐθέλῃσι, | δώσει (Θ 142-3)

'He will give to us also afterwards under these circumstances (*κε*), namely if he wishes.'

αἶψα δ' ἐλεύσομαι αὐτις, ἐπὴν εὖ τοῖς ἐπαμύνω (M 369)

'When I have brought help to them, then under those circumstances (*άν*, contained in *ἐπὴν*) I will at once come back.'

ἔρδειν ὅττι κε κείνος ἐποτρύνῃ καὶ ἀνώγῃ (O 148)

'If he urges and orders you to do anything, then (*κε*) do it.'

It has long been recognized that indefinite relative and temporal clauses express conditions; and in fact Goodwin<sup>4</sup> calls them conditional relative clauses. It is then not surprising that *άν* and *κε*, which are used when a main clause is dependent on a condition, should occur when that condition is expressed by an indefinite clause.

Neither is it surprising that the *άν* or *κε*, though originally felt to go with the main verb, should be placed inside the subordinate clause. In Attic Greek the usual position of *άν* in a main clause is either with the verb or with some emphatic word or phrase.<sup>5</sup> This emphatic word or phrase often implies the condition to which the main verb is subject. For example in:

ἡμῖν δ' ἐκ πολλῆς ἂν περιουσίας νεῶν μόλις τοῦτο ὑπῆρχε (Thuc. 7. 13)

the words *ἐκ πολλῆς περιουσίας νεῶν* express the condition to which *ὑπῆρχε* is subject; 'This would hardly be our position if we had a great abundance of ships.' Similarly in Homer we find:

ὧδέ κέ μοι ῥέζων, Ἀχιλεῦ, κεχαρισμένα θείης (Ω 661)

<sup>1</sup> On p. 27 he makes a similar mistake in seeing potential optatives in the protases at E 273 and ν 389-91. In his translation of these passages the difficulty is obscured by an ambiguity of German similar to that which we noticed in English when discussing the view of Schwyzer and Debrunner. Musié does not, however, claim that his interpretation is certain.

<sup>2</sup> *Hom. Gram.*, § 362.

<sup>3</sup> *Griech. Gramm.*, Part II, p. 305. Stahl (*Synt. d. griech. Verbuns*, p. 256. 2) rejects this view on the ground that it does not agree with the use of *άν* and *κε* in some conditional protases. This objection falls to the ground if my views are accepted, of course.

<sup>4</sup> *Moods and Tenses*, § 520.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, § 219.

'If you were to do this, Achilles, you would be granting me a great favour.' In both of these examples the *αν* or *κε*, though it qualifies the verb, is placed with a phrase implying a condition; and note that it does not come either after or before the whole of the phrase which implies condition, but after the first important word of it. This is because both *αν* and *κε* are enclitic in position,<sup>1</sup> though of course *κε* alone is enclitic in accent. Therefore, when placed with a whole phrase, they come after the first important word of the phrase, just as other enclitics like *δη* and *γε* do. Similarly we should expect that, when the writer wishes to use them to emphasize a complete clause, they will come after the first word of the clause, or at least be separated from it only by other enclitic words with which they have to compete for second position. On my view this is exactly what happened when *αν* and *κε* began to be placed in indefinite clauses.

To justify further my view that it is possible for *αν*, when placed within a subordinate clause, to qualify the verb of the main clause, I must quote a few passages from classical and post-classical Greek before returning to the passages in Homer whose interpretation is simplified by the adoption of my theory. The first passage is from Andocides, *De Myst.* 21:

φέρει δὴ τοῖνυν, εἰ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐβούλετο ὑπομένειν, τοὺς φίλους ἂν οἴσθε ἡ ἐπιτρέπειν αὐτῷ μένειν ἢ ἐγγυήσασθαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν παραιτεῖσθαι καὶ δεῖσθαι ἀπέναι ὅπου ἂν ἔμελλον αὐτὸς σωθῆσθαι ἐμέ τε οὐκ ἀπολεῖν;

Here Goodwin<sup>2</sup> interprets *αν* ἔμελλον as a potential indicative; but it is very difficult to interpret it in this way, and consequently this *αν* was bracketed by Dobree, and still remains bracketed in modern editions. But if my argument is correct, it can be taken as a repetition of the preceding *αν*, and construed with *παραιτεῖσθαι* and *δεῖσθαι*; and therefore the manuscript reading may be restored.

The second passage is from Plato, *Phaedo* 101 d:

εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, χαίρειν ἐώης ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὀρμηθέντα σκέψαιο . . .

Jackson, indeed, in a note to an article in *Journal of Philology*, vol. x, p. 148, proposed to bracket this sentence, for reasons which have nothing to do with the grammar; and Archer Hind, in his edition of the *Phaedo*, followed him. Unless we are to join them, the *αν* after *ἕως* looks at first sight very anomalous in Attic. Goodwin<sup>3</sup> says that it is a case of *αν* retained in indirect speech in a clause which would have had *αν* and the subjunctive in direct speech; but this cannot be so, since there is no indirect speech (actual or virtual) about the passage. Burnet, in his note on the passage, following Liddell and Scott,<sup>4</sup> says that, '*αν*—is added to the Optat. (not to *ἕως*) if the event is represented as conditional'. Presumably he means that *αν* . . . σκέψαιο is a potential optative. This is a possible construction in a temporal clause, but in the present instance it makes nonsense. It could only mean

'You would not answer until you would consider . . .';

<sup>1</sup> *Ib.*, § 222; Kühner and Gerth, *Griech. Gramm.*, Part II, p. 246.

<sup>2</sup> *Moods and Tenses*, § 428(b).

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, § 702.

<sup>4</sup> s.v. *ἕως*, I. 1. c; or, in the 9th edition, *ἕως*, A. I. 3.

but the meaning which we require is

'You would not answer until you had considered . . .'

If we were to translate:

'You would not answer until you might (or "could") consider . . .'

we should be merely obscuring the difficulty by using an ambiguity of the English language similar to that which we have already noticed in the verb-form with 'may'. Plato's point is that Cebes, who is addressed in this passage, would answer, not when he was able to consider, nor when it was possible that he might have considered, but only when he really had considered. But if, as I suggest, we can take the *ἄν* with *ἀποκρίναιο*, all difficulty disappears. Probably the force of the *ἄν* after *ἐφ' ἧς* continues over *ἀποκρίναιο*, but even so we merely have a case of the very common repetition of *ἄν* in an apodosis.<sup>1</sup> Goodwin<sup>2</sup> says that 'A participle representing a protasis is especially apt to have an emphatic *ἄν* near it'. Here, in exactly the same way, we have a repeated *ἄν* placed with a conditional temporal clause. This provides an exact parallel to the process which, in my opinion, gave rise to the use of *ἄν* in indefinite clauses which take the subjunctive.

The third example is from Demosthenes, *De Fals. Leg.* 29:

δεῖ δὲ . . . ἐκεῖν' ὁρᾶν, ὅτι ὄντων' ἄν ὑμεῖς εἰς ταύτην τὴν τάξιν κατεστήσατε καὶ τῶν συμβάντων καιρῶν ἐποιήσατε κύριον, οὗτος, εἴπερ ὡς οὗτος ἐβουλήθη μισθώσας αὐτὸν ἐξαπατᾶν ὑμᾶς καὶ φενακίζειν, τῶν ἴσων αἴτιος ἦν ἂν κακῶν ὅσων περ καὶ οὗτος.

This is the reading of the best manuscripts, and is adopted by the Oxford, Budé, and Teubner texts. The *ἄν* after *ὄντων'* is at first sight anomalous. Shilleto's translation in his note on the passage seems to take it with *κατεστήσατε*, making the latter a potential indicative; but this does not give the sense required. As I have pointed out above, we must not be misled by the ambiguity of the English 'Whomsoever you might have appointed'. But the *ἄν* makes perfect grammar and sense if construed with *ἦν* and regarded as an anticipation of the *ἄν* which follows *ἦν*. We have here, in fact, an example of the common idiom whereby, in a sentence containing a potential indicative or optative towards the end, an extra *ἄν* is inserted near the beginning to give warning of what is coming.<sup>3</sup>

These three examples, which have all come to my notice by accident during the last few years, are all taken from good Attic prose. Now the grammatical rules of Attic prose are more precise, and have been more carefully studied, than those of other forms of Greek; and so we can state more confidently that a usage is anomalous if it occurs in Attic prose than if it occurs elsewhere. These examples, as I have tried to show, are very anomalous unless my explanation is correct; in fact so anomalous that the editors have been driven to emend the Andocides passage, and to propose impossible interpretations for the others. Therefore they support my view that a Greek, when speaking and writing his own language, could very naturally insert into a subordinate clause an *ἄν* or *κε* which he intended to be taken with the verb of the main clause, particularly if the subordinate clause expressed a condition.

Having established this, we may consider some places in non-Attic Greek

<sup>1</sup> Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, § 223.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, § 224.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, § 223.

where the same thing seems to have happened. Firstly there is Theocritus 2. 124-6:

καί μ' εἰ μὲν κ' ἐδέχεσθε, τὰδ' ἥς φίλα (καὶ γὰρ ἐλαφρὸς  
καὶ καλὸς πάντεσσι μετ' αἰθέροισι καλεῦμαι)  
εὐδὸν τ' εἴ κε μόνον τὸ καλὸν στόμα τεῦς ἐφίλησα.

Here serious difficulty has been felt about *κε* in both the first and the last lines of the passage quoted. In the first line Meineke transposed μ' and κ', attributing the change to Ahrens; this change may perhaps be right, because, as Gow points out in accepting it, μ' ἐδέχεσθε is now supported by a papyrus. In the last line Wilamowitz altered εἴ κε μόνον to εἰ μῶνον; and Ahrens in the Teubner edition reads εὐδὸν κ', εἴτε μόνον. But I wish to say that it is possible to retain the manuscript reading in the first line, and that we certainly ought, with Gow, to retain it in the last line. For if we can take the first *κε* with ἥς, and the second with εὐδόν, all difficulty disappears in both protasis and apodosis. Gow, in his note on this passage, says that where the protasis is introduced by εἴ κε, the omission of *κε* in the apodosis is easier. I strongly agree with him, and am merely adding the reason, namely, that it is possible for an *αν* or *κε*, which is construed with a main verb, to be placed after the introductory word of a subordinate clause.

The notes of Cholmeley and Gow on this passage mention two other places in which the same phenomenon occurs. They are:

τοῦ δ' οὕτιν' ὑπέρτερον ἄλλον οἷω  
νόσφιν γ' Ἑρακλῆος ἐπελθέμεν, εἴ κ' ἔτι μούνον  
αὔθι μένων λυκάβαντα μετετράφη Αἰτωλοῖσιν. (Ap. Rhod. 1. 196-8)

εἰ δέ κε μὴ προπάρουθεν ἐμῆς ἤψασθε τραπέζης,  
ἦ τ' ἂν ἀπὸ γλώσσας τε ταμῶν καὶ χεῖρε κεάσσας  
ἀμφοτέρας, οἴοισιν ἐπιπροέηκα πόδεσσιν. (Ap. Rhod. 3. 377-9)

Mooney's note on the first of these Apollonius passages mentions two other places in which we find εἴ κε, and, in my view, the *κε* can best be taken with the verb of the apodosis. They are firstly an oracle quoted by Herodotus (1. 174):

Ἴσθμόν δέ μὴ πυργοῦτε μηδ' ὀρύσσετε.  
Ζεὺς γάρ κ' ἔθηκε νῆσον εἴ κ' ἐβούλετο.

Here Bekker would emend to εἴ γ'; secondly, a piece of Doric at Aristophanes, *Lys.* 1098-9:

ὦ πολυχαρεῖδα δεινὰ γ' αὖ πεπόνθαμες,  
αἱ κ' εἶδον ἀμέ τῶνδρες ἀναπεφλασμένως.

Here Enger altered the text to κ' αὖ πεπόνθαμες in the first line, and Ahrens to αἰ εἶδον in the second. Wilamowitz reads αἰκ εἶδον, with the manuscript reading γ' αὖ in the first line. This makes perfectly good grammar if αἰκ is used as the equivalent of *οτι*, as εἰ so often is after *θανμάζω*. But the joke has very much more point if we have an unfulfilled condition here; and my explanation shows how this is possible without altering the manuscript reading.

The most important example of this kind of arrangement is from Homer himself:

εἰ δέ κ' ἔτι προτέρω γένετο δρόμος ἀμφοτέροισι,  
τῷ κέν μιν παρέλασσ' οὐδ' ἀμφήριστον ἔθηκεν. (Ψ 526-7)

Here again the easiest way to take the  $\kappa'$  after  $\epsilon\iota\delta\acute{\epsilon}$  is as an anticipation of the  $\kappa\epsilon\upsilon$  with  $\pi\alpha\rho\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha\sigma\sigma'$  in the second line. It would be rash to say that no other view of the matter is possible, since the language of Homer is in a fluid state in which surprising things can happen. But if my explanation is not correct, we have here the only example in the whole of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* of  $\kappa\epsilon$  construed with an historic tense of the indicative in an unfulfilled protasis. It may be possible for such a thing to occur once and once only, but it is not likely.

There are also two places where we find  $\kappa\epsilon$  in a protasis containing a future indicative. They are:

$\alpha\iota' \kappa\epsilon\upsilon \acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\upsilon \acute{\epsilon}\mu\acute{\epsilon}\theta\epsilon\upsilon \kappa\alpha\iota \text{ Ἀθηναίης ἀγελείης, . . .}$   
 $'\text{Ιλίου αἰπεινῆς πεφιδήσεται, οὐδ' ἔθελήσει | ἐκπέρσαι, . . .}$   
 $\text{ἴστω τοῦθ' ὅτι νῶϊν ἀνῆκεστος χόλος ἔσται.} \quad (O\ 213-17)$   
 $\sigmaοὶ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \delta\acute{\eta}, \text{Μενέλαε, κατηφείη καὶ ὄνειδος}$   
 $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\sigma\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota, \epsilon\iota \kappa' \text{ Ἀχιλῆος ἀγανοῦ πιστὸν ἑταῖρον}$   
 $\tauείχει ὑπο \text{ Τρώων ταχέες κύνες ἐλκήσουσιν.} \quad (P\ 556-8)$

In both cases the verb of the apodosis is also future indicative; and on any theory of the meaning of  $\kappa\epsilon$ , the particle will make better sense in both these passages if taken with the verb of the apodosis ( $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\alpha\iota$  and  $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\sigma\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ ) than if construed with the verb of the protasis. Of the other passages which Monro<sup>1</sup> classifies with these,  $\sigma\ 524$  is an indirect question; and at  $B\ 258$  and  $E\ 212$  the verbs are probably not future indicative but aorist subjunctive. Chantraine<sup>2</sup> also sees  $\kappa\epsilon$  with the future indicative in a protasis at  $\epsilon\ 417$ ; but here, too, the verb is probably aorist subjunctive. My reason for saying that these verbs are probably subjunctive is that the certain examples of  $\acute{\alpha}\nu$  or  $\kappa\epsilon$  with the subjunctive in protasis are incomparably more numerous than the certain examples of  $\acute{\alpha}\nu$  or  $\kappa\epsilon$  with the future indicative. Therefore we should expect that, among the cases where the verb could be either subjunctive or future indicative, in a large majority of cases it is actually intended as subjunctive; that is to say, in any particular case there is a strong probability that the verb is subjunctive, strong enough to outweigh the evidence to the contrary provided by the rarity of the aorist forms concerned in the above three examples.

Another argument in favour of my view is based on two passages of Homer which have hitherto been rather puzzling. They are:

$\tau\acute{\omega} \delta\acute{\epsilon} \kappa\epsilon \nu\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}\sigma\alpha\upsilon\tau\iota \phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\eta \kappa\epsilon\kappa\lambda\acute{\eta}\sigma\eta \acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\iota\tau\iota\varsigma. \quad (I\ 138)$   
 $\tau\acute{\omega} \delta\acute{\epsilon} \kappa\epsilon \nu\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}\sigma\alpha\upsilon\tau\iota \gamma\upsilon\eta\eta \kappa\alpha\iota \kappa\tau\acute{\eta}\mu\alpha\theta' \acute{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\iota\tau\omicron. \quad (I\ 255)$

In these passages,  $\tau\acute{\omega} \kappa\epsilon \nu\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}\sigma\alpha\upsilon\tau\iota$  looks as if it ought to mean  $\acute{\omicron}\pi\acute{\omicron}\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma \kappa\epsilon \nu\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}\sigma\eta$ ,  $\tau\acute{\omicron}\upsilon\tau\omega$  . . .; that is to say,  $\kappa\epsilon$  is used with a participle, not, as usually, to make it potential, but in the way in which it is used with the subjunctive in an indefinite clause. But this use is so unparalleled and anomalous that most scholars (e.g. Monro in his note on  $I\ 138$ , and Stahl, *Synt. d. griech. Verbuns*, p. 252. 1) are at pains to point out that  $\kappa\epsilon$  must be construed with the main verb. But if I am right in thinking that the  $\kappa\epsilon$  of  $\acute{\omicron}\pi\acute{\omicron}\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma \kappa\epsilon \nu\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}\sigma\eta$  would in Homer's time be felt to go, not with  $\nu\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}\sigma\eta$ , but with the main verb, then all difficulty disappears; the  $\kappa\epsilon$  of  $\tau\acute{\omega} \kappa\epsilon \nu\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}\sigma\alpha\upsilon\tau\iota$  is exactly parallel to that of  $\acute{\omicron}\pi\acute{\omicron}\tau\epsilon\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma \kappa\epsilon \nu\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}\sigma\eta$ , but is now a normal use with a future indicative at  $I\ 138$  and with an optative at  $I\ 255$ , instead of an anomalous use with a participle.

<sup>1</sup> *Hom. Gram.*, § 326. 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Gram. Hom.*, tome ii, § 333.



Further, my view satisfactorily explains why *án* or *ke* in an indefinite clause clings so closely to the relative pronoun or other word introducing the clause. The fact that it does so cling has been generally recognized;<sup>1</sup> but as far as I know, no satisfactory explanation has hitherto been given how and why it came to attach itself so closely. But when once we see that these particles originally belonged to the main verb, and were merely placed with the indefinite clause in order to emphasize it, we realize how natural it is for them always to come as second word of the clause, just as *δή* and *γε* do when they emphasize whole clauses. Here, however, I must be careful not to overstate my case, because in Homer there is a strong tendency for *án* and *ke* to come second in principal as well as in subordinate clauses.<sup>2</sup> In fact my theory explains, not why these particles come as second word in indefinite clauses in Homer, but why they were kept in second position in these clauses in later Greek, when they had come to move about principal clauses more freely.

It would be unsound to oppose my argument by saying that, since in Homer *án* and *ke* normally come after the first word of the sentence, we cannot suppose that they would commonly be moved so far from their normal position as to be placed in a subordinate clause. We can easily suppose that they began to be put with indefinite clauses in cases where the indefinite clause comes first, like

ὅς δέ κε μῆρῖνθοιο τύχη, ὄρνιθος ἀμαρτῶν,  
ῆσσαν γὰρ δὴ κείνος, ὃ δ' οἴσεται ἡμιπέλεκκα. (Ψ 857-8)

The indefinite clause is really a part of the main sentence, of course, so here *ke* is in its normal position as second word in the sentence (disregarding the other enclitic *δέ*, with which it had to compete for second position). Then perhaps these particles developed a fondness for being placed with indefinite clauses, like their fondness for being placed with *οὐ*;<sup>3</sup> and so they came to be put with the indefinite clause wherever the latter came in the sentence.

When we were discussing Monro's view of *án* and *ke*, we saw that a satisfactory theory must explain how and why these particles came to be used in almost all Homer's indefinite clauses with the subjunctive referring to the future, but in less than half of those which refer to the present or past. I think my view of the matter will satisfy this requirement also. When *án* and *ke* are used in principal clauses in Homer, it is with the future indicative, the 'prospective' subjunctive, the potential optative, or an historic tense of the indicative.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, if the *án* or *ke* of an indefinite clause really belongs to the verb of the main clause, these particles must have first been used in indefinite clauses subordinate to main sentences containing one of the above four types of verb. Of these four types of verb, the historic indicative tenses with *án* or *ke*

<sup>1</sup> Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, § 218; Kühner and Gerth, *Griech. Gramm.*, Part II, p. 245.

<sup>2</sup> Often, of course, there are other particles which compete with *án* and *ke* for second position. Monro (*Hom. Gram.*, § 365) gives the rules on the subject.

<sup>3</sup> Monro, *Hom. Gram.*, § 365. 6.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, §§ 275-6, 300, 324, 326. 1; Stahl, *Synt. d. griech. Verbuns*, p. 251. 2 ff. The argument of Sloty (*Der Gebrauch des Konjunktivs*

*und Optativs in den griechischen Dialekten*, §§ 138-54 and 204-35) that the *voluntativ* subjunctive and optative can take *án* or *ke* is based on a false classification of usages; but in any case it does not affect my argument, because these uses of the subjunctive and optative also refer to the future. Sloty's mistake was pointed out by reviewers when his book was published, e.g. by Meltzer in *Beiblatt zu I-g. Forsch.* xxxv, p. 31.

never have indefinite clauses dependent on them in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Moreover, they are hardly ever used in Homer except with reference to the past;<sup>1</sup> therefore they could in any case only very rarely govern indefinite clauses with the subjunctive, since the latter hardly ever refer to the past.<sup>2</sup> Now of the three verb-forms which can both take *άν* or *κε* and govern indefinite clauses with the subjunctive, the future always,<sup>3</sup> the subjunctive almost always,<sup>4</sup> and the optative very often,<sup>5</sup> refer to the future. Moreover if the main verb is a potential optative, the indefinite clause depending on it tends to take the optative rather than the subjunctive;<sup>6</sup> and so it is hardly necessary here to consider optative main verbs, the one of our three categories which most often fails to refer to the future. Therefore I believe that *άν* and *κε* in indefinite clauses with the subjunctive were first used in sentences which referred to the future and had a future indicative, a 'prospective' subjunctive, or occasionally a potential optative, as their main verb; e.g.

ὁ δὲ κεν κεχολώσεται ὃν κεν ἴκωμαι. (A 139)

Then, once this use was thoroughly established, they would come to be used when the main verb was of a different type, an imperative for example, but the reference still to the future. This stage has already been reached in Homer, and we find many examples like:

τῶν ἄλλος μὲν ἀποφθίσθω, ἄλλος δὲ βιώτω,  
ὅς κε τύχη. (Θ 429-30)

Then, as we have seen, in the time of Homer the use of these particles was beginning to be extended to clauses denoting indefinite frequency over the present.

The situation is more complicated with clauses which take the optative, because we had to divide them into a greater number of categories. Of our categories, those which refer to the absolute future commonly depend on a main verb of some form which can have *άν* or *κε*; and therefore can have picked up the *άν* or *κε* in the indefinite clause by the same process which I have suggested for similar clauses with the subjunctive. Perhaps the analogy of the subjunctive clauses also helped. Consequently this category shows the greatest proportion of clauses with *άν* or *κε*. Where the reference is to an imaginary situation, the main verb is most often and most naturally a potential optative, as for example in:

ὅς τὸ καταβρόζειεν, ἔπει κρητῆρι μιγείη,  
οὗ κεν ἐφημέριός γε βάλοι κατὰ δάκρυ παρειῶν. (δ 222-3)

Consequently this class of clause shows a certain proportion of occurrences of *άν* and *κε*, but not as many as in references to the absolute future, because here analogy cannot come into play as much. Where the reference is to the relative future, the main verb is usually an historic tense of the indicative, a verb-form which cannot take *άν* or *κε* without decisively altering its meaning. A typical example is:

κεῖτο δ' ἄρ' ἐν μέσσοισι δύν χρυσοῖο τάλαντα,  
τῷ δόμεν ὅς μετὰ τοῖσι δίκην ἰθύντατα εἴποι. (Σ 507-8)

Consequently the proportion of such clauses with *άν* or *κε* is again small; and

<sup>1</sup> Monro, *Hom. Gram.*, § 324.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, § 298.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, § 326. 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, § 275-6.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, §§ 299(f)-300.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, § 301.

where one of these particles is used, it is because some analogy is felt between the relative and the absolute future. Where the reference is to an indefinitely large number of cases in the past, the main verb again is usually a tense of the indicative which cannot take *án* or *ke* without drastically altering its meaning, as for example in:

ἔρχεῖ δ' αἰεὶ  
Τρώας ἄμυνε νέων, ὅς τις φέροι ἀκάματον πῦρ. (O 730-1)

Therefore, since here the analogy to references to the future cannot be felt so clearly, we find in this category our lowest proportion of occurrences of *án* and *ke*. The only point which I have not explained is the greater frequency of *án* and *ke* in references to a single case than in references to an indefinite number of cases in the relative and absolute future. I have no explanation of this to offer to replace Monro's. But since my view explains other facts which Monro leaves unexplained, and is parallel to the view which is suggested by examination of the subjunctive clauses, it is still the more likely to be correct.

My view also enables us to see a hitherto unsuspected parallel between certain regular Attic usages, some of which indeed are already prevalent practice in Homer. To take examples, we find at E 224-5:

τὼ καὶ νῶϊ πόλινδε σώσσετον, εἴ περ ἂν αὐτε  
Ζεὺς ἐπὶ Τυδεΐδῃ Διομήδεϊ κῶδος ὀρέξῃ.

and at Ω 366-7:

τῶν εἴ τις σε ἴδοιτο θοὴν διὰ νύκτα μέλαιναν  
τοσσάδ' ὀνείατ' ἄγοντα, τίς ἂν δῆ τοι νόος εἴῃ;

These are two conditional sentences referring to the future, the former vivid, the latter remote; and in accordance with the rules which became normal in Attic, the former takes *án* in the protasis only, and the latter in the apodosis only. Now it could be just by chance, and for quite independent reasons, that in each of them *án* is used once and once only; but this fact is more likely to be due to some parallelism between the two examples; and my view of the matter shows how it is possible to regard them as parallel. In the first case the *án* was originally felt to go with *σώσσετον*, and so is parallel to the *án* going with *εἴῃ* in the second case. The apparent difference has only arisen because in the first type of case the Greeks acquired the habit of placing the *án* with the subordinate clause, but in the second type of case they preferred to keep it in the main sentence.

A similar parallelism may be observed in clauses which denote indefinite frequency in the past and present. We have seen that in Homer the practice of inserting *án* or *ke* in indefinite clauses with the subjunctive referring to the present has begun, though it is not yet the commonest construction (as it later became in Attic). So we find examples like:

ἀτὰρ ἦν ποτε δασμὸς ἱκηται,  
σοὶ τὸ γέρας πολὺ μείζον, ἐγὼ δ' ὀλίγον τε φίλον τε  
ἔρχομαι ἔχων ἐπὶ νῆας, ἐπεὶ κε κάμω πολεμίζων. (A 166-8)

This construction, which is only just beginning in Homer, seems parallel to another which is entirely post-Homeric. A good example of it is:

εἰ μὲν τινες ἰδοιέν πῃ τοὺς σφετέρους ἐπικρατοῦντας, ἀνεθάρσυσάν τε ἂν  
καὶ . . . (Thuc. 7. 71)

Here, where the reference is to the past, the *άν*, which in the preceding example was placed in the subordinate clause, is now with the main verb; and the parallelism between these two examples is very similar to that which we have seen between the two kinds of conditional sentence referring to the future. It would, of course, be foolish to pretend that all Attic indefinite clauses can be arranged in a system of parallels like this; but the fact that some of them can be so arranged tends to give a little additional support to my view.

It is, however, necessary to look for a reason why the Athenians should have come to place the *άν* in the indefinite clause when the latter contains a subjunctive, but not when it contains an optative. This is, of course, connected with another question, namely, why has the use of *άν* with the future indicative in main clauses almost died out in Attic, but the use of *άν* with the potential optative become an almost invariable rule? The two questions are connected because an indefinite clause dependent on a future indicative usually takes the subjunctive, and one dependent on a potential optative usually takes the optative; and in fact in my view the use of *άν* with the future indicative has not almost died out in Attic but survives in the *άν* of indefinite clauses. The answer to our problem is that *άν* made a greater difference to the meaning of an optative and an historic indicative tense than to a subjunctive or a future indicative; and of these four verb-forms, the optative and the historic indicative tenses are most naturally accompanied by an optative in an indefinite clause, but the subjunctive and the future indicative are most naturally accompanied by a subjunctive. Therefore, in the cases where the indefinite clause takes an optative, there is greater need to keep the *άν* in the main clause, to make the difference in the meaning of the main verb quite clear.

But perhaps my statement that *άν* (and *κε*) made comparatively little difference to the meaning of a subjunctive or a future indicative requires further justification. If so, we may look at the following examples:

τοὺς δέ κ' ἔπειτα  
Παλλὰς Ἀθηναίη θέλξει καὶ μητίετα Ζεύς. (π 297-8)  
οὐκέτ' ἔπειτ' ἔσται θάνατον καὶ κῆρας ἀλύξαι. (Φ 565)

Here we have two main clauses containing the future indicative, one with and the other without *κε*, and with no perceptible difference in meaning caused by the presence or absence of this particle; both are dependent on a condition implied by the word *ἔπειτα*. There are similar examples with the subjunctive at *H* 87 and *Θ* 354. There are, indeed, some cases where the optative is used in a general potential sense indiscriminately with and without *κε*, as we see if we compare *Ξ* 245 with *γ* 231. But even in Homer the optative without *άν* or *κε* is never used in the apodosis of a condition which is *known* to be unfulfilled; here it must be accompanied by one of these particles, as in:

εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ δῶρα φέροι, τὰ δ' ὅπισθ' ὀνομάζοι | Ἀτρεΐδης, . . .  
οὐκ ἂν ἔγνωγέ σε μῆνιν ἀπορρίψαντα κελοίμην | Ἀργείοισιν ἀμυνέμεναι. (*I* 515-18)

It seems, then, that the Greeks felt that *άν* or *κε* made an essential difference to the meaning of the verb in cases such as this; and it needs no argument from me to show that these particles make a most important difference to the meaning of the historic tenses of the indicative. But if the Greeks had come to put *άν* regularly in indefinite clauses with the optative, this would, if my views are correct, in most cases have originally involved taking away the *άν* from

an optative or historic indicative main verb; and so it is easy to see that on the whole the Greeks would prefer to keep the particle in the main clause in order to make the meaning clear, instead of putting it in the optative indefinite clause. So in Homer the use of *āν* and *κε* has not advanced as far in indefinite clauses with the optative as in those with the subjunctive, and in normal Attic it is very rare indeed.<sup>1</sup>

Perhaps I can best conclude by summarizing the development which I believe took place, since hitherto I have mentioned it piecemeal, as the evidence for each part of it turned up. *āν* and *κε* were originally used in main clauses with the future indicative, the 'prospective' subjunctive, or the potential optative, and in Homer their use is being extended to the historic tenses of the indicative. Their function was probably to mark the sentence as conditional, and they showed a strong tendency to come as second word in the sentence. They could be used in the same way in subordinate clauses. When the condition was expressed by an indefinite relative, temporal, or conditional clause with the subjunctive, depending on a subjunctive or future indicative main verb, if the subordinate clause came first, the *āν* or *κε* would naturally be placed after the introductory word of the subordinate clause. It then developed a fondness for this position, like its fondness for coming after *οὐ*, and so came to be placed in the subordinate clause even when this did not begin the sentence; and moreover came to be used in the subordinate clause when the main verb was not a subjunctive or future indicative, but some other form which can refer to the future. In Homer its use is being extended to indefinite clauses with the subjunctive referring to the present, and in classical Attic this process of extension is complete. And although in Attic, where *āν* is used in a main clause, it has lost its tendency to come as second word, it has retained this tendency in indefinite clauses, because it was once felt as construed with the main verb. It was perhaps at one time placed with the indefinite clause in order to emphasize it, and so it took the position which *δὴ* and *γε* occupy when they emphasize a whole clause. Meanwhile, in the time of Homer, some classes of indefinite clause with the optative were beginning to pick up the use of *āν* and *κε*, partly under the influence of the corresponding clauses with the subjunctive, and partly by repeating inside themselves an *āν* or *κε* which belonged to the main verbs on which they depended. But this process was not carried very far, because such clauses usually depended on an optative main verb, which needed to keep its *āν* or *κε* near itself in order to make its precise meaning clear; and so, by the time of classical Attic, *āν* had almost entirely died out in indefinite clauses with the optative but was regularly used with the potential optative in main sentences.<sup>2</sup>

*University College of the Gold Coast*

R. H. HOWORTH

<sup>1</sup> The same explanation also tells us why *āν* is almost always retained in the apodosis instead of being placed with an unfulfilled conditional protasis with an historic indicative verb. I have already mentioned Homer's only exception to this rule at *Ψ* 526, where

the *κε* of the apodosis is anticipated in the protasis.

<sup>2</sup> Last but not least, I must thank Professor Jopson for his helpful criticisms in the preparation of this article.

## THE COSTUME OF THE ACTORS IN ARISTOPHANIC COMEDY

PROFESSOR BEARE has attacked the position established by Alfred Körte in 1893 and accepted in large measure by Sir Arthur Pickard-Cambridge in *Dithyramb*, etc., and *Festivals*. The following reply is brief because I have dealt with the works of art at some length in *Rylands Bulletin*, xxxvi (1954), 563 f. and in a forthcoming number of *Ephemeris Archaïologike*.

1. The statement of Aristotle (*Poet.*, ch. 4). I have tried to show that various elements in the 'phallic performances' were taken over by comedy and that we have some evidence that the leaders of padded dancers wore the phallos.

2. *Clouds* 537 f. Professor Beare translates 'she (our play) has no dangling leather symbol stitched to her garments'. It means 'has not had a *dangling* etc. leather object stitched on to the tights of the actors'. No one wore the phallos on their garments, because it represented part of the body: male characters wore it on their tights, which represented their skin (and can be detected on vases and terracottas because they wrinkle). Male characters must always wear the phallos on their tights or they would not be male; if the character is either naked or wearing short clothes, it is visible; if it is tied up, it is inoffensive; if it 'dangles etc.', it is meant to be offensive. Aristophanes means that the male characters in the *Clouds* were not meant to be offensive.

3. A third variant was seen towards the end of the *Lysistrata*, as the commentator on *Clouds* 542 says. He and the different commentator on 537 may only be drawing sensible conclusions from the text, but if the costume lasted, as I think, into the last quarter of the fourth century, Alexandrian scholarship knew all about it: the memory of the mask called after the fifth-century actor Hermon survived.

4. Padding. Works of art show considerable variation. If it was traditional, it could be exaggerated when needed and mentioned when amusing. I had always supposed that *Ecll.* 539 was strong evidence of padding.

5. Works of art. I need not restate my arguments for the connexions between the *phlyakes*-vases of Magna Graecia and Attic comedy; I must, however, point out (a) that since the publication of A. D. Trendall's *Paestan Pottery* in 1936 there is no excuse for writing as if any of them were painted in the third century, (b) that where the vase shows a stage the artist must at least have started with a memory of a stage scene, (c) that as the artist is not a photographer he naturally gives momentary expressions to his masks (and even on occasion to statues). Much more important is the increase in Attic evidence since Körte wrote. I now count seven Attic vases<sup>1</sup> dating from about 420 to not later than 380 and 154 different types of Attic terracottas dating from about 400 to not later than 325. They were immensely popular and were exported and copied all over the Greek world. It is difficult to find any other performance which they can illustrate, and if they illustrate Old and Middle Comedy, they take their natural place as predecessors of the flood of New Comedy illustrations. Moreover, masks which can be paralleled on vases and terracottas appear on two marble fourth-century reliefs unknown to Körte; one is the grave-relief of a comic poet (first published in 1903) and the other (first

<sup>1</sup> Add now the very interesting polychrome in a forthcoming *Hesperia*.  
oinochoi to be published by M. L. Crosby



published in 1941) a decree honouring the producers of a comedy in the Attic deme Aixone (*Festivals*, figs. 89 and 18).

If Körte's position is right, there is no difficulty in *Eccl.* or *Thesm.* Praxagora and her friends are female characters; they put on men's clothes, but they cannot put on parts of the male body; they look like the man in the big cloak on the left of the Leningrad oenochoe (Bieber, *H.T.*, fig. 121; Pickard-Cambridge, *Festivals*, fig. 80). In the *Thesmophoriazusae* Mnesilochos is a male character. When he is stripped, he appears in tights and phallos; when he puts on women's clothes, they conceal his phallos.

The texts which use the deictic pronoun or otherwise imply visibility (Professor Beare's Nos. 2-4, 6-10, 12-14) can only be explained on Körte's assumption. Greek comic actors were respectable people (e.g. Satyros) and could not display their bodies in public or behave like Theophrastos' *agroikos* and *bdelyros*. I see no reason to deny them the tights which secured them the *verecundia* of Cicero's actors (*de Off.* 1. 129). But the male characters, besides distorted masks, often wore short clothes, which showed the phallos sewn to the tights, and so Aristotle called them 'men worse than ourselves'. Aristophanes, however, exploited the contrast between their appearance and their sentiments: τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον οἷδε καὶ τρυγωδία.

University College, London.

T. B. L. WEBSTER

## PLUTARCH AND ALEXANDER<sup>1</sup>

MODERN scholars have been concerned with the hostility shown to Alexander by the Hellenistic schools of philosophy. Two literary portraits have been distinguished, the Peripatetic and the Stoic, the former deriving from Theophrastus' book on Callisthenes, or *περὶ πένθους*; starting with this work the Peripatetics worked out a theory of *τύχη* and applied it to Alexander, in order to belittle his achievements. It was a case of giving sophisticated expression to the kind of crude resentment expressed by Demades.<sup>2</sup> The Peripatetic view is referred to by Cicero,<sup>3</sup> when he mentions Theophrastus' account of the matter. According to this view Callisthenes met with a man exercising supreme power, who did not know how to make proper use of prosperity. More precisely, a change in Alexander's character was dated to the capture of Persepolis. Aristotle had done his best for Alexander, who, however, was ruined by 'tyche'. In this way education was vindicated and the pupil blamed.

The second portrait of Alexander came from the Stoics, who did not give Alexander the benefit of the doubt up to the time of Persepolis. Their demands on the educator were rigorous and they blamed Leonidas for not ridding Alexander of his *τύφος*. Consequently Alexander became the symbol of the *ἀνὴρ πετυφωμένος*, at all periods of his life. This view appears to date from Diogenes of Babylon, according to Stroux's argument based on two passages in Quintilian and Clement.<sup>4</sup>

In the history of the philosophers and Alexander no one appears to play a more ambiguous part than Plutarch.<sup>5</sup> For this reason the following paper is devoted to an analysis of Plutarch's works on Alexander, the speeches *de Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute* and the *Vita Alexandri*.<sup>6</sup> As the case needs some exposition the conclusions of the argument are summarized here. The speeches, taken in connexion with the *de fortuna Romanorum*, are a Plutarchan essay on a theme suggested, perhaps, by Livy's discussion of Rome and Alexander in his ninth book. It is evident from Livy<sup>7</sup> (9. 17) that some Greek writers dismissed the Roman achievement as mere luck (*fortuna*). Plutarch, however, requires both virtue and fortune as the essential ingredients of historical world unity (*de fort. Rom.* 316f). These conditions were satisfied in the case of Rome, but not with Alexander. In other words, the apologetic tone of the speeches must be taken with the *de fortuna Romanorum*, in order to understand the theme of 'virtue and fortune'. The speeches also present us with an Alexander who is far superior to the philosophers of the past, in opposition to those who had made Alexander an example of everything a philosopher is not.

<sup>1</sup> I wish to thank Professor J. M. R. Cormack, Professor F. W. Walbank, and Mr. G. T. Griffith for helpful suggestions and comment.

<sup>2</sup> Demetrius, *De Elocutione* 282: οὐ τέθνηκεν Ἀλέξανδρος, ἀ ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· ὥζε γὰρ αὐτὴ οἰκουμένη τοῦ νεκροῦ.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero, *Tusc.* 3. 21, 5. 25; *Ad Att.* 13. 28. 3.

<sup>4</sup> Stroux, *Philologus*, lxxxviii, 1933, pp. 223 f. The passages are Quintilian, *Inst. Or.*

1. 1. 19 and Clement, *Paed.* 17.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Tarn, vol. ii, p. 296: 'any one sentence [sc. of the Life] may need an essay to elucidate it'.

<sup>6</sup> Henceforth referred to as the speeches and the Life.

<sup>7</sup> Treves (see below, p. 100, n. 3) stresses the speech of Appius Claudius, *Vita Pyrrhi*, 19. 2-3, in his account of Plutarch's attitude to the Livian *excursus* and the Alexander legend.

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The *Life*, on the other hand, depicts Alexander as an *ἀνὴρ θυμοειδής*, in both senses of the word: in a good sense, in so far as Alexander is ambitious (*φιλότιμος*), in a bad sense, when he acts angrily (*διὰ θυμόν*). In earlier criticisms only the bad ideas connected with *θυμός* had appeared. However these stories started, they were developed by the Stoics into the theme of the *homo iracundus*. Before the *Life* Alexander was both *felix* and *temerarius*; in the *Life* he is still *felix*, is only partly *temerarius*—above all he is *θυμοειδής*. This study is not so much concerned with Plutarch's value for the historian of Alexander as with Alexander's meaning for Plutarch.

To start with an analysis of the speeches. In both the approach is clear, though the detail is riddled with ambiguity and contradiction. In both speeches Alexander appears as a type of the philosopher in action, no school-protected thinker but a thinking soldier; he would have been a Diogenes if he had not been taming the barbarians and spreading peace and justice over every race. This central theme is enough to show the fairness of Walbank's remark,<sup>1</sup> that the speeches are rhetorical and artificial. This particular idea depends on a heavy-handed antithesis between *ἔργον* and *λόγος*.

Plutarch complains that some people think philosophy *λόγος* and not *ἔργον* (328 a).<sup>2</sup> The word *λόγος* is taken in the very limited sense of a written work, such as a treatise on syllogisms. All one expects is that Plutarch should remind these people of the other meanings of *λόγος*; for instance, live argument. The view he describes is a view of philosophy as books, not as discussion. But Plutarch accepts this view as a basis for his argument. Socrates wrote nothing but is rightly considered a philosopher; he is judged by what he said, how he lived, and what he thought. Apply the same treatment to Alexander and he will appear as philosopher.

The argument is factitious. It ignores the fact that Socrates not only practised moral virtue but also discussed the theory of virtue. All that is shown by the citations of Alexander's *obiter facta dictaque* is that Alexander practised certain moral virtues. It is fair to ask of a philosopher that he should practise virtue as well as discuss it; it is another matter to say of a practical man that, because he is virtuous, he is a philosopher. For this reason *εἰκότως ἂν φιλοσοφώτατος νομίζοιτο* is a paradox of the most artificial kind.

Apart from the distinction between *λόγος* and *ἔργον*, the speeches are based on the more relevant antithesis *ἀρετή-τύχη*. From this point of view Plutarch seems to be campaigning against the usual Peripatetic idea of Alexander. Fortune rules over everything and promotes Alexander in particular; hence he has no credit for his exploits, while the Peripatetics had the pleasure of inventing the reason for this.

In the course of his argument against the adherents of 'tyche', Plutarch contradicts himself. He says, in the course of an address to 'tyche': *Δαρείος ἦν σὸν ἔργον ὃν ἐκ δούλου καὶ ἀσπίνδου βασιλέως κύριον Περσῶν ἐποίησας* (326 f). A similar remark is made of Sardanapalus, that he rose from the position of wool-dresser to that of king. By itself this could stand as a somewhat casuistic apologia for Alexander's *ἀρετή*, since he was at least King of Macedonia and leader of the Greeks before he conquered Darius. But such is Plutarch's inconsistency that he contradicts this later on, for the sake of greater effect. At 329 d he quotes Demaratus of Corinth as saying: 'All the Greeks who had already died

<sup>1</sup> *O.C.D.*, art. 'Plutarch', 14.

<sup>2</sup> The relation between *λόγος* and *ἔργον* is

a favourite with Plutarch. Cf. *de Stoicorum repugnantibus* 1033 b.

were deprived of great joy because they did not see Alexander sitting on the throne of Darius.' On this Plutarch declares that it was merely the work of 'tyche'; he himself would rather have seen the *καλὴ καὶ ἱερὰ νυμφαγωγία* (329 e), when Alexander married a Persian bride and married off other Macedonians in the same way.

Contradictions like these make it difficult to see what precisely is meant by 'tyche'. In the above example (326 f) 'tyche' is the power that controls everything by the simple device of elevating the low and then abasing them. In another passage, at 327 d, 'tyche' appears to be synonymous with *τὰ ἔκτος ἀγαθά*, that which constitutes the means for the full and active exercise of the virtues of the great-souled man. As evidence for this Plutarch describes the inadequate resources with which Alexander crossed into Persia. The *viaticum* supplied by 'tyche' was a mere 70 talents or food for 30 days (327 e). It is argued that if 'tyche', in this sense, were responsible for the success of the expedition, it would have been more generous with supplies. This is a different aspect of 'tyche' from that which exalts and destroys. Sometimes, too, Plutarch works with the concept of a personal 'tyche', like the *δαίμων* who presides over each individual life. This appears to lead on to a more striking idea, the 'tyche' of an age or period.<sup>1</sup> In general, the most common form of the argument in favour of Alexander's *ἀρετή* is not that there is no such thing as 'tyche', that 'tyche' is nonsense; but that 'tyche' was always opposed to Alexander. All his wounds are ascribed to the maleficence of fortune (327 a, b, 344 c). That Alexander struggles to subdue 'tyche' is a form of argument which reappears as a suggestion in the *Life*<sup>2</sup> and most emphatically in the words of Curtius—'fortunae quam solus omnium mortalium in potestate habuit' (Curtius 10. 5. 35).

The interest of the speeches lies in the application of the *τύχη-ἀρετή* antithesis to a large number of anecdotes. Formally, this can always be presented in the following way. Alexander spoke or acted in a certain manner: to speak or act so, typifies virtue and not fortune; therefore Alexander is a type of virtue, and not of fortune.<sup>3</sup> This formal presentation can be deduced from the *Life* also, though there it is usually a case of demonstrating Alexander's virtue, rarely of denying his fortune.

The flaws and distortions in these speeches are obvious. But if we make allowances for the rhetoric of a school thesis, we are left with two portraits; though both are favourable to Alexander, they have to be distinguished from one another. The first portrait arises from the orator's approach to his theme through *λόγος-ἔργον*. It is the 'philosopher in action', based on the antithesis between *λόγος* and *ἔργον*. With this end in view Alexander is made superior to all the great philosophers of the past (328 d, e). Socrates tried to introduce new gods and was put to death by the Athenians; but Alexander introduced Greek gods to the whole of Asia. Many famous philosophers failed to convert their pupils, even though they knew Greek; but Alexander had no difficulty in civilizing the Greekless peoples of the East. Plato, who wrote only one *πολιτεία*, could persuade no one to use it; but Alexander founded more than seventy *πόλεις* among the barbarians. These examples show how Alexander's deeds are built up to outdo the arguments of the philosophers.

The second portrait, though also eulogistic, is based on the application of the

<sup>1</sup> 337 a.

<sup>2</sup> *Life* 26. 7.

<sup>3</sup> The technique of earlier biography; see below, p. 107.

question—fortune or virtue—to anecdote, and does not raise any uneasy paradox. Alexander is commended for choosing Persian dress rather than Median;<sup>1</sup> the Persian dress was *εὐτελεστέρα* and thereby Alexander chose *μεμυγμένην τινα στολήν*. There are examples of generosity in Alexander. From time to time there is a whole summary of his virtues. Such a précis occurs at 337 b where the orator asks ‘tyche’—‘without Alexander, what would you be?’—*ἂν σοῦ τις ἀφέλῃ τῶν ὅπλων τὴν ἐμπειρίαν, τοῦ πλοῦτου τὴν φιλοτιμίαν, τῆς πολυτελείας τὴν ἐγκράτειαν, ὧν ἀγωνίζῃ τὸ θάρσος, ἐν οἷς κρατεῖς τὴν πραότητα...* All these virtues have anecdotal backing in the text.

By these two methods Plutarch urges upon us his view of Alexander as virtuous man *par excellence*. What was the purpose of the work? Here opinions differ widely. Eicke<sup>2</sup> thinks the speeches a product of the new régime under Trajan; a rosy present is inclined to give colour to the past. Besides, Trajan liked to think himself an Alexander. But there is not much in the text to justify this view. Eicke suggests that Plutarch is dropping a hint to Trajan, when he praises Alexander for his restraint (343 a). The idea is that Trajan *paululum amori deditus erat* and would presumably model himself on Alexander in this matter as in others. The suggestion is too esoteric to be credible. Others, as Hoffmann,<sup>3</sup> have seen in the speeches no more than a rhetorical *tour de force*; but it would be wrong to suppose that, because we recognize a convention which we tend to despise, the work is valueless for that reason. Tarn,<sup>4</sup> perhaps, went to the other extreme and saw in the speeches a serious defence of Alexander, which was recanted by the author when he came to write the *Life*. The following explanation suggests a way between these extremes.

It was suggested above that the speeches are developed from two antitheses; *λόγος-ἔργον* and *τύχη-ἀρετή*. The results of both have much in common—they appear to prove too much. Alexander is not only *φιλοσοφώτατος*, he is also superior to the philosophers; he is not only virtuous but positively haunted by bad luck. This excess is partly due to the rules of rhetoric. You need not rest content with refuting the case of your adversary. It is possible to prove exactly the opposite.<sup>5</sup>

The *λόγος-ἔργον* theme is directed against earlier philosophical treatment of Alexander as a type of man. The Peripatetics and Stoics especially had portrayed Alexander as morally inadequate (see below, pp. 103–104); it was therefore necessary to make him more than a philosopher.

The meaning of the other antithesis can be seen if we consider the *de fortuna Romanorum*;<sup>6</sup> the significance of ‘tyche’ hampering<sup>7</sup> Alexander becomes apparent. In that work Plutarch discusses whether virtue or fortune played the larger part in the success of Rome. Although Rome is both virtuous and

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the *Life* 45. 2. For an earlier, similar view see Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* 1. 3. 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Veterum philosophorum qualia fuerint de Alexandro Magno iudicia*, 1909, pp. 53 f. He mentions *de fort. Rom.* 326 a, but does not see its purport.

<sup>3</sup> ‘Das literarische Porträt von A. d. G. im gr. und r. Alt.’, p. 93: ‘Plutarch hat eine Paradoxie in durchaus rhetorischer Weise zu rein epideiktischen Zwecken durchzuführen versucht.’

<sup>4</sup> Vol. II, App. 16 *passim*.

<sup>5</sup> Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1355<sup>a</sup>35: τῶν μὲν οὖν

ἄλλων τεχνῶν οὐδεμία τάναντία συλλογίζεται, ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ μόναι τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν· ὁμοίως γὰρ εἰσιν ἀμφοτέραι τῶν ἐναντίων.

<sup>6</sup> Lassel, *de fortunae notione Plutarchi*, p. 57, says: ‘postrema declamationis pars mutila... deest prae ceteris virtutis oratio’. But this is unnecessary.

<sup>7</sup> Lassel, *ibid.*, p. 63 distinguishes the fortune of the speeches from that of ‘*de Romanorum fortuna*’. World-rule provides a link, e.g. 317 c and 327 d.

fortunate, her good fortune plays a greater part than virtue. As the last instance of good fortune the death of Alexander is mentioned (326 a); had he not died, he would have invaded Italy. From a comparison of these works it is clear that Rome was fortunate in not having to put up with Alexander's invasion; and that, consequently, Alexander was correspondingly unfortunate all the time and particularly in his death. In a sense the speeches have developed from the well-beaten rhetorical *τόπος*,<sup>1</sup> whether Rome would have beaten Alexander. Livy<sup>2</sup> had asserted, in his strong, patriotic manner, that Rome would have conquered, that Alexander was corrupted by power and untested by adversity. Plutarch, in rehabilitating Alexander, is perhaps not taking sides on this question, but is viewing the whole of history as a trend towards world unity. Unity was accomplished by Rome, but—this seems to be the implication—was also the object of Greek history and of Alexander's campaigns. If Alexander, unlike the Romans, had not been hampered by 'tyche', he might have established unity and world-empire. Plutarch admits to having read Livy.<sup>3</sup> The advantage of this view is that it helps to explain why 'tyche' hampers Alexander; if it had merely been a case of proving Alexander's virtue, all Plutarch needed was to say *εἰ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ, οὐκ ἔστι τύχη*.<sup>4</sup> But he says there are both, and concludes that the 'tyche' which favoured Rome did not shine on Alexander<sup>5</sup> (317 f). The over-emphasis on Alexander's bad fortune was introduced to contrast Alexander with the Romans.

After the speeches, the *Life* is simpler to follow, in that there is much less verbal display. But although there are many contradictions scattered among the speeches, they combine to give a single impression. Rhetorical theme and anecdote unite. The position taken in the *Life* appears to be in contrast; it is clear from the start that there are two Alexanders, one of whom is the opposite of the other.<sup>6</sup> Before, we had an Alexander who could do no evil; now Alexander does a great deal of good but also some evil. This inconsistency is explained below, as well as the rather reluctant unity which appears to be common to both the good and the evil.

The portrait of Alexander 'the good' is built up in much the same way as before. A few instances will be adequate. At 12. 1 Alexander is praised for his treatment of the unfortunate Timocleia, *γυναικὸς ἐνδόξου καὶ σώφρονος*. He is generous towards noble prisoners, whether their nobility consists in character or in birth.<sup>7</sup> His *σωφροσύνη* is stressed as in the well-known passage at 21. 7, where he is said to have thought *τοῦ νικᾶν τοὺς πολεμίους τὸ κρατεῖν ἑαυτοῦ βασιλικώτερον*. And similarly his method of waging war is described as usually *νομίμως καὶ βασιλικῶς* (59. 4). As well as *σωφροσύνη* there are instances of *μεγαλοψυχία* (refusing to see Paris' lyre: 15. 5) and of *pietas* (concern for his tutor Lysimachus: 24. 6).

On the other hand, as opposed to the speeches, Plutarch has now included material which cannot but show Alexander in an unfavourable light.

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps *Auct. ad Herennium* 4. 22. 31 is an excerpt from a theme of this type.

<sup>2</sup> Livy 9. 17.

<sup>3</sup> *de fort. Rom.* 326 a. The relation of the speeches to the Livian *excursus* is also dealt with by Treves, *Il Mito di Alessandro e la Roma d'Augusto*, esp. pp. 99, 100.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Johannes Lydus, *de Mensibus* 4. 62; and for the converse, 343 c.

<sup>5</sup> Hoffmann (p. 90) thought 'dass eine Rede der "τύχη" vorausging, in der sie sich den Ruhm Alexanders zuschrieb'. The only evidence is the opening—*οὗτος ὁ τῆς τύχης λόγος*—but this is simply a dramatic way of stating the view against which Plutarch is to argue.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Tarn, vol. ii, App. 16.

<sup>7</sup> See his treatment of Darius' womenfolk, 21.

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The instances which Plutarch cites are not always authentic,<sup>1</sup> but it is enough that some are; for Plutarch they made the others credible and demanded an explanation of some kind. After the account of Persepolis and the fire there (38), we are told that Alexander was worried by the behaviour of his men after victory (40 f.); they were making the most of luxury. Then there is an apparent digression in which Alexander is described as an impartial judge. 'But afterwards the number of accusations which he heard rendered him harsh and led him to believe the false because so many were true. Particularly when he was maligned he lost discretion and was cruel and inexorable, since he loved his reputation more than his kingdom.'<sup>2</sup> Here, at least, is an Alexander capable of weakness, though Plutarch is struggling to give him the benefit of the doubt when possible. In the Philotas affair, for instance, one glimpses the influence exercised by the enemies of Philotas. In fact other individuals are often blamed for the change which occurred in Alexander's character.<sup>3</sup> But the change, or deterioration, made itself felt. When Alexander was going to cross into India he gave orders for most of the baggage to be burned. Although many did this willingly, Plutarch adds ἡδὲ καὶ φοβερὸς ἦν καὶ ἀπαραίτητος κολαστὴς τῶν πλημμελούντων (57. 2). As well as massacring some Indian mercenaries, which is called a stain on his reputation,<sup>4</sup> Alexander acted badly when forced to turn back by the army—ὕπὸ δυσθυμίας καὶ ὀργῆς ἔκειτο (62. 3). He is said to have left many vainglorious monuments behind him—πολλὰ πρὸς δόξαν ἀπατηλὰ καὶ σοφιστικὰ μηχανώμενος (ibid. 6).

Some of this appears to be harmless enough. It is refreshing to meet this figure of flesh and blood after the ethical model extolled in the speeches. But we have to remember that characters in Plutarch are judged by the highest standard, and enough has been said to show that Plutarch is deeply shocked by some things. The events which most perplexed him were the destruction of Thebes and the murder of Cleitus. The latter has disturbed everyone, whether he admires Alexander or not. The former is perhaps a case of Plutarch's sympathy for Thebes; the account he gives (11) makes Alexander far more responsible than the versions of Diodorus 17 and Arrian 1. 7. The use of the word *καλλωπισαμένου* suggests that Alexander tried to escape from his responsibility by making the allies technically responsible.

There is a divergence between these two portraits of Alexander. Leaving the good for the time being, consider the bad portrait. Sometimes it is suggested that Plutarch has returned to the view which he controverted in the speeches; that 'tyche' has been reinstated as *arbiter Alexandri*.<sup>5</sup> Perhaps it is a point in favour of this view that any deterioration in character is mentioned as first occurring after Persepolis and as reappearing on subsequent occasions. The passages where 'tyche' is cited are worth quoting. Of Issus<sup>6</sup> Plutarch says that 'tyche' gave Alexander the advantage of the terrain; but, given that advantage, he was the better general. Here the *ἀρετή* of the general is above 'tyche'. The murder of Cleitus is attributed partly to *δυστυχία*; but this would hardly

<sup>1</sup> e.g. Bagoas. See Tarn, vol. ii, App. 18.

<sup>2</sup> 42. 2-4 . . . διαβολαὶ διὰ τῶν ἀληθῶν πάροδον ἐπὶ τὰ ψευδῆ λαβοῦσαι. This can hardly mean 'slanders which took up what he really meant and turned it into something he did not mean . . .' They are slanders by other people (about others), which Alex-

ander was trying to judge.

<sup>3</sup> Anaxarchus, for instance. 52. 4.

<sup>4</sup> 59. 4.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Tarn, vol. ii, pp. 298-9: 'but more important is Fortune'. Though Tarn recognizes that Fortune is not applied in any consistent way.

<sup>6</sup> 20. 4.

serve as an argument that 'tyche' spoiled Alexander. This is a case of 'tyche' working against Alexander, rather like the 'tyche' which hampers him so often in the speeches. 'Tyche' assists Alexander at the incident of the Malli town (63. 2). But the decisive passage on the other side is at 17. 3; here Plutarch goes out of his way to refute the Peripatetic view that Alexander's passage along the Pamphylian coast was due to 'tyche'. He does so by quoting drily from Alexander's letters for his own account. So that Plutarch, whatever Peripatetic material he has admitted in the *Life*, is still not prepared to countenance 'tyche' as an explanation of the whole man. Apart from specific instances, where a situation might call for 'tyche' to describe some uncontrolled or unexpected aspect, there is the consideration that 'tyche' would be useless for illustrating character.

Have we any right to expect a unity of character? Perhaps the truth about Plutarch's approach is given in the *Vita Cimonis* 2. 4, 5, where he suggests that evil must be described, for the sake of accuracy, but that it should be subordinated to the good.<sup>1</sup> But a more satisfactory explanation may be found at the beginning of the *Life*: '... a slight thing like a phrase or jest often makes a greater revelation of character than battles where thousands fall, or the greatest armaments, or sieges of cities' (1. 2).<sup>2</sup> He continues by saying that he wishes to indicate the type of man—*εἰδοποιεῖν τὸν ἐκάστου βίον*. We have yet to see whether there is any unity in the character; there is certainly confusion in the battle-scenes.

But if Plutarch has been as good as his word, we ought to find an incident or story which leads to a judgement about the kind of life (*εἶδος*) Alexander stands for. Such a remark does occur, though it appears to be so trivial that it has escaped notice. At 4. 3 Plutarch describes the appearance of Alexander and goes on to account for his pleasant smell. From this curious fact Plutarch draws a whole paragraph of erudition and conjecture:

Αἰτία δὲ ἴσως ἡ τοῦ σώματος κράσις πολὺθερμος οὖσα καὶ πυρώδης· ἡ γὰρ εὐωδία γίνεται πέφει τῶν ὑγρῶν ὑπὸ θερμότητος, ὡς οἶται Θεόφραστος. ὅθεν οἱ ξηροὶ καὶ διάπυροι τόποι τῆς οἰκουμένης τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα τῶν ἀρωμάτων φέρουσιν· ἐξαιρεῖ γὰρ ὁ ἥλιος τὸ ὑγρὸν ὥσπερ ὕλην σηπεδόνος ἐπιπολάζον τοῖς σώμασιν. Ἀλέξανδρον δὲ ἡ θερμότης τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ποτικὸν καὶ θυμοειδῆ παρεῖχεν.

The first clause to *πυρώδης* and the whole of the last sentence may well be Plutarch's own form of approval;<sup>3</sup> that is shown by the cautious *ὡς ἔοικε* in the last and the *ἴσως* in the first. Plutarch first suggests an explanation for Alexander's *εὐωδία*, which he supports by Peripatetic erudition. The reference may be to the treatise *De Odoribus*, where, at § 3, Theophrastus says: *εὐοσμία μὲν οὖν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν τὰ πεπεμμένα καὶ ἡκιστα γεώδη*—which answers broadly to the account of *εὐωδία* given by Plutarch. After this learning Plutarch suggests that *εὐωδία* is simply one case of Alexander's *θερμότης*; the fact of *φύσις* is given an explanation in terms of *φύσις*. This in turn serves to portray Alexander's whole

<sup>1</sup> Loc. cit. *ἐπεὶ χαλεπὸν ἐστὶ . . . ἀμεμφῇ καὶ καθαρὸν ἀνδρὸς ἐπιδείξει βίον, ἐν τοῖς καλοῖς ἀναπληρωτέον ὥσπερ ὁμοιότητα τὴν ἀλήθειαν*.

<sup>2</sup> A contrast between his own *βίοι* and *ιστορίαι*. Cf. Barbu, *Biographies de Plutarque*, p. 37.

<sup>3</sup> Barbu, op. cit., p. 139: 'L'εὐικός dans les jugements de Plutarque'. Cf. esp. p. 143: '... au cas où il s'agissait d'une opinion risquée sur un homme politique, il s'en tenait à l'εὐικός de toute l'activité de cet homme'.

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character; it makes him prone to drink (though this is just one tendency) and makes him also *θυμοειδής*. Alexander now appears as the 'spirited' man; the precise meaning of the word depends on the context. *θυμός*, meaning anger, occurs several times as an explanation of evil. After the destruction of Thebes Alexander was filled with sorrow; perhaps he was already *μεστός τὸν θυμόν* (13. 2).<sup>1</sup> His crossing of the Granicus is described as *μανικῶς καὶ πρὸς ἀπόνοιαν μάλλον ἢ γνώμῃ* (16. 3), though here there is a trace of the purely rhetorical antithesis which so often occurs in Diodorus.<sup>2</sup> After the murder of Cleitus *εὐθὺς ἀφῆκεν ὁ θυμὸς αὐτόν*. Not only Alexander himself but some of the important Macedonians are affected by the workings of *θυμός*. Olympias appears as *δύσζηλος καὶ βαρύθυμος*, encouraging Pausanias against Philip—*ὡς θυμονόμενῳ τῷ νεανίσκῳ προσεγκελευσαμένην*. Similarly *θυμός* accounts for Philip's mishap between two beds—*εὐτυχία δὲ ἑκατέρου διὰ τὸν θυμόν καὶ τὸν οἶνον ἔπεσε σφαλῆς*. At times one might be reading a tract on Aristotelian geo-politics, with reference to the 'spiritedness' of northern barbarians.<sup>3</sup>

In a good sense *θυμός*, or rather *τὸ θυμοειδές*, accounts for much of the best in Alexander. Hence at 26. 7 we are told that 'tyche' yielded to his onslaughts and *τὸ θυμοειδές ἄχρι τῶν πραγμάτων ὑπεξέφερε τὴν φιλονεικίαν ἀήττητον*. It is the nature of *τὸ θυμοειδές* to lead men to *φιλοτιμία*.<sup>4</sup> Ambition, in the best sense, was a leading part in Alexander's character from the start of the *Life*; at 4. 5 we are told that even in his youth 'his ambition kept his spirit serious and lofty in advance of his years'. Perhaps this aspect of *τὸ θυμοειδές*, as issuing in laudable ambition,<sup>5</sup> was mentioned in the missing *σύγκρισις βίων*. Ambition plays a great part in Caesar's character; like Alexander he did not turn to hedonism as a result of success but thought of greater plans—his success was *ὑπέκκταναι καὶ θάρσος*<sup>6</sup> for the future.

Conviction that *τὸ θυμοειδές* is the key to Alexander in the *Life* is reinforced by a review of the speeches. There the references to that concept are designed to refute the view of Alexander as 'choleric' in the bad sense. At 332 d it is said that Alexander's *θυμικόν* was *εὐδιάλλακτον*. Even at 335 a, where we find the stronger expression *διεφλέχθη τὸν θυμόν*, it merely describes the effect of music in rousing martial ardour. Most convincing of all is the passage, 339 f, where Plutarch describes the measures taken against Philotas. For seven whole years Alexander did not reveal his suspicions—*οὐκ ἐν οἴνῳ ποτὲ τὴν ὑπόνοιαν ταύτην ἐξέφηνεν ὁ μεθύων, οὐδὲ ὀργὴν ὁ θυμοειδής . . .*;<sup>7</sup> obviously these words are ironical in their context and represent Plutarch's proof that Alexander was not viciously *θυμοειδής*. Had he been, the Philotas affair would have come to light much earlier.

Now that we have discovered a ruling idea in the *Life*, we proceed to find the previous uses to which it was put and its role in Plutarch's biographical work. Stoic criticism of Alexander, as it appears in Seneca's treatise on anger, makes frequent use of the ideas *θυμός* and *τύχη*; only once<sup>8</sup> does the idea

<sup>1</sup> Cf. also *Vita Demosthenis* 23. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Diodorus 17. 20. 23. For the Hippocratic origins of *τὸ θυμοειδές* cf. Jaeger, *Eranos*, xlv. 123-30.

<sup>3</sup> Aristotle, *Politics* 7. 6. 1327<sup>b</sup>18.

<sup>4</sup> 'The parts of the soul', *ἐπιθυμία*, *θυμός*, *νοῦς*, correspond to the three lives of pleasure, ambition, and reason.

<sup>5</sup> Distinct from the *φιλοτιμία* in Dioto-

genes 266. 14 (Delatte, *Traité de la Royauté*). There it appears with *θηριόρας* as a vice.

<sup>6</sup> *Vita Caesaris* 58. 2.

<sup>7</sup> Eicke, op. cit., p. 63, misses the irony.

<sup>8</sup> *De Ira* 2. 23. 2: Alexander's behaviour is contrasted favourably with that of Hippas. But Seneca adds: 'hoc eo magis in Alexandro laudo, quia nemo tam obnoxius irae fuit'.

connected with *θυμοειδής* appear in a good sense, when Seneca praises Alexander for his confidence in his physician, and remarks, 'Quanto *animosius* Alexander!' *Animosus* would seem to be a fair rendering of that aspect of *θυμοειδής*, when laudable energy of temperament is meant. Elsewhere we come across the words *temerarius* and *iracundus*, so that Alexander's career stands for a type of random and angry activity. He not only murders Cleitus but throws Lysimachus to a lion (3. 17. 1); at 3. 23 we are told that Philip was controlled and that Alexander owed his anger to no one but himself. This portrait of Alexander recurs in the *De Beneficiis*, where *ira* is united with *fortuna*—at 7. 3. 1. Alexander is driven on by his *felix temeritas*,<sup>1</sup> and at 1. 13. 3 it is said that *felix temeritas* took the place of *virtus* in his character.<sup>2</sup>

Seneca quotes Aristotle as saying that anger is necessary, that it is a spur to virtue, and that it should be used not as a general but as a soldier.<sup>3</sup> But he himself rejects anger completely. Hence even Alexander's conquests and expeditions are treated, not as arising from genuine ambition, but as the work of a *vesanus adulescens*.<sup>4</sup> This agrees with part of the Peripatetic portrait given by Curtius; at 4. 14. 8 Darius describes Alexander as 'unum animal . . . et temerarium et vecors, adhuc nostro pavore quam sua virtute felix'. In Curtius, however, there appears a certain forced parallelism between the fate of Alexander and the fate of Darius. Darius is arrested and destroyed by his own people; and, similarly, Alexander's men refuse to let him have his own way.<sup>5</sup> The conqueror has to imitate the man he has defeated; and history is distorted, as so often, for the sake of illustrating an hypothesis.

Apart from these indications in Seneca and Curtius (assuming that Curtius is earlier than Plutarch<sup>6</sup>), there are no certain indications of an *original* composite *θυμός-τύχη* portrait. There are several stories about Alexander's taste for drinking,<sup>7</sup> and we have already seen that *ποτικός* is one of the epithets included by Plutarch in his account of Alexander's *φύσις*.<sup>8</sup> Certainly, the stories about drinking were thought important enough to be worth refuting, as Arrian gives the true version.<sup>9</sup> It is only possible that *θυμός* ideas, together with the concept of chance, formed part of an early Peripatetic interpretation of Alexander, in a pejorative way.

The full meaning of such a portrait can be seen from the treatment of *θυμός* in Aristotle's *Ethics*. Briefly, the matter can be stated like this; by calling Alexander 'fortunate' his historians would make him not responsible for his success. By calling him a man of *θυμός*, however, the angry man, they would make him

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 56: 'Was den König bei seinen Raubzügen besonders treibt, ist seine temeritas, die aber immer von Glück begleitet ist . . .'

<sup>2</sup> For instances of this important idea in Roman historiography see Nordh, 'Virtus and Fortuna in Florus', *Erano*, I. 112.

<sup>3</sup> *De Ira* 1. 9. 2. Cf. Plutarch, *Περὶ ἀοργησίας*, 458 c: ἡ δ' ἀνδρεία χολῆς οὐ δεῖται. Did Aristotle use *θυμός* or *ἀργή* or even *χολή*? It seems impossible to say. The point, however, is that *θυμός* has a wider meaning than the others, even though it can be confined to mere anger.

<sup>4</sup> *Epist.* 91. 17; 113. 29; 119. 7; *Nat. quæst.* 5. 18. 10; *De ben.* 7. 2. 5.

<sup>5</sup> Curtius 5. 13. 4. (Alexander loq.): 'Dareus haud procul, destitutus a suis aut oppressus.' Cf. ib. 9. 2. 32 (the army refuse to go on) and 8. 1. 47 (murder of Cleitus): 'comprehendi se a proximis amicorum, quod Dareo nuper accidisset, exclamat . . .'. Cf. Arrian 4. 8. 8.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Pauly-W. iv. 2, 1872: 'Der Stil mit den zerhackten Sätzen, den aufdringlichen Sentenzen, der unruhigen Effecthascherei weist auf die Zeit Senecas.'

<sup>7</sup> Tarn, op. cit., pp. 49 f., refers the stories of Alexander's *κῶμοι* to Cleitarchus.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. above, p. 102.

<sup>9</sup> Arrian 7. 29. 4.

fully responsible for the evil he committed. For among the many passages where Aristotle treats of *θυμός*, the most important is at *Eth. Nic.* 1135<sup>b</sup>18. There he says: (ἀμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ᾗ τῆς αἰτίας, ἀτυχεῖ δ' ὅταν ἐξωθεν)· ὅταν δὲ εἰδῶς μὲν μὴ προβουλευσας δέ, ἀδίκημα, οἷον ὅσα τε διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἄλλα πάθη . . . In other words an act committed διὰ θυμὸν is different from chance action; the individual is held responsible. An isolated act διὰ θυμὸν does not yet constitute a *ῥέξις*—οὐ μέντοι πῶς ἀδικοῖ διὰ ταῦτα—but is still an injustice. The traces of the *θυμός-τύχη* portrait, as we have them in Seneca and Curtius, show little knowledge of those passages in Aristotle where *θυμός* is given some moral significance.<sup>1</sup>

The above remarks, although they deal with a conjecture, are useful as a means of returning to Plutarch's *Life of Alexander*. We have now to see whether *θυμός* and *φιλοτιμία* play a part in the rest of Plutarch's biographical narratives or whether they are confined to his study of Alexander. We may say at once that both words are crucial for an understanding of Plutarch's aims.

In reading Plutarch one is struck by the number of times *θυμοειδής* occurs in conjunction with *φιλότιμος*.<sup>2</sup> This is not always explained as due to the *φύσις* of the man concerned, which is the explanation offered in the case of Alexander.<sup>3</sup> For instance, τὸ φιλότιμον in Lysander's character was due to Spartan education and not to nature (*Lysander* 2. 3), something implanted and not innate. Closer inspection of these passages shows that in most cases *φιλοτιμία* is used to account for evil or anti-social acts, sometimes the stain which mars an illustrious career.<sup>4</sup> But there are also indications that the word has to be qualified, as though ambition itself were neutral, and the historian's judgement of the man must depend upon the use made of ambition.<sup>5</sup> With this thought we meet an old problem of the Greek language and of Greek ethics.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle expounds his theory that each virtue is a mean, with two vices, one of excess and the other of defect. He attempts to illustrate this theory by giving names for each virtue and each of the vices. Unfortunately for his theory the Greek language does not bear the strain to which it is artificially subjected, for in some cases there are not enough names to go round. Sometimes we are in the position of knowing that there are three places on a map and even their relative location. But we do not always know what they are called—and the pertinent doubt occurs that even if we arrive at one of these places, we may not be able to say with satisfaction 'That is x'. The case of *φιλότιμος* is an apt illustration of this dilemma. For when the mean has no name, 'the extremes lay claim to the mean positions'.<sup>6</sup> This is precisely the case with the words *φιλότιμος* and *ἀφιλότιμος*, which have to perform double functions. Here the case is complicated still more because, of the *διαθέσεις*, we can speak only of *φιλοτιμία*, not of *ἀφιλοτιμία*; though, in another passage, Aristotle, clearly following the logic of his theory against the run of the language, introduces *ἀφιλοτιμία* (*Eth. Nic.* 1125<sup>b</sup>10-25).

In view of this inconsistency in Peripatetic theory, it is hardly surprising that Plutarch's use of *φιλότιμος* is confusing. Before considering it again it may be

<sup>1</sup> e.g. *θυμός* is an analogical form of courage, *Eth. Eud.* 1229<sup>a</sup>25.

<sup>2</sup> e.g. *Fabius Max.* 2, *Aratus* 36, *Lysander* and *Sulla* (comparison) 4; for *φιλονικία* and *θυμός* cf. *Dion* 47, *Agésilas* 11, *Agésilas* and *Pompey* (comparison) 1.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. above, p. 102.

<sup>4</sup> e.g. *Agésilas* 18, *Agésilas* and *Pompey* (comparison) 1.

<sup>5</sup> e.g. *Fabius Max.* 10: οὐχ ὕμναιον σὺ φιλοτιμία and 22: φιλοτιμίας ἥττων.

<sup>6</sup> Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1107<sup>b</sup>27 f.



useful to consider whether the word *φιλόνηκος* might have solved the problem of finding a name for the vice of excess and reserving *φιλότιμος* entirely for the virtue, the mean. Evidently Aristotle rejected this solution, in spite of the fact that a distinction had been made before his time.<sup>1</sup> However, it had not become popular, though it certainly lingered, as we can see from a passage in Plutarch where the two are distinguished, *φιλοτιμία* and *φιλονεικία* being responsible for the faults of Titus and Philopoemen: though apparently the former is less serious than the latter.<sup>2</sup> But elsewhere Plutarch does not adhere to this difference; in several passages *τὸ φιλόνηκον* and *τὸ φιλότιμον* are coupled, so that one can hardly read any difference into them.<sup>3</sup>

As this is so, we have to find an explanation of the view that *φιλοτιμία*, in the case of Alexander, appears to be applauded, whereas elsewhere it is responsible for much harm and evil. We are helped by a passage in *Agis and Cleomenes* (1 and 2), where the question is dealt with at some length. The remarks depend greatly on the context; for Plutarch criticizes ambition as a mere image of virtue, a *πάθος*,<sup>4</sup> when it submits itself to mob desires in pursuit of its own end. That is also the gist of his criticism of the two Spartan kings, who turned demagogue. But he adds that youth must be encouraged, when it is also ambitious, by having the right to glory in noble achievements. But *τὸ καλόν* must appear somewhere as the true end, that is we must be ambitious for *τὸ καλόν* or ambition will be considered good in itself. This state of affairs is *ἐν . . . ταῖς πολιτικαῖς φιλοτιμίαις ὁλέθριον*.<sup>5</sup>

In part this accounts for Plutarch's attitude to Alexander: for he speaks of his *ζῆλος* and *πόθος* for philosophy, which is the only way he could learn about *τὸ καλόν* (*Life*, 8). However, the real distinction is between anti-social and social ambition. When the ambition of a Greek does harm to other Greeks the result is pernicious; witness Agesilaus and Lysander. But when Lysander asks the Persian Cyrus for more money for his men, Cyrus is pleased *ἐπὶ τῇ φιλοτιμίᾳ τοῦ ἀνδρός*.<sup>6</sup> Alexander's ambition is rather similar; he is acting for a good end, in fighting Persia, exporting *στάσις* to make a just foreign war, and tries to serve the Greeks by his *φιλοτιμία*.<sup>7</sup> Thus, when he makes the *φιλοτιμοτάτη* inscription on the spoils sent to Athens after Granicus,<sup>8</sup> he is said to be sharing his victory with the Greeks; and again he is said to be *φιλοτιμούμενος πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας* when he orders the end of tyrannies and the rebuilding of Plataea.<sup>9</sup> His ambition results in benefits to Greece; it is on a comparable level with that recorded in the Chremonidean decree, where ambassadors are explicitly thanked for the *φιλοτιμία ἣν ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸν δῆμον*.<sup>10</sup> It is a kind of public service performed by a foreigner for the benefit of a whole community. Alexander's ambition is of service to others as well as himself, a display of kingship, although *θυμός*<sup>11</sup> occasionally leads him into disaster.

<sup>1</sup> As at Plato, *Parm.* 128 d, e and apparently Thucydides, 3. 82. 8.

<sup>2</sup> *Titus and Philopoemen (comparison)*, 1.

<sup>3</sup> e.g. *Agesilaus* 8 and 23; *Cimon* 8; *Fabius Maximus* 25.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Agesilaus* 33, where he is said to have forsaken *τῶν ἐμφύτων αὐτῷ παθῶν, φιλονεικίας καὶ φιλοτιμίας*.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Lysander* 23 and *Agesilaus* 5: αἱ γὰρ ὑπερβολαὶ τῶν φιλονεικῶν χαλεπαὶ ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ μεγάλους κινδύνους ἔχουσι.

<sup>6</sup> *Lysander* 4. 4.

<sup>7</sup> For Plutarch's view on the war against Persia cf. *Agesilaus* 36.

<sup>8</sup> *The Life*, 16. 8.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* 34. 1.

<sup>10</sup> Dittenberger, *Syll.* 3, 434. Chremonidean decree, l. 30. Cf. also l. 60: κατὰ [τὸν νόμον] *φιλοτιμίας ἐνεκα καὶ εὐνοίας*.

<sup>11</sup> e.g. Thebes and Cleitus, *The Life*, 11 to 13 and 50. Cf., too, Plutarch, *περὶ ἀσπρηγίας* 458 b, where Callisthenes and Cleitus are mentioned.



To approach the matter from another point of view, Plutarch is writing chiefly about men of action.<sup>1</sup> Men of action, statesmen, orators, and soldiers need a certain impetus in their make-up, which can only come from *θυμός*. Plutarch 'quotes' Plato with approval (in his *Life of Galba* 1), for saying that *φύσις* must be a harmonious compound of *τὸ θυμοειδὲς καὶ δραστήριον* with *τῷ πράγι καὶ φιλανθρώπῳ*. The 'one long year' of Roman imperial history was caused by *θυμός* getting out of hand, a leader instead of a subordinate. But as long as *θυμός* is kept in order, it is useful; since, short of predicting the uncertain future, there was a strong Greek feeling that it was better to go and encounter *τύχη*, instead of waiting for it to develop oppressively against personal inertia.<sup>2</sup>

The Alexander of the *Life* is a much better person than is sometimes suggested. Although it is a compilation from many sources,<sup>3</sup> Plutarch himself is not at the mercy of those sources. He wants to do the best for all his heroes, with the possible exception of Antony and Demetrius Poliorcetes.<sup>4</sup> He says, in the *Life of Cimon* 2, that he prefers to regard mistakes as *ἐλλείματα ἀρετῆς* *τινός* rather than *κακίας* *πονηρέματα*. And, secondly, he is concerned with the question of ambition, as it seeks for power, and the ends to which it is consecrated or by which it is more often bedevilled.

Such unity as there is in the *Life* also derives from the type of Peripatetic biography on which Plutarch drew so much. The technique of writers like Hermippus and Satyrus<sup>5</sup> was to write about a psychological and moral *ἀρετή* and illustrate it by a story concerning the great men of the past. Sometimes they generalized from a single instance to the whole life or character, as Plutarch has attempted to use *τὸ θυμοειδὲς* and *φιλοτιμία*. Heracleides Ponticus talks of Pericles as choosing *τὸν μεθ' ἡδονῆς βίον*<sup>6</sup> (if these are his own words), because he lived with Aspasia. At any rate we can say there was a tendency in these early *βίοι* to look for an all-embracing idea that would explain the whole man; Plutarch developed this scheme.

Both historians of Alexander and critics of Plutarch may come to agree that the *Life* is more fruitful than the speeches. The speeches say that Alexander was always good, the *Life* that he mostly used power for right ends, being ambitious by nature but trained by philosophy towards the right end of service. The latter is likely to be more historical, for it represents more experience on the part of the writer, and much less debate.

#### University of Reading

A. E. WARDMAN

<sup>1</sup> Except for Lycurgus and Numa, the ideal legislators.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the speech to the Spartans at Thucydides 1. 69. 5. Also Cleitarchus, frag. 35, Jacoby. For Plutarchan usage the most interesting example is the *Caesar*, 32. 6, ... *μετὰ θυμοῦ τινος ὥσπερ ἀφ' αὐτὸν ἐκ τοῦ*

*λογισμοῦ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον* . . . .

<sup>3</sup> Following Tarn, vol. ii, pp. 306-9 against Powell, *J.H.S.* 1939.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Demetrius* 1, *passim*.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Barbu, *op. cit.*, pp. 27, 49.

<sup>6</sup> Athenaeus 536 f.

## THE TEXT OF ARISTOTLE'S *TOPICS* AND *ELENCHI*: THE LATIN TRADITION

THE surviving textual tradition of the *Topics* and *Elenchi* down to A.D. 1503 includes, as far as we know:

1. *Greek texts*: (a) a small papyrus fragment,<sup>1</sup> c. A.D. 100; (b) over a hundred Greek manuscripts, from c. A.D. 900 onwards; (c) the Aldine 'editio princeps', A.D. 1495; (d) commentaries, paraphrases, and scholia;<sup>2</sup> notably: Alexander of Aphrodisias on *Top.*, c. A.D. 200; John Italos on *Top.* 2-4, 11th century; Michael of Ephesus on *El.*, 11th century; Sophonias on *El.*, c. A.D. 1300; Leo Magentenus on *Top.*, 14th century;
2. *Latin texts*: (e) the translation by Boethius, c. A.D. 510; (f) fragments of a new recension of the same translation, probably by Boethius himself (only for *Top.*); (g) a number of readings from a new translation or from a revision of Boethius' *El.*, possibly due to James of Venice, c. A.D. 1120-50; (h) William of Moerbeke's revision of Boethius' *El.*, c. A.D. 1260-70; (i) Lefèvre d'Étaples's revision of Boethius' *Top.* and *El.*, A.D. 1502;
3. *Arabic texts*: (j) Abu 'Uthmān's translation of *Top.* 1-7, c. A.D. 900; (k) Ibrāhīm ibn 'Abdallāh's version of *Top.* 8 from Ishāq ibn Hunain's lost Syriac translation, both c. A.D. 900; (l) ibn Nā'ima's version of *El.*, 9th century; (m, n) the two translations of *El.* made by Yahyā ibn 'Adi, d. A.D. 974, and ibn Zur'a, d. A.D. 1008, from the lost Syriac version of Athanasius of Balad, d. 696; (o) the first few lines of an anonymous translation of *El.*<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the apparatus to 109<sup>b</sup>7-14 in *Top.* ed. Strache and Wallies, Leipzig, 1923; also Grenfell and Hunt, *Fayūm Pap.* 88-89, and *Arch. f. Papyrusf.* ii. 367.

<sup>2</sup> See Strache and Wallies, xiii-xix. Fragments of a Latin translation of Alexander on *El.* seem to be preserved on the margins of cod. Vienna Nationalbibl. 2377; this translation is also quoted in a 12th-century commentary (cod. Oxford Bodl. Laud. lat. 67, f. 8<sup>v</sup>) and, according to M. Grabmann ('Petrus Hispanus', *Sitzungsab. d. Bayer. Ak., Phil.-hist. Abt.* 1936, ix. 87), in two 13th-century logical treatises; there was a copy in Richard of Fournival's library in the middle of the 13th century (Delisle, *Cab. d. Manusc.* ii. 525); see about it our 'Note sur l'Arist. lat. mediev. ix' in *Riv. di Filos. Neo-scol.* xlv (1954), 229-31. The 12th-century Latin commentary by James of Venice on *El.* of which a few quotations remain (codd. Paris. Bibl. Nat. lat. 15141, ff. 3<sup>r</sup>, 22<sup>r</sup>, 28<sup>r</sup>, and Berlin Oeffentl. Wissensch. Bibl. lat. fol. 624, ff. 65<sup>r</sup>-73<sup>v</sup>) was related to Michael of Ephesus's commentary: probably both depended on Alexander (cf. our 'Note . . . vi' in *Riv. di Filos. Neo-Scol.* xlv (1952), 401-5). A

Greek copy of Alexander on *El.* seems to have existed in Mosul in the 10th-11th century (cf. a note at the end of the Arabic translations of *El.* in cod. Paris. Bibl. Nat. arab. 2346, printed in 'Abdurrahmān Badawi, *Organon Aristot. in vers. arab. ant.* iii, Cairo 1952, 1018); but the translations mentioned by Wenrich (*De auct. Graec. version.*, Leipzig, 1842, 274; cf. *Comm. Ar. Gr.* ii. iii, p. v, n. 1) are not translations from Alexander but from Aristotle's text (see ibn al-Nadim, *Kitāb al-Fihrist*, ed. Flügel, Leipzig, 1872, 264).

<sup>3</sup> All these translations are now printed in Badawi, op. cit. ii-iii, Cairo, 1949-52 (467-733 *Top.*, and 735-1016 *El.*); cf. R. Walzer, 'New Light on the Arab. Transl. of Arist.', in *Oriens vi* (1953), 106, 112-13, 141. That Yahyā ibn 'Adi translated *El.* from Theophilus' Syriac version is stated in *Fihrist*, 249 (cf. Walzer, 112), but contradicted by the title of his translation in the Paris MS. (Badawi, 737). It is possible that more material for the history of the Greek text exists in Arabic commentaries and paraphrases.

Boethius' Greek copy was, therefore, about four centuries older than any surviving Greek manuscript, perhaps equally older than the copies of *Top.* underlying the Arabic translations, and possibly one and a half centuries older than the copy of *El.* on which two of the Arabic versions depend. Only the unimportant papyrus fragment and the readings quoted and discussed in Alexander's commentary<sup>1</sup> are older evidence of our texts than the very literal and complete Boethian translation as preserved in medieval manuscripts: modern editors ascribed to Boethius readings derived from Lefèvre's revision, thus dating back to the early sixth century evidence which partly belongs to c. A.D. 1500.

Cicero seems to have owned a Greek copy of *Top.*:

'cum mecum in Tusculano esses et in bibliotheca uterque nostrum ad suum studium libellos quos vellet evolveret, incidisti in Aristotelis Topica quaedam, quae sunt ab illo pluribus libris explicata' (Cic. *Topica* 1).

But his own treatise with the same title bears hardly any relation to Aristotle's work,<sup>2</sup> although it purports to be an account of its contents, based on memory:

'haec, cum mecum libros non haberem, memoria repetita . . . conscripsi' (ibid.).

Marius Victorinus seems to have been contented with commenting upon Cicero's *Topica* (Boeth. *In Cic. Top.* 1 proem., and Cassiod. *Instit.* 2. 3. 18), thinking perhaps that there was no need for a 'new' Latin rendering of the actual Aristotelian treatise. Cassiodorus (loc. cit.) gave currency for a long time to the view that Cicero had in fact translated Aristotle, and the popularity of his handbook may explain the eclipse of Aristotle's *Top.* until the beginning of the twelfth century to the advantage of Cicero's *Topica* and of Boethius' two works connected with it, viz. the commentary and the *De Differentiis Topicis*. For a long time not even Boethius' actual translation could compete with the easier Latin works.

Boethius refers three times to his own rendering of *Top.* (*In Cic. Top.* i, P.L. lxiv, col. 1051 d-1052 b, *De Diff. Top.* i. 1173 c, iv. 1216 d), never to a translation of *El.* Most probably there was no copy of these two versions in Vivarium, and the mention in the  $\Phi\Delta$  recensions of Cassiodorus' *Instit.* 'Boethius . . . Topica Aristotelis octo libris in Latinum vertit eloquium'<sup>3</sup> seems to come from Boethius (*De Diff. Top.* i. 1173 c), 'his octo voluminibus . . . quibus Aristotelis Topica in Latinam vertimus orationem'. We have found no evidence to suggest that either of the two Aristotelian works was read in Latin between the time of Boethius' death and approximately A.D. 1115-30 when Abailard read and quoted *El.* (*Glossae sup. Peri Erm.*, ed. Geyer, pp. 400, 489), Adam of Balsham made use of *Top.* and *El.* for his *Ars Disserendi*,<sup>4</sup> and the oldest surviving manuscript of *Top.*, cod. Oxford Trin. Coll. 47, was written in England.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The lemmata reflect later stages of the Aristotelian texts; cf. Strache and Wallies, xiii-xiv.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. B. Riposati, *Studi sui Topica di Cicerone*, Milan, 1947.

<sup>3</sup> *Instit.* 2. 3. 18 (see the apparatus in Mynors's edition); Cassiodorus seems to have

also misled his latest editor on this point (cf. his Index auctorum, s.v. *Arist.*).

<sup>4</sup> See our 'The *Ars Disserendi* of Adam of Balsham, Parvipontanus' in *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies*, iii (1954), 136-40.

<sup>5</sup> See G. Lacombe, etc., *Aristoteles Latinus, Codices*, i, Rome, 1939, 11-12, 46, 418.

Boethius' translation of *Top.* is contained in about 250 manuscripts and a dozen printed editions;<sup>1</sup> and so is his version of *El.*, but often in an impure form. In all but one manuscript and in the older editions these versions are anonymous, and no pre-Renaissance reference to Boethius as their author had been found until very recently; but his name accompanied Lefèvre's revision from 1503 onwards. On the other hand, a passage inserted between 1157 and 1169 in a Norman chronicle mentions that a new translation of *Top.* and *El.* had been made in the first half of the twelfth century by a Venetian cleric, James: this made modern scholars wonder whether the medieval 'vulgate' was Boethius' or James's work. A detailed study of the vocabularies and methods of the two translators has confirmed Boethius' authorship against James's claim.<sup>2</sup> This conclusion verifies the explicit ascription of *Top.* to Boethius in the oldest Latin manuscript, written about the time at which James is supposed to have produced his own version, and the ascription of *El.* by a twelfth-century author of an exposition of this work:

Notandum est quod quidam ob hoc dicunt Aristotilem non fecisse Elencos quia non exempla grecorum sed latinorum in Elencis apposuit; nam si ipse Elencos fecisset, grecorum exempla pretenderet. Sed dicimus ipsos mentiri; quia Boethius, qui hoc opus de greco in latino [sic] transtulit, exempla latinorum et non grecorum dedit, ideo scilicet quia, veluti voces apud latinos et grecos sunt diverse, sic et ipsarum accidentia id est accentus, quibus ipse voces modulantur (cod. Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 15141, f. 15<sup>r</sup>).

The author of the exposition is at this point commenting on two examples taken from Horace (*Carm.* 1. 25. 8-9) and Virgil (*Aen.* 5. 13) as equivalents of two hemistichs from Homer (*El.* 166<sup>b</sup>1-9): it is in fact a characteristic feature of Boethius' translations—in contrast to those made in the Middle Ages—that examples are changed to fit the Latin context whenever this is expedient. One further confirmation of Boethius' authorship can be found in the rendering of τῶν ἐτέρων γενῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπ' ἄλληλα τεταγμένων: 'diversorum generum et non subalternatim positorum' is used to translate that phrase both in the undoubtedly Boethian version of *Cat.* 2<sup>b</sup>16<sup>3</sup> and in that of *Top.* 107<sup>b</sup>19. It is unlikely that two different translators should have used the same words in all the instances in which other alternatives were possible (*diversorum—aliorum; subalternatim—sub alternis—sub invicem; positorum—ordinatorum*).

Boethius translated the Greek text very carefully and literally; in almost every detail of some interest it is possible to detect the Greek words underlying the Latin rendering. The most notable exceptions are three short passages in *El.* in which Greek examples are either omitted or substituted by means of different Latin examples: 166<sup>b</sup>3-8 the two Latin lines from Horace and Virgil mentioned above take the place of two Greek hemistichs, and the discussion on these is omitted; 177<sup>b</sup>37-178<sup>a</sup>2 a pun based on οὐδ—οὐ leaves the place for one based on 'pendere—pendere'; 182<sup>b</sup>16-21 one example of paralogisms from equivocity is skilfully adapted (ἀνὴρ ἐφέρετο κατὰ κλίμακος δίφρον = vir ferebatur

<sup>1</sup> See *Arist. Lat. Cod.* ii, Cambridge, 1955, Index nom. et oper. s.v. *Elenchi, Topica*; and *Gesamtkat. d. Wiegendr.* nn. 2335, 2337-41, 2391-3, 2401-4.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. our 'Iacobus Veneticus Grecus', *Traditio*, viii (1952), 265-304, and 'Note . . .

vi', quoted above, 398-411.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. 'The Genuine Text of B.'s Transl. of Arist.'s *Cat.*', *Mediaev. and Renaiss. Stud.* i (1943), 151-77, and 'The Text of the *Cat.*: the Lat. Trad.', *C.Q.* xxxix (1945), 63-74.

*gradatim sedens*), one is shortened (καὶ τὸν ἀνούμενον *om.*), two are omitted (καὶ ὅπου στέλλεσθε; πρὸς τὴν κεφαλαίαν and ἄρ' Εὐαρχος; οὐ δῆτα ἀλλ' Ἀπολλωνίδης). Minor details of the Greek text cannot be reconstructed from Boethius' translation in the following cases: (a) varying Greek orthography (e.g. αὐτόν—ἐαυτόν, μηδέν—μηθέν, μικρός—σ μικρός); (b) Greek words with identical or almost identical meanings (μηδεῖς—οὐδεῖς, ὅς—ὅστις 100<sup>a</sup>28, καθά—καθάπερ 100<sup>b</sup>28, ὑπέρ—περί 101<sup>a</sup>29, ὀρικὰ—ὀριστικά 102<sup>a</sup>9; sometimes ὅτι—διότι, e.g. 101<sup>a</sup>34; etc.); (c) different meanings with different accents (e.g. πῶς—πως, τίς—τις; Boethius' copy was not necessarily provided with accents); (d) Latin declension ambiguities (e.g. 103<sup>a</sup>4 *appellantes*, προσαγορευθέντες *A*, -as *celt.*); (e) different usage of tenses and moods (aorist and perfect, aorist and present, pluperfect and perfect; subjunctive and indicative, optative and indicative or subjunctive); (f) almost regular omission by Boethius of *ἄν* and *γε*, and occasional omission of *μέν* (before γάρ and οὖν), *ὥς* (before a participle), *τε*, *τις*, *καί* with the first member of an enumeration or in the meaning of 'also'; (g) presence or absence of an article with no pronominal or emphatic value (e.g. [τοῖς] πᾶσιν 100<sup>b</sup>22, [τῶν] συλλογισμῶν 101<sup>a</sup>18); (h) addition of *est*, *sunt*, *esse*, etc., to nominal phrases (this was occasionally practised by Greek scribes or editors as well as by Boethius); (i) inversions of two or more words (not frequent); (j) some unjustified changes in the tenses, particularly of present into future, future into present, present into perfect.

Only a very small section of the available Greek tradition of *Top.* and *El.* has been inquired into so far. Bekker collated the whole texts in cod. Marcianus gr. 201 (*B*) of the middle tenth century and in cod. Vaticanus Urb. gr. 35 (*A*) of c. A.D. 900, and the sections—covering most of the two texts—written in the eleventh century in cod. Coislin. 330 (*C*); he also collated cod. Paris Bibl. Nat. gr. 1843 of the thirteenth century (*D*) for the sections missing from *C* (132<sup>a</sup>17–139<sup>a</sup>19 and 176<sup>b</sup>14–184<sup>b</sup>8). Waitz collated anew *A* and *B*; he also collated completely cod. Basle Univers. F ii. 21 of the twelfth century (*u*), and partially eight more manuscripts (*c, f, i, o, g, N, P, T*).<sup>1</sup> Strache included in his apparatus readings from the Greek commentators. Sir David Ross provided me with a new collation of *u* and with a collation of *D* (except for the sections already collated by Bekker). No study has been made of any Arabic version in connexion with the textual tradition.

A comparison of the Boethian translations with the available Greek evidence had been partly attempted by Strache; but he collated as Boethian the 1546 reprint of Lefèvre d'Étaples's revision, while giving, on the other hand, as coming from another, anonymous, translation some readings from a bad

<sup>1</sup> Cod. Coislin. 170, which Bekker gives as the equivalent of *D* in his list of sigla, does not contain Aristotle's works (cf. Waitz, *Aristotelis Organon Graece*, i, Leipz. 1844, 11; Torstrik, 'Die authentica d. Berl. Ausg.' in *Philologus*, xii (1857), 512–13; and R. Devreesse, *Le Fonds Coislin* [Bibl. Nat., Catal. des Manusc. grecs ii], 1945, 152–3); nor does the text of cod. Coislin. 157, which was considered to be *D* by Ross, *Aristotle's Prior and Post. Anal.*, Oxford, 1949 (among the sigla), correspond to cod. *D* as collated by Bekker. The identification of *D* with cod. Paris. Bibl. Nat. gr. 1843 has been made recently by

H. D. Saffrey, after a comparison with Bekker's readings. The sections of *c, f, i, o, g, N, P, T* collated by Waitz are the following: *c* and *f* very many passages from the whole works; *i* 164<sup>a</sup>20–170<sup>a</sup>21, 172<sup>a</sup>10–176<sup>a</sup>16, 177<sup>b</sup>12–184<sup>b</sup>8; *o* 100<sup>a</sup>18–108<sup>b</sup>33; *g* 129<sup>a</sup>27–164<sup>b</sup>19; *N* 151<sup>b</sup>28–155<sup>a</sup>38; *P* 100<sup>a</sup>18–135<sup>b</sup>24, 139<sup>a</sup>16–148<sup>a</sup>19; *T* 164<sup>a</sup>20–178<sup>a</sup>31. The manuscript *o* is almost identical with *u*, and is probably a direct copy from it; we have quoted it in the one case in which it seems to differ from *u* while agreeing with Boethius' translation.



edition of Boethius' actual version.<sup>1</sup> I have based my inquiry on the oldest known Latin manuscripts which I have also compared with several later ones. The text of *Top.* is almost perfect in cod. Oxford Trin. Coll. 47 of the early twelfth century; I have collated it with a microfilm of the now lost cod. Chartres 497 of the same period which, apart from a number of obvious mistakes, agrees with it in all details, with cod. Oxford Balliol Coll. 253 (see below), and in selected passages with a number of English, Italian, Austrian, and German manuscripts. The purest text of *El.* I have found in the early twelfth century cod. Chartres 497, equally lost; I have collated a microfilm of it with codd. Cambridge Trin. Coll. O.7.9 = 1337, c. A.D. 1200, Balliol Coll. 253, and Avranches 228, both of the thirteenth century, and partly with several other manuscripts.

The results of my comparison between these texts and all the readings recorded in Bekker's and Waitz's apparatuses, as completed and corrected by Sir David Ross's collations of *D* and *u*, are the following (*A* = Greek manuscript underlying the Latin version):


- (1) *A* agrees on the whole with *B* and *D* more than with any other manuscript;
- (2) in *Top.* 1-4 and *El.* *A* agrees more often with *B* than with *D*, differing from *B* in about 350 readings and from *D* in more than 500; but in about 190 cases *A* agrees with *D* against *B*;
- (3) in *Top.* 5-8 there is an almost complete agreement between *A* and *D* in important readings; while there are differences between *A* and *B* in more than 600 cases, in more than 500 of these *A* agrees with *D*;
- (4) there is a considerable amount of agreement between *A* and *u* against *B*; in *Top.* 1-4 and *El.* the number of readings in which *u* agrees with *A* against *B* is almost exactly the same as that of readings in which *D* agrees with *A* against *B*, but in about one-third of these cases *u* and *D* disagree with each other; but in *Top.* 5-8 *u* agrees with *A* against *B* much more rarely than *D* does (about 300 cases against 500), and only exceptionally does *u* disagree with *D* while agreeing with *A* against *B*;
- (5) the relationship between *C*, *A*, *D*, and *B* is very similar to that described above between *u* and the same other manuscripts; but *C* is less near than *u* to either *A* or *D*;
- (6) all the manuscripts collated only in parts by Waitz (*c*, *f*, *i*, *o*, *q*, *N*, *P*, *T*) show, to a greater or less extent, characteristics similar to those observed for *u* and *C*; this is particularly true for *o* (which is obviously a faithful copy of *u*), for *f* (which, in *Top.* 5-8 agrees with *A* against *B* if *D* does, hardly ever if *D* does not agree with it), and for *P*;
- (7) there is hardly any instance of *A* agreeing with *A* against *B*, particularly of *A* agreeing with both *A* and *D* against *B*, except in the case of obvious mistakes by the scribes of *B* or of manuscripts from which *B* derives;
- (8) it seems, therefore, possible to suggest that at the basis of the tradition, as far as it is known from the collated Greek manuscripts and Boethius' translation, there were two texts of *Top.* and *El.* differing from each other in approximately one thousand readings; that one of these two texts is represented in a rather pure form by *A* and, for *Top.* 5-8, in a somehow more corrupted form by *D*; that the other text is represented by *B*, and

<sup>1</sup> See 'The Text of the *Cat.*' *C.Q.* xxxix (1945), 71.

The  
comple  
only th  
from *B*  
with th  
eviden  
reading  
reading  
due to

*Top.*  
DuCA<sup>1</sup>  
17 δδ. η  
33 ερωτ.  
†11 τις  
om. uC  
δδ ποσόν  
†104<sup>1</sup>13  
36-37 γ  
DuCP  
105<sup>1</sup>1 τ  
δομώμελ  
†21 τφ  
†19 τι L  
107<sup>1</sup>19  
lius A)  
ταν+δέ  
ωσπερ u  
*Top.*  
μέτρης L  
... τοῦ  
13 μετέχ  
†22 τοῦ  
30 μόνου  
14 οὐ τῶ  
†34 δη]  
DuPq  
DuPqA<sup>2</sup>  
\*134<sup>1</sup>1 ε  
17 δδ. δν  
DPfq  
14 δδ.+  
om. DuP  
om. DP





Top. 1. 100 <sup>b</sup> 21 καὶ <sup>2</sup> αὐτ. om. DuP	101 <sup>a</sup> 1-2 ἐριστικός συλλογισμός f	†7 ταύτη
DuCA <sup>1</sup>	*12 αἰ <sup>2</sup> om. Df	
17 δὲ γέν. transp. DC	*37 ἀρχών om. DCGF <sup>8</sup>	101 <sup>a</sup> 16 δὲ+γίνονται DC
17 δὲ γέν. transp. DC	†19 ἰδ. +τὸ μὲν DuCPA	102 <sup>a</sup> 26 ἰδ. om.
33 ἔρωτ. ἀποδ. transp. Duf	36 εἰς <sup>a</sup> om. D	39 θῆ+ταῦτα DuCPf
†11 τις DuCAP	†33 καὶ om. DuP	103 <sup>a</sup> 8 ἦ γὰρ ἀρ. ἦ DuCP
om. uC	21 τέτταρες+διαφοραὶ Duf	103 <sup>b</sup> 16 ἰσχυρ.
25 διὰ <sup>2</sup> ἀπὸ C	25 διὰ <sup>2</sup> ἀπὸ C	†28 ὅτε δὲ ποσόν om. PA (ὅτε
δὲ ποσόν ὅτε δὲ ποσόν om. C)	30 τί+τε D	34 τί τε ἐστι Du
†104 <sup>a</sup> 13 τὰ DCPA <sup>2</sup>	13-14 καί <sup>2</sup> ἀντ. post ἐν C	†28 καί <sup>2</sup> DuP
36-37 γεωμ.—γεωμ. . . ἱατρ.—ἱατρ. transp.	37 γεωμέτρης C	104 <sup>a</sup> 9 οὐδέποτε
DuCP	24 εὐθὺς+ἐστιν Du	105 <sup>a</sup> 26 πρότ. ποιήσ. transp. C
105 <sup>b</sup> 1 τέχνην u	5 αἰσθ. <sup>2</sup> ἐπιστήμη D	*37 ἦ+καί CPf <sup>10</sup>
δομώμεθα P(uC)	24 δὲ+οἶον uC	106 <sup>a</sup> 1 προτάσεων u
†21 τῷ DuCA <sup>2</sup>	23 οὐδὲν Du	15 γὰρ τούτων DuP
†19 τι DuCA	34 πλεον. <sup>1</sup> (πολλ. u)+λέγεται DuP	19 ἀντίκειται Df
107 <sup>b</sup> 19 ἄλλ.+εταγμένον (τατμο. f) Pf	33 διαφ.+ὁ γὰρ ἀνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βόσ <sup>2</sup> οὐκ (uC	32 πᾶν
των+αἰὶ ο	108 <sup>b</sup> 1 ἐστ. ἐκ. transp. DuCPf	4-5 ἐκ. τ. οὐσ. transp. u
ώσπερ u		15 ὡς ποτε]

Τον. 5. 4-9. †132 <sup>a</sup> 25 ἰδ. + ὄτι DuPqB <sup>a</sup>	†28 οἶον DuP	31 γεωμέτρον q	33 γεω-
μέτρῃς Duqf	*33 τοῖσι τοῖσι DPf	*36 μὴ ὅτι DuPf	132 <sup>a</sup> 8-9 ὁ λόγ. . . . .
... τοῦν. . . . ὁ λόγ. transp. Df	*9 λέγεται ἀληθείαςτα Df	10 εἰν. ἰδ. transp. q	11 et
13 μετέχον διεκτικὸν DPf	*14 καὶ + εἰ DP	15 κατῆρ. σμ. DP	21 κείμ. + εἰναι DPf
†22 τοῦ κατῆρῳσμονον DP	25 ὑποκ. + λεγομένην P ( + λέγομενον Df)	25 διότι DPf	
30 μόνον fq	31 ὧν ὡς D	†133 <sup>1</sup> τί ἦν DP	2 ἐνός σμ. D
14 οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν) οὐτε D (οὐκ P <sup>a</sup> , οὐ τῶν q, σμ. u)		16 ἡ τὸ ἀνθρώπος) τῶν - u	
†34 δῆ] δεῖ DuP	133 <sup>3</sup> 3 οὐδ' DuP	10 καθὼ DuP	†10 αὐτοῖ
DuPq	21 ὑπ. κ. ἀνθρ. transp. DuP	*22 πολλὰ τοιαῦτα Duqf	†22-24 τὸ - εἶτι δὲ
DuPqA <sup>a</sup>	†31 ἕτερον DuPa <sup>a</sup>	†32 ταῦτον σμ. uPqA	†32 λαβάνων. σμ. DuPaA
*134 <sup>1</sup> ἔστι DuPa <sup>a</sup>	8 εἰναι σμ. Du	*15 καὶ σμ. DuPf	*16 σημαίνει DuPf
17 ἰδ. ἀνθρ. transp. DuP	†26 ἰδ. DuP	36 ἀμαρτάνουσιν uq	134 <sup>8</sup> οἶον + νῦν
DPf	9 ἐκείνου D	*13 ἀποδοθεῖ DPf, - ἦ u	13 καθότι DP
14 ἰδ. + τὸ ἀποδοθέν f	15 ἰδ. + καὶ Df	16 ἔχοντι + καὶ Df	14 ἔστιν DP
σμ. DuPf	24 ὁπάρξει DP	29 ᾧ εἰναι post φῶς DP	29 ἔκαστος + δ' DP
σμ. DP	†30 δεῖ + ὅταν DP	†135 <sup>3</sup> 3 τοῖσι σμ. DP	4 τοῦ + ἀπλῶς πρὸς καὶ q, +

πυρ. ἀπλ. κ. u 4 ταὐτὸ τοῦτο] τὸ τοιοῦτον D 14 ἀν+οὖν D 15 μὲν om. D 22  
 εἰ om. D 28 ἐπεὶ om. DuCf 135<sup>b1</sup> μὲν om. Du 2 ἐστὶ δ'] ἐστὶν Du 5 ἰδ.<sup>1</sup>+  
 καὶ DPf 5 γῆς<sup>1</sup>+κατὰ τὸ σύμπααν Duf 15 καὶ τὸ γῆν εἶναι om. Duf 10-11 τὸ  
 βέλτιστον τῷ χειρίστῳ D 13 γὰρ om. D 18 οὐδὲ+γὰρ DP 23 γὰρ om. Df 24-25  
 τὸ δὲ ἐν πρὸς δύο om. DuP 27 τρίτον+δ' D 29 δὲ om. Duf 31 ἐστ. ἰδ. transp. Du  
 136<sup>a7</sup> γ] καὶ D 8 ἐστ. ἰδ. D 10 ἐστὶν om. Df 11 αὐτ. ἰδ. transp. DuCA 12 ἰδ.  
 ἐστ. transp. D 14 ἦ+καὶ D 15 ἐξ] καθ' DPfA 17 εἰ δ' om. Df 20 ἰδ. εἴη transp. D  
 transp. D 26 ἐστὶν ἰδ. transp. D 27 ἰδ. φαν. transp. D 28 ἰδ. φαν. transp. D 32  
 ἀπόφ.+ἐστὶν DufA 33 ἰδ.+ἐστὶν uFA 33 οὐκ—ζῶον] τοῦ μὴ ζῶον οὐκ ἔσται D  
 136<sup>b3</sup> δ' om. D 4 μηδὲν] τι Du 6 κεῖται+εἶναι Df 6 ἄλλων+θηγῶν DuPc(f)B 2  
 8 οἰοῦν+τὸ ληφθέν f (post ἐστὶν Du) 12 ἀρετὴν+εἶναι DPcA 16 ἰδ. εἴη transp. D  
 24 προτέρων f 34 γὰρ om. D 36 οὐκοδ. post οικ. D 137<sup>a1</sup> οὐδ' D 5 εὐεξ.+  
 εἶναι Df 6 εἶναι bis om. D 6 ἰδ. ἀν εἴη καὶ D 11 ἰδ.+τοῦτον οὐκ Du (+οὐκ q)  
 †12 καὶ] ἰδίων Du \*15 φρον.] αὐτῆς Df 19 ὁ τόπ. οὐτ. transp. et ἐστὶ om. D 29  
 πρὸς<sup>2</sup> om. D 31 ἐστὶ om. D 32 ἰδ. ante κατὰ D 32 αὐτὸ] τὸ εἶναι Df 34 τοῦτο]  
 τὸ φθείρεσθαι D 137<sup>b2</sup> πρὸς om. D †2 τὸ γίγν. αὐτὰ] τὰ DuCA 10 μὴ om. D  
 12 ζῶον D †25 εἴη ἀν DuCA 26 δὴ om. D 28 δὴ] δὲ Duq †29 ἰδ.+οὐδὲ—  
 τοῦ ἥττον D (+οὐδὲ—τοῦ μᾶλλον u) 33 εἴη ἰδ. transp. Du 34 ἐστ. τοῦ ἀπλ. D  
 138<sup>a4</sup>-5 μὴ ἐστὶ τ. μᾶλλ. transp. D 7 ἰδ. ζῶον transp. D 11 ἰδ. ἀνθρ. transp. D 12  
 ἰδ. τοῦ ζῶου D 14 ἰδ.<sup>1</sup> om. D 21 δ' om. Du 23 ἰδ. τοῦ ζῶου transp. D 32 ἰδ.<sup>3</sup>  
 om. D 36 τοῦτον ἐστὶ transp. D 37 ἐστὶ om. D 37 καὶ γὰρ transp. D 138<sup>b1</sup>  
 ἰδὸν ἐστὶν ἰδίων τοῦτου D 2, 3, 4 ἰδ. om. D †6 δευτέρων+δ' DuCA †7 αὐτοῦ om.  
 Duq 11 αὐτοῦ ὃν bis transp. Df 13-14 ἰδ. ψυχῆς transp. D 15 μέρους D 20  
 ἀνθρ. ἰδ. transp. D 22 οὐδὲν] οὐκ ante ἐστὶ D 25 τῇ+μόνον D 25 τῇ] τῷ D  
 29 ὑπάρχ. post ὄντι D 32 ἰδ. om. Df 33 οἶον] ὁ D 36 τότε om. D 139<sup>a</sup> 13  
 ὑπάρξει DCf.

TOP. 6. 1-5. 139<sup>a24</sup> ἐστὶ πέντε transp. DuCPcf 139<sup>b24</sup> εἰ<sup>2</sup> om. DuCPq 25 τε]  
 γὰρ P 32 εἰ<sup>2</sup> om. DP †33 τιθῆναι DuC 36 ὥς+οὐ D \*140<sup>a13</sup> κυρίως<sup>1</sup> om.  
 DuCPcf \*16 ὁσοῦν DuCPcf \*30 χωρίζε+ἀπὸ DuCPcf 140<sup>b2</sup> δὲ+ἐστὶ  
 uCf 5 ὁποτέρως DCf 6 δ'] οὖν D 7 ὅτι om. DP(u) 11 καὶ τοῦτο om. DPf  
 †11 καὶ ἄλλο τι transp. DuCPq 16 ἐτι] ἦ D 20 ὅλος+ὁ λόγος DuC(P) †29 ἐστὶ  
 DuCPq †29 ὅρος τῆς ἐπιθυμίας DuCq †31 ἐστὶ DC \*141<sup>a4</sup> οἶον εἰ om. ucq  
 (εἰ om. DC) †17 ὥστε—δίκαιον DCqu<sup>2</sup> (περιττόν—δίκαιον u<sup>1</sup>) \*18 ὥστε καθ.] καθ.  
 γὰρ DuCcf 23 καλῶς+ὥρισται DuCPcf 24 ὥρ. κ. εἴρ. transp. DuCPcf 26  
 μὲν+οὖν DCP 31 φαν.+οὖν DP 31-32 δὲ μὴ] γὰρ ὥρισται DuC 33 γνωριμ.+  
 ἐτι DCP †35 ἐκάστω DuCPq 141<sup>b4</sup> εἰ<sup>2</sup> om. DufC 4 εἰ<sup>2</sup> om. DuPfi 11-12  
 γραμμῇ δὲ σημ. om. D 12 μᾶλλον—γὰρ] διὸ οἱ πολλοὶ μᾶλλον (διὸ μᾶλλον οἱ πολλοὶ DuC  
 (P)cf) 12 γνωρ. DuCcf 19 ὁρισμοὶ DP 20 ὁ bis om. Du 22 περ. φασ. transp.  
 DuCc \*25 γνωρ.<sup>1</sup>+ὄν u 29 δὲ om. u 31 καὶ<sup>2</sup> om. C \*35 ἐκάστοις uCcfB<sup>2</sup>  
 142<sup>a1</sup> ἐκάστω Du 1 γνωριμωτάτων DuCc 2 χρῆ] δὲ ante ποιεῖσθαι Duc (ante τὸν C)  
 3 μὲν+γὰρ DuCc 10 ἐστὶν et τὸ om. P 12 ἐκαστον Du \*17 τόπος DCPq (cf.  
 142<sup>b20</sup>) 19 ἄλλος (ἄλλο u)+δὲ Du 20 ἡμῖν om. Dufq 20 πρ. γὰρ+καὶ γνωριμω-  
 τέρων P (πρ. γὰρ γνωρ. D, γνωρ. γὰρ κ. πρ. Cf) 23 οἶον+εἰ DuCq 29 τὸ εἶν. ταῦτ.  
 transp. Dufq 29 τῷ] τὸ PA<sup>1</sup> 32 αὐτ.+καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων DuCf 142<sup>b1</sup> χρωμ.+  
 καὶ DuCpc 2 ὅπ. φωρ.] πρὸς τὸ φωρᾶσθαι DuCcfB 4-5 ὑπὲρ γῆς om. Df 20  
 τόπος DuCP 22 δεῦτ.+δὲ DuCpf †24 ἐστὶν C 143<sup>a3</sup> ὅγ. . . νός. transp.  
 DuCc 12 οἰκ.+αὐτοῦ DuCc 13 περὶ] πρὸς Du 15 ὁ om. Du 18 ἐκάστω DP  
 20 θείναι+nam qui virtutem dixit et habitum dixit.

EL. †165<sup>a1</sup> λέγειν uCTA 2 τι ἐξ ἀν. transp. i \*2 διὰ τῶν κειμ. om. DuCTcfA  
 24 ἐν<sup>1</sup> om. Cl<sup>1</sup> 32 γένος λόγων transp. D †165<sup>b2</sup> οὐκ DuCiA \*8 συλλ. ἦ φαν.  
 om. (συλλ. ἦ om. Dc) \*166<sup>a4</sup> ὅ] οὐ 13 γὰρ+ἐστὶ uTc 13 καὶ om. Ci 20  
 ἐπιστάσθαι C †166<sup>b15</sup> τὸ . . . τῶν transp. DuCTiAB †28 παραλ. DuCTiA  
 29 πραγμ.+τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ C 32 ὑπάρχ.+πάντα γὰρ οὕτως ἔσται ταῦτα uCTcf 167<sup>a7</sup>  
 τὸ δ' om. DuCTcf 22 ἄλλᾱ om. i 23 γὰρ+ἐστὶν DuCTc 30 οὐ διπλάσιον D  
 167<sup>b28</sup> γέν.+ἐναντίον DCc †37 τῶν om. uCTiA 168<sup>a19</sup> ποιησαμένους u 21  
 ἀσπλόν.] inmodificati †168<sup>b24</sup> αἷτια τοῦ om. DuTi 31 ἐνί+καὶ DuTc 169<sup>a2</sup>  
 λαμβάνει uCTcf †7 ἡμᾶς τὸν DuCTiA 11 μία+μόνη uC †24 καὶ τὸ δν DuCTiA  
 37 τόπος 169<sup>b7</sup> ἐτι+δὲ uCTci †11 προσσημαίνον CTiA †12 πῶς uCiA  
 22 δὲ<sup>2</sup>+οὐκ 31 συλλογίζεσθαι D 170<sup>a2</sup> μὴ om. uC<sup>1</sup> †9 δ' om. uCTA †10  
 παρ' ὅσα DuCT(i)A 19 τοῦδε] τὰ λοιπὰ T 30 ἀν εἰεν DC 170<sup>b13</sup> λόγ. ἐτέρ.]  
 τοὺς T 20 δὲ T 24 ἐστὶν DuT †171<sup>a3</sup> συλλογισμοὶ uTA<sup>2</sup>B<sup>2</sup>C<sup>2</sup> 19 διδόντα

DC	34	ἐπειτα	35	παθεῖν (ποιεῖν T) + ἢ (καὶ D) ποιεῖν ὡς D	171 <sup>b5</sup>	τις + διδ
περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖ καὶ DuCT	10	ἢ τὸ συμπ. transp. T	†11	ἐκάστων CTA	16	
εἰ + γὰρ	37	παρὰλ. + καθάπερ DuC	37	γεωμετρικῇ(?) -κόν CcT	†172 <sup>a36</sup>	καὶ
DuCH	172 <sup>b1</sup>	οἷας ui	5	τόποι	25	τρόπος
14 παράδοξον Dui	33	ἐδείξαμεν vel δεδείχαμεν(?)	36	ἐστὶν + διπλάσιον C	37	δι-
DuPC(f)B <sup>a</sup>	173 <sup>b1</sup>	πάντες om.	†16	ταυτὸ εἶναι DuT	21	τοῖς πολλοῖς
174 <sup>a20</sup> ἐτι ἐστι D	40-174 <sup>b1</sup>	χρῆ παραβ. transp. C	175 <sup>a8</sup>	εἰ 20 τε om. u	23-	
25 ἐπὶ τῶν λόγ. . . ἐν τοῖς ἄλλ. transp.	175 <sup>b10</sup>	ἐγίνετο ἂν ἀνάγκη	†176 <sup>a7</sup>	εἰ		
DuTiAC <sup>3</sup>	†28	πάντως DCA	†176 <sup>b20</sup>	ἢ om. DuT	31	λέγ.] γίνεταί DT
DuPC(f)B <sup>a</sup>	177 <sup>a8</sup>	ρέδιον uT	†30	συνεπ. om. DuCTA	38	κάκ] καὶ DuT
DuCiA	†8	ποσῶν DuCTiA	†178 <sup>b30</sup>	βραδὺ DuCiA	34	εὐρ. ἢ μαθ. transp. u
*179 <sup>b22</sup> ἀλλ' οὐκ] οὐ γὰρ Dc	180 <sup>a18</sup>	ἀμα + δ' D	39	δ' γὰρ u	181 <sup>b4</sup>	
†182 <sup>a1</sup> σημαίνει	*14-15	αὐτῶν ταυτὰ ἄλλων αὐτὰ	19	οὐτοί + οἱ λόγοι u	39	ὁμοίως
ἀμφω post καὶ καθ.—πτωχ. (om. 20 καὶ τὸν ὀνόμ.)	†34	οἱ] ἢ DuCiAB <sup>a</sup>	39	ὁμοίως		
183 <sup>a9</sup> ἐστὶν om. D	31	ἐτι + δὲ DuCci	†183 <sup>b9</sup>	καὶ ἐκ ποίων om. DuCA	184 <sup>b6</sup>	
ὡμὸν A <sup>a</sup> B <sup>a</sup> C <sup>a</sup> .						

At least one manuscript of Boethius' translation of *Top.*, cod. Assisi Bibl. Comun. 658 of the late thirteenth century,<sup>1</sup> contains on the margins and between the lines a considerable number of readings preceded by 'alia translatio'. In several instances both the common reading found in the course of the full text and that of the 'alia translatio' presuppose the Greek text independently, e.g. ('alia translatio' in *italics*):

100 <sup>a18</sup> μέθοδον methodum: <i>viam</i>	100 <sup>b29-30</sup> τοῖς καὶ μικρὰ συνορᾶν δυναμένοις etiam
eis qui parva videre possunt: <i>et parum intelligere valentibus</i>	101 <sup>a13-14</sup> ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων ex
convenientibus: <i>ex propriis</i>	102 <sup>a24</sup> τύχη forsitan: <i>contingat</i>
χωρὶς proponentes extra: <i>seorsum supponentes</i>	107 <sup>a7</sup> σώφρονα castam: <i>sobriam</i>
11 τὰ ἀφ' ἐκατέρας συμβαλόντα τῆς ὑποθέσεως que utrimque accidit dicere ex hypothesi:	103 <sup>b10-</sup>
<i>utrimque convenientia</i> [in MS. <i>utramque convenientiam</i> ] <i>hypoteses</i>	20 ὅρων εὐπορεῖν terminorum
idoneum esse: <i>terminis habundare</i>	33 εὐπορήσας idoneum esse: <i>facultatem habere</i>
ποιηρολογίαν laboriosum sermonem: <i>vitiosam verborisalem</i>	14 ἀπείχεσθαι τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι
ἀγωνιστικῶς abstinere a disputatione certatoria: <i>abstinere disputationis sophisticæ</i>	

We have examined all the passages marked 'alia translatio' in book 1 as far as 107<sup>b1</sup> and in book 8, passages ranging in extent from one to twenty-five words. Only in three cases out of seventy the two texts clearly presuppose different Greek readings recorded by Waitz:

105 <sup>a21</sup> διωρίσθω ABCDu determinentur: διηρήσθω Pf <i>divisa sint</i> [MS. <i>sunt</i> ]	163 <sup>b27</sup> ἐν
τοῖς λόγοις ABD in orationibus: τοὺς λόγους Cuq <i>orationes</i>	164 <sup>a8</sup> πλείονων Af pluribus:
κοινῶν CDu <i>communibus</i> : πλείονων κοινῶν B.	

In four more cases the differences between the two Latin texts and corresponding differences between Greek readings recorded by Waitz are too small to allow any inference to be drawn as to the relation between the Greek and the Latin tradition:

104 <sup>b5</sup> αὐτοῖς ABPu eisdem: αὐτοῖς CD <i>sibi ipsis</i>	158 <sup>a28</sup> ἢ ABDuq aut: om. C <i>et alia</i>
transl.	162 <sup>a25</sup> ἐνὸν ABCq quod inest: ἐνδεχόμενον Du <i>quod possibile</i> (in this case the second rendering can well correspond to ἐνόν)
163 <sup>b20</sup> ἐτι A amplius: ἐτι τε BCDqu	
<i>amplius et.</i>	

<sup>1</sup> Two other MSS. are mentioned in *Arist. Lat. Cod.* i, 12, 47, 120 as containing these readings; the large sections of one of them, Charleville 250, which we have exam-

ined do not contain any quotation from the 'alia translatio'. The passages quoted at p. 120 have been transcribed from the MS. very carelessly.

In some instances one of the Latin texts seems to imply a Greek reading not recorded by Waitz:

107<sup>a</sup>11 μέτριον . . . μέτριον *codd. mediocri . . . mediocre: μέτρον . . . μέτρον(?) mensura . . . mensura*  
 158<sup>b</sup>32 γραμμῆν *codd. lineam: ἐπίπεδον(?) planum* 162<sup>b</sup>4-5 καλεῖται δὲ  
 φαίνόμενος ἐριστικῶν συλλογισμὸς(?) *vocatur autem apparens litigiosorum syllogismus: δ*  
*καλεῖται ἐριστικός συλλογισμός (συλλογ. ἐριστ. D) codd.: quod appellatur syllogismus contentiosus.*

One of the readings of the 'alia translatio' which implies a recorded Greek text different from that underlying the received Boethian text appears as an alternative reading in the oldest Latin manuscript (early twelfth century):

162<sup>a</sup>20 τοῦ ἑτέρου A<sup>2</sup>D: ἑκατέρου *cett.: altero (vel utroque add. marg. saec. xii<sup>o</sup> in., cod. Trin. 47): utroque.*

This seems to suggest that at least some of the readings of the 'alia translatio' were alternative readings found in Boethius' translation itself. There are several examples of such readings in his versions of the *De Interpr.*, *Top.*, and *El.* which need not have any other source but the translator's uncertainty on the best way of rendering one Greek word; it is not unlikely that he had, in some cases, a choice between two Greek readings, and passed on the choice to the Latin reader.

Variations of the same kind as those which we have just examined also occur in the text of *Top.* as it appears in different Latin manuscripts. Among the differences which we noticed between the texts contained in cod. Oxf. Trin. Coll. 47 and Oxf. Ball. Coll. 253, the following two are clearly due to different Greek readings recorded by Waitz (the readings of the Ball. MS. are in *italics*):

100<sup>b</sup>27 τῶν λεγομένων ABCDu eorum quae dicuntur: τῶν φαινομένων P eorum quae videntur  
 119<sup>b</sup>6 κακόν C malum: ἀγαθόν ABDPu bonum.

In about forty other instances smaller divergences in the Latin texts correspond to divergences in the Greek text; e.g.:

102<sup>b</sup>23 τότε ποτὲ u tunc quando: τότε ABCDP tunc 105<sup>b</sup>26 τῶν εἰρημένων C earum  
 quae dictae sunt: τῶν προεξημένων ABDPu earum quae praedictae sunt 117<sup>a</sup>24 ἀντίος  
 BCDP intristitia: + μάλλον Au + magis 118<sup>a</sup>25 δυσφοροῦντι ABDPu graviter ferenti:  
 -οὔσι C -ibus 132<sup>a</sup>28 οἷον DPu ut: ἢ ABq aut 133<sup>b</sup>3 ἴδιον δὲ DPu semper pro-  
 prium: ἴδιον ABq proprium 154<sup>b</sup>24 κατασκευάζοντι C construenti: -ειν ABDNqu -ete.

The following double reading in cod. Trin. Coll. is of the same kind as that quoted above (162<sup>a</sup>20 τοῦ ἑτέρου—ἑκατέρου):

116<sup>b</sup>9 ὑγιάζεσθαι AB<sup>2</sup>Pu: γυμνάζεσθαι B<sup>1</sup>CD: sanum fieri (vel exercitari *add. marg.*): sanum fieri.

It may be suggested that the readings of *Top.* mentioned so far as evidence of a limited variety in the Latin tradition have all a common source, and that this source is again Boethius; that either two slightly different editions of his translation have survived the dark ages, or one copy carried many signs of his work as a reviser of his own translation. If this is not so, the few variants interesting for the tradition of the Greek text which are found in the 'alia translatio' must be in any case older than the end of the thirteenth century, when the Assisi manuscript was written; the others cannot be later than the middle of the thirteenth century (date of the Balliol manuscript).

The Latin text of *El.* is far from uniform in the various manuscripts which we have examined.<sup>1</sup> The oldest among them, cod. Chartres 498, seems to give it in the purest Boethian form. The second oldest, cod. Ambros. I. 195 inf., agrees on the whole with the former, but differs from it in a large number of words and phrases in chapter 12 (172<sup>b</sup>9-173<sup>a</sup>30), and in several details here and there. The differences cannot be explained unless one supposes that both texts derive from the Greek independently of each other, at least in a number of readings. Readings which differ in a similar way from those given by cod. Chartres 498 and by many other manuscripts, including Ambros. I. 195 inf., are found in cod. Avranches 228 of the middle of the thirteenth century;<sup>2</sup> others are found in cod. Laurent. S. Croce XI sin. 9 and, partly, in cod. Cambridge Trin. Coll. O.7.9. In a few instances some of the anomalous readings are found in more than one of these manuscripts. Cod. Assisi Bibl. Comun. 658—the same which contains phrases from the 'alia translatio' of *Top.*—contains a dozen short passages marked again 'alia translatio' on the margins of *El.* The vocabulary of all these passages and readings, in the various manuscripts just considered, seems to be uniform, and uniformly different from that customary for Boethius. Moreover it seems to agree consistently with the vocabulary used by James of Venice in his translations. In this, the different texts of *El.* distinguish themselves clearly from those of *Top.*, where the vocabulary of the basic text and of the 'alia translatio' is always consistent with that of Boethius, and never with that of James. It can be, therefore, suggested that the anomalous texts of *El.* are the result of various contaminations between Boethius' text and a new translation, or a revised version, by James of Venice.<sup>3</sup> But the material which we have been able to collect for *El.* has not yielded sufficient elements to show discrepancies between the Greek texts underlying Boethius' version and James's revision or new translation.

William of Moerbeke (d. 1286) revised Boethius' translation of *El.*, using a quite pure copy of this version and correcting it with the help of one or more Greek manuscripts.<sup>4</sup> His revised text is preserved in cod. Paris. Bibl. Nat. lat. 16080 of c. A.D. 1300. It is not a very accurate work: obscurities, even mistakes—due both to Boethius and to the tradition of Boethius' text—are left unchanged. William has left his mark in many passages by altering minor details to suit his vocabulary and method of translating, but in many other passages he has left the Boethian characteristics intact. Thus he has not restored Homer's examples instead of the Ovid and Virgil substitutes; but he has translated in his very literal way the examples which Boethius had left untranslated, because they could not be latinized, at 173<sup>b</sup>39-174<sup>a</sup>4.<sup>5</sup> His text, therefore, does not

<sup>1</sup> For further details on the various texts of *El.* discussed here see 'Note . . . ix' in *Riv. di Filos. Neo-Scol.* xlv (1954), 223-9.

<sup>2</sup> Some of the peculiar readings of cod. Avranches 228 had already been noticed by B. Geyer, 'Die alt. lat. Übersetzn d. arist. Anal., Top. u. El.', *Philos. Jahrb. d. Görres-Ges.* xxx (1917), 33-34; he gives the number of the MS. as 227.

<sup>3</sup> It is possible that a few words quoted in the Berlin MS. mentioned above (p. 108, n. 2) belong to the lost translation or revision by

James (cf. our 'Note . . . vi', 411).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. 'Note . . . vi', 405-8.

<sup>5</sup> 'Et in dictis quidem vasis, habentibus autem feminini aut masculini declinationem. Quaecumque enim in .o. et .n. terminantur, hec sola vasis habent declinationem, puta xylon id est lignum, skhoinion id est tabernaculum. Que autem non sic, feminini aut masculini, quorum quedam ferimus ad vasa, puta ascos id est uter quidem masculinum nomen, klini autem id est lectus, feminini.'

reflect in all its details the Greek copy or copies which he had at his disposal. In a few passages it is, however, possible to recognize differences between his and Boethius' Greek original. In the first half of the work—the only part we have examined for this purpose—the following different readings (those in *italics* belong to the *revision*) correspond to readings recorded by Waitz; with two exceptions, William's new readings are also found in *u*:

165<sup>b</sup>8 μὴ ὄντων δὲ συλλογιστικοὶ non sunt autem syllogizant: + ἡ φαινόμενοι συλλογιστικοὶ Bu (cf. ACDTf) + aut apparentes syllogizantive sunt<sup>1</sup> 9 τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν ABCDT demonstrativis: τῶν διδασκαλικῶν καὶ ἀποδ. cu doctrinativis et dem. 166<sup>b</sup>14 ποιεῖν ABCDi facere: ποιοῦν faciens Tu 32 οἶον ABD ut: ὥσπερ (οἶόν CTfi) φασιν οἱ σοφισταί, οἶον (οἶον om. Cfii) CTcfiu ut aiunt sophiste puta 167<sup>b</sup>25 πρὸς BC ad: πρὸ τοῦ συμπεράσματος A<sup>2</sup>DTciu ante conclusionem 168<sup>a</sup>8 πάντα AB omnia: πάντα ταῦτα CD: ταῦτα πάντα u omnia hec 170<sup>b</sup>2 συμβαῖνον c<sup>u</sup> accidere: μὴ συμβαῖνον ABCDTiu<sup>2</sup> non eveniens 19 τὰ λοιπὰ T reliqua: τοῦδε ABCDiu hunc 170<sup>b</sup>19 ἐφ' ὃ ABC<sup>1</sup> ad quod: ἐφ' ᾧ C<sup>2</sup>DTu in quo 171<sup>a</sup>9 δοῦναι ABC<sup>1</sup>Du dare: δοῖν ἂν T (δοῖν C<sup>2</sup>) dabit utique 35 παθεῖν ABCu: pati vel facere: παθεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν D: ποιεῖν T facere.

Lefèvre's revision of the Boethian text (A.D. 1502)<sup>2</sup> is again based on one or more Greek texts. One of these must have been the recent 'editio princeps' whose publisher was a friend of Lefèvre's; at least some of his corrections are based on readings accepted in the Aldine edition (e.g. 165<sup>a</sup>1 ὥστε συνάγειν = ut colligamus; Boethius had ὥστε λέγειν = ut dicatur; 2 διὰ τῶν κειμένων = per ea quae posita sunt, omitted by Boethius with ACTcfiu). But the interest of this revision for the historian of the Aristotelian text lies mainly in the fact that, by a curious editorial accident, it came to be known as Boethius' translation, although the non-revised and genuine text had been anonymous for several centuries. Buhle and, following him, Waitz and Strache took their evidence for the Boethian text from Lefèvre's revision as it appeared in the editions of Boethius' *Opera Omnia* since A.D. 1546. The following is a list of Greek readings *wrongly* ascribed by Strache to Boethius in the first two Bekker pages of *El.*, and belonging, at best, to the Greek original of Lefèvre's revision (more than half the 'Boethian' readings quoted by Strache in *El.* and many in *Top.* are wrong for the same reason):

165<sup>a</sup>2 διὰ τῶν κειμένων 5 ἐστὶ om. 32 τι om. 165<sup>b</sup>6 δὲ om. 6 determinandum est (this variant of 'determinatum est' appears only in Migne's reprint of Lefèvre's text) 7-8 μὴ—ἢ om. 13 ταῦτα πέντε 20 δὲ om. 166<sup>a</sup>3 ὅτι om. 13 τοῦς λέγοντας 15 ἢ om. 16 ἢ 18 ἐπίστασθαι 28 significabit 166<sup>b</sup>4 ἀτόπως εἰρηκότα 20 τῶν τρόπων om. 26 τὸ τὸ 32 οἶον φασιν οἱ σοφισταί 32 ἕτερος 37 λέγεσθαι om.

Oxford

L. MINIO-PALUELLO

<sup>1</sup> The reading of *A* is not recorded as an independent reading by Waitz; but it seems probable that ἡ φαινόμενοι συλλογιστικοὶ was a gloss written between the lines, that in some manuscripts it has been added as a part of the text, and that in others it has supplanted a section of the phrase which it was meant to explain; Boethius may, in this instance, preserve alone the right text.

<sup>2</sup> On this revision, and on the way in which it came to be accepted as Boethius' translation, see 'Note . . . vi', 408-11. On Buhle's, Waitz's, and Strache's use of it see 'The Text of the *Cat.*' 71. The actual Boethian translation is quoted several times by these editors—from a corrupt text—as a translation by an unknown scholar (Strache's siglum 'tr').



## A NOTE ON THE METRICAL SCHOLIA TO THE *AGAMEMNON*

METRICAL scholia to the *Agamemnon* appear in the manuscripts commonly called F (Laurentianus XXXI. 8) and Tr (Farnesianus Neapolitanus II F 31)—also in G (Venetus Marcianus 663), but these are the same as some of those in F and are of interest only at one point (see below, C). In the lyrical passages these scholia are of two types, which I shall call 'long' and 'short'; Professor Eduard Fraenkel, who prints illustrative examples, has pointed out the distinction (*Aeschylus: Agamemnon*, 1950, i, pp. 16-21). 'Long' scholia give a comparatively full description of the metre of the passage to which they refer: they state adequately the number and order of the cola, classified according to the metrical system which Demetrius Triclinius learnt from Hephaestion's work. 'Short' scholia merely state briefly what types of cola occur, without saying where they occur in the lyric in question. Naturally different parts of the play offered different degrees of difficulty to the metrical analyst. Accordingly the 'long' and 'short' scholia take different forms; to Fraenkel's examples the following may be added: line 782 σύστημα ἐπιφθεγματικὸν μετὰ τὰς στροφάς καὶ ἀντιστροφάς εἰς δύο περιόδους διηρημένον κώλων ἀναπαιστικῶν κζ'. ὦν τὸ δεύτερον, τὸ πέμπτον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ εἰκοστὸν μονόμετρα, τὰ λοιπὰ δίμετρα ἀκατάληκτα, τὰ δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἀποθέσεσι τῶν περιόδων καταληκτικὰ ἤτοι ἐφθημιμερῇ. Tr. The corresponding 'short' scholion is a note in the right margin of F: ἀναπαιστικὰ κῶλα κζ'.

Fraenkel says that the metrical scholia in Tr are 'long' and those in F are 'short'; so he suggests that the latter are an abridgement of the former. His account of the distribution of the two types of scholia between the two manuscripts is incorrect. In the lyrical passages from the beginning of the play to line 1034, Tr has 'long' and F has 'short' scholia; but in those from line 1072 to the end F has 'long' and Tr has 'short' scholia. The following description will substantiate this second statement; the lines are numbered according to Fraenkel's edition.<sup>1</sup>

### A. 1072-1113

At line 1072 both manuscripts have similar general descriptions of the lyrical passage as a whole. That in F is marked with a cross, that in Tr with a cross and the word *ἡμέτερον*.

(i) At the beginning of each strophe (1072, 1080, 1090, 1100) F has a 'long' scholion marked with a cross, Tr has only a very brief note close to the left edge of the text; for example 1080 *ἑτέρα στροφή ἔχουσα κῶλα τρία, ὦν τὸ πρῶτον πενθιμιμερές, τὸ δεύτερον δίμετρον ἀκατάληκτον, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἰαμβικὸς στίχος τρίμετρος ἀκατάληκτος* F. *στροφή ἑτέρα* Tr. (In F the note at line 1072 on the strophe concludes that on the passage as a whole.)

(ii) At the beginning of each antistrophe (1076, 1085, 1095, 1107) F has a 'long' scholion marked with a cross and Tr has only a brief note close to the

<sup>1</sup> Photostats of those leaves of F and Tr which give the *Agamemnon* will be found in the Bodleian Library; I am grateful to the staff of the library for allowing me to use

them. These photostats were previously in the possession of Fraenkel, who kindly transferred them to the library.

left edge of the text, as in the case of the strophes. The note on line 1076 is missing from F, perhaps through an error of the copyist.

(iii) Where the chorus begins two iambic lines (1074, 1078, 1083, 1088, 1093, 1098, 1105, 1112) Tr has to the left of the text *σύστημα* and to the right *ἱαμβοί*; F has to the right *ἱαμβοί δύο*.

(iv) Also above six lines Tr has the word *ἱαμβος* (1082, 1087, 1092, 1097, 1102, 1109).

#### B. 1114-77

Both scholiasts hold that the words of Cassandra and those of the Chorus form two distinct metrical schemes.

(i) At the beginning of each of the short strophes (1114, 1136, 1156) and antistrophes (1125, 1146, 1167) sung by Cassandra, F has a 'long' scholion marked by a cross and Tr has only a brief note to the left of the text.

(ii) At the beginning of each of the passages sung by the Chorus (1119, 1130, 1140, 1150, 1162, 1173) Tr has a short note to the left of the text and calls each of these passages *σύστημα*. F has 'long' scholia marked with crosses to these lines; in F half of these passages (beginning at 1119, 1140, 1162) are called *στροφαὶ τοῦ χοροῦ* and half (1130, 1150, 1173) are correspondingly called *ἀντιστροφαὶ τοῦ χοροῦ*.

(iii) A note on the difference between A and B appears at line 1114 in F: *ἐντεῦθεν ἑτέρως ἐσχημάτισε τὸ μέτρον*; in Tr a comparable note appears at line 1119: *ἐντεῦθεν ἑτέρως ἐσχημάτισε τὰ τῶν συστημάτων κῶλα*.

(iv) Also Tr has *ἱαμβος* above two lines (1116, 1127) and *ἱαμβοί* above four (1138, 1148, 1160, 1171).

C. The description at line 1178 of the non-lyrical passage 1178-1330 is substantially the same in both manuscripts; the differences are merely of phraseology, except at one point. According to Tr an iambic dimeter occurs after the thirty-third colon, which is wrong; F gives the figure as thirty-six, which is right. However, G gives thirty-three. The agreement between G and Tr suggests that the reading of the hyparchetype of F and G was thirty-three, and that thirty-six in F is an alteration made by the scribe who wrote F; for similar cases in the text of the play see Fraenkel, *op. cit.* i, pp. 30-31. If Tr and the hyparchetype of F and G both gave the wrong figure thirty-three, one of them will probably have copied from the other.

D. At line 1407 Tr has a 'short' scholion, marked with a cross and the word *ἡμέτερον*, to describe lines 1407-11; F has a 'long' scholion, marked with a cross, to describe the same lines.

#### E. 1448-1576

Both manuscripts distinguish anapaestic and 'choriambic' passages here.

(i) At the beginning of each anapaestic passage (1462, 1475, 1489, 1497, 1513, 1521, 1537, 1551, 1567) F has a 'long' scholion marked with a cross; Tr has merely short notes close to the right and left edges of the text; for example 1462 *ἀναπαιστικά κῶλα ἕξ, ὧν τὸ δεύτερον μὲν μονόμετρον, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ δίμετρα ἀκατάληκτα, τὸ δὲ ἑκτὸν ἐφθήμερες* F. *ἀναπαιστικά κῶλα ἕξ, εἶτα παράγραφος* Tr (right). *σύστημα κατὰ περικοπὴν κῶλων ἕξ* Tr (left). The note on line 1489 is missing from F, perhaps through a copyist's error.

(ii) At the beginning of each 'choriambic' passage (1448, 1468, 1481, 1505, 1530, 1560) Tr has similar brief notes; F has fuller descriptions marked with crosses, though these scholia are not so informative as the 'long' scholia on the anapaests and those in A and D; for example at line 1468 F has *στροφὴ ἑτέρα κώλων χοριαμβικῶν ἑπτὰ*: εἰσι δὲ τὰ μὲν δίμετρα, τὰ δὲ τρίμετρα καταληκτικά καὶ βραχυκατάληκτα καὶ ἀκατάληκτα.

(iii) Tr says that the 'choriambic' passages 1505-12 and 1560-6 are antistrophes corresponding to the strophes 1481-8 and 1530-6 respectively; F in the scholion on line 1448 says that the 'choriambic' passages 'have no antistrophes'; but in the scholion on line 1560 F says that the passage 1560-6 'is likely to be' (*ἔοικε . . . εἶναι*) an antistrophe to the strophe 1530-66.

There are also metrical scholia at lines 1331, 1343, 1372, 1412, 1426, 1431, 1577, 1649; but these show no significant differences between the two manuscripts. As in the part of the play before line 1072, metrical signs, such as the paragraphus, and references to them in the scholia occur only in Tr.

Some conclusions follow. First, from line 1072 to the end of the play the metrical descriptions are much fuller in F than in Tr: F has many 'long' scholia, Tr has none; in the part of the play before line 1072 the distribution of 'long' and 'short' scholia between the two manuscripts was the opposite of this, as Fraenkel noticed. But, secondly, although the composer of one set of scholia may have used the other set, the 'short' scholia in Tr are no mere abridgement of the 'long' scholia in F. For the Tr-scholias disagree with the F scholias about strophic responsion (E (iii)) and about where to discern a change of metrical scheme (B (iii), cf. B (ii)); the Tr scholias has not merely abridged and copied pedantically, he has also thought independently about the metre. In any case, 'short' scholia are not necessarily an abridgement of 'long' scholia; they may be an earlier attempt to describe metres later described more successfully.

The text and scholia of Tr were written by Triclinius. Perhaps one may assume that the text and scholia copied in F come from a recension of the text and a set of scholia both composed by one man;<sup>1</sup> this is an assumption and it is implicitly denied by Fraenkel. If it is made, the facts just stated may have some bearing on the problem of the relationship between F and Tr. On this there are two views: Professor A. Turyn (*The Manuscript Tradition of the Tragedies of Aeschylus*, 1943, pp. 110 ff.) holds that F is copied (ultimately) from an earlier recension by Triclinius, who later wrote Tr as his second recension; Fraenkel (op. cit. i, pp. 11 ff.) has revived the view that F is a copy of a text independent of the editorial work of Triclinius. It is agreed that Tr is the work of Triclinius, and it should be noted that this 'edition' was intended

<sup>1</sup> There are differences of terminology between the F-scholia and the Tr-scholia. In particular, the term *εἰσθεσις* is used in F both before and after line 1072 (e.g. at lines 258, 489, 810, 1035, 1072, 1178, 1331, 1343, 1448, 1577, 1649) but not in Tr (it is used in the Tr-scholion on line 1 but in a different sense, that of 'the beginning of the play'); the terms *σύστημα* and *συστηματικά περίοδοι* occur in Tr both before and after line 1072 (e.g. at lines 1, 258, 355, 489, 681, 782, 810,

1035, 1072, 1078, 1098, 1119, 1162, 1448, 1513, 1537, 1567) but not in F. It might be inferred, first, that all the F-scholia were composed by the same scholar, and secondly, that they were either not composed by the Tr-scholias or composed by him at a different period from the Tr-scholia. But neither inference would be secure, for the manuscript F is a copy of an earlier recension and the terminological peculiarities may have been introduced by an intermediate copyist.

for a comparatively small public, perhaps for Triclinius' pupils; for his practice in his 'long' metrical scholia (e.g. that on line 367, quoted by Fraenkel, *op. cit.* i, p. 16) of urging the reader, who is addressed directly in the second person, to scan the verses indicates a much more intimate relation than that between a modern editor and his readers.

Either of two hypotheses will account for the distribution of the 'long' and 'short' metrical scholia. On Fraenkel's theory it must be supposed that Triclinius, in preparing his recension, gave a complete account of the metre as far as line 1071 but contented himself with a sketchy account for the rest of the play; and that later someone took the text from a non-Triclinian source, abridged Triclinius' metrical scholia as far as line 1071, but enlarged them for the rest of the play. On Turyn's theory it must be supposed that, in preparing his first recension, Triclinius composed a first draft of metrical scholia; that these merely gave an outline of the metre as far as line 1071, but for the rest of the play Triclinius already attempted a much more thorough account of the metre; and that, in preparing his second recension, he amplified his inadequate scholia up to line 1071 but was content, in the rest of the play, to abridge and modify what he had written before on the metre, because his first recension already offered an almost complete metrical account of this part of the play to his pupils. The second hypothesis has the merit of greater simplicity.

There may be more in favour of the second hypothesis. Fraenkel points out (pp. 27-28) that the F-scholia on line 1537 describes the colon  $\delta\pi\omega\tau\alpha\varsigma \dots \chi\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha\nu$  (line 1540) as an (anapaestic) catalectic dimeter; in the text of F the colon is a hephthemimeres, but in the text of Tr it has become an catalectic dimeter by a typically Triclinian emendation. Fraenkel holds that the text of F is pre-Triclinian but the scholia are Triclinian. But where does Fraenkel suppose that the copyist who wrote our manuscript F discovered Triclinius' colometry of lines 1537-50? He could not find it in Tr, for there the note on line 1537 is simply  $\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\pi\alpha\iota\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\alpha} \kappa\acute{\omega}\lambda\alpha \delta\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\alpha, \epsilon\iota\tau\alpha \pi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\gamma\rho\alpha\phi\omicron\varsigma$ . Since the F-scholia disagrees on colometry with the text, it was presumably written by someone who thought on metrical grounds that the F text of line 1540 was wrong. On Fraenkel's theory (that is, on the first hypothesis above), this would be a later scholar than Triclinius, perhaps a pupil of his; that is possible. Yet there was certainly one scholar who thought on metrical grounds that the F text of line 1540 was wrong, for he emended it later: that was Triclinius; it would be otiose to ask why he refrained from emending the line in making his first recension.

University College of North Wales, Bangor

RAPHAEL SEALEY

## TACITUS AND THE DEATH OF AUGUSTUS

TACITUS' use and adaptation of phrases from earlier Latin writers is well known. By this means he adds to his own context something of the atmosphere belonging to the context from which the phrase is borrowed. So, for example, when at *Ann.* 4. 1 he describes Seianus in language modelled on Sallust's description of Catiline (c. 5), the reader is immediately made aware that he is to expect Seianus to display the same resolute villainy that Catiline had shown.

A similar effect may be obtained—as it often is in Virgil—when the author echoes his own language to stress the parallelism between two passages. The resemblance between *Ann.* 1. 6. 1 'primum facinus noui principatus fuit Postumi Agrippae caedes' and 13. 1. 1 'prima nouo principatu mors Iunii Silani Proconsulis' has often been noted, and the anachronistic use at the end of *Ann.* 1. 5 of *Neronem* to describe Tiberius (the cognomen is strictly applicable only before Tiberius' adoption by Augustus in A.D. 4) is probably<sup>1</sup> employed to stress that the circumstances of Tiberius' accession were as dubious as those surrounding the accession of Nero. The parallelism of the incidents which Tacitus records in the two cases has been well brought out by M. P. Charlesworth:<sup>2</sup> 'The similarity is so great that it can scarcely be regarded as accidental; the reigning emperor (Augustus, Claudius) has been persuaded to adopt a stepson (Tiberius, Nero) as his heir: towards the end of his reign he appears to show signs of remorse and a desire to reinstate the dispossessed heir (Agrippa Postumus, Britannicus); the empress-mother (Livia, Agrippina the younger) is alarmed for the safety of the scheme for which she has so long planned, and decides to put her husband out of the way; the emperor dies suddenly, but the news of his death is kept concealed until the accession of the stepson has been made certain.' But not only is there this considerable resemblance between the incidents enumerated in either case: there is a much greater degree of verbal correspondence than has yet been noted. The correspondence can best be illustrated by the use of letters in brackets<sup>3</sup> to indicate the beginning and end of each group of words where there is a significant degree of parallelism in thought or language.

<(a) grauescere ualetudo Augusti (a)>, et quidam <(b) scelus uxoris suspectabant (b)>... neque satis conpertum est <(c) spirantem adhuc Augustum

<sup>1</sup> Professor C. O. Brink reminds me that Sörbom, *Variatio Sermonis Tacitei*, p. 4, among examples of *variatio* in the use of proper names, quotes *Ann.* 3. 56 *Tiberium Neronem—Neronem—Tiberius*. Similarly *Ann.* 1. 4-5 have *Tiberium Neronem—Tiberius—Neronem*. Since in the former case there is nothing more than a literary variation, it cannot be assumed without argument that *Neronem* in 1. 5 is anything more. But in 3. 56 the reference is to the tribunician power first conferred on Tiberius in 6 B.C.; there is thus no anachronism in the use of *Neronem* there. Similarly in 1. 3 *Nero*, used of Tiberius im-

mediately prior to his adoption by Augustus, is legitimate. *Neronem* in 1. 5 is different in being an anachronism (an unparalleled one, I think), and it is accordingly reasonable to believe that its employment in that passage is deliberate.

<sup>2</sup> Livia and Tanaquil: *C.R.* xli (1927), p. 55a.

<sup>3</sup> The letters (a), (c), (d) should be ignored for the present. They do not mark Tacitean parallels but represent correspondence between the versions of Tacitus and one or both of Suetonius and Dio Cassius; their significance is discussed later.

(c) . . . an <(e) *exanimem* (e)> (sc. Tiberius) (c) reppererit (c)>. <(f) *acribus namque custodiis domum et uias saepserat Livia* (f)>, <(g) *laetique interdum nuntii uulgabantur* (g)>, <(h) *donec prouisis quae tempus monebat* (h)> simul excessisse Augustum et <(i) *rerum potiri Neronem* (i)> fama eadem tulit. <(k) *primum facinus noui principatus fuit Postumi Agrippae caedes* (k)> (*Ann.* 1. 5-6).  
 tum <(b) *Agrippina sceleris olim certa* (b)> . . . de genere ueneni consultaui. . . . <(d) uocabatur interim senatus uotaque pro incolumitate principis consules et sacerdotes nuncupabant (d)>, cum iam <(e) *exanimis* (e)> uestibus et fomentis obtegeretur, <(h-i) *dum quae res forent firmando Neronis imperio componuntur* (h-i)>. iam primum <(f) *Agrippina . . . cunctos aditus custodiis clauserat* (f)>, <(g) *crebroque uulgabat ire in melius ualeitudinem principis* (g)> . . . <(k) *prima nouo principatu mors Iunii Silani* (k)> . . . (*Ann.* 12. 66-13. 1).

Tacitus' intention is unmistakable: it is to use the suggestive power of words to invest the accession of Tiberius with the same air of questionable legitimacy that attended Nero's accession and to stress how Tiberius, in just the same way as Nero, owed his position to the machinations of the emperor's widow. The purely fictitious nature of the allegations against Livia has been demonstrated in another paper by M. P. Charlesworth.<sup>1</sup> Of the episode the Cambridge Ancient History says, 'the malicious gossip retailed by Tacitus (*Ann.* 1. 15) and Dio (56. 31. 1) at Livia's expense is unworthy of mention'.

It is clear then that the factual ingredients of Tacitus' account of the *Tiberius* episode<sup>2</sup> derive principally from the account of *Nero's* accession (an account common to Tacitus, Suetonius, and Dio). But the borrowing of language is in the reverse direction, i.e. Tacitus' Nero passage depends upon what he had already written of Tiberius. It will not do, however, to leave the matter there, for it is well known that for much of the period under discussion<sup>3</sup> the three main authors (Tacitus, Suetonius, Dio) are dependent principally on the same literary source. Since the dependence on a common source extends at times to the reproduction of close verbal parallels, some attempt must be made to show whether the parallels that have been noted in the two passages from Tacitus are the work of Tacitus himself, or whether he is merely reproducing parallels that already existed in his source. In attempting to answer this question it will be convenient to take first the accounts in Suetonius and Dio of the Claudius-Agrippina-Nero episode: the letters in brackets indicate the themes corresponding to those similarly designated in the passage from Tacitus.

#### Suetonius, *Claudius* 44

prius igitur quam ultra progrediretur, <(b) praeuentus est ab Agrippina (b)> . . . et ueneno quidem occisum conuenit; ubi autem et per quem dato, discrepat. . . . <(e) mors eius (e)> celata est, <(h-i) donec circa

<sup>1</sup> Tiberius and the death of Augustus: *A. J. Ph.* xlii (1923), 145 f.

<sup>2</sup> Dio also, it will be seen, has the same basic story; it follows that the factual parallelism is not the creation of Tacitus, but goes back to the source that both he and Dio used.

<sup>3</sup> There are some differences of detail in

their account of the time and manner in which the poison was given to Claudius; for their significance cf. A. Momigliano, *Rendiconti d. R. Accad. Naz. d. Lincei*, Serie VI, vol. viii (1932), 293 f. But since Tacitus gives no details of the alleged poisoning of Augustus, this portion of the story does not concern us here.

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successorem omnia ordinarentur (h-i)). itaque et <(d) quasi pro aegro adhuc uota suscepta sunt (d)>, et inducti per simulationem comoedi, qui uelut desiderantem oblectarent.

The thought of (b) corresponds approximately to (b) in Tacitus, but is much nearer to Dio (b) (*vide infra*), with which it has a close verbal affinity. Items (e), (h-i), (d) are consecutive in Suetonius, as are (d), (e), (h-i) in Tacitus: Suetonius lacks items (f), (g), (k). The verbal correspondence between Tacitus (d), (h-i) and Suetonius (h-i), (d) is striking and must derive from their joint source. If it is allowed that (h) (i) in *Annals* 1 corresponds to (h-i) in *Annals* 12 (the correspondence may be disputed, but seems probable),<sup>1</sup> it follows that items (h) (i) in Tacitus' account of *Tiberius'* succession, like items (h-i) in *Ann.* 12, must derive from Tacitus' source for *Nero*. This would confirm the opinion of Charlesworth that Tacitus, when he wrote his account of the death of Augustus, was influenced by what he had already read about the actions of the younger Agrippina.

Dio 60. 34. 2; 61. 6. 4(-5)

<(b) ἡ Ἀγριππῖνα . . . αὐτὸν προκαταλαβεῖν φαρμάκῳ . . . ἐσπούδασεν (b)>.  
<(k) ἡ Ἀγριππῖνα οὕτω καὶ τὰ μέγιστα πράττειν ἐπεχειρεῖ ὥστε Μάρκον Ἰούλιον Σιλανὸν ἀπέκτεινε, πέμψασα αὐτῷ τοῦ φαρμάκου ὧ τὸν ἄνδρα ἐδεδολοφονήκει (k)>.

We have only Dio's epitome for the period, and he lacks items (d), (e), (h-i), (f), (g). The verbal resemblance between Suetonius (b) and Dio (b) has already been noted. Dio (k) records the circumstances surrounding Silanus' death, but without any verbal resemblance to Tacitus (k).

Next we may take the Augustus-Livia-Tiberius episode in both Suetonius and Dio.

Suetonius, *Augustus* 98; *Tiberius* 21-22

<(a) adgrauata ualetudine (a)> Tiberium diu secreto sermone detinuit. . . <(c) sed tamen spirantem adhuc Augustum repperit (c)> fuitque una secreto per totum diem. . . <(i?-k) excessum Augusti non prius palam fecit quam Agrippa iuvene interempto (i?-k)>.

Suetonius states unequivocally that Augustus was still alive when Tiberius reached him, and disdains to record the allegations that he was poisoned by Livia. Parallels with Tacitus are therefore necessarily confined to (a), (c),

<sup>1</sup> Since it is quite unlikely that the correspondence already existed in Tacitus' source(s) for the two reigns, there are two alternatives: (i) that the apparent correspondence is illusory, (ii) that the correspondence is of Tacitus' making. Exact parallelism between the two occasions is precluded by the fact that, whereas Tiberius' accession was effective from the time of the announcement from the house at Nola, the significant moment in Nero's case was his proclamation as *imperator* in the praetorian camp (*Ann.* 12. 69; cf. Ramsay's translation (vol. ii, p. 115,

footnote 3) for the increasing importance of the military in the appointment of a new emperor). In view of the difference in the circumstances, it may be argued that the degree of verbal correspondence is too great to be accidental. If *Neronem* in 1. 5 is deliberate (cf. p. 123, n. 1), an intentional correspondence between the two passages is perhaps made more likely. However, even if a resemblance between themes (h) and (i) in *Ann.* 1 and 12 is denied, it does not invalidate the other conclusions suggested in this paper.

(i?-k), but the verbal resemblance between (a) and (c) in the two authors is striking—the Tacitean phrase is given first in both cases) (a) *grauescere ualeitudo / adgrauata ualeitudine*, (c) *spirantem adhuc Augustum . . . reppererit / spirantem adhuc Augustum repperit*—and must surely derive from their common source. The correspondence of (i?-k) in Suetonius is debatable (*excessisse Augustum / excessum Augusti* scarcely clinches it). Suetonius has rejected the alternative that Augustus was dead before Tiberius arrived; but, having accepted the view that the announcement of the death *was* delayed, he requires a new motive for it, and finds it in the need to secure Agrippa's death first.

Dio 56. 30. 1; 31. 1; 57. 3. 5

⟨(a) ὁ δ' οὖν Αὐγουστος νοσήσας (a)⟩ μετήλλαξε. καὶ ⟨(b) τινα ὑποψίαν τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ ἢ Λιουία ἔλαβεν (b)⟩. ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τὸν Ἀγρίππαν κρύφα ἐς τὴν νῆσον διέπλευσε κ.τ.λ. . . . οὐ μέντοι καὶ ἐκφανῆς εὐθὺς ὁ θάνατος αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο. ἡ γὰρ Λιουία, φοβηθεῖσα μὴ τοῦ Τιβερίου ἐν τῇ Δελματία ἔτ' ὄντος νεωτερισθῇ τι, συνέκρυψεν αὐτὸν μέχρι οὗ ἀφίκετο. ταῦτα γὰρ οὕτω τοῖς τε πλείοσι καὶ τοῖς ἀξιοπιστοτέροις γέγραπται· εἰσὶ γὰρ τινες οἱ καὶ παραγενέσθαι τὸν Τιβέριον τῇ νόσῳ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπισκῆψαι τινὰς παρ' αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν ἔφασαν. . . . ⟨(k) τὸν μὲν γὰρ Ἀγρίππαν παραχρῆμα ἀπὸ τῆς Νώλης πέμψας τινὰ ἀπέκτεινε (k)⟩.

The main outline of the alternatives given in Tacitus (c) and (e) is covered by Dio (who alone has the full story of the alleged poisoning of Augustus by figs), and is therefore to be ascribed to their joint source, but Dio has no resemblance to Tacitus in vocabulary, turn of phrase, or grouping of incidents.

The comparison of the versions of both anecdotes in all three authors has shown that for the parallel items that he uses in *Annals* 1 and 12-13 Tacitus draws upon different sources. Among the probable sources three are specially worthy of note:

1. Items (b) [the empress-mother (Livia/Agrippina the younger) decides to poison her husband] and (k) [the deaths of Agrippa Postumus and Iunius Silanus] derive from the primary source, but (i) *scelus*, occurring in both Tacitean passages alone, is probably Tacitus' own choice of word. He has chosen it, however, not in order to draw attention to a specific correspondence between the two passages, but because of the general associations that the word bears for him—*scelus* is a favourite word of Tacitus for describing poisoning (cf. Furneaux on *Ann.* 1. 5); (ii) though the fact of Agrippa Postumus' death is recorded by all three authors, the verbal parallelism of *primum facinus noui principatus / prima nouo principatu mors* is in Tacitus alone. It is unquestionable that this is Tacitus' own touch and that it is designed specifically to stress the parallelism of the two situations.

2. Themes (h) (i) [the emperor's death (Augustus/Claudius) is concealed until all necessary steps have been taken to ensure the stepson's accession] may possibly in both *Annals* 1 and *Annals* 12 derive from the primary source for *Nero*. The significance that this hypothesis, if true, has for Tacitus' method of composition has been commented on above. The use of *Neronem* for Tiberius in item (i) of *Annals* 1 is probably due to Tacitus himself (see p. 123, n. 1).

3. There still remain two themes, (f) and (g) [the empress-mother barricades the house in which the dead emperor lies, and issues reassuring reports about his health], which recur in both passages of Tacitus and nowhere else. In both

passages they occur side by side,<sup>1</sup> coupled by *-que*. There can surely be little doubt that these two details are to be ascribed to Tacitus? They are the graphic, circumstantial details added to corroborate the rest of the story. One cannot be certain what suggested these two details to Tacitus' mind, but it is perhaps worth pointing out that precisely these two details are a conspicuous feature of Livy's account (1. 41) of the concealment of Tarquinius' death by Tanaquil.<sup>2</sup> The parallel is not a verbal one—the broader canvas that Livy allows himself for the episode makes that understandable—but the following extracts from Livy's narrative are worth noting:

Tanaquil inter tumultum claudi regiam iubet, arbitros eicit . . . iubet bono animo esse; sopitum fuisse regem subito ictu; . . . iam ad se redisse; . . . omnia salubria esse; confidere propediem ipsum eos uisuros.

Though there is, I think, no other case in Tacitus where verbal echoes and parallelism of incidents extend over so considerable a portion of continuous narrative, the method of composition in the two passages is basically that which Tacitus uses on many other occasions. Starting with a core of factual detail, he works it into a context where 'non-factual material'<sup>3</sup> establishes the emotional or moral tone that he wishes to evoke in the reader. At times—as, for instance, in much of the account of Nero's reign—the 'non-factual material' merely strengthens the impression that is already implicit in the facts themselves: but where the interpretation of the facts is obscure or does not automatically support the view that Tacitus wishes his reader to take, it is the function of the 'non-factual material' to ensure that the reader accepts Tacitus' interpretation of the events; this is particularly the case in *Annals* 1–6, where Tacitus' portrait of Tiberius' character depends less upon the record of his actions than upon the interpretation put upon them. Two of the three devices that Pippidi<sup>4</sup> mentions as being used by Tacitus in his portrayal of Tiberius' character are used in *Annals* 1. 5–6 init. The suggestion of Livia's responsibility for the death of Augustus is given merely as a rumour ('quidam scelus uxoris suspectabant. quippe rumor incesserat', etc.). But after the rumour has been given in oratio obliqua, Tacitus resumes with a telling phrase ('utcumque se ea res habuit') which serves as a 'gloss': its effect is 'I do not positively assert Livia's guilt, but her subsequent actions show that she was undeniably involved in the intrigue to secure Tiberius' succession'. The phrase *primum facinus* also functions as a 'gloss': it implies both that Agrippa Postumus' death was a crime for which the new régime was responsible, and that it was only the first of many such crimes.

Once the pattern had been built up for the Livia-Tiberius episode, it was a simple thing to make use of its incident and language when Tacitus came to write the account of Claudius' death and Nero's accession. The sequence of

<sup>1</sup> Whereas (h-i), which, it has been suggested (vide § 2 *supra*), have a different origin, are continuous with (f) and (g) in *Ann.* 1, but separated from them in *Ann.* 12.

<sup>2</sup> The parallel is already noted in Aurelius Victor, *de Caesaribus* 4. 15: 'ceterum funus [sc. Claudii], uti quondam in Prisco Tarquinio, diu occultatum, dum arte mulieris corrupti custodes aegrum simulant atque ab eo mandatam interim priuigno, quem paulo ante in liberos asciuerat, curam reipublicae.'

<sup>3</sup> The phrase is taken from B. Walker, *The Annals of Tacitus* (Manchester, 1952); see chapter iv, especially pp. 33–34, and chapter viii, p. 158.

<sup>4</sup> D. M. Pippidi, *Autour de Tibère*, Bucharest, 1944 (see the important review by J. P. V. D. Balsdon in *J.R.S.* xxxvi (1946), 168–73): the three devices are (i) general psychological affirmations—this does not concern us here, (ii) 'glosses' (*glosses, éclaircissements*), (iii) 'rumores'.

incidents corresponded closely—this is not surprising, since the Livia episode was probably first fabricated on the basis of the traditional account of Claudius' death; as a result much of the phraseology could be taken over from the earlier passage without losing its appropriateness to the context. Two points only need comment. Whereas the allegation of the poisoning of Augustus is quoted only as a rumour, in the case of Claudius Tacitus could state the poisoning as a fact, because it was universally believed to be so. In the second place, the barricading of the royal house and the issuing of reports of the (already dead) emperor's improving health, which Tacitus had added in *Annals* 1. 5 (probably, as we have seen, from Livy's account of Tarquinius and Tanaquil) as corroborative detail, is inserted also into the account of Claudius' death.

It would be unwise from two passages to try to draw far-reaching conclusions about Tacitus' method of composition, but about the passages themselves two general points are clear. First, although there is little in them that is entirely original, the material is drawn, not from one source only, but from several; here, at least, Tacitus does not observe 'Nissen's law'. Secondly, it is clear that, even if the probable sources of most of the material can be traced, the composite picture has a unity, bearing the imprint of Tacitus' own personality, that enables us significantly to describe the narrative as 'Tacitean'; by that word is meant something more than merely the narrative 'which Tacitus took over from the authors he copied'.

*University of Leeds*

R. H. MARTIN

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